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SUMMARY 
Social cash transfers (SCTs) are part of social protection instruments aimed 
at reducing poverty and vulnerability. SCTs are among the most evaluated 
social protection interventions. Most designs and much of the current 
evidence give limited attention to effects of SCTs on social capital. Greater 
attention has been devoted to economic and human capital outcomes. The 
purpose of this study was to explore and analyse the effects of Zimbabwe’s 
Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) on social capital in a rural and a 
peri-urban settlement. To achieve this, the study first identified and analysed 
design and operational features of the HSCT. The analysis drew from the 
perspectives and experiences of beneficiaries and other stakeholders.  
The study was based on a mixed methods design. The theoretical framework 
was informed by social capital and social network theories. 
The results confirm and in other cases contradict findings from previous 
research, and there are areas where new insights were found. The results 
indicate that HSCT’s features particularly targeting and selection methods, 
complementary services and the payment method have effects on social 
capital. 
Additionally, findings indicate that the HSCT affected a diverse set of social 
relations with positive effects on bonding and linking social capital. There are 
positive psychosocial effects, limited evidence on bridging social capital, and 
inconclusive results on collective action. The HSCT seems to strengthen trust 
between beneficiaries but has negative effects on social relations between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Social networks created through the 
HSCT are exclusionary. There were isolated cases of domestic violence in 
some households. The HSCT has unintended effects particularly the 
exclusion of some beneficiary households from access to other benefits; 
women’s empowerment; and social and economic risks to beneficiaries. 
Evidence from this study confirms that unconditional cash transfers go well 
beyond their primary goal of consumption smoothing, and have positive and 
vi 
 
negative effects on social capital. This provides a strong case for the design 
and implementation of SCTs to embed explicit objectives and strategies that 
promote the strengthening of social capital. There is greater need for 
collaborative efforts between economists, sociologists and anthropologists in 
the design and analysis of SCTs.  
Key words:  
Harmonised Social Cash Transfer; targeting; payment method; 
beneficiary; household; social relations; social capital; exclusion; trust; 
social network. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets the scene for the study that was undertaken; providing an 
account of development issues and challenges in Zimbabwe. A 
comprehensive review of contextual information surrounding and influencing 
the study is also presented. Many issues related to people’s well-being, socio-
economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe are presented. The issues 
combine to give a panoramic view, and useful background for understanding 
the context and rationale for social protection policy and cash transfer 
instruments in Zimbabwe.  
The nature of the research is outlined. The main problems that influence the 
research are formulated into a coherent statement that leads logically to the 
definition of the overarching aim of the research. The chapter then provides 
the specific objectives, research questions, importance of the study, and 
demarcation of the research. The chapter concludes with an outline of thesis 
and chapter contents. 
1.2 Socio-economic context 
Poverty, Human Immune Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(HIV and AIDS), climate-related shocks, decline of key economic and social 
indicators, food insecurity, political instability, the state’s inability to deliver the 
efficient and equitable public goods and basic services, and weak governance 
and public policy inconsistencies have all interacted with one another, 
creating intricate patterns of reinforcing hardships in Zimbabwean 
communities. 
Zimbabwe experienced a protracted economic decline between 2000 and 
2008, which negatively affected all the sectors of the economy, politics and 
social dimension of the country. Hyperinflation, limited national fiscal space, 
rapid de-industrialisation, high rates of unemployment, informality of 
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employment, migration of professional skills, reduced agricultural productivity, 
political polarisation and significant increase in social welfare cases 
characterised the period between 2000 and 2010. 
1.2.1 Demographics 
According to the 2012 official national population census done by the 
Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat), the total population of 
Zimbabwe was estimated as 13,061,239 people with a sex ratio of 93 males 
per every 100 females. Forty-one percent of the population are below the age 
of 15 years and 55 percent are between the ages of 15 and 64 while just four 
percent are above the age of 65 years (ZimStat 2012:11). This makes for a 
population pyramid typical in many developing countries – one with a broad 
base and a narrow summit, signifying a young population.  There were 
3,059,016 private households with an average of 4 persons in each 
household (ibid.).  
According to Magaisa (2016:2), the figures on the number of Zimbabweans 
living and working outside the country, commonly referred to as 
“Zimbabweans living in the diaspora,” are a subject of speculative estimation 
as no official scientific study has been done. Consequently, a significant 
number of Zimbabweans outside the country is undocumented. However, it is 
known that a large number of Zimbabweans began to leave the country at the 
turn of the Millennium, when the country began to experience signs of political 
and economic crises. By far the largest number of Zimbabweans outside the 
country lives and works in South Africa, with Botswana and Namibia also 
hosting a fair percentage among host countries in Southern Africa. Overseas, 
most Zimbabweans settled in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the 
United States of America (ibid., 3). Zimbabwean migrants are in two 
categories – economic migrants who left the country in search of better 
income and economic opportunities, and political refugees who have sought 
asylum in host countries (ibid.). 
The ZimStat carries out Poverty, Income, Consumption and Expenditure 
Surveys (PICES) every five years. The latest relevant data available from the 
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2011/12 PICES report show that 68.3 percent of the population resides in 
rural areas while 31.7 percent of the population is found in the urban areas. 
Zimbabwe is therefore predominantly rural. PICES finds that Zimbabwe has a 
young population, with the proportion of children under 15 years being around 
42 percent, while the proportion of individuals of age 65 and older is 4.3 per 
cent. Households in rural areas are larger (4.7 persons) than in urban areas 
(4 persons). In rural areas, households with more than 5 persons were found 
to be 50.5 percent compared to 33.5 per cent in urban areas. Most 
households in Zimbabwe are headed by males with 65 per cent while 35 per 
cent are female-headed (ZimStat 2013a:18-22). 
1.2.2 Orphanhood prevalence  
Orphanhood is prevalent in Zimbabwe with 19.3 per cent of the children aged 
0-17 years being orphans. There are more orphans living in rural areas (12.4 
per cent) compared to 6.9 per cent in urban areas. (ibid., 30). The Zimbabwe 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) is a consortium of 
Government, United Nations (UN) agencies, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and other international organisations and was 
established in 2002. Its mandate is to conduct annual rural livelihoods 
assessments, which are part of a comprehensive information system that 
informs government and its development partners on programming necessary 
for saving lives and strengthening rural livelihoods in Zimbabwe. ZimVAC 
(2015:14) finds that 22 percent of households had at least one orphan. The 
report recommends that “interventions for households with orphans and 
vulnerable children need to be scaled-up as the assessment has shown a 
strong relationship between non- [school] attendance and the presence of 
vulnerability characteristics in the household” (ibid., 117). 
1.2.3 Poverty and extreme poverty 
Poverty is one of the major developmental challenges affecting Zimbabwe. 
Indices of poverty show that prevalence, depth and severity of rural poverty 
are much worse than those of urban poverty. In 2011-2012 about 72.3 
percent of Zimbabweans were poor and 22.5 percent were extremely poor 
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(ZimStat 2013b:44). Poverty is more prevalent in rural Zimbabwe at 84.3 
percent (ibid.). The poverty prevalence rate of people residing in urban areas 
is 46.5 percent (ibid.). Extreme poverty is relatively low in urban areas at 5.6 
percent in contrast to rural areas where about 30.4 percent of the populace is 
extremely poor (ibid.). The prevalence of household poverty shows a similar 
pattern between rural and urban areas. About 4 percent of urban households 
are extremely poor, that is, they are below the lower food poverty line (ibid.). 
This indicates a low prevalence of extremely poor households in urban areas. 
In rural areas, 22.9 percent of households are extremely poor (Table 1.1), that 
is, they lack enough resources to meet their minimum food needs (ibid.).  
Table 1.1: Poverty by place of residence, 2011-2012 
 Prevalence (%) of Poverty Indices 
Residence Poverty Extreme 
Poverty 
Poverty Gap 
Index 
Poverty 
Severity 
Index 
Households     
Rural 76 22.9 36.1 20.6 
Urban 38.2 4.0 12.3 5.6 
All Zimbabwe 62.6 16.2 27.7 15.2 
People     
Rural 84.3 30.4 42.8 25.4 
Urban 46.5 5.6 15.5 7.2 
All Zimbabwe 72.3 22.5 34.1 19.6 
Source: (ZimStat 2013b:44) 
Incidence of poverty in Zimbabwe is also high when analysed according to 
asset ownership, employment and income sources, housing living conditions 
and food security measures. The poverty in Zimbabwe also has a gender 
dimension. ZimStat (2013b:53) found that: “the highest prevalence of poverty 
of 68.9 per cent is observed in female-headed widowed households 
compared to 54.7 per cent for male-headed widowed households.” 
Human development refers to the general well-being of society or the quality 
of life for a particular society (Gumede 2016:27). The Human Development 
Index (HDI) measures human development as a composite indicator 
consisting of per capita income, life expectancy, and literacy (ibid.). Clark 
(2002:18) argues that if these three key choices are not available, then many 
other options to expand human capabilities are not likely to be accessible as 
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well.  The HDI is used by the UN to rank countries in terms of their human 
development. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with countries below 0.5 
classified as being in the low human development category, and countries 
with an index of greater than 0.8 classified as high human development 
countries. Thus, the low the HDI, by implication, the low is the quality of life 
because the HDI takes in to account levels of educational attainment, access 
to health care and the levels of per capita incomes (Gumede 2017:6). The 
HDI has its shortcomings. While it has been modified and improved since 
1990, and provides a much wider, richer and deeper conception of 
development, than any single indicator, “it remains conceptually weak” 
(Kelley; Srinivasan; and Streeten cited in Clark 2002:18). Key points of 
criticism are that: (1) the weights attached to the three core indicators are 
necessarily arbitrary; (2) the index only provides a relative estimate of how 
well a certain country is doing in relation to the performance of other 
countries; and (3) the HDI is an average and therefore says nothing about 
inequality between the rich and poor, men and women or urban and rural 
people (ibid.). Gumede (2017:6) makes a similar point arguing that “…the 
index [HDI] itself is debatable, as to what it exactly means or measures.” 
Despite the HDI’s shortcomings, it still gives a sense of overall general 
wellbeing of a society or region (ibid.).    
The UNDP’s 2016 Human Development Report (2016a:204) shows that 
Zimbabwe’s HDI value for 2015 is 0.516 with men having a higher HDI of 
0.535 than women with 0.496. The HDI value of 0.516 is in the low human 
development category and places the country at number 154 out of 188 
countries and ranked territories. The HDI value of 0.516 is marginally above 
the average of 0.497 for countries in the low human development category, 
but below the average of 0.523 for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 
2016b:4). From Sub-Saharan Africa, countries which are close to Zimbabwe 
in 2015 HDI rank are Lesotho and Kenya, which have HDI rankings of 160 
and 146 respectively. The low human development category has 41 countries 
and territories, and includes Nepal, Swaziland, Lesotho, Uganda, Gambia and 
Yemen.  
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The trend of Zimbabwe’s HDI values between 2000 and 2015 shows that the 
HDI values have remained in the low human development category and below 
the average values for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2000 and 
2015, Zimbabwe’s HDI value increased from 0.427 to 0.516 and this 
represents an increase of 20.8 percent. (UNDP 2016b:2).  
The HDI values show that on the outlook Zimbabwe continues to face 
significant challenges in reducing poverty and that significant improvements 
are needed in Zimbabwe’s three dimensions of human development – a long 
and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. Zimbabwe has 
some human development work to do if it is to catch up with South Africa, and 
“two so-called developmental states in Africa” Mauritius and Botswana 
(Gumede 2016:27). Human development as quantified by the HDI is doing 
well in these 3 countries. Between 2000 and 2011 HDI values increased from: 
0.616 to 0.619 for South Africa, 0.585 to 0.633 for Botswana, and 0.672 to 
0.728 for Mauritius (ibid., 46). 
1.2.4 HIV and AIDS 
Zimbabwe has recorded a decline in adult HIV prevalence among women and 
men age 15-49 yet it still has one of the largest and most sustained HIV 
epidemics globally (Pascoe, Langhaung, Mavhu, Hargreaves, Jaffar, Hayes & 
Cowan 2015:2). The adult HIV prevalence shows a declining trend and is now 
plateauing. According to the 2015 Zimbabwe Demographic Health Survey 
(ZDHS) report, HIV prevalence among women and men age 15-49 decreased 
from 18.1 percent in the 2005-06 ZDHS, to 15.2 percent in the 2010-11 
ZDHS, and more recently to 13.8 percent in the 2015 ZDHS (ZimStat and ICF 
International 2016:273). Despite the decline, Zimbabwe still has one of the 
highest adult HIV prevalence rates in the world in generally, and in Southern 
Africa,  region which is at the epicentre of the global epidemic (Pascoe et al. 
2015:1; and UNDP 2008:11). 
ZimStat and ICF International attribute the decrease in HIV prevalence among 
women and men age 15-49 to a change in population over time. Some of the 
decrease between the 2010-11 ZDHS and the 2015 ZDHS is attributable to a 
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change in the HIV testing algorithm between the two surveys (ibid.). In 
addition, ZimStat urges caution in the interpretation of the ZDHS prevalence 
findings for two reasons: (1) an ageing HIV epidemic, and (2) the findings do 
no account for a potential increase in HIV prevalence among the population 
age 50 and older (ibid.). However, UNAIDS (2016:6) attributes the general 
decline in Zimbabwe’s HIV prevalence rate to the effects of national 
prevention efforts aimed at sexual behaviour change, prevention of mother to 
child transmission services, and effective treatment care and support 
services. Pascoe et al. (2015:2) concur with UNAIDS by suggesting that the 
significant decline in HIV prevalence is driven in part by behaviour change.  
The decline in the prevalence trend has in part contributed to an increase in 
average life expectancy at birth. According to ZimStat (2012:13) average life 
expectancy at birth is 58 years. The UNDP (2008:11) estimates that life 
expectancy was 39 years in 2003. 
The epidemic has registered a huge reversal of fortunes for many children, 
households and communities in Zimbabwe. It has led to social, economic and 
psychological effects that combine to increase the vulnerability of children and 
families. The high mortality rate related to HIV among Zimbabweans aged 15-
49 years has increased the dependency ratio and left approximately 25 
percent of children orphans. (UN 2014:77). The orphans are in most cases 
cared for by the elderly hence the term ‘missing generation’ in those 
households.  
In addition, HIV and AIDS has had a significant effect on the composition of 
the labour force in terms of age, skills and experience, with the productive age 
group 15-49 years, the most affected. The epidemic has profound adverse 
effects on the economy, workforce, businesses and the infected and affected 
individuals and their families (UNDP 2008:107). In this regard, HIV and AIDS 
is one of the key drivers of poverty in Zimbabwe. The reverse is also true and 
it’s supported by empirical evidence. Pascoe et al. (2015:16) find that poor 
young rural women in Zimbabwe, particularly those who lack access to 
adequate food and those with lower educational attainment levels, faced an 
increased risk of HIV infection and are likely to remain exposed to that risk 
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given that many of these risk factors continue to be prevalent in Zimbabwe. 
The authors conclude that “poverty is associated with many factors that drive 
and influence HIV risk behaviours” (ibid.). 
1.2.5 Food insecurity 
The food security situation in Zimbabwe is influenced by food crop production 
and household incomes. The Fast Track Land Reform (FTLF) programme is 
an important factor whose outcomes include shifts in agricultural performance 
and food production. The effects of the FTLRP on food production are 
discussed in detail under the land reform section in this chapter.  Zimbabwe’s 
agriculture is highly dependent on rainfall. Rainfall season quality as 
determined by the duration of the season, amount of rainfall received, and 
temporal and spatial distribution, has a significant influence on crop 
production. Food insecurity remains high in the country and has negative 
implications for human capital development.  
Agriculture productivity is declining on all crops especially grains, thus, 
worsening the food security situation, malnutrition and increasing in poverty. 
During the peak hunger period between January and March 2016 of the 2015-
2016 consumption year, a total of 1,490,024 were projected to be food- 
insecure in Zimbabwe and this represents a 163 percent increase compared 
to the 2014-2015 consumption year. Sixteen percent of the rural population 
(about 1,405,000 people) were projected to be food insecure during the same 
period (ZimVAC: 2015:95). 
An exogenous variable affecting food crop production is the recurrent 
droughts caused by climate change. Most of the communal and resettlement 
farmers depend significantly on natural rainfall for food crop production and 
this puts the farmers at high risk of droughts and vulnerability to hunger. The 
climate change phenomenon requires that farmers reduce dependence on 
rain-fed agriculture as it has become erratic and unpredictable. They need to 
shift to alternative water sources such irrigation or use of different farming 
methods. Fighting poverty through agriculture production requires Zimbabwe 
to address these challenges to enable households to be food secure. 
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The average household income decreased from $111 in April 2014 to $86 in 
April 2015. This trend is consistent with the economic decline in the country 
especially the downturn in the productivity of the agricultural sector, a primary 
source of income for most rural households who depend on communal 
farming activities. Rural households’ incomes are generally low, highly 
variable, and dependent on rainfall patterns and availability of casual labour 
(ibid., 118). According to the Food and Nutrition Council (2014:30), Jayne and 
Chisvo point out that “inadequate purchasing power among the poor is often 
cited as the reason why food insecurity can persist amidst food abundance.” 
In the 2014-2015 consumption year the better household food security 
situation was partly influenced by the household purchasing power in terms of 
the amount of maize grain the household could purchase from the average 
household income. The price of maize grain, Zimbabwe’s staple food crop, 
was also stable during the consumption year. The 2014-2015 consumption 
year had better household purchasing power than previous years and this 
buttressed the low levels of food insecurity during 2014-2015 (ibid.). 
The food insecurity trends have remained relatively the same over the past 
three years. Mashonaland provinces have the least proportion of food 
insecure compared to the Matabeleland provinces which have the highest 
proportion of the food insecure rural population (ZimVAC 2015:98).  
The prevalence of food insecurity amongst other variables is correlated with 
child malnutrition and stunted growth. Chronic malnutrition among the under-
fives remains a major health problem in Zimbabwe. On a population basis, 
high levels of chronic malnutrition are reflection of poor socio-economic 
conditions including food insecurity. According to ZimStat and ICF 
International (2012:141) between 2010 and 2011, 32 percent of children in 
Zimbabwe were stunted, 3 percent wasted, and 10 percent underweight. 
Rates of stunting, wasting and underweight were higher among rural than 
urban children (ibid.). The ZimVAC (2015:72) finds that 3.3 percent of the 
children in the 6-59 months category had acute malnutrition and 2.3 percent 
had severe acute malnutrition. The number of meals consumed by children 
aged 24-59 months “to support optimal growth and good health is at least 4 
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meals a day of a diverse and nutrient-dense diet constituted from animal 
source foods, pulses, fruits and vegetables and energy giving foods” (ibid., 
74). 
1.2.6 Labour market challenges 
Unemployment, underemployment and poor remuneration are factors that 
contribute to poverty, extreme poverty and vulnerability in Zimbabwe. Rural 
poverty in Zimbabwe is primarily a challenge of underemployment and low 
agriculture productivity. About 84.1 percent of the economically active 
population in rural areas work either as communal and resettlement farmers 
or as unpaid family workers (ZimStat 2013b:73). They are not classified as 
unemployed. The economic activities found in rural areas of Zimbabwe are 
most likely to be associated with high levels of poverty. This is because 
households in communal lands are not generating adequate incomes to cover 
consumption expenditures, investments in assets and livestock, and savings. 
Only 7 percent of the economically active poor people in rural areas are 
permanent paid employees (ibid.). The ZimStat (2013b:74) finds that 
“households headed by a communal/resettlement farmer have the highest 
prevalence of poverty at 83 percent compared to other heads of households 
across land use sectors …. It has also been established that households 
headed by members in the other main economic activity such as a retired 
person in rural areas, are more likely to be poor in all land use areas due to 
lack of a sustainable source of income.” The 2011 Labour Force Survey finds 
that unemployment rates in rural areas are 2 percent for males and 4.7 
percent for females, 7.8 percent for female youth, and 3 percent for male 
youth. 
The ZimVAC (2015:15) makes a finding that has important implications on 
livelihood strategies for households in rural areas: “A total of 59 [percent] of 
the households reported having inadequate labour from household members 
for normal agricultural activities.” These households are as a result unable to 
reach their agricultural potential. This may result in households engaging in 
risky coping mechanisms such as selling assets and livestock. Twenty 
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percent of the households surveyed reported having hired labour in the 2014-
2015 agricultural seasons (ibid.). 
The labour market dynamics in urban areas of Zimbabwe exhibit peculiar 
characteristics including differences in the composition of employment. The 
economy is fragile and growth is stagnant. A challenging business investment 
climate with limited Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows, lack of 
competitiveness, power shortages, public and private sector corruption, and 
inconsistent policies are binding constraints to inclusive growth and 
employment creation. Formal employment has declined, displacing once 
formal and permanently employed workers into the insecure informal sector. 
The economic activities in urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe now include 
unregulated street vending, and artisanal mining. Labour costs are relatively 
high due to volatility of the multiple currency system used in Zimbabwe with 
the dominant currencies being the United States dollar and the South African 
rand. Underlying social inequalities such as gendered roles and occupations 
limit the economic participation of women and youth. 
The 2014 Labour Force Survey provides two definitions of unemployment: 
“strict” and broad”. The “strict” definition refers to “a person [of] 15 years and 
above who, during the reference period, was without work, available for work 
and was actively seeking for work.” The “broad” definition of unemployment is 
similar to the “strict” definition but takes away the condition of actively seeking 
for work (ZimStat 2015b:134). The survey results show that the broad 
unemployment rates (7.3 percent for males and 14.9 percent for females) 
were higher than the strict unemployment rate (4.4 percent for males and 5.2 
percent for females). The overall broad unemployment rate increased from 
10.7 percent in 2011 to 11.3 percent in 2014 (ibid.). The data further shows 
that unemployment rates are higher in urban than rural areas. 
Zimbabwe has a high youth unemployment rate. Unemployed youths aged 
15-34 years constitute a very high proportion (77.3 percent) of the total 
unemployed persons, with almost similar patterns for young females and 
males (ibid., 143). A the national level, the current broad youth unemployment 
rate for youth aged 15-34 years is 15.3 percent, with young females having a 
 12 
 
higher rate of 20.4 percent than young men with 9.8 percent, in 2014 (ibid., 
178). Youth unemployment is a major issue of developmental concern for two 
major reasons: (1) the country losing out on its demographic dividend in 
development, and (2) youth unemployment can cause social upheavals of 
various forms. 
Informality of employment is very high in Zimbabwe. The proportion of the 
total employed population aged 15 years and above in informal employment 
in Zimbabwe increased from 84.2 percent in 2011 to 94.5 percent in 2014 
(ZimStat 2015b:82). In May 2014, of the 1.5 million paid employees, around 
1.4 million (93.3 percent) were in informal employment (ibid., 84). There is 
also a large informal sector employing around 13.7 percent of all employed 
persons (859 060 persons), with 52.5 percent of them being women (ibid., 
86). A very high proportion (85.9 percent) of those currently employed in the 
informal sector were unskilled, with 54.4 percent of the unskilled being women 
(ibid., 100). 
Importantly, the informal sector workers do not have access to protective or 
preventive social protection mechanisms, for example, social insurance 
schemes through the workplace. These schemes are absent because the 
employment arrangements are informal. ZimStat (2013b:57) finds that 
households headed by an informal sector worker are likely to be poor in both 
rural and urban areas. This is explained by higher physical and income 
mobility. The availability of short term economic and income opportunities 
means that poor urban labourers tend to seize opportunities over multiple 
informal activities, locations and within shorter timeframes. 
Poor remuneration is a contributing factor to poverty and vulnerability in 
Zimbabwe. The poverty datum lines (PDLs) represent the cost of a given 
standard living that must be attained if a person is to be deemed not poor. 
There are two measures of standards of living: the Food Poverty Line (FPL) 
and the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL). The FPL represents the 
minimum consumption expenditure necessary to ensure that each individual 
can (if all expenditure were devoted to food) consume a minimum food basket 
representing 2,100 kilocalories. An individual whose total consumption 
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expenditure does not exceed the food poverty line is deemed to be very poor.  
The Labour Force Survey shows that in May 2014, the FPL for a person was 
US$31.70, indicating that about 33 percent of the paid employees were below 
the FPL thus deemed to be very poor. The TCPL calculates the non-food 
consumption expenditure of poor households whose consumption expenditure 
is just equal to the FPL. This amount is added to the FPL. An individual whose 
total consumption expenditure does not exceed the total consumption poverty 
line is deemed to be poor. The estimated TCPL per person per month in May 
2014 was about US$102, indicating that around 58 percent of the employed 
population received an income less than the TCPL (ZimStat 2015b:58). The 
average household size in Zimbabwe was estimated in 2014 to be 5 persons. 
The FPL and TCPL for a household in May 2014 was US$158.48 and 
US$507.97 respectively. The percentage of the paid employees who received 
an income above the FPL and TCPL for a five-person household was 42 and 
4.1 respectively (ibid., 59). 
1.2.7 Gender and happiness 
The data from the 2015 Human Development Report shows that Zimbabwe is 
still experiencing high levels of gender inequality, with a Gender Inequality 
Index (GII) of 0.504, ranking 112 out of 155 countries in the 2014 index 
(UNDP 2015b:5). High rates of violence against women and girls are of great 
concern in Zimbabwe. According to the 2009 Global Peace Index report, 80 
per cent of all people murdered in Zimbabwe in 2009 were women. The 2015 
ZDHS shows that 39 per cent of women in Zimbabwe have experienced 
physical or sexual violence, whether it was physical only (26 per cent), sexual 
only (5 per cent), or both physical and sexual (9 per cent) at some point in 
their lives. In addition, 6 per cent of women who have ever been pregnant 
reported that they experienced violence during one or more of their 
pregnancies. The prevalence of violence during pregnancy varies little by 
urban-rural residence but shows greater variation by province (ZimStat & ICF 
International 2016:319-320). Overall, the aggregated cost of gender-based 
violence (GBV) to Zimbabwe in 2009, including direct and multiplier costs was 
estimated at US$2 billion (SIDA 2010:15). The 2015 ZDHS findings on GBV 
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suggest that significant work remains to be done if women are to be protected 
against all forms of violence. It is acknowledged that the effects of GBV in 
Zimbabwe go beyond human rights concerns but also include economic and 
health concerns (ZimStat & ICF International 2016:315). 
Happiness is increasingly considered a measure of social progress and a goal 
of public policy. The goal of governments should be to foster the happiness of 
citizens, and especially to reduce misery. Governments are increasingly 
measuring the subjective well-being of their countries’ populations. Measuring 
happiness enables citizens and policy-makers to know their problems and 
opportunities. Happiness data could be linked to human development 
information, for example, health, education, food security and nutrition, and 
poverty reduction. The United States’ Founding Fathers recognised the 
inalienable right to the pursuit of happiness while Bhutan has famously 
adopted the goal of Gross National Happiness (GNH) rather than GNP. 
Bhutan’s GNH index is ground-breaking as it is the first of its kind globally. 
China champions the goal of a harmonious society (Sachs 2012:6) The 
United Arab Emirates has made happiness and well-being a central tenet of 
the design and delivery of its National Agenda. It seeks “to be the happiest of 
all nations”. The Dubai Plan 2021 describes the vision for Dubai as “a city of 
happy, creative and empowered people….” (Helliwell et al. 2015:4). The 
World Happiness Report (2015) uses measures of “subjective well-being” to 
define “happiness”. According to Helliwell, Huang and Wang (2015:15) the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states that 
“subjective well-being encompasses three different aspects: cognitive 
evaluations of one’s life, positive emotions (joy, pride), and negative ones 
(pain, anger and worry).” The Gallup World Poll (GWP) contains measures of 
positive and negative affect as well as life evaluations. The GWP data is 
derived from population-based samples across countries and it provides far 
greater coverage than is currently available from any other source. In the 
GWP, respondents (aged 15 or over) are asked to evaluate the quality of their 
lives on an 11-point ladder scale running from 0 to 10 with 0 being the worst 
possible life for them and 10 being the best possible. Positive and negative 
affect unlike life evaluations, are measured on a 0 to 1 scale. Life evaluations, 
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positive and negative affect are explained in terms of six key variables: GDP 
per capita, social support, healthy life expectancy, freedom to make life 
choices, generosity, and freedom from corruption. For example, household 
income and healthy life expectancy have significant effects on life evaluations. 
Negative emotions are significantly reduced by social support, freedom and 
absence of corruption (Helliwell, Huang & Wang 2015:21). 
Data from the 2012-2014 GWP country happiness rankings positions 
Zimbabwe at 115 out of 158 ranked countries. The country’s average ladder 
score is 4.610. The four top-ranked countries are Switzerland, Iceland, 
Denmark and Norway – all in Europe. The least happy countries are all poor 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Zimbabwe’s average score is slightly higher 
than the 10 countries with the lowest average ladder scores. All the 10 
countries have averages below 3.7. Eight of the 10 countries are in Sub-
Saharan Africa while two are conflict-affected countries, Syria and 
Afghanistan (ibid., 29). Zimbabwe’s average ladder score of 4.610 is 
explained by income inequalities; high levels of unemployment; the 
population’s worries about constraints to healthy life expectancy; limited 
social, economic and political freedom and space to make life choices; low 
levels of generosity (for example donations to charity), and perceptions of 
corruption. Social support, defined as “having someone (friends or relatives) 
to count on in times of trouble” is the only variable contributing a high score to 
Zimbabwe’s average ladder score. The data suggest that while Zimbabwe 
may be economically poor, the country has strong social relations and 
networks between citizens (family, friends and community) – key components 
of social capital. 
1.3 Political context 
The political space in Zimbabwe is highly contested. One political party, the 
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu PF) has been 
dominating power since independence in 1980. This of course, has been 
through the agency of regular national elections as required by the 
constitution. In the first 15 years following independence, that is, from 1980 to 
1995, the Government of Zimbabwe successfully provided social services 
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such as education, housing, health care, relatively higher wages and a better 
working environment to its population mainly the black majority, who had been 
previously underserved during the colonial period. Despite these 
achievements, there remained multifaceted underlying social, political and 
economic problems that would eventually produce a national crisis from 1995 
to 2008. The period between 1995 and 2008 was characterised by significant 
political unrest and controversial policy choices which led to hyperinflation, de-
industrialisation, high unemployment, large-scale emigration and migration 
associated with loss of human capital skills mainly to Western countries and 
Southern African region countries particularly to South Africa, Namibia, 
Zambia and Mozambique. The period was also characterised by a weak 
balance of payment position, decline in agriculture productivity and food 
insecurity associated with the controversial land reform process. Of the 
above-mentioned challenges, the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP), land issue, and a clean-up operation referred to as 
Operation Restore Order, were the most significant, and politically 
controversial. The land reform process described as fast track land reform 
programme was the most profound as it had been the biggest single 
motivational factor behind the war of liberation. 
1.3.1 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
According to Magaisa (2016:10) the acceptance and introduction of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank-driven ESAP model 
represented a major political decision, and economic policy shift by the Zanu 
PF government. The ESAP required a lot that went against what a populist 
government preferred (ibid.). The ruling party had been known to pursue a 
pro-poor and socialist ideology Zimbabwe reluctantly adopted the “neo-liberal 
package of economic reforms” (ibid.) in 1991. The growth model was 
anchored on market-driven economic reforms, severe reduction in 
government expenditure on non-productive sectors social services sectors 
such as health and education. Other measures introduced through the ESAP 
growth model were: liberalisation of trade and investment; introducing a lean 
civil service through job retrenchments; devaluation of the local currency and 
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adoption of a market-determined rate of exchange; removal of subsidies on 
public goods and services; commercialisation and privatisation of state 
enterprises; and the removal of controls on prices of basic commodities and 
wages. At the heart of ESAP was a desire to change the composition of 
national output in favour of tradable and exportable goods. Rapid export 
growth was to become the means for a faster and economic growth take-off. 
The structural adjustment programme set an annual target of nine percent 
growth in exports for the period 1991-1995 (Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara & 
Martens 2011:452-453). 
While the ESAP was considered successful in de-regulating the economy, 
and removing foreign trade and foreign exchange restrictions, it resulted in 
severe austerity measures imposed on the people of Zimbabwe. It led to 
massive labour force cuts of both skilled and unskilled, closure of 
manufacturing industries, and a deterioration of social services. According to 
(Manjengwa 2012:10) up to 60,000 people had lost their jobs because of 
retrenchments and company closures and labour unions reacted strongly 
against the neo-liberal economic policy; and standards of living declined with 
the introduction of user fees in the education and health sectors resulting in a 
significant drop in hospital and school attendance rates. Consequently, the 
intended economic stabilisation was not achieved. Rate of inflation increased, 
financial markets interest rates soared and a falling exchange rate and falling 
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) meant Zimbabwe lost its place in the 
Southern Africa region as an emerging economic powerhouse, prosperous 
and stable country. Government fiscal and monetary targets were not met and 
the continuing budget deficits contributed to depressed economic growth rates 
in 1997 and 1998. The above factors combined to represent Zimbabwe’s point 
of departure in terms of gradual but systemic decline of the formal economy 
and to the emergence of the informal sector particularly in urban and peri-
urban areas of Zimbabwe. 
One of the most important seminal effects of the ESAP was the creation of 
what Magaisa described as “a huge reservoir of discontent within the working 
class and students’ communities [and civil society].” This marked the early 
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stages of the evolution of new forms of opposition against the government. 
The year 1998 started with chaotic scenes of food riots and demonstrations 
against government’s economic policies, which were negatively affecting 
people’s standards of living.  According to Tekere (as cited in Manjengwa 
2012:10), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
reported that ESAP had negatively affected the food security situation in 
Zimbabwe. As a result of the negative effects of the ESAP on the lives of 
ordinary Zimbabweans, the government discontinued the programme in the 
late 1990s, and replaced it with the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and 
Social Transformation (ZIMPREST). The ZIMPREST aimed: “to provide the 
economy with a firm basis for sustainable growth, greater employment and 
equitable distribution of incomes (ZimStat 2013b:3). The development 
challenges brought about by the various economic reform programmes 
described above were followed by controversial land reforms which 
contributed to increased poverty and vulnerability. A discussion of Zimbabwe 
land reform follows. 
1.3.2 Land reform 
The narrative of Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political context can never 
be complete without the Fast track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) not 
least because it was the basis upon which the liberation struggle was fought 
in the 1970s; it completely radicalised the agrarian structure altering the 
nature of property rights and labour relations; it was characterised by policy 
contradictions; and the effects it had on livelihoods and social order in the 
newly created communities (Scoones et al. 2010:2, 234; Moyo & Chambati 
2013:2-8; Matondi 2012:208). Magaisa (2016:2) characterised the FTLRP as 
a “land revolution” and contends that it was a process which had a 
fundamental effect on the economy and politics of Zimbabwe. A detailed 
description and analysis of the land reform process, outcomes and 
implications for the well-being of the people is provided below. 
There is no single narrative of Zimbabwe’s land reform. There has been a lot 
of academic research on Zimbabwe’s land issue. The scholarly literature on 
the subject reveals competing narratives and a highly divided evidence base 
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on the success or failure of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme. The key 
debates on the FTLRP are around contested interpretations of the motivation 
behind the radical land reform with the dominant literature suggesting that 
land question was an important rallying point for receding electoral support for 
Zanu PF (Magaisa 2016:15; and Marongwe, Zamchiya, Raftopolous, 
Scarnecchia et al. cited in Moyo & Chambati 2013:12). According to Moyo 
and Chambati (2013:13) citing Marongwe and Zamchiya, it has also been 
alleged that the beneficiaries of the FTLRP are largely politically-connected 
elites. Scoones et al. (2010:238) using field-based evidence challenged this 
“myth” by affirming that the beneficiaries of the FTLRP “were classified as a 
diverse ‘ordinary’ group….” However they also concede that some “politically-
connected elites” indeed benefitted especially in the A2 farm schemes. 
Moyo and Chambati (2013:13) citing Richardson; Campbell; and Bond state 
that by 2005, the debate had shifted to claims that agricultural performance 
and production had collapsed creating serious food insecurity. The basis for 
this was that the radical FTLRP was a failed agrarian policy that had replaced 
commercial farming with subsistence agriculture – a process Magaisa 
(2016:15) refers to as “ruralisation of commercial agricultural land.” For these 
scholars, hunger and food shortages were inevitable outcomes from the 
“unstructured” and radical land reform. Field-based studies done by Scoones 
et al. (2010) counter this argument and instead paint a mixed picture of 
agricultural performance across different classes of new settlers, crop types 
and agricultural regions. Some of the arguments for the collapse of 
agricultural production as an outcome of the FTLRP ignore or at best give little 
attention exogenous factors such as the effects of economic crisis of the late 
1990s and erratic rainfall patterns on agricultural production. They also mute 
significant changes in the manners in which the new farmers organised 
themselves to utilise land with their land use preferences not necessarily 
conforming to the preferences of the white former commercial farmers (Murisa 
2013:251). Other important debates in the land reform discourse have 
focused on claims that there is no investment in the FTLRP resettlement 
areas, that the rural economy has collapsed (Scoones et al. 2010:239-240), 
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and that the agricultural labour regime had been transformed for the worst 
with significant unemployment outcomes (Chambati 2013). 
It is instructive for the purpose of this study to acknowledge the major 
outcomes of the land reform in Zimbabwe. The outcomes contribute to the 
framing of the socio-economic and political context within which the HSCT 
programme is implemented, and why it is a necessary intervention partly on 
the basis of the adverse effects of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe. 
The FTLRP radically altered Zimbabwe’s agrarian structure (Scoones et al. 
2010:3, Moyo cited in Chambati & Moyo 2013:8) with the institution of private 
ownership of agricultural land (property rights) having been dismantled and 
replaced by public ownership (Magaisa 2016:14). In 1980, 15 million hectares 
of prime agricultural land were in the hands of some 6,000 commercial 
farmers most of whom were white. Scoones et al. (2010:4) estimate that by 
2010 there were only 3 million hectares of land (or 9 percent of total land 
area) remaining under large-scale commercial farms. This includes all large-
scale commercial farms, agro-industrial estate farms, church and trust farms, 
farms under Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements 
(BIPPA) owned by foreign nationals and multinational corporations, 
plantations and conservancies. According to Government of Zimbabwe 
quoted in Matondi (2012:56) by 2009 there were approximately 300 large 
white-owned commercial farms remaining in Zimbabwe. The FTLRP changed 
and expanded the agrarian base. The size of commercial farms was reduced 
through sub-divisions thereby increasing the number of commercial farmers 
through the A1 and A2 farming models. The tenure arrangements shifted from 
private ownership to public ownership through the 99-year leasehold format 
for A2 farmers and “offer letters” for A1 farmers. Moyo (2007:8) described the 
“offer letters” as “permissory forms of tenure”.  
Moyo and Chambati (2013:8) observe that land redistribution also increased 
access to farm infrastructures and natural resources which were previously 
dominated by a racial minority. Moyo and Nyoni cited in Moyo and Chambati 
(2013:9) argue that “[t]he overall outcome of the FTLRP has essentially been 
the constitution of a qualitatively different tri-modal agrarian structure, in which 
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various classes compete for control over land, land, water and natural 
resources, as well as for access to state support and influence over the 
regulation of markets.” 
The other major agrarian outcomes of the FTLRP were major shifts in the 
agrarian structure, agricultural performance and production; changes to the 
agrarian labour structure, conditions and relations; and displacement of farm 
workers. The picture is highly differentiated on some of the outcomes. 
Matondi (2012:130) quoting the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; Richardson; and 
Moyo, states that agricultural performance declined significantly in the post-
2000 settlement schemes. Majority of the FTLRP beneficiaries have not yet 
reached the expected production levels and have cited challenges of access 
to seed fertilisers, chemicals, equipment, support services and output 
markets.  
Production trends for commodities such as maize, tobacco, beef, wheat, tea 
and coffee have remained at lowest levels and figures are not comparable to 
the situation before the FTLRP (Matondi 2012:131; and Moyo cited in 
Gumede 2014:56). As Matondi (2012:131) observes, there are highly 
differentiated views as to the factors that account for the decline in agricultural 
performance. One group of authors attributes the decline of performance “to 
the sabotage of the programme by the white farmers (and a mostly white-
controlled industrial sector), as well as to restrictive measures and or 
sanctions imposed [on Zimbabwe] by the international community especially 
on the balance-of-payments support that affected the economy in general” 
(ibid.).  
A second group of writers advances the principal argument that “it was a 
disabling environment permeated by human rights abuses and violence that 
undermined the FTLRP and accounted for the decline, and that the use of 
violence and forceful takeover of land had the effect of undermining property 
rights leading to underinvestment in agriculture” (ibid.) A third group of 
scholars point to a combination of factors cited in the opposing views together 
with the speed with which the FTLRP was implemented as factors leading to 
the decline in agricultural production (ibid.). 
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Yet for Scoones et al. (2010:239) the agricultural production picture is mixed 
and more complex. While acknowledging that output of agricultural exports 
declined, the production of cereals and cotton has been maintained post-
FTLRP. The production of some crops such as edible beans has boomed. 
Field level data from A1 schemes in Gutu district in Masvingo province 
showed that A1 farmers produced more than a tonne of maize sufficient for 
household provision and some sales (ibid.). Across their study sites, Scoones 
et al. (2010) observed “a very positive dynamic of productive agriculture by 
40-50% of households.” The authors make the point that small holder A1 
farmers and informal farmers have fared best, where there is low capital 
investment and reliance on local labour. On the new A2 commercial farms, by 
contrast, the broader economic crisis prevented substantial capital 
investment, and new farm enterprises have been slow to take off (ibid., 238). 
Pre-FTLRP, Zimbabwe used to export excess food and other agricultural 
commodities but is now a net importer, with most people in rural and some 
urban areas relying on humanitarian aid provided by international 
development partners. Cross, cited in Gumede (2014:56), asserts that low 
maize production levels have led to food imports and emergency relief 
between 2001 and 2009, although the 2009 maize harvest was around 1.24 
million tonnes, reducing the humanitarian aid requirements. 
Agricultural labour dynamics, relations and conditions were substantially 
altered from what they were pre-2000 (Matondi 2012:131). This was a 
redistributive outcome (Chambati 2013:157) but also a displacement effect of 
the FTLRP. The scale of the effects of the FTLRP on the agrarian labour 
regime is subject of intense scholarly debate and dispute. Chambati 
(2013:157) argues that the post-2000 land redistribution literature tends to 
neglect the issue of agrarian labour relations generated after the FTLRP. In 
particular the literature is dismissive of the redistributive nature of the FTLRP 
and the changing patterns of agricultural production (ibid.). Chambati (2013) 
observes that most studies analysing agrarian labour relations post-FTLRP 
adopt “modernisation perspectives, in which formal wage labour in the 
capitalist large-scale commercial farms is treated as superior to self-employed 
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forms of labour in the […] peasant sector.” The self-employment of peasants 
is neglected because it does not fit the formal employment category used by 
liberal economists (ibid.). Rather the primary focus has been on the 
displacement of former farm workers form their jobs in the large-scale 
commercial farms. Chambati (2013) advances the principal argument that a 
new kind of agrarian employment structure has emerged and the social 
relations of production that this entails. The change to the ownership of land 
instigated by the FTLRP is a central factor in the alteration of agrarian labour 
relations because of its influence on who sells or hires labour (ibid.). By 
reversing the racial monopoly in land ownership the FTLRP generated a new 
agrarian employment structure in which political power was diffused amongst 
A2 capitalist farmers and peasant farmers through the A1 farm model.  
Commercial agriculture requires labour yet much of the experienced labour 
has been lost to the informal self-employment sector such as cross-border 
trade, migration outside the country, gold panning and petty commodity 
trading, as well as to part and full-time wage-labour  in A1 farms (Matondi 
2012:155, Chambati 2013:169). The A1 sector employed most of the farm 
wage jobs amongst the peasantry amounting to an estimated 145,800 and 
860,220 full and part-time wage workers (Chambati 2013:169). The small to 
medium and large-scale commercial farms (A2 model) are experiencing 
serious shortage of skilled agricultural labour and this is a key characteristic of 
the new agrarian structure. Chambati (2013:166) outlines reasons for the 
shortages of labour across farm classes as: (i) the new agrarian labour regime 
diversified sources of employment in the reformed agrarian structure to 
include peasantry, small-to-medium capitalists, large capitalists, plantation 
estates and conservancies. Consequently there exists competition for labour 
resources across all different farm classes. (ii) Competition for labour 
resources also exist amongst a set of social production activities that include 
self-employed farming, petty commodity production for example natural 
resources exploitation, and hiring out labour to farmers. Chambati (2013) 
advances the principal argument that farm labour shortages are broadly a 
result of the expansion of self-employment amongst the potential agrarian 
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labour force from the communal areas, who gained access to land, poor 
wages and new non-farm job and economic opportunities. 
The A2 farmers assert that the former farm workers are reluctant to work for 
them because they owe allegiance to their previous large-scale commercial 
farm employers. Yet, from the perspective of the ex-farm workers, “… the new 
farm owners are contemptuous of them as workers, and they feel looked 
down upon and regarded as renegade members of the opposition” (Matondi 
2012:154). Field data from Mazowe district reveals that farm workers regard 
the new farmers as completely unequipped because of their lack of 
organisational skills for commercial farming (ibid.). Scoones et al. (2010:144) 
seem to corroborate this view by observing that: “… a particular challenge in 
many [A2] farms has been labour management. Many found it difficult to 
recruit new labour, and even more difficult to retain it…. The failure by the plot 
holder to pay wages regularly resulted in workers resorting to theft of farm 
equipment and tools.”  
The forced evictions of white commercial farmers also led to significant 
displacement of some of the farm workers from former large-scale commercial 
farms (Scoones et al. 2010:127). The scale and effects of the displacements 
are subjects of intense debate in the literature. Between 30,000 and 45,000 
workers are estimated to have been displaced from the former large-scale 
commercial farms to communal areas, towns and informal settlements 
(Chambati & Moyo; and Chambati & Magaramombe cites in Chambati 
2013:164). According to Gumede (2014:56) Moyo estimates that 150,000 
permanent farm worker households, formerly resident and working on the 
large-scale commercial farms along with many temporary workers many of 
them women were displaced during the FTLRP. Scoones et al. (2010:127) 
estimate that around 45,000 permanent worker households were displaced 
and had to move elsewhere. Others who were temporary workers had to seek 
new sources of income. According to Chambati (2013:164) most of the 
physical displacements occurred during the early stages of land reform – a 
period characterised by intense confrontation and violence between new 
settlers and farm workers. Some of the farm workers who lost their jobs were 
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completely displaced from the former large-scale commercial farms while 
others remained resident in the farm compounds (ibid.). Scoones et al. 
(2010:128) assert that the patterns of displacement varied across the country 
with significant displacements occurring in the highly capitalise commercial 
farms in the Highveld areas. Yet in some areas where ranching operations 
were the primary activities, displacements were minimal because the 
operations offered limited employment. 
The displacements of farm worker communities resulted in severe socio-
economic challenges for the affected groups. This has remained a key social 
policy challenge that the Zimbabwe government has to address. Matondi 
(2012:171) raises a fundamental point around the issue of property losses on 
the former large-scale commercial farms. Much of the discussion on property 
losses has focused either on productive infrastructure or on social services 
invested in by the former commercial farm owners. Yet there were significant 
asset losses of the poor former farm workers. They lost significant assets as 
land occupiers targeted them. They were viewed by land occupiers as a line 
of defence for the former land owners. During the mayhem caused by the 
FTLRP, some farm workers fled their homes leaving behind their 
possessions. In the farm compounds some of the farm workers had their 
houses destroyed (ibid.). The affected farm workers lost their source of 
livelihoods including a number of social benefits, such as farm-based schools 
and health facilities. Matondi (2012:156) makes the point that the FTLRP 
disrupted health delivery systems on the former large-scale commercial farms 
resulting in farm workers increasingly exposed to diseases including AIDS. 
The FTLRP has led to the establishment of a new social order and 
reconstruction of communities on FTLRP farms (Matondi 2012:208) with new 
priorities for social policy. The new resettlement areas face non-existence or 
inadequacy of social structures such as schools, clinics and community 
centres. The likely adverse effect is poor human capital development 
outcomes for children living in the FTLRP communities. A key issue in the 
new resettlement schemes is the problem of security for agriculture 
infrastructure and property. The displacement of former farmers and farm 
 26 
 
workers was also accompanied by vandalism of security infrastructure. 
Previous farm owners had invested in farm security and had created highly 
secure communities intolerant of theft and vandalism (ibid., 212-213). Matondi 
(2012) asserts that the chaos resulting from the FTLRP broke down social 
control in the former large-scale commercial farming communities. Cases of 
theft of farm produce, house breaking and poaching of natural resources are 
wide spread in the new resettlement areas. The relationship between former 
farm workers who have remained in the farm compounds and new settlers are 
fraught with tensions and conflicts. The government lacks a clear policy on the 
situation of former farm workers (ibid., 222). 
Matondi (2012:233) makes a fundamental point with respect to the social 
capital within resettlement communities by observing that “[s]ocial capital 
emanating from kinship, traditional values, norms and customs faces 
enormous challenges where people with diverse origins have been forced to 
co-exist.” The FTLRP also brought some changes to the nature of family 
structures as families are more individualised on fast track farms as the 
communities do not consist of relatives as is the case in most communal 
areas (ibid., 223). The households in the new settlements are typically 
unrelated to and unacquainted with each other. Murisa (2013:251) similarly 
asserts that “the Fast Track resettlement process disrupted known ties of 
reciprocation developed within lineage and kinship ties in customary tenure 
areas.” Thus, the design of the FTLRP did not take into account an important 
social consideration valued by people in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. 
Relationships between rural folk in the communal areas of Zimbabwe are 
founded on historical African values, norms and traditions. The people in the 
communal areas have developed and nurtured strong bonds, bridges and 
links (types of social relationships) over generations and would certainly have 
preferred to preserve them. The social capital dimension in the resettlement 
areas as observed by Matondi (2012) has potential implications for this study. 
One of the study sites, Goromonzi district, also went through the “land 
revolution”. It is likely that there was a reconfiguration of the social 
organisation of communities triggered by the FTLRP in the district. Improved 
social capital in the new farming communities may have positive effects on 
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production and people’s well-being in general. Social cash transfers may be 
critical in strengthening or weakening this social capital among the newly 
resettled farmers.  
Scoones et al. (2010:250) make the case for provision of social protection 
support in the resettlement areas. The authors point out that not every new 
settler will succeed. Field data from Masvingo study sites show that some 
resettled farmers are struggling, while others have opted out, abandoning land 
and returning to their places of origin (ibid.). Matondi (2012:233) observes that 
the new resettlement areas face multiple crises, and are struggling to meet 
the demands of the new social communities. The former farm workers need 
government support for alternative livelihoods after most of them lost their 
jobs and economic opportunities during the FTLRP era.  
Social protection in the resettlement areas comprises largely of informal 
safety net systems through kinship and links with former homes and church 
networks (ibid.). Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and other civil 
society organisations that provide humanitarian and relief aid have limited 
presence in resettlement areas because most have adopted policies that 
prohibit them from delivering aid to resettlement areas as they regard the 
settlements as “contested land”. Scoones et al. (2010) suggest diverse social 
protection instruments to support the poor and vulnerable groups in 
resettlement areas: agricultural input support schemes, livestock restocking 
through small stock loans, school fees assistance for children of resettled 
farmers and of former farm workers who are still resident in farm compounds, 
and provision of basic farming equipment. Social protection instruments 
should be tailor-made to cater for the socially-differentiated classes of people 
in resettlement areas. 
1.3.3 Operation Murambatsvina  
An otherwise innocent term, “Operation Murambatsvina” (also called 
Operation Restore Order) which refers to cleaning up or rejecting filth and 
chaos, is synonymous with a brutal operation which left thousands of 
Zimbabweans without shelter, means of livelihoods, and access to basic 
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services. Operation Murambatsvina, launched on 19 May 2005, represents an 
excessive and disproportionate nationwide destruction of “what the 
Government [of Zimbabwe] termed illegal vending sites, structures, other 
informal business premises and homes, literally displacing hundreds of 
thousands of people” (UN 2005:12).   The operation targeted urban areas and 
major cities. Slums, shacks, and informal markets, trading and vending sites 
were destroyed.  The Government of Zimbabwe argued strongly that it was 
compelled to reassert the rule of law and halt the chaos resulting from rapid 
urbanisation between 1980 and 2005 (ibid.). The authorities blamed the urban 
poor and informal traders for the rapidly deteriorating standards of health, 
housing and other services, crime rates and other socio-economic vices (ibid). 
However, a less benign rationale was put forward. Magaisa (2016:5) suggests 
that some analysts locate the basis of Operation Murambatsvina in politics. 
The author makes the point that analysts have argued that Operation 
Murambatsvina “was an [political] attempt to frustrate and diminish the 
population of urban voters supporting the opposition party as well as punish 
these supporters for their political allegiance.” The history of local government 
and national elections in Zimbabwe appears to support this notion. It has 
shown that urban areas are “strongholds for opposition parties, in particular, 
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) while rural areas represent the 
strongholds for the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic 
Front (ZANU PF)” (ibid.). Consequently the political outcome of Operation 
Murambatsvina was to weaken the MDC’s support base in urban areas. 
Operation Murambatsvina was started in the capital city, Harare, and rapidly 
evolved into a nationwide demolition and eviction campaign brutally executed 
by the combined force of State security organs: the police and the army; and 
the relevant local governments’ municipal authorities (ibid.). The best and 
most comprehensive account of the scope and effects of the Operation was 
produced in July 2005 by Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, the then Tanzanian 
director of the UN Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), whom the then UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed as a special envoy to investigate. 
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The UN (2005:7) found that: “Operation Restore Order, while purporting to 
target illegal dwellings and structures and to clamp down on alleged illicit 
activities, was carried out in an indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with 
indifference to human suffering, and, in repeated cases, with disregard to 
several provisions of national and international legal frameworks.” 
According to the UN (2005:7-8) specific findings of the UN mission were that:  
1. Because of the Operation’s speed and ferocity it resulted in the 
destruction of homes, business premises and vending sites.  
2. It was estimated that some 700,000 people in cities across the country 
lost either their homes, source of livelihoods or both.  
3. A further 2.4 million people (then 18 percent of Zimbabwe’s population) 
were indirectly affected in varying degrees. The vast majority of those 
directly and indirectly affected were the poor and disadvantaged 
categories of the population. They were projected to be in deeper in 
poverty, deprivation and destitution for a long time between then and 
the future and many were rendered vulnerable. 
4. Hundreds of thousands of women, men and children were made 
homeless, without access to food, water and sanitation, or health care.  
5. Education for an estimated 500 000 children of school age was 
disrupted, and with it long term consequences on human development.  
6. Many of the sick, including those with HIV and AIDS, lost access to 
care support and services. 
There is no doubt that 11 years after, the destruction wrought by Operation 
Restore Order constituted far-reaching and long-term social, economic, 
political and institutional consequence (ibid.). The UN asserted that: “The 
humanitarian consequences of Operation Restore Order are enormous. It will 
take several years before the people and society as a whole can recover” 
(ibid., 8).  
1.3.4 Global Political Agreement 
Political stability is a necessary condition for economic recovery and growth. 
The period between 2009 and 2013 was characterised by a stable socio-
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economic and political context. The Global Political Agreement (GPA) was 
signed by the country’s three main political parties in September 2008: 
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu PF) and the two 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations. The parties came 
together to agree the political terms under which they could all work together 
in the interest of the nation, following extensive diplomatic facilitation by the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). The GPA had been a 
consequence of the deadlock that Zimbabwe faced following inconclusive and 
disputed Presidential elections in March and June 2008. Political polarisation 
and violent tensions had arisen following a narrow Presidential election victory 
by the MDC-T leader in March 2008, a result that did not satisfy the 
constitutional requirement of a 50 percent plus one vote for an outright victory 
and subsequent power transfer.   
According to Kochan and Joffe (2011:10) the GPA’s Declaration of 
Commitment stated that: 
The Parties hereby declare and agree to work together to create a 
genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable 
solution to the Zimbabwe situation and in particular to implement the 
following agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the 
current political and economic situations and charting a new political 
direction for the country. 
The Inclusive Government or Government of National Unity (GNU) that 
resulted from the GPA facilitated the creation of a relatively peaceful and 
enabling environment for marginal economic growth and political 
development. It went some way to ease political tensions and restored the 
legitimacy of the Zimbabwe government in the eyes of the regional and 
international community. During the subsistence of the GPA, Zimbabwe 
adopted a Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) that 
introduced a multi-currency system dominated by the United States (US) 
dollar and the South African rand; removed price controls; halted 
hyperinflation; and committed to fiscal discipline while operating on a cash 
budget system. STERP facilitated stability of process and market-oriented 
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policies.  This enabled the country to move out of the previously protracted 
humanitarian crisis of the period 1997-2008. Zimbabweans demonstrated 
unity of purpose and fulfilled one of the major GPA commitments of 
developing a new constitution, subjecting it to a national referendum, and 
leading to the national elections of 31 July 2013.  
The July 31, 2013 national elections saw the end of a 5-year old GNU. The 
elections were observed by the SADC and the African Union (AU), and 
assessed as “free, peaceful and credible”. Zanu PF won the elections by a 
majority of votes in both the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. ZANU 
PF proceeded to form a Government, and in October 2013 launched a five 
year (2013-2018) national recovery and development programme called 
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation 
(ZimASSET), whose theme is “towards an empowered society and a growing 
economy.” The ZimASSET is a results-based plan anchored on four strategic 
clusters: food security and nutrition; social services and poverty eradication; 
infrastructure and utilities; value addition and beneficiation (Government of 
Zimbabwe 2013:9-10). The government hopes to achieve sustainable 
development and social equity. Indications thus far show that Government 
has not had sufficient fiscal space to implement the ZimASSET plan. Key 
result areas such as social protection and infrastructure development are 
lagging behind. 
Areas of concern in the policy context remain particularly the indigenisation 
and economic empowerment policy. The indigenisation rules came into force 
on 1 March 2010 and require companies and businesses with assets worth at 
least US$500 000 to cede 51 percent of their shareholding to indigenous 
partners. According to Magaisa (2015):  
The philosophy behind it [indigenisation policy] is hard to fault. The 
idea of locals benefiting from resources in their areas makes sense to 
anyone who cares about social justice and the need to protect the 
vulnerable against the aggressive nature of global capitalism…. 
Indeed, Zimbabwe is not the only country that has policies designed to 
protect local interests in this way. In 2009, Indonesia passed a new 
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mining law, banning the export of unprocessed minerals after January 
2014. It requires mining companies to process and refine raw minerals 
in Indonesia. The law also requires foreign shareholders in mining to 
divest shares in their businesses in order to achieve majority 
Indonesian ownership within 10 years from the commencement of 
commercial production. 
The indigenisation regulations appear to have caused real investment risk and 
capital protection concerns among foreign investors and have resulted in very 
limited foreign direct investment flows into the country. Consequently, this has 
affected prospects of economic recovery and growth. According to Dercon 
(2015), “investment is about risk as well as trust and it requires effective 
states and effective politics.” Zimbabwe has not been able to fulfil the two 
conditions. Dercon captures the essence of the role of policy in promoting 
inclusive growth through FDI by highlighting the five Cs that must be positively 
associated with policies: content, commitment, correction, clarity and 
certainty. Zimbabwe needs to pursue a politics in which leaders and elites are 
committed to growth and poverty reduction. Commitment include: clarity, 
limited reversals, no discretion, systematic implementation, more 
transparency, property rights and rule of law. 
1.3.5 International sanctions and isolation  
Zimbabwe has, over the past decade, received extensive adverse covert and 
overt international political and economic alienation by some few countries, 
including United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA) and the 
European Union as a bloc. The imposition of sanctions is contested by the 
Government of Zimbabwe which sees them as illegal as they are not backed 
by a United Nations resolution. The then Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) 
Governor in his detailed presentation of the analysis of the socio-economic 
effects of sanctions and measures against Zimbabwe assert that adverse 
international publicity, coupled with punitive measures by some foreign 
governments, multilateral institutions, as well as some private sector entities 
have worked to constrain the policy options available to the country, which in 
effect has worked to worsen the socio-economic environment, with the poor 
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and the vulnerable groups being the hardest hit (Gono 2006:2). According to 
the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed by parties to the coalition 
government in Zimbabwe in September 2008, the sanctions and measures 
imposed on Zimbabwe include the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic 
Recovery Act (ZIDERA) by the USA congress, which outlaws Zimbabwe’s 
right to access credit from international financial institutions in which the USA 
administration is represented or has a stake; suspension of balance of 
payment support; suspension of grants, offshore financing and infrastructure 
development support and; targeted travel bans against some government and 
business leaders (GPA 2008:3). The sanctions have been applied in response 
to perceived political and constitutional breaches by the Zimbabwean 
government, such as human rights violations from the perspectives of 
international conventions; disputed national elections, democratic governance 
deficits, and differences over the land reform programme (ibid.). 
The combined effects of the sanctions have seen a reversal of gains made in 
the education, health and infrastructure sectors. Poor people in rural 
communities have experienced the effects of the sanctions on agriculture 
development sectors through effects on irrigation schemes. The sanctions 
debate has divided and polarised Zimbabwean communities with some 
sections arguing that the imposed sanctions are targeted at specific 
individuals and have no adverse effects on the economy and the general 
population. Other sections of the Zimbabwean society assert that the 
international isolation resulting from the sanctions has significantly affected 
the wider economy and general population.  
Assessing the extant realities in Zimbabwe, sanctions are real, have had and 
continue to have wider effects on the economy and have adversely affected 
the poor and vulnerable populations in Zimbabwe. A lecture presentation at 
the University of Zimbabwe by the United Nations human rights chief, Navi 
Pillay, who visited Zimbabwe from 20-25 May 2012, concurred with the call for 
sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe to be lifted. The United Nations human 
rights chief called on the European Union and the United States to lift 
sanctions on Zimbabwe, stating they have worsened the country’s economic 
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problems with “quite serious ramifications for the poorest and most vulnerable 
who have also had to cope with the political instability and violence as well as 
a severe drought” (Pillay 2012). Kochan and Joffe (2011:26) make the point 
that: “These targeted sanctions continue to haunt Zimbabwe as it seeks to 
rebuild its political and economic position. They have been a barrier to growth 
and the progress of STERP and subsequent efforts by the country to increase 
the role and contribution of international investors.” The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) has also called on the foreign governments 
and entities that have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe to lift them. 
The preceding section discussed in detail the important policy factors, events 
and processes that shape Zimbabwe’s current socio-economic and political 
context. These factors have directly and indirectly combined to influence the 
development of social policy, social protection and cash transfer programmes 
aimed at reducing poverty, vulnerability and inequality among the poor 
Zimbabweans.  
The next section is an overview of social protection policy and programmes in 
Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe’s Harmonised Social Cash Transfer scheme is one 
such programme, and it is described in detail in the next chapter.  
1.4 Social protection in Zimbabwe 
Developing countries are increasingly formulating national social protection 
policies as part of strategies to eliminate poverty, and Zimbabwe is no 
exception. Social protection is enshrined in the national constitution of the 
country. Article 30 of the Zimbabwean constitution states that “… the state 
must take all practical measures, within the limits of the resources available to 
it, to provide social security and social care to those who are in need.” The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) also includes an inclusive and progressive 
Bill of Rights that accentuates the provision of social protection (Articles 80 to 
84). Included are socio-economic rights of women, children, the elderly and 
persons with disabilities. Emphasis is on equality of opportunities and non-
discrimination as well as empowerment and employment creation. 
 35 
 
Zimbabwe is a signatory to many of the international and regional conventions 
and agreements which provide legal bases for social protection. For example, 
Zimbabwe signed up to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976), 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1990), the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(1979), and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(2006). Zimbabwe endorsed the Social Policy Framework for Africa created 
by the First Session of the African Union (AU) Conference of Ministers in 
Charge of Social Development, in Windhoek, Namibia, in 2008. The AU, 
Schubert and Beales (as cited in Garcia & Moore 2012:41) state that the 
Social Policy Framework encourages countries to include social protection in 
their Poverty Reduction Strategies and National Development Plans, to reform 
and support existing programmes, to determine costs for a minimum social 
package, and to use social protection to protect impoverished people from 
adverse systemic shocks.  
From the foregoing it can be said that Zimbabwe’s social protection policy is 
located within the rights-based school and acknowledges resource constraints 
that may be faced by the state in fulfilling its social protection obligations. The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe accepts that scarcity of resources is a problem but 
insists that the government and other duty bearers must do all they can to 
allocate resources to the fulfilment of their obligations to rights holders. This 
approach is consistent with the international human rights instruments which 
incorporate the doctrine of the progressive realization of socio-economic 
rights. 
According to the World Bank (2015:3), as of 2015, 77 countries have a social 
protection policy in place, while 31 countries are currently planning or 
formulating one. Zimbabwe is one of the countries that have recently 
developed a social protection policy launched and endorsed by the 
government in Epworth on 9 December 2016. According to MOPSLSW 
(2015a:16) ‘social protection’ is operationally defined as “… a set of 
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interventions whose objective is to reduce social and economic risk and 
vulnerability and alleviate poverty and deprivation.” This definition is 
consistent with the one stated in the Zimbabwe Economic Development 
Strategy (2007). Zimbabwe’s definition of social protection adopts a wider 
scope to deliver social protection and describes all initiatives that: reduce 
poverty; protect the vulnerable against risks; and reduce the economic and 
social vulnerability of the poor, vulnerable and marginalised populations. 
Many of these socio-economic challenges which social protection 
interventions in Zimbabwe seek to address were consequences of the set of 
events, processes and factors described and analysed in the preceding 
section. Zimbabwe’s definition of social protection incorporates the key 
elements of responses to social-economic risk, poverty and vulnerability, first 
proposed by Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2010). In addition, Zimbabwe’s 
social protection policy includes four categories of instruments: provision, 
promotive, preventive and transformative measures – terminology first 
introduced by Guhan (as cited in Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2010:70). 
Provision, promotive, preventive and transformative social protection in the 
Zimbabwean context includes programmes that provide social insurance, 
social assistance, universal benefits and access to basic social services, 
labour market as well as livelihood support and resilience building 
interventions. 
1.4.1 Social protection programmes in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe’s social protection programmes include social assistance, social 
insurance and labour-market interventions. The social protection system 
addresses varied sources of risks and vulnerability particularly poverty, 
human capital development constraints, and labour market challenges such 
as retirement, sickness and loss of employment through retrenchments. 
Grosh et al. (2008:514) define social assistance programmes as: “non-
contributory transfer programmes targeted in some manner to the poor and 
those vulnerable to poverty and shocks”. Their definition is consistent with 
ILO’s which highlights that “social assistance provides support for those in 
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poverty” (Barrientos and Hulme 2010a:3). In some countries, social 
assistance is known as public assistance, and is tax-financed.  
The government, NGOs and development partners in Zimbabwe implement a 
range of social assistance including cash transfers, in-kind transfers, fee 
waivers for health care and education, public works and social care services 
(Blank 2014:11). The Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) is the main 
social assistance instrument aimed at assisting the extremely poor and most 
vulnerable groups in the country. It is the subject of this study and is 
described in detail in the next chapter. 
The next section is an outline of the problem statement, aim and objectives, 
research questions, importance, scope and limitations of the study. 
1.5 Problem statement and justification of the study 
1.5.1 Background to research problem 
The efficient, effective and sustainable delivery of public goods and services 
requires that considerable attention be given to the analyses of social effects 
of development policies, projects and programmes. Analysing the social 
effects of development policies and projects has particular significance for 
understanding the plight of the poor and the social appropriateness of 
interventions. Two other important factors support the rationale for analysing 
social effects of polices and projects: (i) development interventions are 
implemented in social settings and often involve social activities; and (ii) 
programmes are often targeted to a subset of the population in a given 
geographical location mainly because of resource limitations which preclude 
universal reach. Targeting implies some form of changes to the social 
organisation of communities. 
The term “social capital” is a broad and multidimensional concept applicable 
across different fields. One of the most influential authors in the social capital 
literature, Putman (1993:167) defines the term as “features of social 
organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions.” Other prominent scholars: 
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Fukuyama, Bourdieu, Coleman, Ostrom, Lin, Woolcock, Loury, Grootaert and 
van Bastelaer, and Burt think of social capital as social structure, social 
relations, social networks, membership in associations, institutions, collective 
action, and cooperation.  
Social capital is an important organising concept within the broader framework 
of social analysis, and the concept can be used in analysing the social effects 
of development policies and programmes at household and community levels. 
It’s a term that has facilitated the insertion of social thinking into development 
policy and practice. There is significant evidence in development literature 
pointing to poverty alleviation projects almost always drawing upon and 
affecting social capital at the household and community levels. For example, 
many microfinance schemes have based their programme design and 
implementation on an analysis of social relationships. In-depth analyses of the 
schemes have shown that several forms of social capital have intervened in 
the success of the programmes, that is, different forms of social capital played 
a role in the functioning of the programmes  (Foschi 2008:479). One of the 
major assertions in the social capital and development literature is that social 
capital can facilitate the solution of collective action problems and improves 
the effectiveness of development projects (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004:11). 
Grootaert 1998; Narayan and Pritchett 1997; Seligson 1999; Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna 2000 (as cited in Krishna 2008:457) found from analyses 
undertaken in parts of the developing world similar positive associations 
between social capital and community development outcomes. The analyses 
concluded that increasing the stock of social capital should help, therefore, to 
improve development results within communities benefitting from 
development projects. 
According to Woolcock (1998:183) “[i]t is impossible to understand the 
prospects of development policies and projects without knowing the 
characteristics of social relations at both the micro and macro level ….” Social 
relations play an important role in shaping and mediating development 
outcomes. Woolcock contends that development projects should seek to 
“create, nurture and sustain” those forms of social capital that build 
 39 
 
participatory communities “that are empowered to assume increasing levels of 
responsibility for their own well-being while also building linkages between 
local communities and formal institutions,” in order to achieve development 
outcomes (ibid., 187). The concept of social capital is discussed in detail in 
the theoretical framework and literature review chapters of the present study. 
Cash transfer interventions are an important component of development 
policy and social protection instruments. Cash transfers have recently become 
a popular poverty alleviation strategy in low and middle-income countries. In 
the last decade, an increasing number of sub Saharan African governments in 
partnership with development agencies, civil society organisations and United 
Nations agencies have introduced and promoted universal and targeted cash 
transfers as part of their social protection response strategies.  
1.5.2 Explaining the research problem 
Cash transfers are contributing significantly to the development of a culture of 
evaluation in the field of social protection. To date cash transfers are among 
the most rigorously researched and evaluated development interventions. The 
existing evidence base of the effects of CTs on social outcomes in the CT 
literature is limited and weak. The discussion on social effects of CTs has 
been peripheral and the patterns of the effects remain unclear. The current 
and extensive body of literature discusses and disseminates effects on human 
development outcomes – health, education, food security and nutrition. 
Another strand of evidence is on the economic effects of cash transfers. In 
most cases CT effects on social outcomes are incidental to findings focusing 
on economic and human capital dimensions. Very few studies give a 
comprehensive and systematic account of the effects of CT programmes on 
social outcomes in general and social capital in particular. Adato 2000; 
Attanasio, Pellerano and Polania 2008; Attanasio, Pellerano and Reyes 2009; 
Hidrobo, Hoddinott, Margolies, Moreira and Peterman 2012; Hossain, Brook, 
Garbarino, Notosusanto, Noor and Seda 2012; Cameron and Shar 2013; 
Daidone, Handa, Davis, Park, Osei and Osei-Akoto 2015; and FAO 2015 
have separately explored the effects of cash transfers on social capital 
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dimensions such as social networks, social institutions, collective active, 
cooperation, trust and social cohesion.  
The concern about the recognisably little attention paid to social effects of 
cash transfer programmes is shared by several authors in the CT literature. 
MacAuslan and Riemenschneider (2011:1) argue that “[i]t is rare to find 
analyses of cash transfers that… comment on how cash transfer programmes 
impact on social relations and how social relations in turn impact on poverty.” 
Usually CT analysis focus on the first order effects and implicitly put a lower 
value on social effects (ibid.) Cameron and Shar (2013:381) state that “… 
there has been little attention paid to the social consequences of mistargeting 
in the economics literature.” Attanasio, Pellerano and Reyes (2009:140) 
observe that the effects of CCTs on human capital outcomes are well-
documented but that the effect on social capital “remains an object of 
speculation and the topic of a variety of anecdotes.” Calvo (2011:55) notes 
that most of the CT impact evaluation studies are rooted in the economic 
disciplines and “there is a recognisable lack of analyses from social science 
disciplines related to the historical, cultural, political, social, and family 
implications ….” Consequently, the effects of CTs on social capital is an area 
understudied. 
It is evident in the CT literature that present state of knowledge of social 
effects of cash transfers has focused on conditional cash transfers and most 
of the studies were conducted in Latin America. CT programmes in Latin 
America are predominantly conditional cash transfers linked to human 
development outcomes: education, nutrition and health. For example 
Attanasio et al. (2009) studied the effects of a conditional cash transfer 
programme introduced by the Colombian government in 2002, Familias en 
Accion, on social capital. CT programmes in Sub Saharan Africa are 
predominantly unconditional, that is, households do not face set constraints in 
deciding how to use their cash. The literature on social effects of 
unconditional cash transfers is scant, and the research evidence base in Sub 
Saharan Africa is also limited but showing signs of growth due to the 
collaborative research efforts of FAO, UNICEF, and country governments. 
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The distinction between conditional and unconditional cash transfers can have 
profound effects and influence on various dimensions of social capital, for 
example, community social relations, collective action, and trust in individuals 
and institutions. The CT effects literature shows that effects of conditional 
cash transfers are largely found in human capital dimensions of nutrition, 
health and education. A key difference between conditional and unconditional 
cash transfers is the potential for the latter to affect a wider spectrum of 
behaviours including social capital outcomes. There is therefore an important 
need to contribute to the filling of the existing knowledge gap in the 
unconditional cash transfer and social capital literature. 
The Zimbabwe Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) programme is an 
unconditional cash transfer programme, and is part of the country’s national 
social protection policy. The programme was introduced in 2011 by the 
Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (MOPSLSW) in 
partnership with UNICEF and bilateral donor agencies. It is targeted to 
extremely poor households that are also labour-constrained in 19 districts. 
Each household approved by the programme receives between $10 and $25 
per month depending on size of the household. The programme’s stated 
objectives are: to strengthen the purchasing power of beneficiary households; 
enable beneficiary households to increase their consumption above the food 
poverty line; reduce the number of ultra-poor poor households; help 
beneficiaries avoid risky coping strategies; and lead to improved nutritional 
status, health and education outcomes especially for children living in 
recipient households (MOPSLSW 2014:7-8). 
The effect of HSCT on social outcomes in general and social capital in 
particular in the recipient households and communities has not been a focus 
of attention in the programme. An analysis of the design of the programme 
shows that there are clear objectives with respect to income effects namely 
that there are expectations to increase the purchasing power of households 
and improvements on human development outcomes for children in the 
beneficiary households. However there are no explicit objectives on social 
capital dimensions such as social relations, networks, trust and collective 
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action yet the extent to which the HSCT programme may have effects on 
these dimensions may have important implications for the achievement of the 
programme’s stated poverty reduction and human development objectives. 
Against such a background, this research will through an exploratory and 
descriptive study combining a quantitative survey and qualitative methods 
generate evidence on the social effects of the HSCT programme in selected 
case study sites. 
The current but limited research in the area of effects of cash transfers on 
social capital often lacks clear and robust theoretical frameworks through 
which to study or analyse the effects. At best, the studies mostly impact 
evaluations, have relied on standard economic frameworks to analyse effects 
of cash transfer programmes. Only one study in the reviewed CT literature, 
done by Attanasio, Pellerano and Reyes (2009), provides an explicit 
theoretical framework to guide its analysis of the effects of a CCT on trust and 
cooperative behaviour. The authors used a version of the public goods game 
theory – voluntary contribution mechanism to measure effects of a CT 
programme on social capital in Colombia. Several impact evaluation and 
qualitative studies identified and analysed in the CT literature are not 
grounded in scholarly theories of social capital. The frameworks of analyses 
are missing. As a result it is not easy to see clearly the variables of the 
studies, key concepts, approaches and interpretations. A six-country research 
study carried out under the auspices of FAO (2015) in Sub Saharan Africa 
analysed the economic and social effects of cash transfers in three 
interrelated areas: household economy, local economy, and social networks. 
The study reports positive effects of the CT programmes on different 
measures of social capital but does not provide a theoretical framework of 
analysis against which to explain the findings. The authors provide no 
connection between the findings and the relevant theoretical literature on the 
subject. The present study establishes and uses multiple theoretical 
frameworks drawn from social capital and social network theories to guide the 
entire research process. This is essential in order to adequately describe or 
explain phenomena. 
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Much of the empirical evidence on effects of cash transfer programmes has 
been generated from quantitative impact evaluations. These technically 
rigorous impact evaluations which rely on use of baseline and follow-up data, 
and use of control groups explore whether CT impacts observed are 
attributable to the CT programmes. Thus, the distinguishing feature of impact 
evaluations is the emphasis on examining causality. Impact evaluations make 
limited contributions to understanding cases, social phenomena and 
processes in CT programme settings. Thorbecke (2005:34-36) makes a 
similar point noting that “… the limitation of this approach [impact evaluations] 
is that it only provides a precise and robust answer to a very narrow question, 
i.e. ‘what is the effect of a specific program[me] within a specific context. … 
[t]he emphasis is on combating the econometric biases and problems often to 
the exclusion of the importance of larger structural and conceptual issues.” 
Randomised Control Trials, Difference in Difference estimates, Propensity 
Matching Scores and Regression Discontinuity Designs cannot generate 
useful data that can explain the effects of CT programmes on social relations 
or trust. The present study addresses the limitations of impact evaluation 
research designs by using a mixed methods approach which combines a 
quantitative household survey and qualitative methods to explore the social 
effects of the HSCT programme in the study communities.   
According to Barrientos and Hulme (2010a:12) “[a]n important constraint in 
the development of social protection in developing countries is the absence of 
a strong research base in universities and leading development institutes.” 
The authors make the point that “there are few researchers specialising in this 
area, even fewer in developing countries, and they are scattered across 
countries and institutions” (ibid., 13). The situation is different in the fields of 
education and health as they are supported by strong institutional research 
and policy bases. The significance of the observation by Barrientos and 
Hulme is that there is an “intellectual vacuum” in the evidence base for social 
protection. This is a present challenge, and an opportunity for scholars to 
contribute to filling the gap in social protection research especially considering 
the role, importance and popularity of social protection instruments such as 
cash transfers within the current development policy agenda in developing 
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countries. This study is therefore a contribution to the growth of scientific 
knowledge on a social protection instrument – HSCT, and will assist in better 
understanding of the social effects of relevant policies and programmes in 
Zimbabwe. 
With the above background this research will through an exploratory study 
utilising a household survey and qualitative methods investigate the social 
effects of an unconditional cash transfer – HSCT, through the social capital 
lens. The research will contribute to a growing body of scientific evidence on 
the effects of unconditional cash transfers on social capital. The study will 
draw out implications of its findings for social protection policy, and the design 
and implementation of similar UCT programmes in Zimbabwe and similar 
contexts elsewhere in the region. 
1.6 Research aim and objectives 
Social research can serve many purposes. The most common and useful 
purposes are exploration, description and explanation (Babbie 2010:92). The 
present study is primarily exploratory with some descriptive dimensions. It is 
exploratory because it seeks to investigate an understudied area - social 
effects of an unconditional cash transfers using the social capital lens - where 
little evidence and gaps exist, and has scope to generate hypotheses for 
further research. The descriptive dimension of the study allows for 
documenting and describing of salient features, events, social networks, trust, 
norms of behaviour, community activities, and processes occurring in the 
HSCT programme and study settings but within the boundaries of the overall 
study.  
The broad aim of the study was: 
To investigate the social effects of an unconditional cash transfer 
programme targeting the poorest segments of the population in a rural 
and an urban project setting in Zimbabwe.  
The concept of social capital and its associated dimensions of social 
networks, social relations, happiness, trust, norms of reciprocity, cooperation, 
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collective community action, and informal and formal institutions provide the 
lens through which to analyse the social effects of Zimbabwe’s Harmonised 
Social Cash Transfer programme. The research sought to contribute to, and 
fill gaps in the empirical knowledge base about the social effects of UCT 
programmes with particular focus on social capital. 
The specific objectives of the study were:  
1. To identify and analyse the key design and implementation features of 
the HSCT programme. 
2. To explore beneficiaries’ views, experiences and perceptions of the 
HSCT’s design and implementation features. 
3. To examine the effects of the HSCT on the structural dimensions of 
social capital (social networks, groups and membership associations, 
and social relations) in the study communities  
4. To assess the effects of the HSCT on cognitive dimensions of social 
capital, (trust, norms of reciprocity, collective action, individual 
psychosocial effects and participation in community activities) in the 
study  communities 
5. To identify the types of social capital (bonding, bridging and linking) 
affected by the introduction of a targeted unconditional cash transfer 
intervention in the study communities. 
6. To analyse the implications of the social effects of the HSCT for social 
protection policy and similar cash transfer schemes, and to propose 
suitable recommendations. 
1.6.1 Research questions 
All research begins with a topic but this is only a starting point that 
researchers must narrow to specific research questions. Research is 
designed around research problems and questions. All research questions 
apply to some group or category of people, organisations or other units. When 
refining a topic into research questions and designing a research study, one 
needs to consider practical limitations. Major limitations include time, costs, 
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access to resources, approval by authorities, ethical concerns and expertise 
(Neuman 2007:87).  
According to McCandless and Bangura (2008:129) developing research 
questions usually requires brainstorming, revision and careful reflection On 
the basis of the research topic identified, the formulated problem statement, 
aim and objectives, the study sought to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the key design and implementation features of the HSCT 
programme? How does the programme operate?  
2. How do the programme design and implementation features promote 
or constrain different dimensions and types of social capital? 
3. What are the beneficiaries’ views, experiences and perceptions of the 
HSCT’s design and implementation features? 
4. What are the views, perceptions and experiences of other stakeholders 
directly or indirectly involved with the HSCT in particular, non-
beneficiaries, community leaders, and HSCT focal persons?  
5. What are the effects of the HSCT on beneficiaries’ risk coping 
strategies? 
6. What are the effects of the HSCT on social relations within beneficiary 
households (genders and generations), between households 
(beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries), and between beneficiaries and 
people from public institutions? Are there other social relations affected 
by the introduction of the HSCT in the two study communities? 
7. What are the effects of the HSCT on trust, norms of reciprocity, 
collective action, individual psychosocial dimensions and participation 
of beneficiaries in community activities? 
8. What are the effects of the HSCT on social networks and membership 
associations or groups? Does the HSCT facilitate the formation of new 
membership groups and social networks, and/or changes to existing 
social networks? Which types of social networks and membership 
associations are most affected by the HSCT?  
9. Does the HSCT facilitate creation of new, and strengthening of existing 
social capital bonds, bridges and links within and across households 
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and the wider community? What are the negative effects of the HSCT 
on different dimensions and types of social capital? 
10. What are the unintended effects of the HSCT in the study 
communities?  
11. What are the implications of the findings for social protection policy and 
the design and implementation of future UCT programmes? 
1.7 Importance of the study 
The distinctive added value of this study lies in the following key dimensions. 
I. The study intends to contribute to the expansion of the scientific 
knowledge and understanding of the social effects of unconditional 
cash transfers through the social capital lens in specific project 
contexts: peri-urban and rural. 
II. The research intends to potentially widen the scope and orientation of 
future unconditional cash transfer programmes by making social capital 
an orienting or strategic concept in the design and implementation of 
unconditional cash transfer programmes.  
III. The study establishes a broad social theoretical framework upon which 
to analyse the findings. The framework of analysis draws from social 
capital and social network theories. Within the two theoretical 
frameworks are sub-theories integrating various social concepts which 
are useful for discussion and analysis of the social effects of the HSCT 
in recipient communities.  This gave the study theoretical strength, and 
is a positive change in the research approach when compared with 
previous similar studies whose focus of attention was long on 
influencing policy and scaling up programmes and short on 
contributions to the academic and theoretical literature. 
IV. The study is a contribution to the growth of academic research on the 
subject of social protection in a developing country context. Research 
in this area in academic institutions in developing countries is currently 
limited yet demand for social protection policies and programmes as 
parts of poverty reduction strategies is growing rapidly in developing 
countries. 
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V. By adopting a mixed methods approach – combining a quantitative 
household survey with qualitative methods - the study has considerable 
methodological strength, thus, enabling contexts, processes, and 
series of events instigated by the introduction of cash transfers in 
research communities to be explored and understood. 
VI. The study’s findings and recommendations have important policy and 
practical applicability in the field of social protection in general and 
cash transfers in particular. Zimbabwe recently developed its social 
protection policy framework, and a specific social transfers’ policy to 
guide implementation and coordination in the sector. Findings and 
recommendations from this study could be fed into these polices during 
policy review forums. 
1.8 Limitations to and scope of the study  
The scope of the study outlines the frame of reference of the research by 
clearly presenting the limits or parameters of the study. In the undertaken 
study the parameters clarify the extent of the study in terms of the time-frame, 
concept, theme and geographical area. 
The study focused on the research question of the social effects of 
unconditional cash transfers using the social capital lens. The study was 
limited in its focus and primary data collection to Goromonzi, a rural district in 
Mashonaland East province, and Epworth, a peri-urban settlement in Harare 
province in Zimbabwe. The study was delimited to a specific unconditional 
cash transfer programme, the HSCT, a five year (2011-2016) programme 
currently being implemented by the Zimbabwe Government in 19 districts.  
The study was not a cash transfer impact evaluation but a case study 
research which combined a quantitative household survey and qualitative 
research methods. The study captured the views and perceptions of 
household and community members, and programme officials focusing on 
social effects of the HSCT in four wards across two project settings – Epworth 
and Goromonzi. 
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The study was in no way conclusive or representative. It was limited to four 
wards, that is, two wards in each sampled district. The study was specific to 
the temporal context of the communities in the sample. It sought to provide 
comprehensive and internally valid findings which could provide strong 
indications of the social effects of an unconditional cash transfer in Goromonzi 
and Epworth districts within which the sampled wards are based. In addition 
the findings may provide general insights of the link between social cash 
transfers and social capital at the wider district and national levels. The 
limitation of resources and capacity available to the researcher did not make 
possible a sampling framework that is representative of all the districts 
covered by the HSCT programme.  
The selected districts represent different economic, political, social, cultural 
and institutional environments. In this regard, the research was in no way a 
cross-case comparison study. It sought to generate case-specific evidence 
which will contribute to the growth of the evidence base about the social 
effects of unconditional cash transfers in Sub Saharan Africa. 
The social capital literature is replete with many definitions and interpretations 
of the concept. For the purposes of the present study the main emphasis is on 
the following dimensions of social capital: social networks, social relations, 
social exchange, local membership associations, participation in community 
activities, trust, cooperation, and norms that govern interactions among 
individuals, households and communities. The study utilised both the 
structural and cognitive dimensions of social capital, and is limited to the three 
types of social capital: bonding, bridging and linking. 
Data was be collected at the individual, household, community and district 
levels, and included an extensive review and analysis of key programme 
documents; fieldwork visits; structured observations at HSCT payment points; 
focus group discussions; beneficiary case studies; and key informant 
interviews in the two project settings.  
The full research design and methodology is described in detail in Chapter 
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1.9 Outline of thesis and chapter contents 
The thesis is organised in six chapters with the following headings. 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
The chapter provides a detailed outline of the national context. The socio-
economic and political conditions that frame Zimbabwe’s social protection 
context and the HSCT programme are presented. An overview of the social 
protection policy and social assistance programmes in Zimbabwe is provided. 
This presents a nuanced foundation and framework for understanding the 
HSCT programme. The problem statement is formulated and descriptions of 
the research aim and objectives; an outline of the research questions; 
importance of the study; and the scope and limitation of the research are 
provided. The chapter concludes with a structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2: Description of the Zimbabwe Harmonised Social Cash Transfer 
programme and research districts. 
An outline of the origins, specific policy context and a description of HSCT’s 
design and operational features are presented. The information is drawn from 
a review of the programme’s founding documents. The chapter also includes 
district and community profiles of the two study sites – Epworth and 
Goromonzi. 
Chapter 3: Literature review and the theoretical framework 
The chapter integrates the research topic into a broader framework of existing 
and relevant cash transfer and social capital literature. The extensive 
literature review covers the key concepts and theoretical orientations of CTs 
social capital, and social networks. The chapter traces the origins and 
expansion of CT programmes as social protection instruments for reducing 
poverty, vulnerability and inequality. It explores the design and 
implementation features of CT programmes and highlights the key debates in 
the CT literature particularly on conditional and unconditional CTs, and 
targeting. The state of the evidence of social effects of CTs is presented and 
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analysed. The unintended consequences of CTs are distilled from the works 
of various researchers. This is followed by a tracing of the historical 
development and conceptual origins of social capital. The main definitions, 
dimensions and types of social capital are examined. The chapter examines 
measurement challenges associated with social capital. This is followed by an 
outline of the positive and negative effects of social capital. The chapter 
concludes with a presentation of the theoretical framework which guides the 
analysis of the effects of the HSCT on social capital. The framework is derived 
from the field of sociology with a focus on social capital and social network 
theories. 
Chapter 4: Research design and methodology 
The chapter is a discussion of the research approach, design, data collection 
methods, study populations and sampling, data analysis and ethical 
considerations for the study. Every aspect of the research process is 
explained.  
Chapter 5: Results – presentation and interpretation 
The chapter presents primary data collected from the field and secondary 
data from a review of relevant research documents. A description of the actual 
sample and its characteristics is described. The main research findings - 
positive and negative are described and summarised. The research findings 
are presented according to themes and sub themes.  
Chapter 6: Discussion, conclusions and recommendations 
The chapter presents a comprehensive discussion and critical analysis of the 
study’s findings in relation to similar studies, theory and practice. This is 
followed by an outline of the implications of the study’s findings for social 
protection policy and cash transfer programmes. Then recommendations for 
future research are provided. The chapter concludes with a section on the 
study’s contributions to research. 
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section. The references are the sources cited as well as sources consulted. 
The sources include but are not limited to books, journals, working papers, 
government documents, programme reports and presentations. The 
bibliography is arranged alphabetically, by authors’ surnames and provides 
the publishing information 
Appendices:  
The section contains the following documents: letter seeking request to 
conduct academic research; permission to conduct research from the Ministry 
of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare; research introductory letter from 
UNISA; and ethical clearance from UNISA. Additionally, selected research 
instruments used in the study are also presented in this section.  
1.10 Summary and conclusion 
The chapter presented the national context and gave an outline of the 
research. The fundamental issues related to the well-being of the people of 
Zimbabwe, socio-economic conditions, demographic factors, HIV and AIDS 
epidemic, labour market conditions, political context, and the policy 
environment were presented and discussed. Poverty, inequality and 
vulnerability in Zimbabwe are intricately linked to the socio-economic 
conditions and the type of political settlement obtaining in Zimbabwe. The 
decline of Zimbabwe’s economic and social indicators has been protracted 
with limited patches of stability and recovery particularly during the period of 
the coalition government between 2009 and 2013. The protracted crisis has 
informalised the economy with more people becoming poor in both rural and 
urban communities. Extreme poverty is more prevalent in rural than urban 
areas. Youth unemployment is high carrying with it the concern that 
Zimbabwe is missing out on the demographic dividend. Zimbabwe is now a 
net importer of many basic commodities including maize. Agriculture 
productivity and production levels are low due to recurrent droughts, and a 
contested land reform programme. Zimbabwe’s HDI has remained in the low 
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HDI category and recent data showed that the country’s HDI is below the 
average for Sub-Saharan Africa. The low HDI values show that the country is 
facing challenges in reducing poverty. The government has come up with 
several policy measures aimed at promoting social and economic recovery, 
and development. The ZIMASSET is one such policy measure introduced in 
2013 and aims to promote sustainable development and social equity. An 
overview of Zimbabwe’s social protection policy and social assistance 
programmes was provided. The HSCT is the main social assistance 
intervention and it’s targeted at the extremely poor and vulnerable populations 
in the country. It is also the subject of this study. The national context 
presented in this chapter provided the foundation for understanding the 
rationale, relevance and appropriateness of the Harmonised Social Cash 
Transfer programme in Zimbabwe. 
This chapter included a detailed outline of the research. The background to 
the research problem was presented and this was followed by a formulation of 
the problem statement. The research problem is informed by multiple factors 
identified through a comprehensive review of the relevant literature. The 
review highlighted limited empirical evidence and gaps in the research on 
social effects of unconditional cash transfers. Much of the empirical evidence 
is on economics and human development effects. The theoretical base of the 
research conducted to date is inadequate as few studies identify clear 
theoretical frameworks to guide the research. The aim and objectives of the 
study were stated and the research questions guiding the research were 
outlined. The significance of the study, scope and demarcations were also 
presented. The study adopted a mixed method design relying on a 
quantitative household survey and qualitative methods. The full research 
design, including a detailed presentation of methodologies including sampling, 
data collection instruments, ethical considerations and analysis of results is 
described in Chapter 4.  
The next chapter provides an outline of the HSCT programme. Included in the 
chapter are district and community profiles of Epworth and Goromonzi – the 
two locations selected for this research.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
DESCRIPTION OF THE ZIMBABWE HARMONISED CASH 
TRANSFER PROGRAMME, AND STUDY DISTRICTS 
2.1 Introduction 
The chapter provides a brief background and description of the HSCT 
programme by tracing its origins, and discussing its policy context. The 
chapter then presents an outline of the programme’s main design features 
including coverage, targeting, institutional setting, and management and 
implementation structures. Included in this chapter are district and community 
profile summaries of Epworth and Goromonzi – two districts selected for the 
purpose of this research. The purpose of providing the profiles of the study 
districts and communities is to give an early understanding of the research 
settings. Epworth is a peri-urban and largely informal settlement. Goromonzi 
is a rural district with mostly communal, resettled and commercial farmers. 
2.2 The policy context of the HSCT programme 
Zimbabwe is a low-income developing country. The context for social 
protection policy and the HSCT programme in the country is characterised by 
several factors which interact and form an intricate web of a complex 
development problem. The key contextual factors most of which were 
elaborated in the previous sections are summarised here: worsening poverty, 
vulnerability and inequality trends; HIV and AIDS pandemic; abuse, 
exploitation and violence against children and women; decline in economic 
growth; high unemployment and underemployment; population 
displacements; food and nutrition insecurity among individuals and 
households; political uncertainty; policy inconsistencies and paralysis in some 
cases; the state’s inability to deliver essential basic services; and threats to 
human capital development. 
Over the years the government of Zimbabwe has crafted and pursued 
national policies that sought to ensure that the interests of the poor and 
vulnerable segments of the population are protected, promoted and 
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transformed through a range of social protection programmes. The 
programme measures range from labour market interventions, user-fee 
exemptions for accessing health education and other basic services, civil 
protection interventions to assist victims of natural disasters such as floods, 
food aid in times of droughts, price controls, social insurance, livelihoods and 
resilience programmes, and social assistance programmes. These 
programmes form the bases of Zimbabwe’s social policy, and social 
protection programmes.  
Specific policies targeting the poor and vulnerable groups in Zimbabwe 
include: Gender Policy; National Orphan Care Policy; HIV/AIDS Policy and 
Strategic Framework; National Action Plan for Orphans and other Vulnerable 
Children (NAP for OVC); National Social Protection Policy (NSPP); and the 
Social Transfer Policy (STP). 
The NSPP, STP, and NAP for OVC have particular relevance to the origins of 
the HSCT programme. The NSPP is the overarching policy framework guiding 
the systematic implementation and coordination of all social protection 
programmes in Zimbabwe. All social protection instruments come together 
under the NSPP to constitute a coherent social protection system. The HSCT 
is one of the key programmes of Zimbabwe’s social protection system. The 
STP is a specific policy framework for social transfers, both cash and in-kind 
transfers. It is designed to direct the focus of social transfer programmes to 
the extremely poor and vulnerable population groups in Zimbabwe (MOLSS 
2011:22). The STP prioritises six outcomes for the extremely poor and 
vulnerable groups:  
1. Increased access to complementary welfare support; 
2. Restoration of sustainable livelihoods; 
3. Asset protection and creation; 
4. Human capital formation; 
5. Empowerment of marginalised groups and the most vulnerable; and 
6. Productivity enhancement (ibid., 20-21). 
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The HSCT programme is one of the social transfer instruments that channels 
direct cash payments to the chronically poor and labour constrained 
households (MOLSS 2011:14). It is currently Zimbabwe’s main social transfer 
programme. 
In response to the concern for the welfare of OVC, the Government of 
Zimbabwe with technical and financing assistance from UNICEF, 
development donors, and NGOs designed the NAP for OVC in 2004. The first 
phase of NAP for OVC ran from 2004 to 2010. A second phase began in 2011 
and ended in 2015. The third phase (NAP for OVC III) was finalised, and 
launched by Government of Zimbabwe in December 2016. The NAP for OVC 
III is designed to contribute to the reduction of extreme poverty through 
empowering and building resilience in poor, vulnerable and disadvantaged 
households (Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare 2016b:12). 
The NAP for OVC III has four programme pillars namely: 
1. Household economic security, 
2. Access to basic social services, 
3. Child protection and safeguarding, and  
4. Systems strengthening (ibid., 21). 
The HSCT is a key component of NAP for OVC III and it is the primary social 
protection and CT instrument responding to the first pillar. It was introduced in 
2011 by the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare through the 
Department of Social Services (DSS). The HSCT is jointly funded by the 
Government of Zimbabwe and donors, while UNICEF provides technical 
assistance and supplementary financial support. The Child Protection Fund 
(CPF) is the financing mechanism through which donors’ and government’s 
funds are channeled to the HSCT. The CPF is managed by UNICEF. Donors 
contributing to the CPF include the European Commission, the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA), and the Swiss Agency for 
Development Cooperation (SDC). DFID is the largest donor to the CPF 
(UNICEF 2014:7). 
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2.3 Description of the HSCT programme 
2.3.1 Programme objectives 
The HSCT is an unconditional cash transfer programme. The overall goal of 
the programme is to alleviate short-term poverty and encourage long-term 
human capital development. Its specific objectives are to: 
1. Strengthen the purchasing power of 55,000 ultra-poor households 
which are at the same time labour-constrained, 
2. Empower beneficiary households to increase their consumption above 
the food poverty line, reducing the number of ultra-poor households, 
and help recipient households to avoid risky coping strategies such as 
child labour and early marriage, 
3. Improve nutrition status, health and education outcomes as well as 
reduction of mortality for children living in beneficiary household 
(MOLSS 2014:7). 
2.3.2 Coverage 
The HSCT programme is present in all 10 provinces of Zimbabwe, and takes 
place in 19 out of a total of 65 districts in Zimbabwe. On average two selected 
districts in each of the 10 provinces receive HSCT assistance. The targeted 
districts are the poorest within the country’s 10 provinces. In the context of 
limited financial resources, the selection of the 19 districts was done using a 
two-phase approach. During phase 1 between October 2011 and January 
2012, the first 9 HSCT districts were selected. The districts were selected 
based on an analysis of triangulated poverty incidence data from three 
sources: (1) the 2003 Poverty Assessment Situation Survey (PASS), (2) the 
2010 National Nutrition Survey, and (3) the 2010 Zimbabwe Vulnerability 
Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) report. The data were adjusted to include a 
mix of urban and rural populations (UNICEF 2012:7-8). Phase 2 taking an 
incremental approach, added 10 more districts to the HSCT programme 
between June and December 2013. The HSCT programme targets all wards 
in the selected districts. It is expected that the HSCT will eventually be 
expanded to cover all the 65 districts in Zimbabwe if the government secures 
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enough funding from various sources including funds from national treasury. 
The table below shows the 10 provinces in Zimbabwe and their respective 
HSCT programme districts. 
Table 2.1: Zimbabwe's ten provinces and the HSCT programme districts 
Province 
 
HSCT programme district Phase 1 
district 
Phase 2 
district 
Bulawayo Bulawayo √  
Harare Epworth √  
 St. Mary’s  √ 
Manicaland Buhera  √ 
 Makoni 
Rusape 
√  
Mashonaland 
Central 
Bindura  √ 
 Rushinga √  
Mashonaland 
East 
Goromonzi √  
 Mudzi  √ 
Mashonaland 
West 
Kariba rural1 
Kariba urban 
√  
 Zvimba  √ 
Matabeleland 
North 
Binga  √ 
 Umguza √  
Matabeleland 
South 
Bulilima  √ 
 Mangwe 
Plumtree 
√  
Midlands Gokwe  √ 
 Zvishavane √  
Masvingo Chivi √  
 Mwenezi  √ 
Source: MOPSLSW MIS 2016a
                                            
1 Kariba, Mangwe and Makoni are shown as their constituent urban and rural populations. 
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Map 2.1: Map of Zimbabwe - provinces and HSCT districts in national 
context 
 
Source: UNICEF (2014:4). 
2.3.3 Beneficiary targeting and verification 
The HSCT scheme targets households. According to the HSCT manual of 
operations, beneficiary households are eligible for assistance under the 
scheme if they are simultaneously food-poor and labour-constrained. A 
household is food-poor when: 
• Household members live below the food poverty line – suffer from 
chronic hunger and malnutrition. 
• They are unable to meet their most urgent and important basic needs. 
They take only one or no meal per day; and are not able to purchase 
essential non-food items like soap, clothing, and school necessities. 
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• They have no productive assets and receive no regular assistance 
from relatives, pensions and other welfare programmes.  
• They are reliant on begging. (MOPSLSW 2014:7). 
A household is labour-constrained when: 
• It has no able bodied household member in the age group 18 to 59, 
who are fit for productive work, or  
• One household member in the age group 18 to 59 years, who is fit for 
work has to care for more than 3 dependents (household members that 
are under 18 years of age or over 59 or are unfit for work because they 
are chronically ill, or disabled or handicapped or are still schooling) or 
• A household has a dependency ratio between 2 and 3 but has a 
severely disabled or chronically sick household member who requires 
intensive care (ibid.). 
The “labour-constrained” criterion is applied in the programme in order to 
support households that are unable to benefit sufficiently from labour-based 
instruments such as public works or informal piece jobs (ibid., 8). 
The household targeting is conducted through proxy means tests 
administered by enumerators who are external to the community. According 
to the MOPSLSW (2014:10) the HSCT follows a two-stage targeting process 
to identify food-poor and labour-constrained households. First, enumerators 
collect census data on demographic and poverty proxy indicators from all 
households in all wards in the selected geographic district (ibid.). Second, a 
verification process consisting of various checks is done. The purpose of the 
verification is to improve the quality and accuracy of the targeting process. 
The verification process may result in a red flag signalling the need for 
investigations.  
The current data on the structure of HSCT beneficiary households is given in 
the table below: The data shows that HSCT households have more children, 
orphans, and chronically ill or disabled members. There are more HSCT 
households headed by females. Some households have labour capacity. 
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Table 2.2: Number and structure of HSCT beneficiary households by district 
Source: MOPSLSW Management Information System (MIS) (2016a).
District 
name
Total no. 
of HHs 
surveyed
Total no. of 
Beneficiary 
HHs
No of 
HHs 
headed 
by 
Elderly
No of 
HHs 
headed 
by 
Women
No of 
HHs 
headed 
by 
Children
No of 
HHs  
with 
Children
No of HH 
Members
No of 
Elderly 
HH 
Members 
60+
No. 
Males 
60+
No. of 
Females 
60+
Children 
below 18
Adults 
19 to 59
No of 
Orphans
No of 
Orphans 
Boys
No of 
Orphans 
Girls
No. of 
disabled or 
chronically - 
ill HH 
members
Adults 
Fit for 
Work 19 
to 59
No. of 
Males Fit 
for Work 
19 to 59
No. of 
Females 
Fit for 
Work 19 
to 59
Bindura 24822 2054 1376 1222 9 1399 7895 1831 638 1193 3868 2196 1173 583 590 1702 1028 392 636
Binga 24473 2812 1954 2010 4 1949 11206 2537 717 1820 6128 2541 1090 526 564 1516 1424 274 1150
Buhera 45401 7944 4475 5241 70 6528 35209 5864 1712 4152 19574 9771 3824 1944 1880 6926 4390 1371 3019
Bulilima 15019 2760 1952 1907 16 2273 13674 2615 712 1903 7522 3537 1955 993 962 2329 1850 573 1277
Chivi 32659 3726 2793 2528 12 3157 19284 3972 1301 2671 9512 5800 3365 1668 1697 4400 2485 907 1578
Epworth 25437 293 168 161 0 218 1243 232 94 138 573 438 156 68 88 195 228 95 133
Gokwe 41473 3009 1725 1867 8 2321 12994 2334 723 1611 7142 3518 1661 834 827 2121 1839 567 1272
Goromonzi 33876 1553 1036 936 2 1162 7276 1403 495 908 3297 2576 1157 584 573 1212 1248 523 725
Kariba Rural 6625 461 223 310 0 375 2187 303 99 204 1036 848 270 138 132 445 380 162 218
Kariba Urban 4205 59 20 41 0 42 236 26 8 18 101 109 33 14 19 51 59 20 39
Makoni 52495 4977 3904 3226 14 3900 23207 5326 1771 3555 11068 6813 4194 2095 2099 5619 2789 1084 1705
Mangwe 11950 1774 1238 1166 5 1541 10297 1754 577 1177 5290 3253 1531 788 743 1450 1494 516 978
Mudzi 25895 4316 3138 2824 47 3000 16402 4315 1389 2926 8631 3456 2580 1272 1308 1701 1779 425 1354
Mwenezi 31064 4774 2580 2938 24 4157 25399 3679 1314 2365 14845 6875 3903 2000 1903 3517 3738 1055 2683
Mzilikazi 50220 2765 1700 1760 23 1940 11415 2271 770 1501 5200 3944 1008 472 536 2576 1678 568 1110
Plumtree 2258 28 14 19 0 22 118 17 6 11 59 42 21 8 13 21 23 5 18
Rusape 6160 151 81 109 1 102 639 107 31 76 280 252 72 34 38 148 106 41 65
Rushinga 23492 777 572 492 1 637 3857 816 264 552 1767 1274 585 295 290 631 563 228 335
St Marys 16275 479 242 306 3 338 1816 314 95 219 835 667 214 106 108 366 309 126 183
Umguza 12654 1246 872 648 0 1022 6777 1320 558 762 3329 2128 1087 555 532 1235 972 401 571
Zvimba 50338 4018 2309 1962 12 2921 16299 3191 1269 1922 8027 5081 1378 709 669 3616 2424 920 1504
Zvishavane 12134 1168 907 764 1 965 5945 1243 404 839 2865 1837 981 482 499 1045 788 304 484
Totals 548925 51144 33279 32437 252 39969 233375 45470 14947 30523 120949 66956 32238 16168 16070 42822 31594 10557 21037
Proportion 
of relevant 
total 9% 65% 63% 0% 78% 19% 33% 67% 52% 29% 27% 50% 50% 18% 14% 33% 67%
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2.3.4 Cash transfer value 
The HSCT benefit level varies by household size. Each eligible household on 
this programme is entitled to a free, unconditional cash transfer every two 
months (bi-monthly). Although the beneficiary households are free to spend 
the transfer in any way they want the programme encourages them to direct 
the transfers towards households’ and children’s basic needs including 
education, health, food and nutrition.  
Table 2.3: HSCT transfer values 
Criteria Amount per month 
1 person household USD10 
2 person household USD15 
3 person household USD20 
4 person household USD25 
Source: MOPSLSW (2014:8). 
For households with over four members, the transfer size remains constant. 
The median cash transfer is set as USD20 per household per month. The 
HSCT transfer amounts were harmonised with the prevailing (at the time the 
HSCT was designed) food basket offered to the poor and vulnerable 
households by other welfare programmes, and payments set by the 
MOPSLSW for the Public Works programme (ibid.). 
2.3.5 Payment delivery method and process 
The cash transfer is distributed regularly to eligible households on a bi-
monthly basis. The HSCT implements a physical cash delivery method 
through a “Cash in Transit” (CIT) private sector security firm called Securico. 
Beneficiaries are paid at pay-point meetings organised by DSSOs at ward 
level and after a pre-disbursement speech by a representative from the 
DSSO. The speech informs beneficiaries about the objectives of the 
programme, advises on use of the cash transfer, outlines the payment 
process, and whom they should approach in case of complaints (ibid., 15). 
The HSCT uses a system for beneficiary proxy representation to assist those 
who have difficulties to travel to the pay-points, for example, the elderly, 
chronically sick, and disabled. The proxies are registered in the district and 
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national level MIS. (ibid.). The appointment of a proxy representative is 
permanent and the beneficiary household can only change a proxy in the 
event of the representative’s death or fraudulent activity by the representative. 
The proxy can only be changed in consultation with the DSSO (ibid., 18).  
At each payment point there are Payment Officers from the DSSO and the 
delivery agency, WCPC HSCT point persons, occasionally monitoring and 
quality control teams from Provincial Social Services Office (PSSO), and 
external observers. UNICEF staff may participate either as observers or 
sometimes to support actual payment administration (MOPSLSW 2015b:1). 
Payment procedures are laid out in the manual of operations and the HSCT 
payment step by step guide.  
The first HSCT payment cycle was undertaken from March to April 2012. The 
second cycle was in May and June and the third cycle was made in July and 
August 2012 (MOPSLSW MIS 2015). The MIS generates data for each pay 
cycle and shows number of beneficiaries enrolled in each district, number of 
beneficiaries on pay schedule, pay sheet amount, number of beneficiaries 
paid, amount paid, number of households not paid and pay sheet balances. 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 below are extracts from the HSCT MIS and provide 
summary information of payment distributions at district and ward levels for 
Epworth and Goromonzi.  
Table 2.4: 25th HSCT payment cycle - payment summary information for 
Epworth district 
Source: MOPSLSW MIS (2016a) 
The table shows that 293 households were on the HSCT pay sheet for the 
25th payment cycle carried out during the January to March 2016 period. Of 
the 293, a total of 278 households were paid. Fifteen were not paid for various 
Payment Cycle Number and 
Period
District 
Name
Ward 
Number
Number of Hholds 
on Paysheet
Number 
Paid
Value Paid in 
US$
Number 
Unpaid
Value Unpaid 
in US$
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Epworth 1 44                                 42                 2,040                2                   130                     
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Epworth 2 39                                 39                 1,930                -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Epworth 3 36                                 33                 1,400                3                   200                     
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Epworth 4 36                                 36                 1,840                -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Epworth 5 41                                 38                 1,840                3                   120                     
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Epworth 6 42                                 40                 2,310                2                   100                     
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Epworth 7 55                                 50                 2,320                5                   260                     
Totals 7 293                               278               13,680             15                810                     
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reasons. All wards were covered during the pay cycle. Ward 7 had the highest 
number of households that were paid (50) and also unpaid (5). All HSCT 
beneficiaries on the pay schedules for wards 2 and 4 were paid their cash 
transfers. The value unpaid was about 5.9 percent of the total HSCT cash 
transfer envelope available for Epworth district during this cycle. 
Table 2.5: 25th HSCT payment cycle - payment summary information for 
Goromonzi district 
Source: MOPSLSW MIS (2016a) 
2.3.6 Change management 
Changes in the structure of beneficiary households (demographic shifts) are 
handled through a change management process. It is a formal process of 
recording and effecting changes to the pay schedule in the MIS in the event of 
the following occurrences: 
• The head of a one-person beneficiary household dies, or 
• A household moves out of the programme area, or 
• A household dissolves completely. 
Payment Cycle Number and 
Period
District 
Name
Ward 
Number
Number of Hholds 
on Paysheet
Number 
Paid
Value Paid in 
US$
Number 
Unpaid
Value Unpaid 
in US$
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 1 148                               146               6,780                2                   140                     
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 2 90                                 89                 4,360                1                   120                     
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 3 63                                 63                 2,830                -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 4 195                               194               9,280                1                   50                        
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 5 94                                 93                 4,330                1                   60                        
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 6 9                                   8                   450                   1                   40                        
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 7 12                                 12                 470                   -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 8 23                                 23                 980                   -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 9 32                                 29                 1,260                3                   180                     
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 10 209                               206               9,120                3                   90                        
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 11 164                               160               7,270                4                   350                     
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 12 94                                 93                 4,660                1                   90                        
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 13 6                                   6                   390                   -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 14 5                                   5                   290                   -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 15 98                                 95                 4,480                3                   360                     
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 16 139                               137               6,650                2                   100                     
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 17 18                                 18                 1,020                -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 18 41                                 41                 1,760                -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 19 2                                   2                   60                      -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 20 31                                 30                 1,550                1                   40                        
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 21 20                                 19                 1,030                1                   20                        
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 22 41                                 33                 1,750                8                   370                     
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 23 13                                 13                 470                   -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 24 4                                   4                   200                   -               -                      
Cycle 25 (Jan - Feb) 2016 Goromonzi 25 10                                 10                 340                   -               -                      
Totals 25 1,561                           1,529           71,780             32                2,010                  
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In all three cases, cash transfer payments have to be discontinued and names 
of the affected beneficiaries removed from the pay schedule (MOPSLSW 
2014:17-18). 
2.3.7 Bi-annual retargeting of beneficiaries 
According to the HSCT manual of operations beneficiary households should 
be retargeted every two years in order to adapt the programme to 
demographic and socio-economic shifts ibid., 19). The changes may include: 
• New households have become eligible. 
• Some beneficiary households have dissolved. 
• Some beneficiary households no longer meet eligibility criteria because 
of life cycle transitions for example; children have grown up and can 
join the labour market. 
• The number and composition of households have changed. 
The HSCT bi-annual (re)-targeting exercise which can also serve as the 
programme’s exit strategy involves the following processes: 
• Re-approving all current beneficiary households that are still labour- 
constrained. Beneficiaries that are still labour-constrained have to be 
re-approved even if their economic status has improved. This ensures 
they do not fall back into extreme poverty. 
• Phasing out those beneficiary households that are no longer labour 
constrained. 
• Updating the size of the transfers to the present number of household 
members. 
• Approving additional households that have become extremely poor and 
labour constrained since the last targeting was undertaken (ibid.). 
2.3.8 Grievance mechanism 
According to the HSCT manual of operations “[a]ll complaints and the follow-
up to complaints are recorded at district level” with programme management 
at CPO receiving periodic reports on complaints and actions taken or intended 
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to address the grievances (ibid., 19). Beneficiaries or community members 
can also directly approach DSSOs and WCPC members to lodge their 
complaints. 
2.3.9 HSCT management and implementation structure 
The HSCT is managed and implemented at four levels: national, provincial, 
district and ward. The MOPSLSW is the institutional home of the programme. 
The Department of Social Services (DSS) housed within the MOPSLSW has 
overall responsibility for programme leadership, management and ensuring 
effective implementation of the HSCT at all levels. At headquarter level the 
DSS has key staff members dedicated to the programme: Senior Social 
Welfare Officer, Programme Officers, MIS specialist and an Accountant. The 
DSS Deputy Director oversees the work the CT staff. The primary tasks of the 
HSCT staff within DSS at headquarter level are: planning and control, 
verification of targeting survey data, capacity development, information 
management systems, finance and administration, and advocacy and 
partnerships. At central level DSS coordinates with UNICEF to contract and 
monitor private sector service providers who deliver specific components of 
the HSCT programme for example the payment delivery agency, and the 
agency that carries out the targeting survey. The DSS also ensures that 
implementation of HSCT is in accordance with the NAP and social protection, 
and social transfers policy guidance (ibid., 22). 
The DSS provides the sub-national management and implementation 
structures and resources that drive the HSCT programme. The provincial 
offices guide, supervise and control the implementing district offices. The 
Provincial Social Services Officer (PSSO) oversees the HSCT programme 
implementation and management at provincial level. The district offices have 
overall responsibility for ensuring that all district level stakeholders implement 
the programme efficiently and effectively and in accordance with the manual 
of operations and official directives and guidance from national and provincial 
offices (MOPSLSW 2014:23-24). 
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The DSSO heads the district office and ensures that all district social services 
programmes are implemented in accordance with district plans, policies and 
manual of operations. The DSSO is assisted by a Social Services Officer 
(SSO), Assistant SSO and an Accounting Assistant (ibid.). 
At the ward, village and household level the DSS is assisted to carry out its 
HSCT programme delivery mandate by the Ward Child Protection 
Committees. The WCPC structures were in existence before the HSCT 
scheme started. They work on a voluntary basis. Membership of the WCPCs 
varies but generally but generally consists of community members (MOLSS 
2012:19). The number of members varies with context, community needs and 
the strength of social capital in a community. One WCPC had 12 members 
and another had 43 (ibid.). The WCPCs are part of the implementation 
structure for the HSCT programme at ward, village and household levels. 
Within each WCPC are named focal persons who work collaboratively with, 
and in coordination with the district offices. According to the MOPSLSW 
(2014:44-46) the main roles and responsibilities of WCPC in the 
implementation of the HSCT programme are: 
i. Assist in the verification of targeting census results and ensure that all 
areas of the ward and all households are covered. 
ii. Passing information to beneficiary households for example on approval 
into the programme, date, time, and location of payments as well as 
general communications between household and communities at the 
ward and district levels. 
iii. Assisting immobile heads of beneficiary households to access their 
payments. 
iv. Assisting the payment process. 
v. Follow up when households have failed to collect their payments. 
vi. Inform the DSSO when the head of a household has passed away or 
has moved out of the ward. 
vii. Inform the DSSO when a representative has to be changed. 
viii. Assist and protect beneficiary households with special reference to 
child-headed households. 
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The WCPC focal persons were trained in various delivery aspects of the 
HSCT programme including targeting, community verification, and payment 
processes. The manual of operations states that in order to facilitate the 
execution of their roles and responsibilities on the programme the WCPC 
focal persons should be provided with three bicycles for transport to visit 
beneficiary households and to deliver forms to the DSSO; copies of manuals 
of operation, and a file containing blank copies of HSCT forms (ibid., 46). 
UNICEF is a key part of the coordination, implementation and management 
structure of the HSCT programme. It has fund management and technical 
assistance roles on the programme. UNICEF manages the multi-donor basket 
of funds through which donors channel their funds to the programme. UNICEF 
is accountable to donors for the management and proper use of the HSCT 
funds, monitoring results and managing risks and handling all procurement 
activities in the HSCT, for example contracting the delivery and targeting 
agencies (UNICEF 2011:27). As a technical partner to the MOPSLSW, 
UNICEF provides bespoke technical assistance and capacity development 
support to the DSS. At payment distribution points UNICEF’s role is to 
observe the payment process, and where requested by DSS provide support 
in the actual administration of payments (MOPSLSW 2015b:1). 
Table 2.6: HSCT at a glance 
Year started 2011 
Status Active. Officially ending 31 May 2016 
Programme 
goals 
Alleviate short-term poverty and encourage long-term human 
capital development 
Targeting 
Target 
population 
Extremely poor and labour-constrained households 
Targeting 
method 
Geographic targeting of districts based on poverty incidence, 
and proxy means testing with community verification 
Coverage Aims to reach 55,000 households in 19 districts 
Household benefits 
Benefit 
structure 
1 person household → USD10 
2 person household → USD15 
3 person household → USD20 
4 person household → USD25 
Payee Head of household or registered proxy 
Payment 
method 
Physical cash delivery by a private sector agency (CIT) at 
selected cash pay points in targeted wards 
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Payment 
frequency 
Every two months 
Duration As long as eligible. Retargeting every two years. 
Additional 
benefits 
Child protection referrals. School going-children from HSCT 
households qualify for education assistance (scholarship) 
under the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM).  
Conditions None: HSCT is an unconditional cash transfer. Beneficiaries 
are free to spend the CT in any way they want. 
Programme Administration 
Institutional 
setting 
Department of Social Services in the Ministry of Public 
Service, Labour and Social Welfare 
Information Management System 
MIS Yes, and housed in the MOPSLSW at central level. The MIS 
for the HSCT houses beneficiary information (names of heads 
of households and official proxy representatives) including 
verification and change management data; generates pay 
sheets; and stores reconciliation records. 
2.4 Epworth settlement profile 
2.4.1 Background 
Epworth is a peri-urban and predominantly informal settlement within Harare 
province. It is located about 12 kilometres south east of Harare city centre, the 
country’s capital. Epworth is famous for being host to the balancing rocks that 
featured prominently on Zimbabwe’s original bank notes. The rocks are 
popular with both domestic and international tourists. 
According to the Epworth Local Board (ELB) (as cited in Chatiza and Mlalazi 
2009:12), Epworth attained local government area status in 1986 through 
proclamation by Statutory Instrument 75 of 1986. The proclamation led to the 
establishment of a local authority - the Epworth Local Board, in terms of the 
Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) (Chirisa and Muhomba 2013:951). The 
ELB’s primary responsibilities include: managing the affairs of Epworth area, 
providing basic services to local residents, regularise existing and future 
development, and collection of rates and other official levies (ibid.). 
Although formal recognition of the settlement by the post-independence 
government of Zimbabwe came in 1986, Epworth settlement’s history dates 
back to about 1890. According to Dialogue on Shelter for the Homeless Trust 
in Zimbabwe (DSHZT) (2009:11) Chiremba, a name for a traditional healer in 
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the local Shona language, was the first settlement to be established in 
Epworth in the late 1890s. The settlement was named after a local traditional 
healer and polygamist called Chihota, who was the first person to live in 
Epworth. A small local community was resident in Chiremba at the time. 
Epworth’s evolution began when the British South Africa Company (BSAC) 
granted land to Reverend Isaac Shimmin of the Methodist Wesleyan Mission 
(Chatiza and Mlalazi 2009:12; Chirisa and Muhomba 2013:951; Dialogue on 
Shelter for the Homeless in Zimbabwe Trust [DSHZT] 2009:2). Following the 
donation of land, the Methodist Church Mission bought two additional 
adjoining farms in the area: Glenwood in 1904 and Adelaide in 1908. The 
Methodist Church was able to establish Epworth as a church mission station 
on the acquired land including Chiremba where a small local community was 
already resident. The DSHZT (2009:13) avers that the Methodist church 
missionaries convinced Chihota, the traditional healer residing in Chiremba to 
convert to the Christian faith. Chiremba then evolved as a church mission 
“with occupancy [of land] strictly based on church affiliation” (ibid.). The 
church’s administrative offices were located in Chiremba. According to 
Butcher (as cited in Chirisa 2013:12) there were about 500 families resident at 
the mission station by 1950, and each had been allocated about 4000 square 
metres of land for residential and agriculture use. The allocation of land to the 
church families did not come with legal title. It was in reality permission to 
occupy on the land. 
As Zimbabwe’s war of liberation peaked between 1970 and 1980 many 
people fled their homes in the country side and moved to settle illegally and 
informally in Epworth. The population of Epworth increased rapidly during this 
time. Chirisa and Muhomba (2013:951) state that: “[people] found it easy to 
settle in Epworth because there was no direct local authority that could control 
the movement of people and development like in other urban archetypal 
settlements.” Butcher (as cited in Chirisa 2013:13) makes the point that 
Epworth’s proximity to Harare made it a strategic destination for migrants 
seeking social, economic and income opportunities. Some of the fleeing 
migrants worked as domestic servants in the low density and affluent suburbs 
near Epworth. In the early 1980s following Zimbabwe’s attainment of 
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independence from Britain more people moved into cities in search of 
economic opportunities and better standards of living. Epworth with its 
informality offered itself as a settlement destination. Meanwhile the Methodist 
church could not control the huge influx of people as they did not have the 
administrative means nor the legal jurisdiction to do so as the area had not 
been planned as an urban settlement area. The Epworth population had 
grown to about 35,000 between 1970 and the early 1980s (ibid.). People who 
had been originally allocated land for agricultural use by the church illegally 
and informally subdivided, and sold pieces of land to the in-coming migrants.  
Most of these new areas where migrants were settling became known as 
“extensions” as they were adjoined to the four original villages of Epworth – 
Chiremba, Makomo, Zinyengerere and Chinamano (Chitekwe-Biti, Mudimu, 
Masimba-Nyama and Jera 2012:132). Other migrants simply allocated 
themselves own pieces of land in previously unoccupied areas and settled 
there. 
Faced with the huge influx of people, lack of administrative capacity, and 
funds for the provision of basic services and infrastructure to the growing 
population in Epworth, the Methodist church donated a large portion of its land 
to the national government of Zimbabwe in 1983 (DSHZT 2009:2; Chirisa and 
Muhomba 2013:951; Chatiza and Mlalazi 2009:12). Following the donation, 
the central government froze all unauthorised developments in the area, took 
an aerial photograph of the settlement, appointed the ELB to manage the 
affairs of the area, and began formal urban development processes to guide 
orderly development of the settlement (ibid.). The central government 
intended Epworth settlement to be upgraded and eventually be incorporated 
into the City of Harare administrative and legal jurisdiction. 
It must be pointed that the ELB’s authority over Epworth has been disputed by 
some residents in Epworth who colloquially call themselves “originals” of the 
settlement and are therefore not bound by the ELB whose establishment 
came after they had already settled in the area. The “originals” were the early 
settlers who had some connection with the Methodist church “either as 
followers, employees at the church farms or immediate relatives of the early 
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settlers” (Chatiza and Mlalazi 2009:13). Some of the “originals” believe 
Epworth is their “ancestral land” and claim their forefathers bought the land 
from the BSAC, the governing authority at the time. It is on this basis that they 
claim “they had the right to administer Epworth instead of the local authority” 
(Chirisa and Muhomba 2013:954). According to Chatiza and Mlalazi (2009:12) 
a residents association representing some 13,093 households was formed in 
1991 following state-sanctioned demolitions of illegal housing structures in 
Epworth. It challenged the legality of the ELB in Zimbabwe’s High Court and 
successfully interdicted the local government elections in the area in 1999. 
Despite this court challenge the ELB remains the officially and legally 
recognised local authority running the affairs of the peri-urban settlement. In 
its quest to bring sanity to the local government area, in 2001 the ELB won an 
eviction order against 6,000 informal settlers but failed to execute the order 
due to political interference (ibid., 958). 
2.4.2 Settlement characteristics 
Epworth is divided into seven administrative wards. According to DSHZT 
(2009:9) Epworth community members “are less familiar with ward 
boundaries” but more comfortable with area names for example: Chiremba, 
Makomo, Domboramwari, Muguta, Chinamano, Jacha, Overspill, MaGada, 
Zinyengerere. Ward names do not necessarily coincide with the areas names 
mainly because Epworth is not a properly planned urban residential 
settlement. The administrative wards in Epworth comprise of residents who 
can be classified into three distinct categories: 
I. Ward 1: Chiremba also known as Muguta, and Makomo areas; and 
Ward 4: Chinamano and Zinyengere areas. The early settlers or 
“originals” that had something to do with the Methodist church are 
found in wards 1 and 4. 
II. Wards 2, 3 and 5: The residents here are predominantly settlers who 
came into Epworth at the peak of the liberation struggle and the early 
years following Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. They moved in 
before the establishment of the ELB. It must be underscored that this 
group of residents have no historical links with the “originals” resident 
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in wards 1 and 4. The areas in wards 2, 3 and 5 are generally referred 
to as “extensions,” for example, Muguta Extension, Makomo Extension, 
and Chinamano Extension. This is because the areas are adjacent to 
the areas where the “originals” settled (Chirisa and Muhomba 
2013:952). 
III. Wards 7: It is occupied by the largest and last group of settlers in 
Epworth. The area is colloquially referred to as “Gada” or “Magada”, 
which means “free riders.” The ward 7 area is formal and planned but 
the residents are illegal and informal occupants (DSHZT 2009:34). 
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Map 2.2: Epworth district in national context 
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2.4.3 Demographic characteristics 
The population figures in Epworth vary by source. Media, official and 
independent research statistics show great variations. This is primarily 
because the settlement has not been properly planned for residential 
settlement. Informal and illegal land occupations have persisted over time. It 
must be underscored that the ELB with assistance from central government 
and non-governmental organisations is doing all it can in the face of limited 
resources to regularise and upgrade the settlement. According to the official 
national population census conducted by the Zimbabwe National Statistics 
Agency (ZimStat) in 2012 Epworth has 167,462 people, with males at 50.2 
percent slightly outnumbering females at 49.8 percent. The number of 
households counted was 47,028 (ZimStat 2012:137). The distribution of the 
Epworth population by sex, total number of households, and household size is 
provided in the table below. 
Table 2.7: Epworth population distribution 
District Males Percent Females Percent Total Percent Sex 
ratio 
Households Average 
Epworth 83983 50.2 83479 49.8 167462 100.0 101 47028 3.6 
Source: ZimStat (2012:137). 
More recent data from the 2015 Zimbabwe Poverty Atlas put the official 
population figure for Epworth at 166,077 people, and 46,012 households. The 
average household size was 3.6 members. Ward 7 has the highest number of 
people at 39,254 followed by ward 1 with 31,302. Ward 2 has the lowest 
number of residents at 14,744. (ZimStat 2015a:306). The distribution of the 
Epworth population by ward and number of households is provided in the 
table below: 
Table 2.8: Epworth district - population distribution by ward and number 
of households 
Ward Number Population Number of 
Households 
Ward 01 31,302 8,872 
Ward 02 14,744 4,280 
Ward 03 15,851 4,308 
Ward 04 23,108 6,159 
Ward 05 16,189 4,504 
Ward 06 25,629 7,151 
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Ward Number Population Number of 
Households 
Ward 07 39,254 10,738 
Total 166,077 46,012 
Source: ZimStat (2015a:306). 
2.4.4 Socio-economic characteristics 
The peri-urban settlement of Epworth is caught in a vicious cycle of poverty, 
informality, and illegality. The settlements in Epworth face acute problems of 
health, water, sanitation, environmental, and electricity services. The 
settlements are also havens for criminal activities ranging from petty to 
serious crimes. The ELB faces significant challenges in carrying out its 
mandate of regularising and upgrading the settlement, and orderly 
development planning including service provision because of resource and 
capacity limitation, and that most of the informal and illegal settlers occupy 
sites earmarked for health, education, electricity and road infrastructure 
development projects (Chirisa and Muhomba 2013:952). 
According to ZimStat (2015a:212) Epworth had a poverty prevalence of 64.5 
percent. Ward 5 had the highest poverty prevalence pegged at 66.6 percent 
while ward 4 had the lowest pegged at 62.5 percent. The settlement is an 
example of an urban area with a large number of poor people and high 
poverty rates. It has some of Harare province’s poorest households (ibid.). 
The table below shows poverty prevalence for households by ward in Epworth 
district (ZimStat 2015a:306). 
Table 2.9: Epworth district - poverty prevalence for households by ward 
Ward 
No. 
Population No. of 
Hholds 
No. of 
Poor 
Hholds   
No. of 
Non-
Poor 
Hholds 
Average 
Hhold 
Size 
Poverty 
Prevalence 
Poverty 
Gap 
Index 
Poverty 
Severity 
Index 
Gini 
Index 
Ward 
01 
31,302 8,872 5,627 3,245 3.5 63.4% 23.5% 11.6% 30.3% 
Ward 
02 
14,744 4,280 2,718 1,562 3.4 63.5% 23.1% 11.2% 29.2% 
Ward 
03 
15,851 4,308 2,852 1,456 3.7 66.2% 25.2% 12.7% 30.2% 
Ward 
04 
23,108 6,159 3,851 2,308 3.8 62.5% 23.3% 11.6% 30.9% 
Ward 
05 
16,189 4,504 2,998 1,506 3.6 66.6% 25.3% 12.7% 29.6% 
Ward 
06 
25,629 7,151 4,688 2,463 3.6 65.6% 24.3% 11.9% 29.3% 
Ward 
07 
39,254 10,738 7,129 3,609 3.7 66.4% 24.8% 12.2% 29.2% 
Total 166,077 46,012 29,862 16,150 3.6     
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A district and ward analysis of social deprivations conducted by UNICEF and 
ZimStat in 2015 shows the ominous patterns of social inequalities and 
persistent social deprivations in Epworth. The analysis focuses on the 
situation of women and children and is based on the Zimbabwe 2012 census 
and population data. The analysis shows that while the urban female teenage 
marriage rates are lower than the rural, Epworth ward 6 stands out as an 
outlier for this indicator with 87 percent. This may imply the girl child in 
Epworth is less protected against early marriages (UNICEF and ZimStat 
2015:26). Epworth district is one of the four districts with the highest 
proportion of teenage mothers with its proportion pegged at 27 percent. This 
indicator is the proportion of girls aged 15-19 years who have given birth 
(ibid.). Epworth district is amongst the worst districts with regards to children 
under 5 in possession of a birth certificate. Its index is in the 14.4 to 27.0 
percent category (25 percent for Epworth wards 4 and 5) which represents the 
worst category (ibid., 32). Birth certificate possession is related to service 
delivery from the state. As the figures for Epworth are low it means that 
service delivery is poor in the district. 
The proportion of population under the age of five is taken as one of the best 
proxy indicators for poverty. In Harare province and in the whole country the 
proportion of under-fives is highest in Epworth with wards 5 and 6 standing 
out with values above 18 percent (ibid., 56). 
While youth unemployment is high in Epworth, the district performs better 
than other areas in this indicator with 18 percent. The worst districts are found 
in the 20.1 to 39.4 percent category (ibid., 33). A study by Msindo, Gutsa and 
Choguya (2013:174) found that a number of settlers in Epworth were not 
formally employed but were engaged in menial jobs including street vending. 
Chirisa (2013:164) makes a similar point: “[Epworth] Households have turned 
public spaces like roadsides as spaces in which they display their wares and 
goods for sale.” Vending is a trade practiced largely by women in Epworth. 
Msindo et al. (2013:174) assert that this is because women’s mobility is 
limited and spend most of their time on household chores and responsibilities. 
Other informal trades practiced by residents of Epworth include self-
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employment enterprises such as sand extraction, brick moulding, welding, 
carpentry, and tyre and shoe repairs. It must be pointed out that not all 
residents in Epworth are working in the informal sector. Some are formally 
employed as civil servants, for example teachers and health workers, while 
others work in the formal industrial sector. ZimStat (2013a:105) provides an 
official account of the percent distribution of the economically active persons 
by age group and activity in Epworth as shown in the table below. 
Table 2.10: Percent distribution of the economically active persons by 
age group (15 years and above) and activity: both sexes 
District Paid 
employee 
% 
Casual 
employee 
% 
Employer 
% 
Communal 
resettlement 
farmer % 
Own 
account 
worker 
Unpaid 
family 
worker 
Unemployed 
% 
Total 
% 
Epworth 23.2 19.8 - 0.4 32.0 1.5 23.1 100.0 
Source: ZimStat (2013a:105). 
The statistics in the table above shows that a majority of the economically 
active persons in Epworth are on account workers who operate their own 
economic enterprise for own consumption or profit, for example petty traders, 
carpenter with or without paid employees (ibid., 124). The proportion of 
unemployed is high at 23.1 percent. As pointed earlier Epworth settlement 
had land reserved for agriculture activities when it was first established. 
However, the table shows that the proportion of communal resettlement 
farmers is low at 0.4 percent which means that agriculture lost its place as a 
livelihood and economic activity in the settlement. 
While the Government of Zimbabwe acknowledges that education is a basic 
right, for children living in Epworth, access to formal education and education 
attainment are nightmares. While the net attendance rate for primary 
education in Zimbabwe is a good result with limited disparities, Epworth ward 
3 stands out in the poorest ward quartile. The net attendance rates at 
secondary school level shows Epworth wards 3 and 1 performing poorly and 
in the red categories with 51 and 59 percent figures respectively (UNICEF and 
ZimStat 2015:59). Data for out-of-school children in the 6-16 years category 
shows a national average of 7.6 percent. Epworth’s ward 3 has an out-of-
school proportion (6-16 years) of 11.4 percent (ibid., 60). The proportion of 
those who have “Never been to school” (including those that enter school late) 
is 5 percent in Epworth’s ward 3 (ibid., 39). In Harare province, low levels of 
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education attainment for youths (20-24 years) are concentrated in Epworth 
wards. Epworth ward 3 is the worst with a figure of 19 percent (ibid., 61). 
Msindo et al. (2013:177) found that several factors account for children’s 
limited access to education at the few government schools in Epworth district. 
Local schools did not enrol children from informal settlements as they were 
considered to be of no fixed residential addresses and could not produce 
proof of residence; many of the poor households can’t afford to pay the 
“expensive” fees; children do not possess birth certificates; and the few 
government schools are distant from residential areas. Due to the 
predominantly informality of Epworth settlement, a number of private schools 
run by unqualified teachers operate illegally (ibid.). The illegal schools cater 
for those who cannot make it in to formal schools mainly for the reasons cited 
above. The major disadvantage is that children attending illegal schools are 
not eligible to write examinations set by the country’s official examinations 
institution – the Zimbabwe School Examinations Council. To overcome this 
challenge some students go through the illegal schools and look for places at 
officially registered centres to write their examinations. 
Criminal activities are a common occurrence and a major problem in Epworth. 
Some have described this phenomenon as social decay and a clear case of 
Epworth “turning back on its Christian roots.” Focus Group Discussion 
participants in a study carried by Msindo et al. (2013:178) stated that Epworth 
is a haven for “some of the most wanted criminals.” Criminal activities 
reported as occurring in the ward 7 area included theft, burglary and rape 
cases. Brewing and selling of illicit beer, and commercial sex work were also 
rampant in the area (ibid.). According to Chirisa and Muhomba (2013:960), 
“[t]he local police have confirmed that ward 7 is a hideout for criminals. The 
police find it difficult to trace these criminals given the building density in the 
area, which is very high, and the structures that are [not] numbered.” 
There is a huge gap between the demand for basic services and the actual 
provision.  Access to electricity, improved water source, sanitation and health 
services for Epworth residents is poor because the settlement was not 
originally planned as an urban residential area; most of the informal settlers 
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occupy sites earmarked for schools, clinics and hospitals, electricity sub 
stations, and water and sewer reticulation systems; and resources and 
capacity constraints faced by the ELB. According to UNICEF and ZimStat 
(2015:62) there are few households with access to electricity in Epworth. 
Electricity is mostly available at some government schools, shopping centres 
and offices such as at ELB. Electricity infrastructure is present in some areas 
for example Overspill, but there are no transformers to enable connections to 
households (DSHZT 2009:31). Access to electricity is below 5 percent in 
wards 5, 6 and 7. Chirisa and Muhomba (2013:956) found that only 2 percent 
of respondents in their study in ward 1 have access to electricity. Fire wood, 
cooking gas, paraffin and candles are used as sources of energy in most 
parts of Epworth. The water and sanitation situation in Epworth poses serious 
threats to the health of residents. With a majority of Epworth residents living in 
overcrowded, unplanned, un-serviced and informal areas, residents have little 
to no access to portable water, use unsafe sources of water in the form of 
unprotected open wells, and pit latrines for sanitation. A study by Msindo et al. 
(2013:177) reports that one borehole in the Komboniyatsva area was serving 
more than 150 households, a situation which forced other residents to turn to 
unprotected water sources. According to Nyamvura and Brown (as cited in 
Chirisa 2013:16) the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban 
Development with technical and assistance from Blair Research Laboratory 
drilled 290 protected tube wells and constructed 1,000 toilets. An international 
organisation, Plan International, complemented government efforts and 
constructed sewer, electricity and water reticulation systems (ibid.). A profiling 
exercise conducted in Epworth found that in areas such as Chiremba, the 
water reticulation system and sewer pipes were installed but were not 
functioning. The water systems had low pumping capacity resulting in 
residents not getting any water in their households (DSHZT 2009:11). 
Access to health services is limited for Epworth residents. Health services are 
provided by two clinics in the area: one in Chiremba (ward 1) built by the 
Methodist church mission, and a second one Epworth clinic in Domboramwari 
built and run by the ELB (DSHZT 2009:15,41). The supply of health services 
is outstripped by demand as the two clinics cannot cope with the huge 
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population numbers in Epworth. It must be underscored that the two clinics 
are located in settlements that are formally recognised by the ELB. According 
to Chirisa and Muhomba (2013:959), reports from Epworth clinic show that 
cases of waterborne diseases such as cholera and typhoid peak during the 
rainy season. The main source of the health problem is ward 7 (Magada area) 
as the area has no protected water sources. Reports also indicate that cases 
of tuberculosis were also high in ward 7 as residents lived in poor, 
overcrowded and dusty conditions. 
The quality of houses constructed by many residents in Epworth does not 
meet building by-laws. Chirisa (2013:182) states that “[g]enerally, houses in 
Epworth (especially in the part with new informal settlers) are characterised by 
irregular stands, in terms of shapes and sizes, coupled by poor construction 
materials (grass, plastics, poles and dagga). In Chinamano extension, 
although most of the houses are built from brick, a majority of them were built 
without approval from the ELB. The houses are old and in states of 
dilapidation. There are at least three structures or shacks build on each piece 
of land (DSHZT 2009:18). 
The land and housing tenure arrangements in Epworth are complex primarily 
because the settlement had not been planned as an urban residential area. In 
addition, regularisation and upgrading of the settlement have been hindered 
by the ELB’s lack of resources and capacity. The authority of the ELB over the 
affairs of Epworth has also been contested by original settlers. None of the 
residents in all wards have title deeds to the land or houses they live in. In 
areas which are formally recognised by the ELB, for example Chiremba and 
Chinamano extension residents have signed lease agreements with the ELB. 
The ELB issued “cards” to residents with lease agreements and they must 
produce the cards when they pay their monthly rates of $3.00 to the local 
board (ibid., 13,18). In other areas such as Zinyengerere extension residents 
settled illegally and informally on land belonging to the ELB. Surprisingly the 
residents entered in to some form of arrangement with the ELB in which they 
pay monthly rates to the local authority even though they are illegal and 
informal settlers (ibid., 22). Chirisa (2013:165) investigated the status in 
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accommodation of Epworth residents and found that “there is a wide array of 
housing tenure arrangements.” The types are: owner or purchaser type (37 
percent); lodging (30 percent); tenancy (15 percent) and property held in trust 
by a friend (2 percent). Chirisa makes a distinction between lodging and 
tenancy, “where the former refers to a housing arrangement in which the 
owner uses part of the stand or house and then sublets the other rooms. 
Tenancy … mean[s] that the owner is completely absent on-plot. Normally he 
or she only visits (from where he or she resides) to collect rentals” (ibid.). 
In discussing the socio-economic characteristics of Epworth it must be 
underscored that the government clean-up exercise, Operation Restore 
Order, carried out in 2005 resulted in an influx of people into Epworth. The 
people fled the forced evictions and demolitions of their informal and illegal 
housing structures in their places of initial or original settlement. Ironically the 
ELB had planned to demolish 17,000 illegal and informal houses in Epworth 
under the same government clean-up programme (Chirisa and Muhomba 
2013:958). Following the intervention of the UN Special Envoy, government 
suspended the clean-up exercise country-wide and it is this move that saved 
the settlement of Epworth from intensified demolitions. Only 500 illegal 
houses or structures were demolished in the early phase of the clean-up 
exercise in Epworth (ibid.). Epworth was largely treated differently from other 
informal settlements demolished elsewhere in the capital and other cities. The 
effects of the clean-up exercise on Epworth were to increase demographic 
pressure, exacerbate informality, and further constrain the ELB’s upgrading 
and regularisation plans. 
Wards 1 and 5 in Epworth were selected for this research. A full description of 
the sampling strategy for site selection is provided in the research 
methodology chapter. 
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• Located in Harare province, 12 kilometres south east of Harare city 
centre. 
• Settlement dates back to 1890. 
• Evolved from a Methodist church mission station to a local government 
area run by a local board. ELB established in 1986. 
• Regularising and upgrading the settlement ongoing but constrained by 
lack of resources and ELB capacity. 
• Divided into 7 administrative wards. Ward boundaries do not necessarily 
coincide with area names. 
• Three distinct categories of residents – early settlers (“originals”), pre 
and post-independence settlers with no links to early settlers, and a new 
breed of informal settlers referred to as “free-riders.” 
• Approximately 70 percent live in overcrowded, unplanned, un-serviced 
and informal and illegal settlements. 
• Ward 05 has highest poverty prevalence rate at 66.6 percent 
• Official population figure is 167,462 people. 
• Ward 7 has the highest number of residents with 39,254. 
• Epworth has a high number of children under-5 years of age. 
• Wide array of land and housing tenure arrangements. 
• Limited to no access to basic services – portable water, sanitation, 
electricity, education and health. 
• Poor housing structures which include shacks. 
• High rates of female teenage marriages and teenage mothers. 
• High rates of criminal activities. 
• Majority of residents employed in the informal sector. Street vending a 
common trade. 
 
Box 2.1: Epworth district summary profile 
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2.5 Goromonzi district profile 
2.5.1 District overview 
Goromonzi district is one of the nine districts of Mashonaland East Province in 
Zimbabwe (see map 3.1). Goromonzi district is located approximately 50 
kilometres east of the capital city, Harare. The district shares boundaries with 
other districts in the province, for example Marondera, Murehwa, and Seke; 
and other districts outside the province, for example Bindura, Shamva and 
Mazowe in Mashonaland Central. The district is predominantly rural and the 
people who live in the district are mainly from the majority Shona tribe. The 
district covers an area of approximately 9,100 square kilometres 
(www.masheast.org/services-view/goromonzi-district/). The African Institute 
for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) (2009:10) states that the district lies in agro- 
ecological region II and receives average rainfall ranging from 900 millimetres 
to 1,200 millimetres annually. Natural region II has some of the most fertile 
soils in Zimbabwe. Goromonzi is divided into 25 administrative wards. 
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Map 2.3: Goromonzi district in national context 
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2.5.2 Demographic context 
According to the official national population census conducted by ZimStat in 
2012 Goromonzi had 224,987 people up from 154,262 in the 2002 census. 
The female proportion of the population is 50.5 percent. There are 58,013 
households in the district. The distribution of the Goromonzi district population 
by sex, total number of households, and household size is provided in the 
table below. 
Table 2.11: Goromonzi district population distribution 
District Males Percent Females Percent Total Percent Sex 
ratio 
Households Average 
Goromonzi 113,326 49.5 113,661 50.5 224,987 100.0 98 58,013 3.9 
Source ZimStat (2012:135). 
ZimStat and UNICEF (2015:81) analysed the 2012 population census data for 
Goromonzi district and found that: the proportion of the district’s population 
below 18 years was 46.9 percent; proportion of population below 5 years was 
15.6 percent; youth proportion stood at 19.6 percent; and the youth sex ratio 
(males per 100 females) was 98. 
Data from the 2015 Zimbabwe Poverty Atlas shows that the population of 
Goromonzi district stood at 222,324 people, and had 55,652 households. The 
average household size was 4 members. Ward 04 which includes areas like 
Domboshava, Zimbiru, Chogugudza and Parirewa had the highest number of 
people at 30,124 followed by ward 25 (Vincent and parts of Thorncroft areas) 
with 26,833. Ward 19, which includes areas like Nyambanje, with 268 people, 
had the lowest number of residents in the district. (ZimStat 2015a:245). The 
distribution of the population of Goromonzi district by ward and number of 
households is provided in the table below: 
Table 2.12: Goromonzi district - population distribution by ward and 
number of households 
Ward Number Population Number of 
Households 
Ward 01 8,657 2,039 
Ward 02 12,430 2,805 
Ward 03 4,919 1,186 
Ward 04 30,124 7,189 
Ward 05 5,829 1,319 
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Ward Number Population Number of 
Households 
Ward 06 11,965 3,109 
Ward 07 5,858 1,443 
Ward 08 5,573 1,561 
Ward 09 4,505 1,256 
Ward 10 7,090 1,788 
Ward 11 8,428 2,122 
Ward 12 14,376 3,594 
Ward 13 2,880 772 
Ward 14 9,611 2,443 
Ward 15 6,418 1,474 
Ward 16 16,081 3,808 
Ward 17 4,926 1,237 
Ward 18 7,796 1,904 
Ward 19 268 67 
Ward 20 5,382 1,459 
Ward 21 3,480 937 
Ward 22 7,210 1,950 
Ward 23 6,091 1,548 
Ward 24 5,594 1,501 
Ward 25 26,833 7,141 
Total 222,324 55,652 
Source: ZimStat (2015a:245). 
2.5.3 Socio-economic characteristics  
Goromonzi district receives high rainfall and with its fertile soils, rain-fed cash 
crop production is the main livelihood activity for most households in the area. 
The major crops grown in the district are maize, soya beans, wheat, tobacco 
and groundnuts. Households grow these crops for both food, and income from 
selling the surplus. Households are also involved in market gardening 
activities especially production and sale of beans, tomatoes, potatoes. 
Additional livelihood activities include livestock production, mainly cattle, and 
small livestock such as goats and chickens. The main markets for the district’s 
agriculture produce are Harare and Marondera. Casual labour activities, 
trading of small goods and services are also common livelihood activities. 
Goromonzi district is home to both commercial and resettlement farms. The 
latter consists mainly of A1 model farms catering for the majority of previously 
landless blacks. According to Tom (2015:87) during Zimbabwe’s fast track 
land reform programme carried out by government from early 2000 to about 
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2005, residents from Marondera and Harare applied for land access in 
Goromonzi district. The prime land, good rainfall pattern, and proximity of the 
district to Harare and Marondera are pull factors. 
According to the 2015 Zimbabwe Rural Livelihoods Assessment Goromonzi is 
one of the districts with lowest food insecurity levels. The proportion of the 
population categorised as food insecure stood at 1.7 percent during the period 
January to March 2015 (ZimVAC 2015:105). Out of the 9 districts in the 
province, Goromonzi had the second highest proportion of food secure 
households after Seke district (ibid., 127). 
According to ZimStat (2015:64) the average poverty prevalence for 
Goromonzi district was 62.4 percent. Ward 01 had the highest poverty 
prevalence at 77.4 percent while ward 06 had the lowest prevalence of 53.4 
percent. Poverty is more prevalent on the peripheral areas of the districts 
such as wards 01 (Munyawiri and Kachuta areas), 02 (Chinamhora, Makumbe 
and Nyakudya areas), 03 (Tsatse), and 05 (Pote) on the northern border of 
the district. The northern part of the district is more densely populated, has 
poorer quality soils, and lower levels of livestock than areas from 
neighbouring wards. Wards 10 (Chipangura, Udembwe St. Francis and 
Inyaguvi areas), 11 (Mukombami, St. Judes, Kudyamadare and Rutope 
areas), and 18 (Rusike and Dudzi areas) on the eastern boundary of the 
district also have high poverty prevalence rates. All of these wards are 
primarily communal. Wards 06 and 24 are farming resettlement areas and 
had the lowest poverty prevalence rates of 53.4 percent and 57.6 percent 
respectively (ibid.). The table below shows poverty prevalence for households 
by ward in Goromonzi district. 
Table 2.13: Goromonzi district - poverty prevalence for households by 
ward 
Ward 
No. 
Population No. of 
Hholds 
No. of 
Poor 
Hholds   
No. of 
Non-
Poor 
Hholds 
Average 
Hhold 
Size 
Poverty 
Prevalence 
Poverty 
Gap 
Index 
Poverty 
Severity 
Index 
Gini 
Index 
Ward 
01 
8,657 2,039 1577 462 4.2 77.4% 34.3% 18.7% 33.8% 
Ward 
02 
12,430 2,805 2053 752 4.4 73.2% 31.8% 17.1% 35.7% 
Ward 
03 
4,919 1,186 909 277 4.1 76.7% 33.8% 18.3% 34.1% 
Ward 
04 
30,124 7,189 4927 2262 4.2 68.5% 27.9% 14.4% 34.8% 
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Ward 
No. 
Population No. of 
Hholds 
No. of 
Poor 
Hholds   
No. of 
Non-
Poor 
Hholds 
Average 
Hhold 
Size 
Poverty 
Prevalence 
Poverty 
Gap 
Index 
Poverty 
Severity 
Index 
Gini 
Index 
Ward 
05 
5,829 1,319 988 331 4.4 74.9% 32.1% 17.0% 33.7% 
Ward 
06 
11,965 3,109 1660 1449 3.8 53.4% 19.6% 9.5% 37.7% 
Ward 
07 
5,858 1,443 935 508 4.1 64.8% 26.5% 13.8% 37.9% 
Ward 
08 
5,573 1,561 1081 480 3.6 69.3% 29.2% 15.4% 37.4% 
Ward 
09 
4,505 1,256 812 444 3.6 64.7% 25.5% 12.8% 36.0% 
Ward 
10 
7,090 1,788 1356 432 4.0 75.9% 33.6% 18.2% 35.3% 
Ward 
11 
8,428 2,122 1571 551 4.0 74.0% 32.0% 17.1% 35.3% 
Ward 
12 
14,376 3,594 2538 1056 4.0 70.6% 30.3% 16.2% 36.7% 
Ward 
13 
2,880 772 538 234 3.7 69.7% 29.2% 15.4% 36.9% 
Ward 
14 
9,611 2,443 1581 862 3.9 64.7% 26.1% 13.3% 37.5% 
Ward 
15 
6,418 1,474 1060 414 4.4 71.9% 31.3% 16.9% 36.6% 
Ward 
16 
16,081 3,808 2703 1105 4.2 71.0% 30.2% 16.0% 36.0% 
Ward 
17 
4,926 1,237 859 378 4.0 69.5% 29.4% 15.6% 37.9% 
Ward 
18 
7,796 1,904 1429 475 4.1 75.0% 33.0% 17.9% 35.4% 
Ward 
19 
268 67 42 25 4.0 62.9% 24.0% 11.8% 33.2% 
Ward 
20 
5,382 1,459 930 529 3.7 63.8% 26.1% 13.5% 39.4% 
Ward 
21 
3,480 937 639 298 3.7 68.2% 28.9% 15.3% 37.2% 
Ward 
22 
7,210 1,950 1287 663 3.7 66.0% 26.7% 13.7% 37.2% 
Ward 
23 
6,091 1,548 970 578 3.9 62.7% 23.8% 11.7% 34.1% 
Ward 
24 
5,594 1,501 864 637 3.7 57.6% 21.7% 10.7% 36.7% 
Ward 
25 
26,833 7,141 5033 2108 3.8 70.5% 29.9% 15.9% 36.1% 
Total 222,324 55,652 38344 17308 4.0     
Source: ZimStat (2015a:245). 
According to ZimStat (2013a:103) the percent distribution of the economically 
active persons by activity in Goromonzi district shows that the highest 
proportion of the economically active persons in the district are communal 
resettlement farmers (44.9 percent) followed by paid employees (23.7 
percent), and casual employee (15.2 percent). The unemployed category was 
6.1 percent reflecting a better score than other districts in the province, for 
example Mudzi (7.2 percent) and Marondera urban (22.2 percent). 
Table 2.14: Percent distribution of the economically active persons by 
age group (15 years and above) and activity: both sexes 
District Paid 
employee 
% 
Casual 
employee 
% 
Employer 
% 
Communal 
resettlement 
farmer % 
Own 
account 
worker 
Unpaid 
family 
worker 
Unemployed 
% 
Total 
% 
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Goromonzi 23.7 15.2 0.2 44.9 4.9 4.9 6.1 100.0 
Source: ZimStat (2013a:103). 
Zimbabwe has experienced a net outward-migration from 2000 to 2009 due to 
a protracted economic crisis. Those who emigrated and are working in foreign 
countries (“diaspora”) send money to their families to help them mostly to 
meet basic needs and services. The transfers are termed remittances and 
constitute a significant portion of total household incomes. Households 
residing in rural areas receive US$66.2 million per annum constituting 20.7 
percent of the total remittances into the country (ZimStat 2013a:84). 
Goromonzi district receives a total of US$682,492 in remittances per year 
which is 6.1 percent of the total remittances channelled into Mashonaland 
East province. On average the households in Goromonzi are receiving 
remittances from abroad amounting to US$2,504 which translates to 
US$208.7 per month. The highest proportion of remittances inti the province 
go to Marondera urban with a figure of US$3,426,006 (ibid., 116) This is 
consistent with the overall finding that urban areas receive the largest share of 
remittances from abroad (ibid., 84). 
Social infrastructure and amenities are important for the provision of basic 
services to people, and for creating sustainable conditions (UNICEF and 
ZimStat 2016:1). The district has a number of facilities and social amenities in 
some areas and is lacking in other areas. Some of the main constraints to 
livelihoods and access to basic services could be linked to the limited 
availability of facilities and social amenities. There are 379 boreholes in the 
district, and 300 of these are functional (79.2 percent) (ibid., 19). The district 
has 82 primary schools and of these 60 (73.2 percent) have electricity. All 82 
primary schools have Early Childhood Development classes in compliance 
with government policy (ibid., 23,25). There are only 2 vocational training 
centres in the district and there are no public libraries in Goromonzi (ibid., 33).  
In terms of traditional leadership, the district has 3 chiefs and 8 headmen 
none of whom are females. There are 25 councillors in Goromonzi district that 
is, one councillor for each of the 25 wards in the district. Of the 25 councillors, 
5 are females (ibid., 37). It is important to note that councillors are elected by 
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people in their wards through a process expected to be guided by democratic 
principles while traditional leaders are appointed on the basis of custom which 
is governed by hereditary. It is perhaps this difference in how councillors and 
traditional leaders assume authority that explains the gender disparity. 
Goromonzi district has 28 health facilities; 25 voluntary HIV testing and 
counselling centres; 82 HIV and AIDS Peer Educators; 14 health technicians; 
8 Community-based Distributors; and 3 functional and 1 non-functional 
ambulance. All these health facilities, personnel and ambulances serve an 
estimated population of 281,665 in the district (ibid., 49-53). ZimStat 
(2013b:168) investigated the methods of treatment sought by different poverty 
categories at province and district levels. The data for Goromonzi is shown in 
table 3.15. It shows that 39.9 percent of the extremely poor households have 
no contacts with public health facilities, traditional healers and private clinics 
in the district. This is probably explained by their status of being ultra-poor 
which means they have little to no income in the household to support their 
access to treatment. They are likely to rely on begging. Fewer in the 
extremely poor category (9.9 percent) approach traditional healers for 
treatment. This could be a result of their cultural beliefs and values and 
potentially low treatment charges at traditional healers when compared to 
private clinics and public health facilities. As would be expected, a majority of 
the non-poor (47.0 percent) seek treatment at public health facilities. 
However, it is surprising that a significant proportion in the non-poor category 
(37.8 percent) have no contact with the three facilities of treatment for 
treatment purposes. 
Table 2.15: Method of treatment sought by poverty category 
District Public health 
facility 
Traditional 
healer 
Private 
clinic 
None Total 
Goromonzi 38.5 4.0 17.0 40.6 100.0 
Non-poor 47.0 2.8 12.4 37.8 100.0 
Poor 38.7 2.4 17.0 41.9 100.0 
Extremely 
poor 
27.7 9.9 22.5 39.9 100.0 
Source ZimStat (2013b:168). 
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Growth points in Zimbabwe are important business and service centres in 
rural areas. Their purpose is to provide services to people at close proximity 
so that people do not have to travel to urban centres to access services. They 
reduce rural-urban migration mainly because they provide local opportunities 
for employment and economic opportunities (ibid., 12). The study found that 
Goromonzi district has 5 growth points and all have electricity (ibid., 62). 
Within Goromonzi district, two wards were selected for this research. These 
are wards 4 and 15. The sampling strategy for site selection is discussed in 
the research methodology chapter.  
 
 
• Located in Mashonaland East province, about 50 kilometres east of 
Harare city. 
• Official population figure is 224,987. 
• District has 58,013 households. Average household size is 3.5. 
• Divided into 25 administrative wards.  
• Ward 04 biggest by population size. Ward 19 smallest population size. 
• Lies in agro-ecological region II – favourable climate and more fertile 
land. 
• Crop production is the main livelihoods activity. 
• Food secure district in the province. 
• Main constraints to livelihoods include lack of access to agriculture 
inputs and labour. 
• Poverty prevalence of 62.4 percent. Ward 01 has highest poverty 
prevalence rate at 77.4 percent. 
• Poorest wards located in the northern eastern parts of the district. 
• Highest proportion of economically active persons is communal 
resettlement farmers followed by paid employees. 
• District receives a share of 6.1 percent in remittances from abroad per 
annum. 
• Inventory of facilities and social amenities in the district shows a mixed 
picture. 
• A lack of women’s representation in the main traditional leadership 
structures in the district. 
• Low representation of women in ward council structure. 
 
Box 2.2: Goromonzi district summary profile 
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2.6 Summary and conclusion 
The chapter began by providing an account of the origins of the HSCT 
programme and locating it within the broad and specific policy contexts. The 
HSCT is a social assistance programme targeting the extremely poor and 
most vulnerable segments of the population in Zimbabwe. It is aligned to three 
specific policy and programme frameworks namely: NSPP, STP, and the NAP 
for OVC III. The chapter included a detailed description of the HSCT. The 
programme’s purpose includes two key components: short term poverty 
alleviation, and long term human capital development. The HSCT is an 
unconditional social cash transfer. Targeting follows a two-stage approach: 
geographic targeting of districts based on poverty incidence and a proxy 
means test with community verification to select the food-poor and labour-
constrained households. The transfer values range from US$10 to US$25 
depending on the size of the household. Cash delivery is done physically 
using a private security company to deliver cash to beneficiaries at designated 
pay points every two months. The MIS is a key feature of the design and 
implementation of the HSCT. It’s use as programme management, monitoring 
and information storage system. The management and implementation of the 
HSCT relies on MoPSLSW’s national and subnational structures. The WCPCs 
provide a direct link between the programme and beneficiaries at the lowest 
implementation level – ward. 
The chapter also provided detailed descriptions of the socio-economic and 
demographic conditions of the research districts and wards. Epworth is largely 
an informal settlement on the fringes of Harare city. The settlement’s history 
dates back to the 1890s and it has continued to evolve. Approximately 70 
percent of the settlement’s residents live in informal, overcrowded, unserviced 
and illegal land. Access to basic services is acutely constrained for many. A 
majority of the residents are employed in the unregulated informal sector and 
street vending is a common trade. Goromonzi is a rural district in 
Mashonaland East province. The district’s major economic activity is crop 
production. Marondera and Harare are the district’s main markets for its 
agriculture produce. The poorest wards are found in the northern and eastern 
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sides of the district. An inventory of facilities and social amenities reveals that 
the district has a number of functional facilities which support people’s 
economic and social activities, and access to basic services such as water, 
health and education. 
The next chapter is a comprehensive review of cash transfer, social capital 
and social networks literature with a focus on understanding historical 
conceptual and theoretical origins of the concepts. The chapter distils from the 
social capital and social networks a suitable theoretical framework which 
guides the analysis of the effects of the HSCT on social capital. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1 Introduction 
This purpose of this chapter is to integrate the research topic into a broader 
framework of existing and relevant literature. The comprehensive review of 
literature covers the conceptual and theoretical orientations of social cash 
transfers, social capital, and social networks. Based on the reviewed 
literature, the preferred theoretical frameworks are selected. The present 
study is based on existing theories of social capital, social network, collective 
action and social exchange. The theories are drawn from the fields of 
sociology and social psychology. The chapter is arranged into seven sections, 
which are outlined below. 
Section 3.2 examines in detail social cash transfer instruments. The review of 
cash transfer literature is important for several reasons: (1) to understand the 
conceptual and theoretical origins of CTs; to describe and explain the broad 
aims and specific objectives of CTs; and (3) to highlight the important 
differences and experiences of social cash transfers across regions of Latin 
America where CT programmes began, and Sub Saharan Africa where there 
is a rapid expansion of social cash transfers. This broad and deep review of 
CT literature helps to locate Zimbabwe’s HSCT programme within the broader 
context of cash transfers and provides a basis for analysing the programme.   
The section starts by examining the definition of cash transfers. A distinction 
is made between unconditional and conditional cash transfers. The debates 
about whether or not to condition cash transfers are highlighted and 
discussed. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical foundations and 
drivers of cash transfers. The three broad aims of CTs are discussed. The 
regional perspectives and experiences of social cash transfers are woven into 
the entire section as a cross-cutting theme. For example, in discussion 
conditional and unconditional cash transfers, the regional differences and 
experiences are highlighted and analysed. The section concludes by 
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underscoring the point that CT programmes can serve multiple objectives and 
therefore can have multiple effects. 
Section 3.3 examines in detail the design and implementation features of cash 
transfer schemes. The key debates about targeting in CT programmes are 
highlighted and discussed across the different targeting methods. The section 
also provides examples of features of different CT schemes and how they 
have shaped different programme outcomes. The section also examines the 
regional differences and experiences of cash transfer design and 
implementation features. 
Section 3.4 reviews and discusses the state of the evidence of the social 
effects of CTs on a range of important outcomes including: social networks; 
risk-coping strategies; discrimination, trust and community participation; 
gender-based violence (GBV); psycho-social effects; happiness; social 
relations; civic participation and membership of associations; electoral 
participation. The section concludes by extracting the essence of the evidence 
of social effects of cash transfers. 
Section 3.5 examines the unintended or indirect effects of cash transfer 
programmes. These effects have been discussed less extensively in the 
literature yet they have important implications for the success or failure of CT 
programmes. The section reviews both the positive and negative unintended 
effects of CTs and what the effects might mean for social policy and CT 
programme design considerations. 
Section 3.6 provides a critical review of the historical development and 
conceptual origins of social capital, discusses its many and varied definitions, 
and critically examines the main dimensions, types and concepts associated 
with social capital. The section also discusses the measurement of social 
capital and the positive and negative effects of social capital. 
Section 3.7 presents the theoretical framework of the study. The study adopts 
a multiple theoretical framework that draws from sociology and social 
psychology fields. The theories are explained and their proponents stated. 
The relevance of the selected theories to the present study is provided. In 
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addition to the use of theoretical frameworks, the study also utilises 
conceptual frameworks for the analysis of the social effects of the HSCT 
programme 
3.2 Social cash transfers 
A considerable and growing literature exists on social cash transfers (SCT) in 
both developing and industrialised countries. Social cash transfer 
programmes constitute critical interventions in social protection strategies in 
many low-income countries. Although they are a vital component of a 
country’s social protection strategy or system when it exists, cash transfers 
can be important programmes on their own.  
Social cash transfers can be traced back to a wave of pilot and expanded 
programmes in the early 1990s in Latin America. The region’s experience with 
innovative conditional cash transfer programmes: Brazil’s Bolsa 
Escola/Familia in 1995, Mexico’s Progresa/Oportunidades in 1997, and 
Chile’s Solidario in 1996 galvanised interest in cash transfer programmes 
(Barrientos & Hulme 2010b:317). Although most of the prominent cash 
transfer programmes are in Latin America interest and experience with the 
programmes have not been limited to these regions.  In recent years, cash 
transfers have been launched in an increasing number of Sub-Saharan 
African countries (Barca et al. 2010:1). According to Garcia and Moore 
(2012:11) the use of cash transfer programmes has steadily increased around 
the world. Cash transfers now exist in Africa, Asia, Central Europe and Latin 
America. The World Bank (2015:ix) states that cash transfers are present in 
130 countries in the world. Barrientos and Hulme (as cited in Garcia and 
Moore 2012:12) estimated that as of 2008, cash transfers benefited 150 
million households throughout the developing world. The World Bank (2015:7) 
states that by 2014, 40 countries in Africa were implementing cash transfer 
programmes, and 64 had conditional cash transfer interventions, an indication 
that there is rapid introduction and expansion of cash transfer programmes in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
 98 
 
Cash transfers aim to reduce poverty and inequality. They address demand-
side constraints for structural and inter-generational poverty reduction and are 
an increasingly attractive option for poor countries to address the complexity 
and multi-dimensionality of poverty.  Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme (2010:27) 
in their description of the extensive experiences of cash transfer programmes 
in the past decade observed that each cash transfer programme is different, 
responding to different levels of social development, institutional structure, 
perceived needs and priorities, and political conditions. Thus, the results and 
effects of cash transfers have varied. In addition they noted that most cash 
transfer programmes have multiple goals (ibid.). Samson (2009:124) makes a 
similar observation: “Social transfers not only tackle income poverty, they also 
provide effective support for broader development objectives…. In addition to 
their vital social contribution, social cash transfers can support critical 
economic objectives.” 
3.2.1 Definition of cash transfers 
A review of the cash transfer literature shows that several authors define cash 
transfers in similar ways. While there is no consensus on the definition of 
social protection, there is broad agreement on the definition of cash transfers 
in the relevant literature. 
Samson (2009:124) defines cash transfers as: “regular non-contributory 
payments of money provided by government or non-governmental 
organisations to individuals or households, with the objective of decreasing 
chronic or shock-induced poverty, addressing social risk and reducing 
economic vulnerability.” Garcia and Moore (2012:8) aver that cash transfer 
programmes provide non-contributory cash grants to selected beneficiaries to 
satisfy minimum consumption needs. Stewart and Handa (2011) cited in 
Handa et al. (2011:31) define social cash transfers as “small, predictable 
sums of money to poor and vulnerable families”. The two authors assert that 
social cash transfers are a relatively new social protection instrument in 
Eastern and Southern Africa, and that they are “rapidly gaining popularity as 
an effective intervention to enhance the participation of the poor in economic 
development and to combat inequality, social exclusion and chronic poverty” 
 99 
 
(ibid.). DFID (2011:2) defines cash transfers as “direct, non-contributory, 
regular and predictable grants to poor households or individuals.” Social cash 
transfers are aimed at targeting resources to the poorest and socially 
excluded, to help reduce deficits in consumption, strengthen individuals and 
household productive capacity, enrol and keep children in schools and to 
boost demand for critical services (ibid.). 
Consistent with evidence in the social protection literature, the source of the 
transfers is the state or other public entities (Garcia and Moore 2012:8). In 
Latin America, although cash transfers were initiated with domestic funding, 
they have received substantial support from the international community (De 
Britto 2010:181). 
Cash transfers are non-contributory in the sense that recipients or 
beneficiaries do not pay into a system that later awards the transfers as some 
social insurance schemes do. By definition, cash transfers do not include 
partially or wholly self-financed contributions. The definitions of cash transfers 
in literature include non-contributory old-age pensions, child support grants, 
poverty-based transfers, and family grants. South Africa is one of the leading 
countries to introduce cash transfers in the form of non-contributory and 
unconditional social pensions as far back as 1928 (Hanlon et al. 2010:38). 
The old-age grants are means tested, and the age of eligibility is 63 years and 
older (ibid.). The social pensions in South Africa help improve the lives 
millions of non-pensioners living with cash recipients, for example there are 
many children under the age of 16 who live with a social pensioner (ibid.). 
Bolivia in Latin America has a universal non-contributory social pension 
scheme with the age of eligibility set at 60 years and older (ibid., 44). Other 
countries with social pensions include Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho, India, 
Nepal and Bangladesh (ibid.). 
Social protection instruments such as public works which require beneficiaries 
to work in order to receive transfers are not included in the definitions of cash 
transfers. Public works programmes usually rely on self-targeting. Individuals 
who are labour-endowed have the option to enrol in to public works 
programme. 
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3.2.2 Conditional and Unconditional cash transfers 
Cash transfers may be conditional or unconditional. A distinction between the 
two instruments is made in the social cash transfer literature. 
3.2.2.1 Conditional cash transfers 
According to De Britto (2010:181) conditional cash transfers (CCTs) 
encompass the provision of grants to targeted poor households on condition 
that they engage in human capital investments such as sending children to 
school and making periodic visits to health centres. This is consistent with 
definitions provided by other authors in the literature on cash transfers. For 
example, Garcia and Moore (2012:20-21) state that “conditional cash 
transfers provide benefits only to beneficiaries who have fulfilled prescribed 
conditions, known also as co-responsibilities.” Cluines-Ross and Huq 
(2014:77) state that the term conditional cash transfer includes all devices 
with these two components: payments to households with children, but on 
condition that certain actions conducive to the children’s education, and 
commonly also health are performed. The basic purpose of a conditional cash 
transfer is twofold: to contribute to the household’s present well-being, and to 
enlarge the future income of its members as a result of the human capital 
investment so encouraged (ibid.). 
Conditional cash transfers in Latin America were launched in the mid 1990s. 
According to Gumede (2008a): “… in the Latin American region, social 
assistance started in high middle income countries and followed the modality 
of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs).” Consistent with other views in cash 
transfer literature, Gumede (2008a) similarly identify the factors leading to the 
adoption and implementation of the targeted and conditional cash transfers 
as: “the 1980s debt crisis and stabilisation strains, [and] budget constraints…”   
Conditions vary in detail from country to country. Govender (2011:144) makes 
the point that conditions depend on what a specific country considers as the 
underlying cause of poverty, “as well as the area that needs investment to 
improve the socio-economic status of the poor.” Common conditions include: 
schooling for children, visits to health centres for medical check-ups or 
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immunisation, the requirement that household adults attend workshops or 
seminars on basic nutrition and health, and attending skills training 
programmes. Samson (2009:124) makes the point that other than human 
development responsibilities, cash transfers can be conditional on recipients 
providing labour in compliance with a work requirement. 
Cluines-Ross and Huq (2014:78) assert that virtually all conditional cash 
transfers in Latin America have health conditions at least for children under 
the age of six; some also cover conditions relating to the health of pregnant or 
lactating women, and a few to the health of others. According to de Britto 
(2010:182-184), globally, the pioneers of conditional cash transfers include 
Mexico’s Progresa launched in 1997 which was scaled up to cover eleven 
states and reached 300 000 families in rural areas; and Brazil’s Bolsa Escola 
programme introduced in the mid-1990s. Progresa consisted of cash and in-
kind transfers to beneficiary households, conditional on school attendance by 
children of those families, and regular visits to health centres by all household 
members. Bolsa Escola granted monthly transfers to poor households with 
children aged six to fifteen enrolled at school in grades one to eight, on 
condition that they had at least 85 percent school attendance rates. As in 
Progresa, the conditional cash transfers were paid to the female head of the 
household. 
De Britto (2010:185) explains that the use of conditional cash transfers in 
Latin America has much to do with their potential to address one key 
determinant of chronic poverty in Latin America: low educational attainment. 
They also had a good fit with contemporary discourse on poverty reduction: 
addressing topical issues including gender, human capital, community 
participation, and empowerment. 
There is abundant evidence in the social cash transfers literature that 
conditional cash transfers can have positive effects for many of the extremely 
poor households in mitigating the present and also future poverty. The 
evidence of effects of cash transfers is discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
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Fiszbein and Schady (as cited in Garcia and Moore 2012:127) and De Britto 
(2010:190) point to the potential challenges associated with conditional cash 
transfers. CCTs entail costs to the beneficiaries, their communities and the 
programme. Conditions may be too costly for he extremely poor households 
to comply with. For example, at the individual level, there are private costs in 
terms of time and money for households to meet conditions and collect their 
cash transfers, and this affects women in particular. Adato (as cited in De 
Britto 2010:190) points out that at community level there can be adverse 
effects of household targeting on social capital - defined by social relations, 
cohesion and solidarity especially in rural areas. Other concerns are that the 
social provisioning or supply side, for example, schools and health centres will 
be unable to support increased demand created by conditional cash transfers. 
Thus conditions can only work effectively where social services exist and are 
delivered to acceptable levels of quality. Additional criticism to conditionality 
draws from the rights-based perspective, and stems from the assertion that 
the State has an obligation as a duty bearer to citizens who are claim holders 
entitled to state transfers.  
3.2.2.2 Unconditional cash transfers 
Lund, Noble, Barnes and Wright (as cited in Govender 2011:143) define an 
unconditional cash transfer as: “one where the constitution or other legislation 
defines a right which becomes an entitlement for a person with certain 
characteristics who meets certain qualifications.” Their definition draws from 
the rights-based perspective of social protection. The World Bank (2015:8) 
provides a simplified definition which states that: unconditional cash transfers 
provide cash without particular conditions or co-responsibilities for 
beneficiaries. Beneficiaries may spend the cash or grants as they wish. Thus, 
in contrast with conditional cash transfers, unconditional cash transfers are 
not dependent on the behaviour of actions of the recipient.  
In contrast to CT programmes in Latin America, Garcia and Moore (2012:53) 
assert that cash transfer programmes that support poverty and food security 
objectives in the Sub Saharan Africa region tended to be unconditional cash 
transfers. Zimbabwe’s social cash transfer scheme which forms the basis of 
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the present study is an example of an unconditional cash transfer grant to 
labour-constrained and food-poor households. Other examples of cash 
transfer programmes that apply no conditions on how to use cash transfers 
include, the Hunger and Safety Net Programme in Kenya and Zambia’s 
Kalomo Pilot Cash Transfer Scheme implemented in Kalomo district. The 
major reason which explains a preference for unconditional cash transfers in 
the Sub Saharan Africa region is limited resources to put in place sufficient 
administrative systems and capacity to enforce and monitor compliance 
conditions (ibid., 119). 
3.2.2.3 The debates about conditional or unconditional cash transfers 
Whether cash transfers should be conditioned or not is subject to intense 
debate in literature. With reference to this subject, Cluines-Ross and Huq 
(2014:78) state the central question in the cash transfer literature as: “Is 
conditionality important, or would the recipients spend (or sacrifice) just as 
much extra on health and education if they were given the payments 
unconditionally?” A review of the cash transfer literature gives mixed 
responses to the question.   
There is significant research evidence on the merits and demerits of 
conditionality versus non-conditionality of social cash transfers (De Brauw & 
Hoddinott 2011:359). The theory underpinning the use of conditions in social 
cash transfers is that poor households lack full appreciation of the long term 
benefits of critical human development services such as preventive 
healthcare, nutrition and education. The interests of parents, guardians or 
adults in benefitting households may diverge from those of the children or 
dependants. Fiszbein and Schady (as cited in Garcia & Moore 2012:127) 
provide a comprehensive discussion on when imposing conditions may be 
appropriate. Conditions may be useful when households underinvest in 
human capital or when adding conditions increases the programme’s political 
acceptability and sustainability. They assert that households may invest in 
suboptimal levels of human capital for many reasons which include: imperfect 
information, poor decision-making, or “incomplete altruism of parents towards 
their children.” 
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De Britto (2010:185) suggests that the popularity of conditional cash transfers 
is not only related to their basic characteristics but also to implementation 
aspects and contextual factors that enhanced their visibility among policy 
elites and donors.  
The theory underpinning unconditional social cash transfers is that the poor 
are rational actors and that easing cash constraints will result in increased use 
of public services without the need for conditions. Beneficiaries are free to 
spend the transfers in the way they want. Schubert (2010:217) in an analysis 
of the design features of Zambia’s Kalomo Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme 
makes the point that: 
The scheme assumes that beneficiary households will spend the 
money wisely: that, even though they are poor, people are not stupid 
or irresponsible, and they know best how precarious their situation is, 
and what they need most in order to survive. It is also assumed that 
the heads of beneficiary households (mainly older women) will spend 
most of the transfers on the OVC living in their households. All these 
assumptions are closely monitored and have so far proved to be 
realistic. 
It is evident from CTs research literature that conditional cash transfers have 
achieved considerable success, for example, Mexico’s Oportunidades. It is 
however not yet clear from the available research evidence whether 
conditions contribute to success of the CCTs. The success of unconditional 
cash transfers in South Africa and an impact evaluation in Malawi raises the 
possibility that cash alone may be enough, with no need for conditions (DFID 
2011:49-50). 
Banerjee and Duflo (as cited in Cluines-Ross and Huq 2014:78) report 
findings from an experiment designed investigate conditionality. The families 
of a sample of school-age girls in Malawi were randomly divided into three 
groups. Members of two of these groups received a monthly stipend: in one 
case on condition that the children remained in school, in the other case non-
conditionality. The third group was the control group which received no 
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stipend. Findings show that the control group had a school dropout rate of 11 
percent, while the conditional and unconditional groups had rates in both 
cases of 6 percent. The difference between the control group and the other 
two groups was strongly significant yet there was no difference between the 
conditional and unconditional cash transfer groups. From the study, it seemed 
that the cash transfer had the effect of encouraging enrolment, presumably by 
defraying its cost, but that the effect was independent of whether the cash 
transfer conditional or unconditional. Further, the findings suggest that it was 
the extra income alone, not the condition attached to it that caused higher 
enrolment. A similar result from a study in Morocco produced a similar result 
(ibid.). 
These findings are consistent with the points raised by Schubert with regards 
to the assumptions made in the Kalomo Pilot Cash Transfer Scheme in 
Zambia. In general, poor families value education and do not need to be 
bribed to invest in it. Evidence in literature seems to suggest that poor families 
may need only a boost in their income to support them to make the necessary 
human capital sacrifices (ibid.). 
There is no conclusive evidence in the cash transfer literature to suggest that 
on the basis of findings pointing to no exact effects of conditionality on 
increased investments in human capital, conditionality should be dropped. 
The decision to condition transfers depends on multiple factors, and 
conditions may or may not be cost-effective in different settings (Garcia & 
Moore 2012:115). A key insight in literature is that conditionality is dominant in 
Latin America while most cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
unconditional. For Latin America, conditions are important to tackle key 
determinants of poverty in the form of low schooling rates and health care. 
This was the case with Mexico’s Progresa and Brazil’s Bolsa Escola 
programmes. Conditions are therefore necessary to achieve specific human 
capital outcomes. The limited representation of conditional cash transfers in 
the Sub-Saharan Africa regions is down to two main reasons: First, it has 
been suggested that the poorest countries in the low-income category face 
significant capacity and resource constraints needed to monitor and enforce 
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conditions. Secondly, cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa are mainly a 
phenomenon of the past decade and so are still being developed. As a result, 
the efficacy of applying conditions in cash transfers within the Sub-Saharan 
Africa region is currently being tested through rigorous impact evaluations. If 
the benefits of conditionality outweigh the costs, programmes in the region 
may focus on conditional cash transfers. Although unconditional cash 
transfers are dominant in the region, conditions are applied in a number of 
countries including but not limited to Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Nigeria, and Tanzania (ibid., 117). 
Govender (2011:142-143) offers useful insights on the conditional versus 
unconditional cash transfers debate. The point is made that: 
Although not explicitly mentioned, most social assistance to the poor is 
conditional. The fact that they have to be poor to qualify for assistance 
is conditional, that is, the person will qualify on condition that they are 
poor. Social insurance is also conditional as it is contingent on the risk 
(illness, unemployment, disability) being realised before any benefits 
are disbursed to the claimant. Schubert and Slater (2004 [sic]:3) aver 
that although not always transparent, there is more often than not 
some form of conditionality in every transfer. 
Lund, Noble, Barnes and Wright (as cited in Govender 2011:143) explain the 
underlying differences between conditional and unconditional cash transfers, 
making clear the distinctions between characteristics, administrative 
compliance requirements and conditionalities. 
Age and disability are characteristics of a person necessary to qualify 
for a grant and are not conditionalities. Identity documents or birth 
certificates are administrative requirements and also not conditions. 
The proof of socio-economic status or income is necessary for the 
means test. This is also not a condition but a mechanism for 
exclusion….There is a category, which the authors regard as true 
conditionalities, and those are where the beneficiaries have to do 
something (regular attendance of school) in order to continue receiving 
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the grants. And any contraventions of the condition lead to punitive 
measures…. 
A concluding key insight from the conditionality debate is offered by Baird, De 
Hoop, and Olzler (as cited in World Bank 2015:9) who assert that “the 
dichotomy between unconditional and conditional transfers is not sharp, rather 
there is a great deal of variation in the intensity of conditionality.” Programmes 
that are explicitly conditional require capacity and resources to monitor 
compliance and penalise non-compliance. 
3.2.3 Theoretical foundations of cash transfers 
Cash transfers represent a paradigm shift in combating the multi-
dimensionality of poverty, risk, and vulnerability. According to Hanlon, 
Barrientos and Hulme (2010:27) the cash transfer model as it is today, is 
largely credited to a group of six large and newly industrialising countries of 
the Southern hemisphere: Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, India and 
China. The six countries recognised the multi-dimensionality and persistent 
nature of poverty and decided to develop new strategies of giving money 
directly to the poor in predictable ways and guaranteed period of time (ibid.). 
The social policy positions of these countries informed by international 
conventions such as the UDHR guaranteed the cash transfers as entitlements 
and not charity. 
3.2.3.1 The neoliberal economic model of the North 
The cash transfer model challenged the neoliberal model promoted by the rich 
North. In the North, the social protection model was based on social insurance 
programmes whereas in the South many people work in the informal sector 
without social security or are peasant farmers whose incomes are not enough 
to cover their consumption, investment expenditures and savings.  The 
neoliberal economic model of the North had failed to stimulate development in 
the South. According to Brohman (1996:201) the central focus of the 
neoliberal development strategy had been economic growth and its trickle-
down effects. The process of economic growth was characteristically thought 
to follow a series of stages which would ultimately spread benefits to all 
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thereby alleviating poverty and inequality. The diffusion of technology and the 
other attributes of modernisation would allow benefits of development to 
trickle down to the neediest of sectors of society, it was asserted. The 
development agenda was viewed as a top-down process in which the major 
international financial institutions in cooperation with local Third World elites 
called the shots. “The people to whom development projects were supposedly 
directed existed mainly in the abstract as socio-economic indicators” (ibid., 
202). There was dissatisfaction in the Third World as many countries began to 
notice that economic growth was not necessarily correlated with other 
development objectives such as creation of employment opportunities, the 
reduction poverty and inequalities, and the provision of basic services. In 
countries such as Brazil, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Nicaragua, India, Pakistan and 
South Africa in which rapid growth had been achieved, growth was not 
eradicating poverty or providing jobs at speed anticipated, and in many cases 
income inequalities were increasing. It was argued that development should 
not be measured in abstract aggregate growth indices, but according to other 
people-oriented criteria such as the universal provision of basic needs, 
promotion of social equity, the enhancement of human productive and 
creative capabilities, and the capacity of communities to set and meet their 
own development goals. Ul Haq (as cited in Brohman 1996:203) argued that: 
“New development models should be oriented toward satisfaction of basic 
human needs and desires particularly at the local community level; and 
development projects should build development around people rather than 
people around development.”  
3.2.3.2 Alternative development strategies 
The neoliberal development model was criticised primarily for ignoring issues 
of mass poverty, social justice, inequality and sustainability. A broadly 
humanist approach to development was proposed, which advocated 
beginning with the satisfaction of the basic needs of the poor who constitute 
the world’s majority. For Hettne (as cited in Brohman 1996:207) the Cocoyoc 
Declaration marked “the birth of an alternative trend in development theory.” 
The alternative strategies, therefore, placed a higher priority on the need for 
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immediate redistributive measures. The strategies favoured a more direct, 
targeted and reliable approach to alleviating poverty and reducing inequalities 
rather than the slow and uncertain process of general economic, and to hope 
for a consequent trickling down of benefits to the poorest people. According to 
Griffin (as cited in Brohman 1996:217) “because of their focus on direct 
redistributive measures, the alternative strategies have sometimes been 
called, the Third World equivalent of Western social democracy.” The cash 
transfer paradigm falls within the rubric of alternative development strategies. 
The cash transfer model assigned a greater role to the State and targets large 
numbers of poor people. Cash transfers are provided on a long term basis, 
eligible recipients can be confident of the predictability and continued 
availability, and they cover significant portions of the population. The main 
source of financing for the cash transfers is the State using tax revenue, and 
the cash transfers are neither contributory nor insurance based. The rich and 
powerful countries argued that poor people are at least partly responsible for 
their own poverty, and therefore unworthy of support. Poor people must be 
guided or even compelled to act in the best interests of their children (Hanlon, 
Barrientos & Hulme 2010:3). The rich North believed the poor would simply 
waste the money hence their obsession with guided development through 
technical experts seconded to international aid agencies. Development 
projects were designed from outside and imposed on the poor communities. 
Many such projects seemed to have worked at cross-purposes with the poor 
people’s aspirations. It was also argued that the international aid architecture 
had systems that were cumbersome and less efficient. 
The cash transfer paradigm’s point of departure is that the poor are no longer 
regarded simply as victims or passive recipients of internal or outside aid, but 
as people who, despite enormous constraints, are actively engaged in the 
struggle to define their own lives and means of livelihood. Countries in the 
South argued that poor people put the money they are given to good use. 
They are wise enough to know what is best for them in the totality of their 
poverty circumstances. Researchers find that households with little money 
have “honed their survival and livelihoods skills over generations and that they 
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use the extra income from cash transfers wisely and creatively without armies 
of aid workers telling the poor people how to improve themselves” (ibid., 4). 
3.2.4 Broad aims of cash transfers 
The cash transfer instrument is rapidly gaining popularity as an effective 
intervention to address four broad goals and priorities: social protection and 
security; development and economic growth; human capital and breaking the 
intergenerational poverty cycle; and rights, equity and fairness (Hanlon, 
Barrientos & Hulme 2010:28). A review of the cash transfer literature shows 
that each cash transfer programme is different because countries have 
different contexts and policy choices. No programme is thought meet all the 
four broad goals. 
3.2.4.1 Social protection and security 
Cash transfers are often envisaged as seeking to address three types of 
objectives related to social protection and security. 
3.2.4.1.1 Vulnerable members of society 
Chambers (as cited in Narayan et al. 2000:61) argued that poverty alleviation 
policies should pay attention to the “particular factors that place individuals, 
households, and communities at risk of poverty or worsened poverty ….” 
rather than just focusing on levels of consumption or income. According to 
Moser (ibid.) “vulnerability is best understood as a lack of key sets of assets, 
exposing individuals, households, and communities to increased or 
disproportionate risk of impoverishment. Simply put an increased and range of 
assets means less vulnerability, while fewer assets increase the risk of 
impoverishment.” Defencelessness, insecurity, and exposure to risk, shocks 
and stress are all important factors related to the concept of vulnerability. An 
examination of vulnerability helps to shed light to these issues (ibid.). 
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2010:65) make the point that “to be a useful 
concept, vulnerability must be defined in relation to some other phenomenon, 
such as poverty, malnutrition, exclusion or neglect.” In this sense, 
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“vulnerability is thus a multidimensional concept and corresponds to the 
complexity of the phenomenon it is defined against” (ibid.). Vulnerability is 
commonly conceptualised as a product of two components: exposure to a 
hazard (shock or process); and resilience, or the ability to manage the hazard 
(Chambers, 1989; Bankoff et al. 2004 in Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 
2010:66). The “ability to manage” is often proxied by income, consumption or 
asset-based poverty measures. For example, if a household falls below a 
specified poverty line, it may be considered unable to cope. According to 
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2010:66) Dercon asserts that: “… to 
understand vulnerability fully, it is not enough simply to take a one-period 
view.” It needs to look into the future, as it makes a prediction about future 
events (poverty or other outcomes. The definition of vulnerability 
encompasses three groups of people: those who are likely to become poor in 
the future as a result of an unexpected shock; those who will remain poor; 
those who might fall deeper into poverty; and those who may move in and out 
of poverty (transient poor) because of predictable fluctuations such as 
seasonality. Dercon (2001) notes that this distinction is important as the 
appropriate social protection interventions or other policy responses are very 
different for each distinct group. 
Children, the elderly, widows, the chronically ill, and the disabled are among 
groups of people in societies often considered most vulnerable. The State and 
broader communities have always acknowledged their obligations to these 
vulnerable groups in populations. These people are unable to provide for 
themselves or contribute adequately to the productive capacities of 
households and communities. They are dependent on the assistance and 
support of others (Narayan et al. 2000:61; Hanlon et al. 2010:29). In 
developed countries, social insurance schemes are a common social 
protection instrument for life-course contingencies such as maternity 
(pregnant mothers), and old age, and work-related contingencies such as 
sickness or unemployment. The schemes also cover the young and children. 
Social insurance schemes pool contributions from workers and disburse them 
to the above-mentioned vulnerable groups. In the low-income countries where 
social insurance schemes cover only a small portion of the labour force 
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because of high levels of unemployment, and a pervasive informal economy, 
non-contributory pensions, cash transfers, family allowances and child 
support grants are the preferred social protection instruments (Hanlon et al. 
2010:29). 
3.2.4.1.2 Raising incomes of the working poor 
According to Addison, Harper, Prowse and Sherpherd (as cited in Hanlon et 
al. 2010:29) most of the chronically poor are actually in some form of 
employment. For example, ZimStat (2013a:56) found that households headed 
by communal or peasant farmers suffer from the greatest poverty prevalence. 
The problem is that the nature of their work is such that the workers do not 
generate a living wage or the incomes from their fields are not generating 
enough incomes to cover their consumption expenditures and to support their 
families. In addition, rural households’ sources of income are highly variable 
and dependent on rainfall patterns, and casual labour whose availability and 
payments are unpredictable (ZimVAC 2015:118). This phenomenon is 
particularly prevalent in rural areas where households experience higher 
poverty incidence than in urban areas across various employment activities. 
Cash transfers have an immediate positive effect of raising the incomes of the 
employed but chronically poor nearer to the poverty line.  
3.2.4.1.3 Safety nets 
Cash transfers constitute a disposable-income safety net that helps the poor 
and extremely poor. The safety net cushions several categories of people: for 
example, those who cannot work because they are sick or injured, the 
homeless, those who cannot find jobs during periods of economic decline or 
those whose agricultural production fails because of natural disasters such as 
floods or droughts. Cash transfers help by reducing the suffering of people 
from extremes of hunger, malnutrition and other forms of deprivation. There is 
broad acceptance that safety nets allow poor and extremely poor people to 
live in dignity and decency. There are numerous examples of cash transfer 
safety nets in the cash transfers literature. According to the Africa Progress 
Panel (2014:48) the World Bank makes the point that Ethiopia’s Productive 
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Safety Net Programme (PSNP) reaches 8 million beneficiaries in about 1.5 
million households providing cash and food support through public works in 
areas affected by drought. Devereux, Marshall, MacAskill and Pelham as 
cited in (ibid., 50) “… households covered by Ethiopia’s PSNP were less likely 
to have to sell their livestock during droughts.” Thus by helping the poor to 
sustain their vital consumption needs, cash transfers enable poor households 
and communities to protect and maintain their productive assets. 
In the United States; short term emergency cash transfers are also common. 
According to Hanlon et al. (2010:30) each family displaced by major natural 
disasters such as floods receives five hundred dollars. Cash transfers have 
also been used to cushion people in Alaska from temporarily higher living 
costs. 
3.2.4.2 Economic growth and development 
There is intense policy debate in the cash transfers literature about the 
relationship between cash transfers and economic growth. The prominent and 
evidenced-based views argue that cash transfers promote economic growth. 
Hanlon et al. (2010:31) state that: “It has been argued that governments 
cannot afford to provide cash transfers and social protection until after 
development and economic growth have occurred, but the opposite is actually 
true: Cash transfers are essential to promote growth and development.” 
Samson (2009:126) makes a similar argument and states that: “In many ways 
social transfers promote economic growth.” Contrary to views by some 
economists positing that there is a negative trade-off between social 
protection and growth, empirical evidence from the richest countries in the 
world show that these countries have the most comprehensive and coherent 
social protection systems: “Social security is an essential basic service in all 
successful states that have experienced long- term sustainable growth rates 
alongside successful poverty reduction,” (ibid.). Thus social protection and 
economic growth can co-exist in mutually beneficial ways. Another 
fundamental myth refuted in the cash transfer literature is that of non-
affordability. Cichon and Scholz (2009:96) argue that: “There is no strict limit 
for national social expenditure depending on the level of economic 
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development”, that is, some countries cannot afford more than a certain level 
of expenditure in a given state of economic performance. The observation 
from statistical analysis of long-term growth rates in the OECD countries 
shows that there is no direct relationship between economic growth rates 
defined as GDP per capita, and the level of social expenditure ratio (ibid., 91). 
However, the authors point to a key caveat: “There is certainly a need for 
more detailed research to remove statistical inconclusiveness and provide a 
proof of causality [as there may be] a saturation point for social expenditure 
beyond which it becomes economically and socially counter-productive” (ibid., 
97). 
The key insights from the cash transfer literature about the relationship 
between cash transfers and economic growth and development show that 
more than simply constituting a safety-net, cash transfers provide a 
springboard for inclusive economic growth in developing countries. The 
positive economic effects manifest in several ways: 
• Stimulates demand for goods and services: The introduction of cash 
transfers directly creates demand for goods and services as the poor 
households spend the money locally. Consumption expenditures on 
food, health, housing and nutrition increase. Whole communities 
including non-beneficiaries benefit through the economic multiplier 
effects on local goods, services and labour markets. Hanlon et al. 
(2010:31) assert that while the value of cash transfer may be small as a 
proportion of GDP (1 percent), the cash transfers boost the purchasing 
power of poor households by 20 percent thus giving a significant 
catalytic action to local economic growth. According to the United 
National (sic) Conference on Trade and Development (as cited in 
Hanlon et al. 2010:31) “domestic demand makes the largest 
contribution to economic growth.” This phenomenon is observed in 
both developing and developed countries.  
• Unlocking investment opportunities through insurance: The extra 
income from cash transfers allows households to consume more and 
invest more. Dercon, Bold and Calvo (2010:47) observe that poor 
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households in developing countries are vulnerable to high risks and 
shocks in the form of natural, health, social and economic risks with 
negative effects for their well-being. The specific shocks range from 
“individual-specific (such as illness, theft or unemployment) to 
economy-wide (such as droughts or recessions).” It is widely 
acknowledged that the poor are usually excluded from the formal 
economy and as a result insurance markets do not usually offer 
insurance contracts to the poor because such contracts are difficult to 
enforce and the poor face extra costs to join such schemes (ibid., 51-
52). Shocks create risk and the poor must acquire coping mechanisms 
in order to survive. The lack of formal market-based or social insurance 
does not imply that the poor are passive towards the risks they face. 
Poor people employ various strategies to reduce, manage and to cope 
with risks. Dercon, Bold and Calvo (2010:55) note that: “Risk 
management and coping strategies are always present in the life of the 
household…. Households cope with risk mainly by using income-based 
strategies – such as diversification of income sources – and assets for 
buffering consumption.” A regular and predictable cash transfer, thus, 
serves as a form of insurance to reduce insecurity and manage risks. 
Households reduce their need to save for emergencies thus unlocking 
funds for investments in a number of domains which include: 
agricultural asset accumulation; increased livestock holdings; 
innovation through investments in new technologies, seeds and 
markets; and diversification of income sources through 
entrepreneurship – setting up, expanding or improving small 
businesses. 
• Closely linked to the investment benefits of cash transfers is the point 
that cash transfers provide start-up capital that enables the poor and 
vulnerable to invest in protecting and building productive assets and 
livelihoods contributing to long term resilience and growth. According to 
the World Bank (as cited in Hanlon et al. 2010:32) the poor and 
vulnerable people to underinvest or not invest because they lack 
access to credit yet their investment choices are often productive and 
can have higher returns. Thus the redistributive effect of cash transfers 
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provides initial capital and immediate liquidity to undertake productive 
investments. 
3.2.4.3 Protecting and promoting human capital development 
Cash transfers promote human development. The poor and vulnerable 
households are often forced to cut spending on nutrition, health care, or to 
withdraw children from school in times of shocks and crises. These distress 
strategies often lead to some of the worst consequences of poverty – 
transmission of poverty across generations, with implications on the well-
being of households, and reducing the prospects for poverty alleviation and 
inclusive economic growth. Cash transfers are an effective instrument to 
break this inter-generational poverty by providing resources that ensure 
households meet their food needs with greater food consumption and dietary 
diversity; children have access to health care; higher school enrolments and 
attendance rates and a reduction in child labour – all better human 
development opportunities for children than the experiences faced by their 
parents. Poor households can also invest in improved housing and sanitation. 
In Latin America cash transfers are conditional on households sending their 
children to school, and attending health and nutritional checks at clinics and 
other health centres. In this way, cash transfers protect children’s 
accumulation of human capital at a critical stage in children’s development 
and ensure that they transition into productive young people and adults 
nutrition who can contribute to economic growth. There is strong evidence in 
the cash transfer literature that good health and nutrition at pivotal times in 
children’s life cycles including early childhood, transition to school, puberty 
and adolescence leads to better school performance and longer term 
employment opportunities. 
According to Hanlon et al. (2010:33) “[while] improved health and education 
can be seen as valuable gains in themselves, they also improve the 
productive capacity of poor households. The main assets that poor people 
have are themselves and their labour power, and cash transfers can boost 
their productive capacities – increasing what economists call their human 
capital.” 
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3.2.4.4 Moral or ethical objectives of cash transfers 
Hanlon et al. (2010:34) make the point that there are many proponents who 
see cash transfers as promoting the moral and ethical goals of equity, 
equality, rights, and empowerment of women and girls. However, the 
interactions of these ethical or moral factors help tackle poverty and bolster 
economic growth and development. 
3.2.4.4.1 Redistribution 
Inequality is very often the cause of poverty.  In highly unequal societies, 
economic growth is accompanied by large disparities in income, wealth, 
education, health and other dimensions of human development between the 
rich few and the poor majority. The poor masses often complain that 
development has not had positive effects on their ordinary lives. Economic 
growth is not correlated with social justice. According to the UNDP (2014:39) 
“[t]he poorest two thirds of the world’s [population] are estimated to receive 
less than 13 percent of the world income while the richest 1 percent amass 
nearly 15 percent.” Milanovic (as cited in UNDP, 2014:39) asserts that “[t]he 
share of the richest 1 percent might be severely underestimated given the 
difficulty of estimating their incomes.” Beyond the global income inequality, 
Fuentes-Nieva and Galasso (as cited in UNDP 2014:39) estimate that “about 
half the world’s wealth is owned by the richest 1 percent of the world’s 
population, with the richest 85 people collectively holding the same wealth as 
the poorest half of the world’s population” 
Deep and chronic inequality exacerbates deprivations and makes it difficult to 
reduce poverty. According to Blank et al. (2011:21) societies characterised by 
high and persistent inequalities divisive, have higher rates of crimes and 
violence, factors which hinder private investment and increase the costs of 
doing business. The UNDP (2014:39) makes similar observations by pointing 
that inequality is a constraint on social cohesion and social mobility, and fuels 
social tensions that can lead to political instability. Huge disparities in incomes 
can even undermine democratic values as wealthy people can engage in acts 
of bribing voters during election times or using money to influence or shape 
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policies that are not in the interest of the poor majority. Inequality often has 
important psychological dimensions for the poorest. It represents 
powerlessness, voicelessness, dependency, shame, humiliation and 
insecurity. According to Narayan et al. (2000:4) these psychological 
dimensions constitute a component of the multidimensionality of poverty. 
It is important to reduce inequality in all dimensions of human development. In 
highly unequal societies, redistribution is one of the most significant ways of 
reducing poverty and vulnerability. Cash transfers have a direct effect on 
tackling inequality. They transfer resources from the upper income to the 
lowest income households in relatively efficient ways.  Samson (2009:126) 
avers that the transfer of resources from the richer to the poorer can follow 
horizontal or vertical patterns. Transfers can come “from wage-earning 
households with no dependent children or dependent adults to those with one 
or more dependents, or from households currently prosperous to those 
currently poor, with the promise to the prosperous that when or if they 
experience future shocks they too can count on similar compensating 
benefits.” Hanlon et al. (2010:34) make the point that social democracy in 
Europe was founded on the belief and principle that societies should be more 
equal and that redistributive measures were necessary to shore up the 
“deserving poor.” Cash transfers running in parallel with a progressive tax 
system, and state-financed basic services – education and health, are key 
components of the redistribution programmes. According to the World Bank 
(as cited in Hanlon et al. 2010:34) Sweden is more equal and the richest 10 
percent earns 6 times the income of the poorest fifth. Brazil and South Africa 
are among the highly unequal societies with the richest 10 percent earning 41 
and 35 times the incomes of the poorest 10 percent in respective countries. 
Part of the rationale for introducing South Africa’s social grants programme – 
Older Person’s Pension, the Child Support Grant, and the Disability Grant – is 
founded on the basis of redistribution of income and wealth from the richer to 
the poorer households. 
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3.2.4.4.2 Empowerment of women and girls 
Women experience many types of disadvantages and discrimination in many 
dimensions of development – health, education and employment. In most 
societies women are socially, culturally, and economically dependent on men. 
Women from poor households are disconnected from ownership of assets 
and face constrained access to factors of production. For example, they are 
typically either landless, or if they own land, they face gender-based 
constraints that affect their ability to achieve viable agricultural productivity. In 
many countries cash transfers are given largely to women, promoting 
empowerment and more balanced gender relations. Mexico’s Progresa 
programme and Brazil’s Bolsa Escola had positive gender biases, addressing 
the transfers to female heads of the household and granting higher subsidies 
for girls than for boys (De Britto 2010:183-184). The broad objective of 
distributing cash to female members of households is fundamentally to 
increase women’s access to and control over resources and in the process 
improve the status of women. Cash transfers also contribute to a broad range 
of outcomes for girls including girls’ education, access to health services, and 
increased economic activity. Evidence from global research and impact 
evaluations on cash transfer effects on women’s empowerment is discussed 
in a later section in this chapter. 
3.2.4.4.3 Right to development  
International human rights instruments provide a legal framework for 
strategies to reduce poverty by compelling states to fulfil people’s social and 
economic rights. Chinkin (as cited in Townsend 2009:34) asserts that “[a] 
rights-based approach… moves away from the instrumentalist and utilitarian 
language of development economists to that of the entitlements and 
obligations enshrined within the formal legal system, while retaining the moral 
authority which other approaches lack.” Thus the provision of cash transfers 
to recipients can be seen as a fulfilment people’s fundamental rights to an 
adequate standard of living (Hanlon et al. 2010:34). 
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3.2.4.5 Multiple objectives 
A key insight from the literature on cash transfers shows that cash transfers 
can be designed to satisfy several of the objectives outlined above. A cash 
transfer programme can have multiple purposes, for example, reducing 
poverty and inequality; increasing human capital outcomes; assisting families 
affected by drought; and stimulating demand in local markets for goods and 
services. For example, according to Handa and Davis (2006:514) “[m]ost 
CCTs have the same dual objectives, combining long-run human capital 
development with short-term poverty alleviation [immediate consumption 
smoothing effect], but their origins are different.” The conditional cash 
transfers in Latin America attempt to achieve a varying balance between 
investments in human capital – education, nutrition and health outcomes, and 
increasing consumption. According to Levy (as cited in Johannsen, Tejerina & 
Glassman (2010:141) assert that: “If the objective is to break the 
intergenerational poverty cycle through investment in… health and education, 
this dual policy strategy … is considered a key factor for success.” There is a 
critical level of direct cash transfers for current consumption that a household 
in extreme poverty needs to satisfy before being able to shift its spending 
towards investments in human capital. As will be discussed later in the next 
section, the design of conditional cash transfer programmes takes into 
account this dual policy objectives strategy. 
3.3 Design and implementation features of cash transfers 
The design, implementation and monitoring of cash transfer programmes is 
an important matter in the CT literature. Well-designed programmes can 
achieve their intended outcomes. Badly designed and poorly implemented 
programmes can leave beneficiaries worse off. There are design features and 
implementation or operational practices that commonly characterise cash 
transfer programmes across regions and countries. A description and 
discussion of how cash transfer programmes work facilitates a nuanced 
understanding of the trends in targeting methods; benefit size and structure 
(benefit system); conditions and compliance; cash payment systems; 
coordination among the several institutions involved in the programme; 
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programme monitoring, evaluation, and accountability, communication and 
grievance mechanisms.  
This section examines in detail the main design and implementation features 
of CT programmes. The features discussed here are: targeting, beneficiary 
registration, transfer size, main recipient, cash payment mechanisms, 
frequency of payments, grievance and complaints management systems, 
graduation and exit rules,  and programme communication. The section also 
discusses examples of features of different CT programmes and how they 
have shaped programme effects. Regional experiences in the design and 
implementation of CTs are also highlighted. 
3.3.1 Targeting methods 
Targeting is about deciding and establishing who are the “deserving” and thus 
eligible, and who are the “non-deserving”, and thus non-eligible poor 
(Neubourg 2009:69). Targeting is a design dilemma of a complex technical, 
social and political nature for cash transfer programmes. Whether cash 
transfers should be targeted is an ongoing debate in the cash transfer 
literature. According to Grosh et al. cited in Garcia and Moore (2012:81) the 
debate is mainly between two extreme positions. There are proponents who 
believe that defining target populations and establishing targeting systems is 
inappropriate and is not an effective redistributive mechanism. These 
proponents argue for a universal approach to cash transfers that is, making 
payments to all who satisfy the agreed criterion of need. Proponents of 
targeting argue that targeting is an efficient way of redistributing limited 
resources. In their view, “universality is a philosophical ideal” which is not 
feasible in the wake of fiscal constraints. In a paper analysing social 
protection in Latin America and Africa, Gumede (2008a) identifies targeting as 
one of the critical policy questions that remains unresolved. The key questions 
are: “why targeting and how to target[?]” Gumede (2008a) argues that: “[t]here 
are issues about geographical, categorical and/or community targeting which 
requires (sic) poverty mapping. There is an issue on selection of beneficiaries 
and questions of means testing, proxy means testing, multidimensional index 
and so on arise. It remains to be answered whether the method used really 
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matters.” One of the key lessons from the cash transfer experiences from the 
countries reviewed by Gumede (2008a) is that targeting the extreme-poor 
remains a challenge compared to targeting the poor. 
Notwithstanding the important debates on targeting in the cash transfer 
literature, cash transfer programmes have clearly defined target population 
groups across regions and countries. The objectives or goals of cash transfer 
programmes ideally guide who deserves and should be selected as a cash 
transfer recipient. Cash transfer programmes in different countries use many 
different ways of setting eligibility criteria and none is perfect hence a many 
countries employ a mix of targeting methods which aim to maximise value for 
money for the target group given resource limitation (Hanlon et al. 2010:101-
102).  
All targeting methods are subject to inclusion and exclusion errors – some 
more than others depending on the intervention and target population. 
Clunies-Ross and Huq (2014:57) assert that while cash transfer programmes 
attempt to minimise both inclusion and exclusion errors, “[t]here is a trade-off 
between propensities to ‘errors of inclusion’ (some of the non-poor included 
as beneficiaries) and propensities to ‘errors of exclusion’ (some of the eligible 
poor denied benefits). More rigour in preventing the one will tend to mean 
increased proneness to the other.”  Devereux, Webb and Handa (2011:8) 
highlight exclusion and inclusion errors arising from “targeting orphans – a 
recognised ‘vulnerable’ category of children – excludes many children who 
are vulnerable because they live in extremely poor households, and also 
includes many orphans who live in relatively well-off households.” Success in 
targeting is generally a matter of degree and it is reflected in how a 
programme limits errors of inclusion and exclusion. It is generally accepted in 
the literature that inclusion errors are easier to recognise in a programme than 
exclusion errors. Grosh et al. cited in Clunies-Ross and Huq (2014:57) 
highlight three primary causes of exclusion errors in descending manner: 
inadequate financial resources, inadequate outreach (itself possibly a result of 
inadequate financial provision) and, misclassification of eligible claimants as 
ineligible. The “bottom line” is that targeting is never 100 percent accurate. 
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The choice of any targeting method for cash transfers or any other 
development intervention involves a trade-off between accuracy and cost – 
cost in the widest sense, financial costs to the administrative authorities and 
costs in time and inconvenience to those who might hope to benefit from 
complying with any conditions imposed. Accuracy will likely be costly (ibid.). 
Five main types of targeting methods can be identified in the cash transfer 
literature: categorical, geographic, means testing, proxy means test, 
community-based targeting and self-selection. All the selection strategies 
highlighted above are explicit administrative targeting systems except self-
selection. Self-selection does not work for cash transfer programmes but has 
been used in some labour-intensive public works programmes based on 
labour endowment factors with wages set very low. Most cash transfer 
programmes in Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa region combine several 
targeting methods to select programmes beneficiaries. 
3.3.1.1 Categorical targeting 
Categorical targeting is also referred to as demographic targeting. Hanlon et 
al. (2010:102) define categorical targeting as: “[s]election based on categories 
of households or individuals that are closely correlated with poverty and 
vulnerability such as children, older people, and adults with disabilities.” The 
important point is that demographic factors such as age (children and old 
age), marital status (single parents) and ethnicity are characteristics linked to 
poverty or vulnerability. Demographic factors are generally administratively 
simple, low cost, easy to apply, transparent to communities and often seen as 
fair. They may either be the only ones used so that all individuals within 
certain age categories receive cash transfers without being means tested, or 
simply be used as the first stage in a two-stage or multi-stage process, with 
some means or proxy tests following. If categorical targeting is used alone 
that is, in a single-stage process to select a level of poverty, there may be 
both inclusion and exclusion errors (Clunies-Ross & Huq 2014:59; Hanlon et 
al. 2010:1105-06). A design issue of concern which is a major weakness of 
categorical targeting is weak correlation with poverty. Categorical targeting 
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requires technical robust and efficient civil registry systems. The method is 
appropriate when targeting specific vulnerabilities such as malnutrition. 
Categorical cash transfers are politically palatable. For example, catch 
phrases such as: “feeding children,” “supporting the elderly,” and “caring for 
the disabled” are often associated with accumulation of political capital by 
governments implementing programmes based on categorical targeting. Such 
programmes are popular and viewed as political feasible and driving political 
incentives.  
Hanlon et al. (2010:106-107) offer some useful insights about categorical 
targeting. First, they point out added advantages of categorical targeting 
noting that the method establishes a right to the cash transfer for all those 
who meet the demographic criterion such as age threshold. In country where 
there is weak vertical or linking social capital between the Sate and its citizen 
(citizens do not trust the State or the civil service) “most people prefer simple, 
and fair [transparent, and easy] targeting approaches to a theoretically better 
technical system that is controlled – and possibly manipulated – by 
bureaucrats and elites.” Categorical cash transfers to children, the elderly, 
and disabled people satisfy a moral and social responsibility to support the 
young, the old and the infirm. Second, while combining cash grants to 
children, the elderly and the disabled could be a way of reaching large 
numbers of poor households; this can be costly from a resource perspective 
as the needs of each category are different. “One way to reduce cost is to 
means-test the benefit. Another way is to try to get poorer families.”  
A fundamental political and practical question essentially unresolved in the 
discourse on categorical targeting is: “Does one give a small amount of 
money to many people or try to give a large amount to those who are poorer?” 
Willmore cited in Hanlon et al. (2010:107) writing on universal pensions for 
developing countries argues for “giving smaller pensions to all elderly instead 
of larger pensions to the poorest, on both political and practical grounds.” The 
political incentive is that such programmes “provide a guarantee of a basic 
income for all voters’ old age …. Starting with a modest universal pension, the 
pressure from voters’ is to increase the size of the pension.” Means-tested 
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benefits lack political appeal and send wrong signals to workers as they may 
introduce a disincentive for low-income workers by discouraging them to save 
for their old age and from continuing to work even on a part-time basis, 
beyond the constitutional retirement age. 
3.3.1.2 Geographic targeting 
In geographical targeting, location is an important determinant of poverty. 
Needy people are selected on the basis of the areas in which they live. 
Hanlon et al. (2010:102) assert that in geographical targeting; communities 
with high or higher than average poverty incidence rates are selected into a 
programme. Poverty incidence is usually determined using census or survey 
data. Geographical targeting may be carried out either as the sole test of 
eligibility or as a first step in a multi-stage targeting process. In the latter case, 
geographical targeting will identify those with the most likelihood of severe 
poverty before a means-test is applied (Clunies-Ross & Huq 2014:59). As with 
other targeting methods geographic targeting is open to inclusion and 
exclusion errors if it is sole test of eligibility for example picking out areas or 
communities with marginalised or concentration poor people could lead to 
better off households or people living in those areas receiving cash transfers. 
Geographic targeting leads to exclusion errors if it means selecting only part 
of the population of interest (ibid.). For example geographic targeting excludes 
poor people in better-off areas who may be an important political constituency 
for some elites. Watkins (2008) and Yablonski and O’Donnell (2009) cited in 
Hanlon et al. (2010)107) highlight two useful examples of where geographic 
targeting has been used: Zambia and El Salvador respectively. The Zambian 
study found that geographic targeting based on census wards was “cheapest 
and most effective ….” In El Salvador the programme “simply [selected] the 
100 poorest municipalities and then all households with children.” The case is 
often made that in Africa rural areas are poorer and the poorest people are 
found in rural areas. However with rapid urbanisation and the associated 
urbanisation of poverty there are increasingly pockets of poorest communities 
in urban areas where social protection programmes are needed. If 
geographical targeting focuses on rural areas based on higher poverty 
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prevalence rates then some extremely poor households and people in 
pockets of urban areas are missed. If not seen as fair, geographic targeting 
can lead to tribal, ethnic or political tensions if certain groups feel they are 
marginalised. 
3.3.1.3 Means testing 
A review of the cash transfer targeting literature shows that whether or not 
categorical and geographical targeting methods are used, many cash transfer 
programmes introduce another layer of targeting as a way of reaching out to 
the poorest. Programmes use means test and proxy means tests to try and 
narrow their targeted groups. According to Clunies-Ross and Huq (2014:58) 
means test “involves in principle assessing either the wealth or the income (or 
some combinations of the two) of all the people who apply for benefits or 
appear from a survey as if through outward signs of poverty they may be 
eligible.” According to Garcia and Moore (2012:86) means tests are more 
popular in unconditional cash transfer programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Means tests often face two key challenges: Many of the poor people have 
informal jobs and this suggests that their incomes are unpredictable, irregular, 
seasonal and income receipts are unlikely to be recorded. Rosa, Leatt and 
Hall (as cited in Hanlon et al. 2010:111) illustrate this point in their analysis of 
the targeting in South Africa’s Child Support Grant programme; “South Africa 
found that means testing is extremely difficult when large numbers of people 
are working in the informal sector or are involved in casual or seasonal work.” 
A household’s net worth, the other indicator of the level of its means, would in 
most instances in rural include livestock, household assets less any known 
debts. The computation of this measure is fraught with difficulties and can 
lead to a negative figure (ibid.). Hanlon et al. 2010:108) make a similar point 
on the challenges associated with means test: “It is difficult to take in to 
account the small amounts that may be earned by children and elderly people 
and it is hard to quantify the food that people raise for themselves.” Grosh et 
al. cited in Clunies-Ross and Huq (2014:58) argue that means tests may be 
associated with labour market disincentives as people may not take up day 
labour or small jobs which may push them over the income threshold thus 
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‘lose out’ on cash benefits. De Neubourg (2009:70) makes a pragmatic 
argument against means-tested benefits. The author points that means-tested 
transfers requires significant administrative capacity to implement robust 
surveys, administer complex systems and monitor applicants and this 
capacity is often not available in low-income countries. The state officials 
administering the system need sufficient bureaucratic capacity “to decide 
whether or not each applicant is eligible, how the information on the 
household’s means is collected and assessed, for how long the transfer is 
allocated and when a new cycle of assessment and allocation should be 
started.” 
3.3.1.4 Proxy means testing 
Proxy means tests use indicators based on household characteristics (often 
assets and household members) other than income. Observers make 
assessments of each household’s level of prosperity or want through visible 
indicators such as: type, size and quality of the house, family composition, 
water supply, households assets such as radios and bicycles, number of 
children, number of adults capable of working, and number and type of 
livestock owned by the household (Clunies-Ross & Huq 2014:58; Hanlon et 
al. 2010:108). Proxy means test targeting methods originated in middle-
income Latin American countries. Several researchers (Samson et al. 2006: 
56; Coady et al. 2002:32) show that Chile was the first country to use proxy 
means testing when it introduced its Ficha CAS program in 1980. 
In their study of targeting methods used by a large number of conditional cash 
transfers, both established and nascent in Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa and South Asia, Fiszbein and 
Schady (2009:70) found that about two thirds of the countries use household 
targeting via proxy means testing. Garcia and Moore (2012:86) make a similar 
observation by noting that: “Proxy means tests are much more common in 
CCTs [Conditional Cash Transfers], a practice similar to CCTs outside of Sub-
Saharan Africa….” 
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Fiszbein and Schady (2009:70) observe that proxy means tests across 
regions and countries implementing conditional cash transfers vary in their 
details: “For example, in all cases, the formula for the proxy means test was 
derived from statistical analysis of a household survey data set; but, of 
course, there are differences in the statistical methods used and in the 
sophistication and rigor thereof.” There are also significant variations in how 
the actual implementation of the proxy means test targeting method is carried 
out in different countries: Several examples are provided in the cash transfer 
targeting literature. Adato cited in Hanlon et al. (2010:108-109) provide two 
examples that illustrate differences. In Mexico, Oportunidades the successor 
programme to Progresa use a complex proxy means test. Communities are 
first selected using geographical targeting followed by a household census. 
The census collects household data on family composition; literacy; education  
of members; economic activities; diverse sources of income; presence of 
disabled people; accommodation characteristics; availability of basic services; 
and possession of productive household assets such as land and drought 
power. A statistical technique is then used separately for each geographic 
region to identify characteristics that best distinguishes between poor and 
non-poor households, and an index is developed. Households are then 
categorised along values of the established index, and those falling below a 
predetermined threshold are chosen as programme beneficiaries. Community 
verification exercises are then carried out to validate the final lists of 
programme beneficiaries. The argument is that community validation is an 
essential part of the process because community members know each other 
well. 
Watkins cited in Hanlon et al. (2010:108-109) notes that the proxy means test  
used in Zambia assesses six variables: household size, number of orphans in 
the household, number of disable people, age of head of the household, 
education level of the head of household, and gender of the head of 
household. The model came up with 61 percent of households falling below 
the poverty line. 
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Other variations in how proxy means tests are implemented include: whether 
households are visited; whether some variables are verified as art of the 
application process for all or a sample of applications; the type of institution of 
agency conducting the proxy means tests. The usual practice is that the proxy 
means test system is led and managed by a central agency.  
Several advantages of proxy means tests are noted in literature. They provide 
“an operationally feasible alternative to the near impossible precise 
measurements of household income or expenditures by using proxy indicators 
which are ideally selected so they are easy to ask, respond to, and verify. 
“Proxy means test require simple and shorter questionnaires while still 
achieving acceptable levels of accuracy, provided they are well designed and 
periodically updated” (Johannsen, Tejerina & Glassman 2010:157). Proxy 
means tests have the potential to select the poorest households as 
demonstrated by numerous examples in literature. Begum and Sen (as cited 
in Hanlon et al. 2010:109) note that studies in Bangladesh showed proxy 
means test yielding a 95 percent accuracy rate of targeting the income-poor. 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009:76-77) find that in Ecuador proxy means test 
correctly identified 95 percent of households in the poorest quintile. In Brazil 
family grants are considered to be well targeted on the poorest with 100 
percent coverage of those in the bottom quintile. 
Another important advantage of the proxy means test method is that “[t]he 
household targeting systems used in some of the best-known CCT 
programmes constitute major ‘institutional capital’ for the country. The same 
system often is used to target many programmes, sometimes with different 
thresholds or ancillary criteria.” In Chile the system is used in the Chile 
Solidario programme and for the child allowance, social pensions, water and 
housing subsidies programmes. In Colombia and Jamaica, proxy means tests 
are also used in multiple programmes for example health insurance, hospital 
fee waivers, secondary education book textbook rentals and school lunches 
(Fiszbein and Schady 2009:70-71). 
Despite the advantages associated with proxy means tests, there are a range 
of challenges or problems with the method. In theory, proxy means test or 
 130 
 
household targeting strive for greater accuracy in identifying and selecting the 
poorest. In practice, the method can have some flaws. A study of the effects 
of Progresa on community social relationships – important forms of social 
capital – found that proxy means targeting had adverse effects on social 
relations undermining social cohesion and solidarity (Adato 2000:11). 
Perceptions of unfairness, lack of transparency and build-up of tensions were 
not only experienced in Mexico’s Progresa programme. Nicaragua and 
Mongolia provide other useful examples. In the former, geographic targeting 
was completed first followed by proxy means test to select beneficiaries. The 
proxy means test was abandoned because it was not widely understood by 
communities (Hanlon et al. 2010:110). Hodges et al. (as cited in Neubourg 
2009:70) highlights the inaccuracy of the proxy means test in Mongolia noting 
that more than one third of the target group were excluded while two thirds of 
the non-targeted group were included (inclusion error) and received 
programme benefits. Hanlon et al. (2010:111) make the point that as a result 
of the targeting inaccuracies in Mongolia’s programme, the proxy means test 
was abandoned and replaced by a universal child benefit scheme. Fiszbein 
and Schady (2009:77) note that a possible cause of exclusion errors 
associated with proxy means tests is that the method “…contains an element 
of statistical error in making their predictions of household welfare.” However, 
the authors also note that exclusion errors may result from inadequate 
outreach to potential beneficiaries. Outreach exercises are carried out to 
create awareness about the programmes and how benefits are accessed. 
Another disadvantage beyond social costs associated with proxy means tests 
is that if households know the proxy indicators in use, they can manipulate 
their family and assets information. For example, they may hide household 
objects like bicycles, radios, television sets and this may yield incorrect 
information about the true status of a household (Hanlon et al. 2010:110). 
Proxy means tests require a competent civil service that can be trusted to 
administer complex systems involved in household targeting methods. The 
civil servants ought to be trusted to act honestly and objectively in working 
through the entire process. Political interference may affect bureaucratic 
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processes and in some cases political affiliation may be a factor in deciding 
who benefits and who does not. The issue of trust is an important dimension 
of vertical or linking social capital which is concerned with vertical ties 
connecting people to formal institutions or authority structures. Where 
countries are subject to government corruption, it means public officials may 
not be trusted and this usually results in poor people failing to access the 
necessary information from institutions of power and subsequently 
programme benefits. 
It is noted in the targeting literature that because of the complexity of proxy 
means tests many countries implementing cash transfers and relying on this 
method continue to refine and improve the implementation of proxy means 
tests. Fiszbein and Schady (2009:80) make the point that many programmes 
have carried out “rectification processes to remove from the list of 
beneficiaries those who have prospered in the interim.” 
3.3.1.5 Community-based targeting 
Samson et al. (2006:68) define community-based targeting as “a state policy 
of contracting with community groups or intermediary agents to have them 
carry out one or more of the following activities: identify recipients for cash or 
in-kind benefits, monitor the delivery of those benefits, and/or engage in some 
part of the delivery process.” Targeting decisions that is, judgements on which 
households are in extreme poverty, made by community members usually 
working through an elected or appointed committee of respected citizens. Like 
other targeting methods, community-based targeting could be the sole test of 
eligibility or as part of multiple stages in a targeting system.  
The cornerstone of community-based targeting is the active involvement of 
members of the community. The key objective is the incorporation of local 
knowledge into the cash transfer’s decision-making processes. Participation 
of communities is expected to lead to better targeted benefits and more 
equitably distributed benefits with less corruption and other rent-seeking 
practices (Mansuri and Rao 2004). 
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Community-based targeting falls under the umbrella term, community-based 
development. The latter refers to “projects that actively include beneficiaries 
[and non-beneficiaries] in their design and management…” (ibid.). 
Community-based targeting relies on communities to use their social capital to 
organise themselves and participate in the development process.  
There is debate about community involvement in defining and applying criteria 
to identify programme beneficiaries. Proponents of community-based 
targeting base their support on the point that community members are better 
placed than agencies and people external to the community to identify the 
poor and vulnerable households in need of assistance (Regional Hunger and 
Vulnerability Programme 2007:2). Dissenters argue in favour of universal 
assistance or provision of support to all eligible beneficiaries. The dissenters 
argue that community-based targeting is labour intensive, divisive and can 
perpetuate local patronage structures and gender biases (ibid.).  
Garcia and Moore (2012:86); Botes (1999:41-49); and Sharp 1997; Coady et 
al. 2002; and WFP 1998 (as cited in Mayanga (2008:36) assert that 
community-based targeting has the following advantages: 
▪ Community based targeting is relatively inexpensive as it avoids the 
costs and complexities of collecting and analysing objective data. 
▪ Local actors have more information available to them or at lower costs 
than would officials from a welfare agency. 
▪ Utilises the communities’ deeper understanding of the interacting 
causes of need and vulnerability and which individuals or households 
are at greater risk and in need of assistance. Communities are familiar 
with any recent idiosyncratic or covariate shocks that community 
members or households may have faced and therefore which 
individuals and households should be assisted. 
▪ Those in the immediate community are likely to know whether or not 
households will use cash transfers in ways intended by a programme’s 
goal and objectives. This is informed by their local knowledge of 
recipients’ behaviours.  
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▪ Community-based targeting facilitates empowerment and capacity 
building of communities. Communities gain mastery over their affairs 
and find own solutions to their development challenges. Community 
groups or committees involved in the targeting system have their 
administrative, leadership and decision-making competencies 
enhanced. 
▪ Community participation in targeting increases access of 
disadvantaged households to project benefits; enhances motivation of 
communities; and increases ownership and community responsibility of 
projects. 
▪ Community-based targeting is about involvement and participation of 
communities in the targeting process. In this regard, communities 
become active recipients rather than mere targets of development 
benefits, something which could result in what Merton (as cited in 
Botes 1999:43) calls a development “anomie” that is, “a state in which 
people are prevented from attaining socially desirable ends by socially 
acceptable means.” 
▪ Community-based targeting can foster social integration and de-
monopolises power within communities by strengthening interpersonal 
relationships, and reducing feelings of powerlessness and alienation, 
all factors being important forms of social capital – bonding, bridging 
and linking dimensions. 
 
Chambers; Ostrom, Lam and Lee; Uphoff; and Narayan cited in Mansuri and 
Rao (2004) argue that community involvement in the selecting beneficiaries of 
poverty alleviation programs “can improve targeting, lower the informational 
costs of delivering anti-poverty programmes and ensure high-quality 
monitoring of programme implementation.” 
The underlying criticisms of community-based targeting cited by the following 
authors: Samson et al. (2006), Sharp (1997) and Coady et al. 2002) as cited 
in Mayanga (2008:36-37); and Garcia and Moore (2012:87); and Hanlon et al. 
2010:113) are as follows: 
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▪ Local elites may distribute resources in ways that deviate from 
targeting guidelines. For example, the danger of nepotism or other 
kinds of favouritism leading to inclusion and exclusion errors. 
▪ When eligibility criteria are ambiguous and leave room for 
interpretation, inconsistent application of targeting rules and 
procedures may arise leading to errors. 
▪ Even when community members objectively target households, 
community-based targeting can still be perceived as unfair or highly 
subjective and can result in social tensions and resentment thereby 
undermining community social capital.  
▪ Since it decentralises important policy elements of targeting, it may 
lead to varying benefit levels for the same groups in different regions 
with the result that horizontal equity is undermined. 
▪ It faces difficulties in standardising or comparing targeting between 
different communities, high inputs of time, training and monitoring may 
be needed to develop the community institutions and ensure fairness. 
▪ Community-based targeting may perpetuate local power structures, 
that is, the multiple interests of the community actors may imply that 
even if they have excellent information on who is needy they may not 
use that information in the way that the central welfare agency funding 
the programme might prefer  
▪ The notion of community is problematic as the idea of community-
based targeting is easiest to apply in small communities where it is 
clear who is and is not a member. 
The research evidence of community-based targeting’s performance is mixed. 
The method yields successful outcomes in some cases yet in other cases 
performance is poor. 
The unconditional social cash transfer pilot scheme implemented in Zambia’s 
Kalomo district in 2004 targeted households meeting two key criteria: (1) 
extremely poor and suffering from chronic hunger, malnutrition and at risk of 
starvation (Schubert 2010:215). These households were described as food-
poor and in most low-income countries, food poverty is viewed as a good 
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indicator of chronic and persistent poverty (ibid.). (2) Households have high 
dependency ratios, have no able-bodied persons of working age or the 
breadwinners are sick or have died (ibid.). The selection and approval 
process was completely community-based with the Public Welfare Assistance 
Scheme (PWAS) structures leading the process (ibid., 217). At the village 
level are Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs) each covering 
200 to 400 households and these committees are elected by the communities. 
Area Coordinating Committees are responsible for coordinating between five 
and ten CWACs (ibid.). The District Welfare Assistance Committees (DWACs) 
oversaw the work of ACCs. A manual of operations setting out the procedures 
of the entire targeting, approval, registration and payment process was in 
place to guide the CWACs in identifying the 10 percent of households that are 
extremely poor and labour-constrained (ibid). In his analysis of the 
effectiveness of targeting and programme delivery, Schubert (2010:219) 
found that the CWACs were effective in selecting those households that fulfil 
the criteria of ‘food-poor’ and ‘labour-constrained’. However not all food poor 
and labour-constrained households were included in the project. Schubert 
makes the point that the CWACs were not responsible for this outcome but 
that the 10 percent ceiling applied to each village meant that there would be 
exclusion errors from the onset (ibid.). The Kalomo unconditional cash 
transfer project showed that it is possible to rely on community structures to 
carry out community-based targeting in cash transfer programmes. 
Results from several pilot grants using community-based methods to target 
the 10 percent ultra-poor and labour-constrained in Malawi showed that in 
2007 in the Mchinji district the exclusion error was high at 37 percent. The 
inclusion error rate was 24 percent explained as recipients not meeting the 
labour-constrained criterion (Millier, Tsoka and Reichert 2008 as cited in 
Hanlon et al. 2010:113). Miller, Tsoka and Reichert 2010 (as cited in Garcia & 
Moore 2012:87) point to concerns of unfairness and favouritism in community-
based targeting in cash transfer programmes in Malawi and Zambia. “Village 
heads were sometimes able to inappropriately influence community members 
involved in selecting beneficiaries for Malawi’s SCT [social cash transfer] 
programme perhaps because community members were not able or confident 
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enough to navigate local political dynamics” (ibid.) In Zambia research 
evidence from Chipata and Kazungula districts revealed significant issues 
with community-based targeting. In the former case, the inclusion error was 
high at 50 percent and 30 percent of the district’s population “believes that 
powerful households had preferential access [to benefits in the programme].” 
In the latter case, the poverty profiles of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
were not different (Hanlon et al. 2010:114). 
Mansuri and Rao (2004) make the point that in communities where people 
have multiple and conflicting identities, community-based targeting may be 
fraught with challenges because of competing incentives 
The negative social effects arising from community-based targeting in cash 
transfer programmes can have implications on a community’s forms of social 
capital similar to some of the negative effects highlighted under the proxy 
means test method. Perceptions of unfairness, bias, nepotism, lack of 
transparency, manipulation of targeting processes, political interference often 
leads to social fragmentation, weakening of social relations and social 
conflicts in communities. A detailed discussion of these social effects of CTs 
is provided in section 3.4. 
Garcia and Moore (2012:87) note that some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
continue to refine and improve the implementation and use of their 
community-based targeting methods. Malawi has taken steps to reduce 
targeting errors in community-based targeting. Miller, Tsoka and Reichert (as 
cited in Garcia & Moore 2012:87) make the point that Malawi’s SCT 
programme bars village heads to sit on community social protection 
committees. This is meant to prevent undue influence of local traditional 
leaders on community processes. The programme added a community 
verification stage to its targeting system. Community verification is done by 
extension workers who are external to the communities and local family 
systems. This brings impartiality and independence into the targeting process. 
Hamonga cited in Garcia and Moore (2012:87) asserts that Zambia while 
allowing local community leaders to participate in community-based targeting 
introduced a “confidential appeals process” thus allowing community 
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members to raise grievances and complaints on anything related to the 
selection, approval, registration and payment processes. Community capacity 
development training activities are part of some cash transfer programmes 
and they aim to strengthen the technical competencies, administrative 
capabilities, and management and leadership skills of community members to 
carry out the targeting process. 
3.3.1.6 Making the targeting decisions: key considerations 
Hanlon et al. (2010:119) state that making targeting decisions and picking a 
choice is “highly political” but it also involves other important factors such as: 
“allocation of scarce resources, administrative capacity, goals, fairness and 
transparency.” Human rights also come into the mix. All factors are 
considered differently in each country and context. 
Much has been written concerning how politics shapes the design and 
targeting of social protection programmes during planning and implementation 
stages. Hickey (2010:259) argues that “politics is central to the ways in which 
social protection is emerging in Africa.” Political elites, actors and institutions 
set the terms of policy debates and provide incentives for, and barriers to, 
action. The reason why politics matter in social protection programmes is that 
“political institutions and actors exist and operate in policy environment 
shaped by socio-economic forces, particularly concerning public attitudes, 
[perceptions], levels and forms of inequality…” In addition, political actors and 
institutions interact and engage with the poor and vulnerable communities at 
grassroots levels in ways that have profound effects on the success or failure 
of social protection programmes (ibid.). 
The literature provides many useful examples of the role of politics in shaping 
the design, targeting and financing of cash transfer programmes across 
regions and countries. According to De Britto (2010:182) Mexico’s Progresa 
programme had significant political support of President Ernesto Zedillo who 
launched it in 1997. It was designed as a populist programme linked to the 
survival of the political regime. The political and economic context in Mexico in 
the 1990s was difficult and posed a significant threat to the political stability of 
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the country. In Brazil electoral considerations seem to have influenced the 
launch of the Bolsa Escola programme in February 2001. The programme 
was rapidly scaled up such that by early 2002, the year of elections, it had 
reached at least 5 million beneficiary households in all most all of Brazil’s 
municipalities (ibid., 184). Brock et al. cited in Hickey (2010:252) provides an 
example from Northern Uganda where a social action fund programme was 
geographically extended to include areas favoured by political elites.  
Cash transfer programmes are politically palatable programmes which 
constitute major political capital because they facilitate establishment of direct 
and regular links between national and subnational governments and huge 
numbers of beneficiaries. The political rationale is to win more votes for the 
ruling parties through maximising the number of beneficiaries (De Britto 
2010:186). Cash transfer programmes that carry a national outlook that is, 
wider coverage or using universal targeting approaches usually attract 
popular perception or the public’s sense of fairness. Popular perceptions tend 
to influence voting choices and electoral judgements (Hanlon et al. 2010:120). 
Morley and Coady (as cited in De Britto 2010:188) and Hanlon et al. 
(2010:120) state that the administrative capacity of a country is an important 
factor in making targeting choices. Cash transfers require significant costs 
and bureaucratic capability requirements to set up. According to the CESSP 
Scholarship Team (as cited in Fiszbein & Schady 2009: 71) Cambodia has 
less administrative capacity than the middle-income Latin American countries. 
As a result it opted for proxy means testing and implements the method “in a 
way that makes rigorous but simplified testing viable.” 
The choice of any method of targeting will in part depend on the goals or 
objectives of a programme. If objectives focus on human capital development, 
typically households with certain children will be targeted. Income distribution 
is another important factor in making targeting decisions. Hanlon et al. 
(2010:120) make the point that if nearly everyone is poor in a place strict 
targeting may be an unpopular choice. Universal benefits may be the 
appropriate choice. 
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A review of literature shows that countries make wide ranges of targeting 
choices. Perhaps the most important insight from the targeting literature is 
that countries combine or mix of targeting methods. The combination of many 
targeting methods is done in ways that attempts to satisfy local conditions. In 
most countries of the Latin America region, conditional cash transfers target 
households in extreme poverty. However, within this target population, the 
programmes direct benefits to a sub-category of extremely poor households 
based on demographic profiles. For example, in Colombia, El Salvador, and 
Peru, conditional cash transfer programmes target beneficiaries only among 
households with children below a certain age group (Johannsen, Tejerina and 
Glassman (2010:141).  
In other contexts the use of community verifications following targeting 
techniques such as proxy means tests could be seen more as “legitimation 
exercises for the ‘scientific’ steps of targeting procedure” (De Britto 2010:188).    
Coady et al. (as cited in Clunies-Ross & Huq 2014:59) reviewed several 
targeting studies and found that generally “using more targeting methods 
produced better targeting”.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
3.3.2 Benefit systems 
The benefit systems of cash transfer programmes differ according to 
programmes and contexts but some main features are common. The systems 
include: a beneficiary registration system, benefit structure, transfer size or 
level of payment, the payee or cash transfer recipient, the cash payment 
mechanism, and frequency of cash transfers. Poorly designed benefit 
systems can lead to negative programme outcomes. 
3.3.3 Beneficiary registration 
A cash transfer system requires a valid registration system to be in place so 
that as soon as eligible beneficiaries have been identified via targeting 
mechanisms they are enrolled into the programme. The registration system 
must include robust procedures to correctly identify beneficiaries. Registration 
of beneficiaries is necessary to distinguish beneficiaries from non-
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beneficiaries. In addition, registration helps to reduce incidence of fraud where 
some people may register for many programmes when they should not do so 
or someone may wrongly collect cash transfers in another beneficiary’s name 
(Garcia & Moore 2012:92-93). 
The major challenge with registration processes in low income countries is 
that many poor people do not have important civil registry documentation 
such as national identity cards and birth registration certificates that are 
necessary to facilitate enrolment into cash transfer programmes. There are 
many reasons for this situation: poor people often experience difficulties to 
acquire national identity documents because of foreign parentage, absence of 
birth records or that their parents never had registration documents in the first 
instance. These constraints particularly affect child-headed households. In 
some countries some of the potential programme beneficiaries may have fake 
national identity documents often fraudulently obtained. Consequently cash 
transfer programmes end up putting in place strict requirements regarding 
identification documents which in some cases leads to exclusion of potential 
beneficiaries. Garcia and Moore (2012) state that “strict documentation 
requirements of Namibia’s cash grant system, for example, have made it 
difficult for some extremely poor individuals to benefit from certain 
programmes. The system requires potential beneficiaries to present birth 
documents, identification documents, and proof of marriage among other 
items.” 
Countries and programme have different registration systems for enrolling 
cash transfer beneficiaries. Hanlon et al. (2010:145) state that some countries 
that already have established and good “identity card systems” such as South 
Africa that system can be used for registering cash grants beneficiaries. For 
other countries where entirely new registration is required, the system used 
for voter registration can be used to register cash transfer beneficiaries. The 
electoral registration is considered “effective, easy to use, and inexpensive” 
and it is often the case that in many countries, “more people have photo voter 
cards that have ID [identification] documents”. Lesotho used voter cards for 
initial identification for its pension scheme (ibid.). The identification documents 
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generated from voter registration systems usually include a person’s full 
names, profile photo usually of passport size, fingerprint, an identification 
number, and a machine readable security barcode (ibid.). Ellis, Devereux and 
White (as cited in Hanlon et al. 2010:146) state that the registration system is 
adaptable and can be used for proxies that is, it can generate identity 
documents for other authorised people who can collect cash transfers for the 
infirm or incapacitated primary beneficiaries. In other cases double photo 
cards bearing the photo of the primary recipient and the proxy may be used. 
Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme (HNSP) programme uses smart cards 
along with finger prints to identify beneficiaries. The information is usually 
captured at registration meetings and does not need beneficiaries to produce 
identification documents (Garcia & Moore 2012:93). Zimbabwe’s HSCT 
provides beneficiaries with photo identification cards. 
New technology is helping transform the cash transfer programmes’ 
registration systems particularly in Sub Saharan Africa. According to Garcia 
and Moore (2012:110) “[b]iometric systems and smart cards hold the promise 
for Sub Saharan Africa CT programmes. Biometric systems using 
fingerprinting can improve registration and identification of beneficiaries…. 
They also add security and checks against fraud in registration and payment 
processes.” 
Disability grants usually present complexities at registration stage. Expert 
certification of disability usually by health workers may be required. This is 
often the case with disabilities that are difficult to identify such as mental 
health challenges and learning difficulties. A country’s administrative system 
needs bureaucratic capacities to address peculiarities that are associated with 
disabilities (Hanlon et al. 2010:146). 
Garcia and Moore (2012:94) highlight an important issue in beneficiary 
registration: the time lag from when beneficiaries are registered to the point 
they start receiving cash transfers. This differs across countries and 
programmes. The major challenge with long time lags is that attrition can 
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occur before beneficiaries even receive their first payments. The attribution 
can be due to several factors such as deaths and relocations. 
3.3.4 Transfer size or level 
Grosh et al. (as cited in Clunies-Ross & Huq 2014:63) assert that the starting 
point is to determine “the smallest transfer necessary to achieve the desired 
outcomes (consumption, income, earnings, school enrolment, or the use of 
nutritional or health services.” There is general consensus in the cash transfer 
literature that deciding on the optimal size of the cash transfers or grant, that 
is, the minimum amount of cash transfers that will yield the desired outcomes 
is an iterative process and no easy task. Garcia and Moore (2012:98) point to 
a range practical and policy factors that need to be considered in determining 
transfer levels: programme budget constraints, the pool of eligible and 
registered beneficiaries, household size and composition, gender of the head 
of household, age of children, and geographical location of beneficiaries. 
Hanlon et al. (2010:153) highlight an important additional consideration, that 
is, “whether the grant should be indexed and, if so, to what.” Brazil’s cash 
grants are indexed to the minimum wage. According to Hanlon et al. 
(2010:153) Devereux makes the point that “protecting poor people against 
rising food and fuel bills requires that cash transfers be index-linked to the 
price of a basket of basic goods or to the consumer price index (CPI).” 
Garcia and Moore (2012:99) assert that cash transfer benefits should align 
with a programme’s specific objectives. For example cash transfers whose 
main goal is to address food insecurity in Sub Saharan Africa attempt to set 
transfers at levels that allow households to meet their nutritional needs. 
Kenya’s HSNP determined its transfer level based on the average cereal price 
over a period spanning five years. Schubert and Huijbregts (as cited in Garcia 
and Moore 2012:99) state that for cash transfers that aim to reduce poverty, 
“an appropriate measure to determine transfer levels is the size of the poverty 
gap for eligible households.” Malawi’s cash transfer programme set its 
transfer level at US$13 per household per month, a figure assessed as high 
enough to lift beneficiary households from extreme poverty. 
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According to Schubert (2010:215) the Kalomo Pilot Social Cash Transfer 
Scheme implemented in Zambia in 2004 was an unconditional cash transfer 
financed by GTZ for an initial period of three years. The programme had three 
main objectives: to reduce extreme poverty, hunger and starvation in the 10 
percent poorest and labour-constrained households; to focus on households 
headed by the elderly and are caring for OVC; and to assess the feasibility, 
costs and effects of the programme as a component of Zambia’s social 
protection strategy. The programme targeted and registered households 
meeting two criteria: extremely poor that is, suffering from chronic hunger, 
malnutrition and in danger of starvation; and incapacitated that is, households 
with no able-bodied person of working age, bread winners are sick or have 
died. The transfer level was set at US$7.5 per household per month. For 
households with children, the monthly cash transfer increased to US$10. A 
transfer level of US$7.5 was sufficient to buy a 50 kilogram bag of maize – a 
staple crop in Zambia. The transfer level was considered large enough to 
enable beneficiary households to eat a second meal. It was expected that the 
transfer level would lift beneficiaries from extreme poverty but not out of 
poverty. The cash transfer programme is an example of one that decided the 
transfer level on the basis of multiple factors: household composition and 
extreme poverty gap. 
In general cash transfer programmes have calculated transfer levels on the 
basis of two factors: “grants should not be high enough to discourage work 
effort or low enough to have no effect” (Castaneda 2010:193). In practice, 
most conditional cash transfer programmes decide cash transfer levels on the 
basis of number of children in the eligible age range, grade or gender of the 
student. According to Fiszbein and Schady (2009:81) deciding the level of 
cash benefits on the basis of the number of children in a household “…is 
consistent an underlying logic of the programme that recognises that each 
child needs to receive health and education services and that there are costs 
(explicit and implicit) in getting those services.” The reality though is that a 
programme’s stated objective meets head to head with a programme’s 
financial constraints. As a result a number of programmes set a limit or cap to 
the number of children who can be covered. For example, Bolsa Familia sets 
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a limit of R45 enough to cover three children in the programme. Mexico’s 
Progresa sets the cash transfer limit at approximately $153 considered large 
enough to cover two children in primary school and one in high school (ibid.). 
Lesotho’s Child Grants Programme (CGP) is indexed to the size of the 
household but capped at US$75 per quarter for households with five or more 
members (FAO 2015:67).  
Some cash transfer programmes across different regions pay flat benefits 
irrespective of the numbers of children in the enrolled households. Flat 
benefits are usually paid in situations where cash transfer programmes face 
budgetary constraints or “if the programme logic is that households need an 
incentive to learn a new behaviour but do not need one to practice it with each 
successive child” (ibid.). In Sub Saharan Africa, Kenya’s Cash Transfer to 
OVC (CT-OVC) programme pays eligible households - those who are 
extremely poor and contain an OVC - receive a regular flat monthly fee of Ksh 
2000 (approximately US$24) per month. The value of the transfer is not 
indexed against numbers of OVC in the beneficiary households. The decision 
about Kenya’s CT-OVC flat transfer level was partly based on empirical work 
from the earlier pilot programme intended to test design programme 
parameters such as benefit level, payment delivery systems and monitoring   
(FAO 2015:66; Handa, Alviah, Musembi & Ochieng 2011:58). In Latin 
America and the Caribbean, cash transfer programmes in Peru, Panama and 
Ecuador pay flat benefits per beneficiary household (Fiszbein and Schady 
2009:81). 
Cash transfer levels can also be differentiated by school grades and gender 
factors. Programmes differentiate between amounts for children in primary 
and secondary schools with the latter receiving higher benefits. The reasons 
for this differentiation are many and varied but the most common ones in 
literature point to higher direct and indirect costs associated with secondary 
schooling for example: secondary school textbooks are more expensive than 
is the case for primary schooling, secondary schools are fewer especially in 
poor rural communities and students walk long distances or commute daily. 
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Senegal’s CCT for OVC set six transfer levels depending on the costs of 
different levels of schooling and training (Garcia & Moore 2012:304).  
Some programmes such as Mexico’s Oportunidades have a strong gender 
focus as they pay higher cash transfers for girls than for boys as recognition 
that girls are disadvantaged due to several factors which include cultural and 
social norms. Jamaica’s cash transfer programme pays higher transfer levels 
for boys in secondary schools because the education data show lower 
enrolment rates and education outcomes for boys than for girls (Fiszbein and 
Schady 2009:82). Nigeria’s Kano CCT for Girls’ Education began in early 
2010 has an empirical component in its design intended to test various design 
features which include the transfer levels: one of US$140 per year for each 
girl, and US$70 per year for each girl. The conditional cash transfer has no 
upper limit imposed on the number of children within a household and who 
are eligible for transfers (Garcia and Moore 2012:296). 
In a review of cash transfer programmes in Sub Saharan Africa, Garcia and 
Moore (2012:102-105) provide some useful findings on cash transfer sizes. 
Transfer levels vary significantly in the region and the differences in the levels 
partly reflect cost of living variations between low-income and middle-income 
countries. The largest transfers are in the latter. Many CT programmes link 
cash transfers to household size. For some transfers, the maximum or upper 
limit is less than double the minimum transfer and in other cases the highest 
transfer level is three times the minimum transfer. Several CT programmes 
determine cash transfer levels in relative to poverty or food poverty 
considered suitable if the programme has food security or related objectives. 
Some of the CT programmes in Sub Saharan Africa indexed cash transfer 
sizes to inflation for example Malawi’s Food and Cash Transfers. Some of the 
important knowledge gaps related to cash transfer levels in Sub Saharan 
Africa were noted as: the need for additional comparable data across 
programmes’ CT sizes through multi-country studies; examination of transfer 
sizes and key outcomes including beneficiary behaviours; and understanding 
the effects of transfer levels on some social capital dimensions such as child 
fostering. 
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3.3.5 Cash transfer recipients 
In most of the CT programmes throughout the world the payee or recipient of 
the cash transfer an adult member of the household. Programme often use a 
system for beneficiary proxy representation to cater for elderly, chronically 
sick or disabled. In nearly all programmes where an adult is the recipient, 
cash payments are made to female parents and guardians primarily the 
mother of the children in the former case and women in the latter case. The 
rationale of directing cash transfers to women members of the household is 
that this helps to improve the status of women in the household and the 
community. In addition, the burden of parental care in the African context falls 
on women. Many of the conditional cash transfers in Latin America for 
example, Mexico’s Oportunidades programme has a positive gender bias as it 
addresses transfers to female members of the household (De Britto 
2010:183). The review of CTs in Sub Saharan Africa shows a different picture. 
Garcia and Moore (2012:113-114) state that the CT programmes “showed 
less preference for distributing cash exclusively to women. Almost half of CCT 
programmes and 9 in 10 UCTs distributed cash to either male or female 
beneficiaries … slightly over 20 percent of all programmes indicated that cash 
transfers should be given to women whenever possible. This tendency is 
markedly greater in CCTs than in UCTs.” Mali’s CT programme funded by 
UNICEF to improve school attendance, and implemented between 2002 and 
2007 paid monthly transfers to mothers of children benefiting from the 
programme (ibid., 276). Nigeria’s COPE CCT programme makes payments to 
an adult female household member (ibid., 292). Transfers in Senegal’s CCT 
for OVC are paid to a parent, guardian or institution in charge of the OVC. “In 
practice, the most effective adult for this role has proved to be the mother 
figure in the household” (ibid., 303-304).  
Some countries are pursuing empirical work that will provide the evidence-
base for deciding which household member should be the transfer recipient. 
Burkina Faso’s pilot CT programme is one such an example where some 
cash transfers are paid to male adults and others are being given to female 
adults in the households. The results from the impact evaluation will inform 
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the design of other CT programmes in the region (ibid., 114). Garcia and 
Moore (2012:114) make the striking point that “[c]are should be taken to 
understand how receipt of the CT especially by women affects intra-
household relationships. Transferring cash to women rather than to men may 
improve household welfare and give women greater household bargaining 
power. Conversely it could also be counteracted in the household.” The FAO 
(2015:33) finds in its six-country case study that “CTs that target OVCs went 
to a particularly large proportion of female-headed households, and these 
transfers increased women’s access to and control over resources in contexts 
where women already had some say in household spending decisions. 
Cumulative findings from global research on CT impacts suggests (sic) that 
transfers given to female recipients are more likely to be spent on meeting 
household needs and lead to positive outcomes for those within the 
outcomes.” 
CT programmes that use a system for beneficiary proxy representation to 
cater for elderly, chronically sick or disabled cash recipients who may be 
unable to walk to pay points or are illiterate require strong fraud risk 
prevention and management mechanisms to be in place. The proxy system 
depends partly on trust within households and communities, and can be open 
to abuse in cases where proxies may choose to convert the cash transfers to 
their own use instead of remitting to the primary beneficiaries. Paying officers 
in the case of pay point distribution systems need to correctly identify proxies 
and link them to registered households in programmes. The proxy system can 
thus be an important operational issue in CT’s and may be a potential 
flashpoint for weakening or strengthening different dimensions or forms social 
capital for example, trust within households and communities. 
3.3.6 Cash payment mechanisms 
A review of the cash transfer literature reveals a range of payment 
mechanisms used across programmes, countries and regions. There are 
similarities and differences in the range of payment systems used in CT 
programmes. Some cash payment systems promote face to face interactions 
between beneficiaries and government officers, and programme staff, while 
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others do not especially those relying on technology. In this regard, a 
programme’s cash payment system may have implications for weakening or 
strengthening different forms of social capital within communities. Currently 
there is no research evidence that addresses the question of cash transfer 
payment methods and their potential or actual social effects.  
Most cash transfer programmes across the world require that payees or 
recipients collect their cash benefits. Many of the Latin American programmes 
dispense cash through the banking system. According to Grosh et al. (as cited 
in Hanlon et al. 2010:148) in Brazil, the cash distribution is through a state 
bank, Caixa Económica Federal, through a simplified current account linked to 
a debit card system. The bank has more than 15,000 banking points at fuel 
stations, lottery sales offices and shops. Most of the Bolsa Familia 
beneficiaries collect their cash benefits from lottery sales points. In Turkey, 
payments are made through a state bank with recipients withdrawing their 
cash from teller points within banking halls. In Mexico payments through 
banks are common in urban areas (Fiszbein & Schady 2009:82). 
In Sub Saharan Africa, payment mechanisms range from technology-based 
distributions to basic pay point methods. Pay point distribution is common in 
Ethiopia, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe among many 
countries. In these countries the registered recipients or their proxies are 
required to be at designated places such as community centres and other 
local facilities such as government district offices, schools, and churches on 
certain days and specific times. Armoured security company vehicles carrying 
cash machines take the money to the pay points. In countries such as 
Zimbabwe, this system is referred to as “cash-in-transit”. Locations are usually 
varied from time to time for security reasons. Community committee members 
involved in the delivery of CT programmes often communicate dates and 
venues to programme beneficiaries nearer the cash payment dates (Hanlon et 
al. 2010:148; Garcia & Moore 2012:106). In the rural areas, the average 
distance walked by cash transfer beneficiaries to and from pay points within a 
ward varies across programmes. In many programmes that rely on pay point 
distributions, distances walked by beneficiaries are regularly monitored to 
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ensure that points are within reasonable distances that do not result in huge 
transaction costs – time and trouble to beneficiaries. A fundamental point with 
any cash payment method is that payments have to be efficiently done. A 
common challenge with pay point distribution is that paying huge numbers of 
people in the same place on the same day could be fraught with delays and 
may result in beneficiaries waiting long periods of time to collect their cash 
benefits. Hanlon et al. (2010:149) suggest that programmes establish enough 
pay points, or payment days may need to be spread out. Vincent and Cull 
(2011:38) highlight additional disadvantages associated with physical delivery 
of cash transfers:  
The physical delivery of cash is expensive, as the liquidity of the 
resource implies that it may be siphoned off as it passes through many 
sets of hands after leaving the implementer [donor or government 
source] and before reaching the legitimate recipient. In addition to 
instances of fraud and corruption, the physical movement of funds 
may also face the risk of cash-in-transit heists. As a result, the costs of 
physically delivering cash transfers may represent a disproportionately 
high percentage of programme budgets. 
Other payment methods common in CT programmes include the following: 
collections from local post offices or post bank systems as in Kenya’s CT-
OVC and Ghana’s LEAP programmes; use of community committees to make 
payments to beneficiaries as is the case in some CT programmes 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Burkina Faso’s pilot CCT-CT programme;  
payments by respected community leaders such as teachers or health 
workers as is the case with Zambia’s cash transfer programmes; and direct 
bank deposits into beneficiaries bank accounts. Bank accounts are 
considered important entry points in to the ‘global village’ of formal financial 
services, such as savings, insurance, and credit. The literature highlights 
three controversies associated with direct bank deposits: potential fraud risk 
as transfers could be made to non-beneficiaries or “ghost beneficiaries”; cash 
deposits could encourage savings at the expense of immediate poverty 
alleviation objectives; and some beneficiaries may just not collect their cash at 
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banks because of transactions involved  (Garcia & Moore 2012:106; Hanlon 
et al. 2010:149). 
The use of technology in cash transfer payment systems is expanding in CT 
programmes throughout the world. The rapid advance is particularly notable in 
Sub Saharan Africa. Point-of-Service (PoS) devices and mobile phone 
technology are already in use. The PoS system uses portable devices that 
can work offline but they must occasionally be connected to a mobile network 
to update financial records following cash out transactions. The PoS system is 
in both urban and rural areas although they feature mainly in the latter 
locations where bank branches are not available. With this method, cash 
recipients are provided with smart cards. Biometric fingerprint verifications are 
done to identify beneficiaries (Garcia & Moore 2012:106). Kenya’s HSNP 
partnered with Equity Bank to distribute cash payments. The bank vets and 
selects the PoS agents. The agents are usually trusted local storekeepers 
who must have enough cash to pay at least 100 CT beneficiaries every month 
(ibid., 263). The repeated face to face interaction can be a basis for 
strengthening of linking ties between the agents and cash recipients. Linking 
ties are a form of social capital:  Through repeated interactions cash 
recipients may also access business-related information such as pricing 
information, inflation, new products, insurance, credit opportunities and labour 
market opportunities. 
Mobile phones are being used for banking and money transfers. According to 
Hanlon et al. (2010:149) the use of cell phone banking in cash transfers 
began in Philippines in 2005.  There is growing research evidence that mobile 
phones have been instrumental in promoting greater financial inclusion of the 
previously unbanked poor people most of whom operate in the informal 
sectors of society. Mobile money transfers are electronic methods of payment 
and are seen as reducing transaction costs of payments, and make delivery 
more convenient and efficient compared to the many existing cash-based 
payment systems. The rapid expansion of mobile phone infrastructure 
worldwide and particularly in Sub Saharan Africa is increasingly making 
mobile money transfers a viable, flexible and efficient option. Beneficiaries are 
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required to register cash accounts on their mobile phones’ sim cards. Cash is 
transferred by text messages, and cash can be deposited by giving money to 
a registered agent such as a local shop, which then credits the account (ibid.). 
Kenya’s M-PESA scheme operated by mobile phone network operator 
Safaricom, is often cited as a successful example of the use of mobile phone 
technology as a delivery mechanism for cash transfers. Beneficiaries register 
at authorised M-PESA agents. Once registered cash transfers are made to 
the recipients’ mobile phones from which it is possible to either obtain cash 
from a number of M-PESA agents engaged directly by Safaricom or to 
purchase airtime, goods or services directly from merchants who are signed 
up for the service, and to pay bills via a billing payment platform also part of 
the M-PESA scheme (Vincent & Cull 2011:42). The wider penetration of the 
M-PESA scheme prompted the international NGO Concern Worldwide to use 
the scheme for a short term humanitarian cash transfer programme (Kerio 
Valley Cash Transfer Project) in 2008. Cash transferred delivered through the 
scheme were assessed as secure and costs effective (ibid.). 
Gerelle (as cited in Garcia & Moore 2012:110) states that Nigeria’s Kano CCT 
for Girls is testing use of mobile phone technology to deliver cash transfers 
and send programme messages in a limited capacity environment. The 
results will have implications for further expansion of mobile phone 
technology-based cash transfer delivery in Sub Saharan Africa. 
South Africa’s CT system is well developed and ahead of many countries in 
Sub Saharan Africa, and compares well with Latin American countries. Most 
Latin American CCT programmes work through the banking system (Fiszbein 
and Schady 2009:83). The South Africa CT payment system has the widest 
coverage of beneficiaries in Sub Saharan Africa. South Africa implements a 
number of grants schemes including: Old Age, Disability, Child Support, 
Foster Care and Care Dependency (Garcia and Moore 2012:309). Transfers 
are delivered through multiple mechanisms but primarily through electronic 
delivery of cash. These include debit cards, smart cards and cell phones 
making use of direct bank deposits, automated teller machines (ATMs) and 
PoS devices. A company called Net1 distributes transfers in five of South 
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Africa’s nine provinces and beneficiaries receive their cash through mobile 
ATMs that function on and off-line (Del Ninno; and SASSA cited in Garcia & 
Moore 2012:310). 
The examples of cash transfer delivery mechanisms highlighted above show 
that a number of important considerations come into play in deciding cash 
payment arrangements in CT programmes not least because payments have 
to be predictable, accurate, efficiently and securely processed. The key 
considerations are that, when designing payment systems critical assessment 
need to be done: the extent of services, quality and coverage by service 
providers in the areas served by the CT programme; modalities to be used for 
payment – electronic or physical cash delivery; cost of modalities including 
institutional restrictions or barriers; transaction costs – in time and trouble to 
beneficiaries; and social, political and administrative costs (Clunies-Ross & 
Huq 2014:61; Garcia & Moore 2012:109; and Castaňeda 2009:196). All these 
factors are critical in maintaining the credibility of the cash transfer 
programmes. It is for this reason that CT programmes often use multiple 
payment systems. 
3.3.7 Frequency and reliability of cash payments 
There are variations in the frequency of payments in CT programmes 
worldwide. Most CCT programmes pay bimonthly or less often in order to 
manage the transaction costs for the programme and beneficiaries. In CCTs 
with education investment goals sometimes there are no payments during 
school holidays, yet in other programmes payments are done throughout the 
year or timed before school terms commence to enable households to 
purchase the necessary school materials (Fiszbein and Schady 2009:82). A 
review of CT programmes in Sub Saharan Africa shows that most of the CT 
programmes pay on a monthly or bimonthly basis. In fewer instances, CTs are 
paid quarterly or annually (Garcia & Moore 2012:109-112). Sabates-Wheeler, 
Devereux and Guenther (as cited in Garcia & Moore 2012:112) highlight key 
factors which must be considered when deciding the frequency of cash 
payments to beneficiaries: transaction costs and timing of the payments, and 
ability of households to incorporate cash payments of a given frequency into 
 153 
 
their household income stream. For example, when the goal of a programme 
is to enhance agricultural productivity, CTs must be paid at suitable times in 
the agriculture production cycle for desired impacts to be realised. 
Transfers must be reliable or assured. Cash recipients must be convinced and 
have the confidence that payments will arrive as scheduled and that 
households can depend on it. If this is case, only then can households make 
medium to long term plans and invest in income-diversification and resilience-
building measures (Hanlon et al. 2010:178). A six-country case study done by 
FAO’s PtoP regional CT research programme found that “across countries 
[except for Ethiopia], late and unreliable payments were the biggest obstacle 
to sustaining positive impacts of CTs.” Cash payments were not always made 
against planned frequencies. When payment dates were missed by the 
implementers, households were negatively affected through increased debts, 
disinvestment of assets and inability to plan (FAO 2015:47). 
3.3.8 Grievance and complaints management system 
Accountability and transparency mechanisms are critical for the success of 
CT programmes. A key design and implementation feature of CT programmes 
that enhances programme accountability and transparency is the grievance 
and complaints management system. The purpose of a grievance and 
complaints system is to ensure that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries have 
access to appropriate channels through which to voice complaints or 
concerns about the CT programme. In addition, grievance mechanisms are 
also important for “the identification of systemic weaknesses which, if left 
unchecked, could undermine a programme’s public and political reputation” 
(Barrett & Kidd 2015:9).  A functional system is made up of defined 
procedures and responsible people for dealing with different types of 
complaints or grievances from beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The main 
problems in CT programmes include: inclusion and exclusion errors in 
targeting, delays to enrolment and cash payments, supply side responses, 
distance to pay points, security of beneficiaries following cash collections, 
fraud and corruption. 
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A grievance and complaints mechanism requires procedures that must deal 
with the following important issues: 
• Defining how complaints, grievances, and updates will be presented; 
• Determining the time limits and responsible units for addressing them, 
and deciding on the penalties; and 
• Handling appeals, for example, to whom they are addressed, when, 
and time limits (Castaňeda 2009:197). 
Barret and Kidd (2015:9) identify similar issues as those put forward by 
Castaňeda (2009) but their departure point is that “there are broadly two types 
of grievance mechanism: appeals against exclusion during 
registration/targeting and complaints about delays to enrolment, loss of 
payment tokens … or fraud at pay points.” The authors assert that cash 
transfer programme designs need to integrate robust grievance and 
complains mechanisms which enable programmes to investigate and respond 
comprehensively to issues and concerns raised (ibid.). Barrett and Kidd 
(2015:9-10) propose a three tier management system for grievances: A first 
tier which setting out a simple complaints procedure operated by payment 
service provider to address complaints such as lost or malfunctioning 
payment tokens. The second tier consists of an accessible complaints 
mechanism operated by the CT programme administrators working 
collaboratively with local government officials, or an independent agency as in 
the case of Kenya’s HSNP. It is important to ensure that in the case of using 
an independent agency, efforts are made to adequately resource the agency 
so that complainants have easy access to the agent and that cases are 
thoroughly investigates and resolved. A third tier is an independent authority 
which acts a last resort after recourse measures fail at tiers one and two. 
Examples of third tier bodies include Human Rights Commissions; State 
Protector or Ombudsman; and the justice system. In South Africa, the third 
tier is the Department for Social Development. 
A review of the CT literature shows significant variations and fewer similarities 
in grievance and complaints management mechanisms. Some programmes 
do not have grievance mechanisms while in others, the systems are 
 155 
 
rudimentary, generally not well-coordinated or are under development. Other 
programmes are using innovative ways to ensure that beneficiaries raise their 
grievances. 
Garcia and Moore (2012:135) highlight challenges associated with grievance 
mechanisms that rely heavily on community-based structures. The challenges 
are particularly notable in Sub Saharan Africa. Community members dealing 
with complaints and appeals may not be impartial, could be retributive, biased 
and processes may be manipulated by political elites. Ethiopia addressed 
these challenges by “allowing appeals of targeting decisions by community 
food security task forces to be taken to higher levels for consideration” (ibid.). 
South Africa’s CT system has a hotline that people can use to channel 
complaints. Lesotho and Zimbabwe use “help desks” at cash transfer pay 
points to receive and address complaints. In the latter’s case, the grievance 
mechanism “is not embedded within a proper accountability framework and 
has numerous important gaps ….” (American Institutes for Research 
2014b:29).  
A qualitative research analysis of six CT programmes in Sub Saharan Africa 
done by FAO (2015:48) found that: 
Mechanisms for filing grievances were generally not well coordinated 
(or sometimes did not even exist), leading to many problems at the 
community level …. In many instances, chiefs, traditional leaders and 
local administrators were often de facto sources of authority to handle 
grievances and mediate conflicts between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries, whether or not they were formally involved in the CT 
processes. They were viewed as being impartial and having a better 
understanding of the community, but they did not know how to help 
people make actual complaints. In Zimbabwe, it was found that 
traditional leaders and councillors were de facto dealing with 
grievances, despite not formally being involved in the programme. 
The problems of weak and uncoordinated grievance mechanisms undermine 
the accountability and transparency of CT programmes. In addition, they are 
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potential inhibitors of formation and strengthening of different forms of social 
capital within communities as often jealousy, resentment and a lack of trust 
become common thereby affecting the success of the programmes. Countries 
implementing CT programmes particularly in Sub Saharan Africa need to 
ensure that programmes have robust grievance and complaints handling 
systems. Learning from best practice and experiences of other countries is 
important. Sub Saharan African countries could learn from Philippines’s 4Ps 
GRS described and analysed earlier.  
Gumede (2008a:2-3) makes the case for South-South cooperation on human 
development policies and programmes: “Countries of the South can benefit 
greatly from each other by exchanging practical experiences in 
conceptualizing and implementing policies and programmes that ensure 
sustainable poverty reduction.” Clearly countries of the South can exchange 
“learning and teaching” experiences on evidence-based design and 
implementation of grievance mechanisms.  
3.3.9 Graduation and exit strategies 
The design of any effective cash transfer programme requires attentive 
consideration of rules for exit and entry. The fundamental question that cash 
transfer programmes attempt to solve at design stage is “whether there 
should be a sunset clause or time limit after which the payments decrease or 
disappear” (Clunies-Ross & Huq 2014:63). This strategic question has 
received considerable attention in CT programmes across regions – Latin 
America, and Sub Saharan Africa regions. A number of reasons explain the 
domination of the notion of graduation in cash transfer programmes. 
According to Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2011:16) graduation is “critical 
for programming and budgetary purposes because [it] defines eligibility for 
and exit from many social protection programmes ….” Fiszbein and Schady 
(2009:24) infer that “entry and exit rules are necessary to avoid confusion 
among prospective beneficiaries and to minimise the potential for 
manipulation and abuse. Entry and exit rules are also important because they 
can have unintended incentive effects, particularly related to labour force 
participation.” Graduation is a central feature in the design of CT programmes 
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also because cash transfers contribute to reducing the vulnerability of poor 
people to the extent that they move off dependency and manage moderate 
shocks and risks on their own or from other social support programmes.    
The concept of graduation is defined in several ways. According to Grosh 
(2014) the concept can refer to: 
1. Actions to raise or stabilise households’ autonomous income – [for 
example] graduating from the present degree of poverty, 
2. Exiting a program due to some benchmark met – aging out, or no 
longer meeting needs assessment, and  
3. Euphemism or fig-leaf for exiting a program with no real prospect of 
betterment. 
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2011:10) distinguish between “threshold 
graduation” and “sustainable graduation.” Devereux (as cited in Sabates-
Wheeler and Devereux 2011:10) states that: “[t]hreshold/benchmark 
graduation describes a process whereby recipients of support move from a 
position of depending on external assistance to a condition where they 
theoretically no longer need this support, and can therefore exit the 
programme.” The threshold is a programme-defined benchmark and is 
primarily an administrative issue. Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2011:10) 
define sustainable graduation as “the ability of the household to remain above 
the benchmark in the medium- to long-term via a transformed [and more 
resilient] livelihood.” Sustainable graduation provides a firm platform for 
security against future destitution and is a pathway towards economic 
independence. A point is made that sustainable graduation requires that 
threshold graduation be met first for example relieving extreme poverty. Much 
of the focus in social cash transfers is on threshold graduation. Several key 
factors that enable or constrain a household’s movement along a pathway to 
sustainable graduation are outlined in the CT literature and include: state of 
markets, baseline resource conditions and functionality and efficiency existing 
assets, size of transfer and coverage, household level incentives and the 
social, political and environmental contexts. These factors may be 
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programme-specific, beneficiary-specific, community-specific or market-
specific (ibid., 11).  
There is general consensus amongst authors in the CT literature on the point 
that some categories of CT beneficiaries should not be expected to quickly 
graduate from programmes and in some cases graduation should not be 
expected to occur at all. In the latter case, provision of cash transfers will not 
have a time-limit or termination plans. Garcia and Moore (2012:129) point to 
the demographic peculiarity in Sub Saharan Africa where generation-gap 
households composed of older persons and many orphaned children are 
increasingly common. Programme graduation is not feasible with such high 
dependency ratio households in the short or even medium term. Sabates-
Wheeler and Devereux (2011:17) make a similar point: “Not all households 
can be expected to ‘graduate’ from social protection programmes. Some 
vulnerable and poor people, such as the elderly poor or people living with 
severe disabilities, are likely to require social assistance over a long, if not life-
long, period.” 
Graduation and exit rules and practices differ across regions and cash 
transfer programmes – conditional or unconditional. Johannsen, Tejerina and 
Glassman (2010:159) provide useful insights into the exit rules and practices 
of CCT programmes in Latin America. The authors assert that “experience 
with truly results-oriented exit strategies is scarce.” Results-oriented exit 
strategies are based on the notion that after desired effects have been 
achieved, beneficiaries exit the programme. For example, CCT graduation 
based on the education cycle in terms of completing a certain secondary 
school grade.  Chile’s Solidario is generally considered an example of a 
programme with a results-based graduation model even though it uses time 
limit on beneficiaries. The Solidario is a bridge programme that adopts a 
phased programme design involving a 2-year intervention and a subsequent 
3-year exit phase “with frozen payment amounts designed to encourage the 
graduation to other programmes.” The programme provides a coordinated 
social safety net platform that links households to a variety of social 
programmes, services and the wider economy. The key expectation in the 
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programme design is that after 2 years beneficiaries will have achieved 
threshold graduation and move towards the sustainable graduation pathway. 
The most common exit strategies in many CCT programmes in Latin America 
are based on budgetary limits and government cycles. These two factors lead 
to exit rules related to time limits (maximum time period to be spent in the 
programme) or to natural age-related graduation when the age cap for 
eligibility to receive benefits is reached as is the case in Colombia’s 
programmes (ibid.). 
In Sub Saharan Africa, Ethiopia’s PSNP and Rwanda’s Vision 2020 
Umurenge Programme (VUP) provide useful examples of the practice of 
graduation in CT programmes. The concept of graduation is an integral part of 
the PSNP. The PSNP’s Graduation Guidance Note (FSCB) as cited in 
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2011:8) describes graduation from PSNP as 
follows: “A household has graduated when, in the absence of receiving PSNP 
transfers, it can meet its food needs for all 12 months and is able to withstand 
modest shocks.” Ethiopia’s Food Security Programme (FSP) is made up of 
four components, and three components contribute directly to the graduation 
model. The three are the PSNP – designed to protect existing assets and 
ensure a minimum level of food consumption, the Household Asset Building 
Programme (HABP) – designed to increase household incomes generated 
from agricultural activities and to build up assets through extension and credit 
services, and the Complementary Community Investments (CCI). Graduation 
in the FSP is a phased approach arising from the combined effect of the 
components and other development interventions in the programme areas. 
Coming first is the graduation from PSNP as described earlier. Households 
then receive a year of support through the HABP enabling them to 
accumulate assets. The graduation becomes sustainable when households 
become resilient enough to support themselves at which point they fully exit 
the FSP (ibid., 9). 
In the case of Rwanda’s VUP households are categorised into 5-7 wealth 
groups. Eligible households are those listed in the bottom two wealth 
categories. Retargeting is carried out biannually and households that no 
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longer qualify to be in the bottom 2 wealth categories exit the programme, and 
are subsequently replaced by others (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux 2011:9; 
and Garcia & Moore 2012:129).  
A key challenge identified in the CT literature on graduation is that some 
programmes across regions often pushed beneficiaries from programmes 
before they were able to survive without cash transfers. Garcia and Moore 
(2012:129) cite the example of PSNP which initially graduated some 
households after they accumulated assets despite the assets being acquired 
on credit in some cases. Such households had no option but to sell the assets 
in order to liquidate their debts thus defeating the objectives of the 
programme. Many of such ‘graduates’ fell back below the graduation 
threshold within a short period of time suggesting that graduation was done 
prematurely. Ethiopia moved to address the problem by promoting 
programme linkages through the FSP described earlier. Johannsen, Tejerina 
and Glassman (2010:159) make the point that “… CCT programmes in Latin 
America are not well prepared to release their beneficiaries” primarily because 
exit strategies based on results are limited in the region. 
Graduation and exit rules in CT programmes represent an important social 
dimension of CT programmes with important social implications. 
Fundamentally, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries need to be informed 
unambiguously about the entry and exit rules of CT programmes. This is 
necessary to build trust between programme officials and communities and to 
avoid confusion through information asymmetries. Results-oriented exit rules 
and graduated benefits provide assurance to beneficiaries that they will not be 
worse off or fall from “cliffs” after payments are stopped. As is emphasised in 
the CT literature, graduation arises from the combined effect of many 
programmes and development interventions, and not just the sole success of 
CT programmes. In this regard, graduation and exit rules that are predicated 
on a programme’s ability to link households to other services are likely to 
serve as a basis to build or strengthen a household or community’s linking 
social capital – that is, the capacity to leverage resources, ideas and 
information from other programmes beyond exited programmes. Accessing 
 161 
 
these additional resources in order to strengthen resilience enables 
households to scale up micro-level social capital – bonding and bridging – as 
they come into contact with new programmes, institutions, new markets and 
higher level economic opportunities and activities. 
3.3.10 Institutional location of CT programmes 
Cash transfer programmes require strong operational capability, robust and 
efficient coordination, specialist and competent management skills. This is 
because CT programmes involve complex implementation mechanisms for 
targeting, payment modalities, grievance handling, accountability aspects of 
the programme, monitoring, and evaluation. Start-up phases of CT schemes 
are in most cases operationally intensive and require significant administrative 
capacities. Thus, deciding the institutional arrangements for the governance 
and running of CT programmes is a task of strategic and operational 
significance. This is an area where most countries and programmes fail for 
they underestimate the complexity and sophistication required to successfully 
run CT programmes. Garcia and Moore (2012:138) assert that “the 
institutional [location] of a programme must have both the capacity to 
implement a CT programme and the ability to coordinate among stakeholder 
groups.” These resources are important for the performance of a CT 
programme. 
The CT literature describes a wide range of institutional locations for CT 
programmes in various regions. There are notable differences between 
established programmes of Latin America and the relatively recent 
programmes in Sub Saharan Africa. Within the Sub Saharan region there are 
also differences in institutional locations of CT programmes between low-and 
middle-income countries (ibid.). 
The trend in Latin America and the Caribbean region shows that most cash 
transfer programmes are housed in governments and run by the Ministries of 
Social Development, Social Welfare or their equivalents. The rationale is that 
“the coordinating role is assigned to the ministry most directly linked to social 
protection” (World Bank 2015:35). This is considered appropriate because 
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cash transfer programmes are a component of social protection and often 
included in long term strategies in social policies. De Britto (2010:188) asserts 
that integration of cash transfer programmes into line ministries “might 
increase the prospects of sustainability and institutionalisation of these 
programmes ….” Brazil’s Bolsa Familia programme is located in the Ministry 
of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation as a regular government 
programme (Cecchini & Madariaga 2011:154). Mexico’s Oportunidades is 
coordinated by the Ministry of Social Development (ibid., 156). 
There are few exceptions In Latin America and the Caribbean region such as 
Colombia’s CCT programmes which are run by the Office of the President of 
the Republic, and El Salvador’s programme which falls under the Office of the 
President and executed by the Social Investment Fund for Local Development 
(Castaňeda 2010:198). The long term political sustainability of cash transfer 
programmes that are coordinated by high level structures such as the Offices 
of the President are vulnerable to political changes because they tend to be 
linked to individual persons – Presidents (Cecchini & Madariaga 2011:152). 
When governments change, new leaders often come with their own 
preferences. 
A third group of CCT programmes in the Latin America and Caribbean region 
take a sector-based approach, that is, they fall under specific sector ministries 
and departments. For example, Bolivia’s Juancito Pinto Grant and Mother-
and-Child Grant are housed in the Ministry of Education, and Ministry of 
Health and Sport respectively. Brazil’s Bolsa Escola school grant programme 
is coordinated by the Ministry of Education (ibid.). A major challenge with 
sector specific programmes highlighted in the literature is the lead ministry’s 
reduced capacity to coordinate with other ministries creating risks of 
duplication of functions, double-dipping by beneficiary groups and ineffective 
use of limited resources. 
Across Sub Saharan Africa, the institutional settings of cash transfer 
programmes show similarities and differences with the practices of Latin 
America and the Caribbean region. In their review of CT programmes across 
Sub Saharan Africa, Garcia and Moore (2012:138) found that nearly 50 
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percent of the reviewed programmes mainly short-term humanitarian cash 
transfers often funded by NGOs and international donors are located outside 
government ministries and departments. The remainder of the programmes 
were based in government social welfare or labour departments. Six Sub 
Saharan African countries included in FAO’s qualitative research and 
analyses of the economic effects of cash transfer programmes are all located 
in government departments (FAO 2015:6). 
Table 3.1: Institutional locations of cash transfer programmes in 
selected countries of Sub Saharan Africa 
Country Institutional location of CT programme 
Ethiopia Tigray Bureau of Labour and Social Welfare 
Ghana Department of Social Welfare, within Ministry of     Employment 
and Social Welfare 
Kenya  Department of Children’s Services, within Ministry of Gender, 
Children and Social Development 
Lesotho Ministry of Social Development 
Malawi Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development 
Zimbabwe Department of Social Services, with the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Welfare  
South 
Africa 
Ministry of Social Development 
Similar to the practice of some programmes in Latin America and the 
Caribbean region, Sub Saharan Africa also has sector-specific programmes 
housed within specific line ministries. For example, Ayala (as cited in Garica 
and Moore 2012:140) states that Eritrea’s Results-Based Financing (RBF) 
programme is coordinated by the Ministry of Health. According to the World 
Bank (as cited in Garcia & Moore 2012:237) Ethiopia’s PSNP is housed in the 
government’s Office of Food Security, under the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development. 
A key finding by Garcia and Moore (2012:138-140) points to a correlation 
between the institutional location of a CT programme and the national income 
status of the reviewed countries in Sub Saharan Africa. “As income levels 
decrease, [CT] programmes are increasingly seated outside of the 
government. Approximately three in four CTs in lower-middle-income 
countries have government homes; [and] this number is reduced to one in 
three for low-income countries…. Excluding Zimbabwean CTs, 85 percent of 
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programmes in fragile states are based outside of the government. This 
situation clearly illustrates why there are concerns that CTs in low-income 
countries are donor driven” (ibid.). 
In Sub Saharan Africa, South Africa is strong example of country whose CT 
grants are housed in a government ministry (Social Development) with actual 
implementation done by a semi-autonomous body – South African Social 
Security Agency. The agency reports to the Ministry of Social Development. 
Barrett and Kidd (2015:14) make the point that SASSA has strong 
administrative capacity to coordinate all the grant schemes as “professional 
staff are placed at all levels [of the agency], including in the local offices 
responsible for managing engagement with applicants and beneficiaries.” 
Compared to Latin America’s CTs, Garcia and Moore (2012:141) find that 
very few programmes in Sub Saharan Africa are coordinated by or operate 
under the Offices of the President. The reason cited for this difference is that 
there are limited or no “widespread national social protection policies and 
programmes” in Sub Saharan Africa. 
A major challenge with the government institutional settings of CT 
programmes across regions is their capacity to ensure efficiency in 
implementation, management, and monitoring, and long-term sustainability. 
The capacity levels of government ministries and departments running CTs is 
low in most of the low-income and fragile states to the extent that most CTs 
are housed in weak institutional locations particularly in Sub Saharan Africa 
(ibid., 141). This is largely attributed to historical colonial legacies as 
government departments and structures created during colonial times did not 
prioritise social protection programmes for the poor majority. The culture and 
skills of the bureaucrats involved with the delivery of CT programmes do not 
match the complexity of most CT programmes. In addition, social protection 
was deeply embedded in informal institutions for example, kinship-based 
systems. 
The implementation of cash transfer programmes requires coordination 
among actors across several sectors (health, education, agriculture, finance, 
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civil registry) and different levels (national, district, local, community). Many 
CT programmes have umbrella bodies usually government ministries, and 
coordination and execution agencies. Where service provision is 
decentralised to subnational levels, countries usually have subnational or 
local coordination structures. Mexico provides an illuminating example of this 
practice. There is a national coordinating council, technical coordinating 
committee, state coordinating committees and local coordination structures 
(Fiszbein & Schady 2009:98). In many countries, cash transfer programmes 
act as a strategic instrument of delivery decentralised services where local 
municipalities and other local authorities run the programmes thus providing 
an opportunity for direct links between beneficiaries and local administrators. 
Apart from the formal institutions discussed above, another strand of literature 
identifies informal institutional arrangements as having an important influence 
on the success or failure of CT programmes. It is argued that ignoring the role 
of informal institutions for development can result in negative outcomes. The 
literature points to examples of programmes and policies that have 
successfully integrated informal institutions to achieve poverty reduction. Most 
definitions of informal institutions in the literature include informal rules, 
customs, traditional practices, beliefs, social norms, family and kinship 
structures, and historical experiences of actors involved social, economic and 
political activities in society. Economist Douglas North (1990) is widely 
credited with catalysing interest in institutions and distinguishing formal and 
informal institutions and their role for economic performance and outcomes. 
North (1990) argues that informal institutions defined as “norms of behaviour 
or societal codes of conduct” shape human interaction and play a part in 
predicting behaviour of other actors or agents in transactions. 
Formal and informal institutions affect CT programmes in multiple ways and 
cash transfers can also reinforce or weaken informal institutions in societies. 
Research done by FAO (2015) in six countries in Sub Saharan Africa shows 
important links between CT programmes and institutions. The links provide 
useful insights in to how cash transfers may affect social capital in a 
community. The research found that the CT programmes’ grievance 
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mechanisms “were generally not well coordinated (or sometimes did not even 
exist) leading to many problems at community levels ….” In many cases, the 
moral authority of key informal accountability institutions such as village chiefs 
and traditional leaders handled grievances and mediated disputes between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (ibid., 48). The village chiefs and 
traditional leaders had no formal roles on the programme and in some cases 
operated outside of the programme’s officially sanctioned channels as defined 
by CTs’ operation manuals yet “they were viewed [by affected people] as 
being impartial and having a better understanding of the community” (ibid.). 
This shows that informal institutions can serve as an enforceable grievance 
handling framework in the absence of clearly defined formal rules and 
sanctions. In this regard informal institutions and the CT programmes 
interacted in mutually reinforcing ways. CTs served to reinforce informal 
accountability mechanisms within beneficiary communities. On the other hand 
the widely accepted moral authority of traditional leaders filled an important 
accountability vacuum. The study further shows that in Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Malawi the CTs enabled the poor to join or re-enter in informal risk insurance 
networks such as informal rotating savings groups and burial societies (ibid. 
43). 
Cash transfers can serve as an important medium for linking beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries with those in positions of power or authority. As most cash 
transfer programme are housed in formal government institutions and with 
government officials involved in the delivery of the programmes through 
administrative and operational processes such as targeting, registration, pay-
point distributions and monitoring processes, CTs can weaken or strengthen 
linking social capital. According to Woolcock (as cited in Mendoza-Botelho 
2013:1221) linking social capital is a useful “alternative way to understand the 
relationship/interaction between people and communities/groups in 
formal/institutional settings….” Szreter (as cited in Mendoza-Botelho 
2013:1221) elaborates the point: “[d]emocratic, respectful linking social capital 
is exhibited by government officials when they conduct themselves as true 
social brokers […] as individuals who are equally conversant with the 
language and values of both the policy world and that of the community in 
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which they are working to bring in certain useful resources.” Mendoza-Botelho 
2013:1222) highlights the importance of people’s trust towards institutions 
proxied by perceptions regarding institutional performance. The point is made 
that “people wouldn’t become active participants in activities of an 
organisations/institution unless there is at least some basic level of trust.”  
Trust in institutions is an important element of the cognitive dimension of 
social capital and discussed in detail in a later section in this chapter. It is 
worth noting here that this element is applicable in CT programmes as trust in 
government officials involved in the implementation of CTs by beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries allows coordinated actions for effective and efficient 
implementation, and social accountability in CT programmes. This type of 
trust also allows for the meaning and active involvement of community groups 
in CT programmes. Trust in institutions leads to efficient functioning of formal 
institutions by reducing transaction costs (for example less enforcement 
mechanisms for compliance with conditions of a cash transfer). The absence 
of institutional trust may hinder the achievement of the goals of CT 
programmes because people have no basis to cooperate with those 
administering the programme. People may think that decisions made by those 
in authority are not in the best interests of the poor for example, targeting 
decisions may result in significant exclusion errors thus defeating the goals of 
CT programmes. 
3.3.11 Communication 
Public communication strategies are critical components of the design and 
implementation of CT programmes. Communication can hinder or help the 
achievement of CT goals. Garcia and Moore (2012:136) and Barrett and Kidd 
(2015:17-18) highlight several points stressing the important role 
communication plays in successful implementation of CT programmes: 
• Raises public awareness of the existence of programmes, 
• Explains the purpose and features of programmes for example 
eligibility criteria and administrative procedures, rights and 
responsibilities of beneficiaries, 
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• Builds broad public and political support for programmes and helps 
maintain that support, 
• Helps reduces the susceptibility of beneficiaries to exploitation and 
abuse, 
• Counters any local level politicisation or misunderstanding of the 
programme among the general population 
• Communication strengthens programme accountability by providing the 
general population with information about programme performance, 
challenges and coverage, and 
• Maximises the effects of CT programmes by influencing the behaviour 
of beneficiaries by encouraging them to save and invest. 
The CT literature provides useful examples of CT programmes that have 
integrated communication strategies in their designs. Kenya’s CT for OVC 
embeds “a strong communication plan” which seeks to increase 
understanding of the programme and enhancing transparency. The 
communication tools in the programme include: community awareness 
campaigns, pamphlets, posters, and digital platforms such as a programme 
website (Garcia & Moore 2012:137). Uganda’s Senior Citizen Grant scheme 
uses its communication strategy to help “allay public concerns over the 
purpose of the registration exercise and, therefore, encourage eligible older 
people to come forward and register” (Barrett & Kidd (2015:17). Garcia and 
Moore (2012:138) point to the inadequacies of CT designs by observing that 
most CT programmes consider the importance of communication “later in the 
implementation process, after problems emerge.” The authors argue that 
communications should be an integral component of CT programmes in the 
entire programme cycle from design to completion. 
3.4 State of the evidence of social effects of cash transfers 
Cash transfers are contributing significantly to the development of a culture of 
evaluation in the field of social protection. To date cash transfers are among 
the most rigorously researched and evaluated development interventions. 
However, much of the research evidence is predominantly quantitative and 
documents effects of CTs on human development outcomes – health, 
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education, food security and nutrition. Another strand of evidence is on the 
economic effects of cash transfers.  
There is limited but expanding empirical evidence on the social effects of CTs 
in the literature. This section examines and discusses the state of evidence of 
the social effects of CT programmes and draws from different programmes, 
countries and regions. The focus is on effects of CTs on structural and 
cognitive dimensions of social capital: social networks; risk-coping 
mechanisms; crime and anti-social behaviours; social capital dimensions of 
trust in individuals and institutions, discrimination and community participation; 
gender-based violence; social status and self-esteem; social relations; social 
networks and membership associations, happiness and electoral participation. 
The review shows a mixed picture indicating positive and negative effects of 
CTs on various dimensions of social capital. 
3.4.1 Effects on social networks 
Social networks are both indicators of social capital and are also a process 
that leads to social capital (Kadushin 2012:177). Entry or re-entry into informal 
social networks is an important source of support and risk reduction 
mechanism in many parts of rural Africa. Several recent studies have 
examined the effects of cash transfers on social networks and risk coping 
strategies and many of the studies have been done in sub Saharan Africa. In 
a six country case study (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and 
Zimbabwe) the FAO (2015:38) tested two hypotheses stated below: 
Cash transfers increase beneficial risk-sharing arrangements and 
economic collaboration underpinned by social capital (trust-based 
reciprocity). 
Empirical evidence partially confirmed the first hypothesis. Cash transfers led 
to improvements in beneficiaries’ access to economic collaboration in the 
communities. The regularity and certainty of the cash transfer payments and 
the absence of basic needs-spending priorities were key factors in 
determining continuity and strength of the economic collaboration. 
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Changes in social networks linked to cash transfers positively affect 
the most vulnerable and least powerful people in a community through 
greater inclusion in decision-making processes (including through an 
increased ability to make “social contributions”) and increasing their 
“entitlement sets” and livelihood choices. 
Empirical evidence largely confirmed the second hypothesis. The cash 
transfers increased the ability of the poorest and most vulnerable 
beneficiaries’ participation and re-entry into the social life of their extended 
families and communities. The study found no evidence of beneficiaries’ 
participation in community decision-making processes (ibid.). The study 
reported social rifts caused by CTs across the case study countries. Jealousy 
and resentment were found within communities where there were only 
marginal differences in poverty and asset ownership between beneficiary 
households and non-beneficiary households in the Kenya CT-OVC 
programme (ibid., 45). 
Daidone, Handa, Davis, Park, Osei and Osei-Akoto (2015:13) used data from 
a quasi-experimental impact evaluation of Ghana’s LEAP CT programme. 
Consistent with findings from the FAO study highlighted above, the found that 
LEAP “plays an important function in helping households [to] ‘re-enter’ social 
networks by contributing to funerals, naming ceremonies and other social 
events ….” 
3.4.2 Effects on risk-coping strategies 
Daidone et al. (2015:96) using data from the FAO’s PtoP research project 
report the effects of four CT programmes in sub Saharan Africa on risk- 
coping strategies. The authors found that cash transfers have enabled 
beneficiaries to better manage risks. In Kenya, Ghana and Lesotho qualitative 
field work suggests that CT programmes have increased social capital and 
enabled beneficiaries to re-enter existing social networks and/or to strengthen 
informal social protection systems and risk-sharing arrangements. In Lesotho 
the cash transfer programme reduced negative risk-coping strategies such as 
begging or withdrawing children from school (ibid., 97). 
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3.4.3 Effects on discrimination, trust and community participation 
Hidrobo, Hoddinott, Margolies, Moreira and Peterman (2012:3) investigated 
the relative effects and cost-effectiveness of cash, food vouchers, and food 
transfers on household food security indicators, household expenditure and 
anemia. In addition, they examined gender effects of the programme, and the 
effects on social capital elements of trust of individuals and of institutions, 
discrimination, and community participation between Colombian refugees 
and the host Ecuadorian population. The study design combined the 
quantitative impact evaluation and a qualitative component. Sample clusters 
were randomly assigned to one of four arms: the cash transfer group, food 
voucher transfer group, the food transfer group, and the control or comparison 
group which received no transfers (ibid., 8). Baseline and follow-up surveys 
were conducted to evaluate the effects of the transfers. The study found that 
the pooled treatment (cash, food and voucher) increased participation in 
groups by six percentage points and decreased the probability of experiencing 
discrimination by six percentage points. Estimates for each treatment arm 
showed that “even though all three modalities decrease discrimination … only 
the cash arm leads to a significant [effect].” These findings suggest that the 
programme successfully brought together individuals from different 
backgrounds – Colombian refugees and Ecuadorians (ibid., 50). The study 
also found that cash transfers significantly increases trust of institutions but 
led to a decrease of 11.7 percent in trust of individuals. A further analysis of 
the trust indicators showed cash decreases beneficiaries’ trust in neighbours 
to take care of one’s home, decreases trust in neighbours to send a letter. 
Despite cash transfers’ negative effect on trust in neighbours, cash transfers 
significantly increase trust in the police (ibid., 53). 
In a study that investigated the social effects of poor targeting in Indonesia’s 
Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) cash transfer programme, Cameron and 
Shah (2013:407) found that feelings of mistrust in the community affects the 
ability of households and community members to work together for the 
common good because cash transfers made way to many ineligible 
households. Individuals’ participation in community groups is negatively 
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affected by the extent of errors of inclusion of BLT cash transfers (ibid., 409). 
The study also found an important gender dimension to the empirical result on 
individuals’ participation in community groups. Women’s participation is more 
responsive to the poor targeting than men’s participation which is unaffected 
by errors of inclusion (ibid.). This finding is consistent with research in social 
sciences and economic literature which points to significant differences in 
behaviour between men and women. Women are more “socially-oriented 
(selfless)”, generous, fair and care about the welfare of others in the 
household and community (Eckel & Grossman 1998:726). The rationale 
behind some cash transfer programmes selecting women as primary 
recipients of the transfers is primarily informed by that basis: cash transfers 
spent by women tend to be directed at goods and services that are more likely 
to positively affect the well-being of household members including children. It 
is therefore expected that women may be “more responsive to the 
misallocation of resources” through poor targeting as established in the study 
by Cameron and Shah (2013:409). 
3.4.4 Effects on gender-based violence 
Hidrobo et al. (2012:73) used questions from the World Health Organisation’s 
(WHO) Violence Against Women Instrument to investigate intimate partner 
violence in the study’s sample population. They examined aspects of 
controlling behaviours, emotional abuse, physical violence, and sexual 
violence. Combining cash, food and voucher transfers and estimating the 
impact of the pooled treatment on intimate partner violence revealed a 
significant decrease in controlling behaviours (by 8 percentage points), 
physical/sexual violence (by 7 percentage points), and any violence (by 7 
percentage points) (ibid., 75). Of the three transfer arms, food and cash 
significantly decrease controlling behaviours, and cash significantly decreases 
any violence (ibid., 76). 
3.4.5 Psycho-social effects 
Vincent and Cull (as cited in Garcia & Moore 2012:168) examined evidence 
from evaluations of 20 cash transfer interventions in Southern Africa. They 
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found that “[i]n general, qualitative evidence from these reviews suggests that 
CTs increase the social status and self-esteem of beneficiaries, thereby 
increasing their independence and respect within the community.” 
A study carried out by AIR (2014a) using a mixed methods design and 
incorporating the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) to assess the effects of 
Zimbabwe’s HSCT programme found that cash transfers have positive effects 
on beneficiaries’ life satisfaction. The SWLS is designed to assess 
respondents’ overall judgement of their life using five statements or items: 
1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal. 
2. The conditions of my life are excellent. 
3. I am satisfied with my life. 
4. So far I have gotten the important the important things I want in life. 
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
The responses coded against a five or seven-point scale: strongly agree; 
disagree; slightly disagree; neither agree nor disagree; slightly agree; agree; 
and strongly agree (Diener et al. 1985:72). 
According to AIR (2014a:31) Zimbabwe’s HSCT raised the SWLC scores by 
1.13 points, representing a 12 percent increase over baseline score. The 
score ranges from 5 to 25 and higher scores mean greater life satisfaction. 
The study found that the subjective wellbeing scores were in the same 
direction for small and large households and across the gender dimension. 
The FAO (2015) explored the effects of cash transfer programmes on 
household economy, local economy and social networks in six country case 
studies: Ethiopia – Social Cash Transfer Pilot Programme (SCTPP), Ghana – 
Livelihoods Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP), Kenya – Cash Transfer to 
Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC), Lesotho – Child Grant 
Programme (CGP), Malawi – Social Cash Transfer (SCT), Zambia and 
Zimbabwe - Harmonised Social Cash Transfer Programme (HSCT). The 
studies used data from qualitative research, econometric analyses of 
quantitative evaluation data, and general equilibrium models. The study found 
behavioural change within cash transfer recipients triggered social effects 
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within the community. In addition to purchasing food, cash transfer recipients 
also purchased other household goods that enhance well-being. Across the 
case study countries in the FAO study, the targeted households used part of 
the CT funds “to purchase non-survival consumption items which had positive 
[effects] on their well-being” (ibid., 23). For example, in Ghana and Ethiopia, 
adult beneficiaries purchased clothes and personal hygiene items which 
helped them to “re-establish social ties and renew confidence” thereby 
strengthening on one hand an aspect of the structural or relational social 
capital (social ties), and on the other hand an aspect of the cognitive 
dimension of social capital (confidence). According to the findings, these well-
being improvements allowed beneficiaries to re-enter communities’ social life 
such as attending church and traditional festivities – as they did not stand out 
as obviously poor. The report highlights that one beneficiary explained in Abid 
Adi in Ethiopia: “When we were dirty, other community members would ignore 
us; they did not greet us, but now they do” (ibid., 23). 
3.4.6 Effects on happiness 
Research evidence from Ghana’s LEAP indicates that cash transfers have an 
effect on happiness. Daidone et al. (2015:14) found that Difference in 
Difference (DiD) estimates on self-reported happiness showed an increase of 
16 percentage points in the likelihood of feeling happy with one’s life among 
LEAP beneficiary households relative to a control group made up of future 
LEAP households. The study found effects of the programme on happiness 
for smaller households and female-headed households. This was primarily 
driven by the programme’s positive and strong effects on beneficiaries’ self-
esteem and hope. According to FAO (2013:40) LEAP beneficiaries reported 
“how the [programme] had increased their sense of self-worth and self-
respect due to being better clothed, fed and able to mingle”, and how this 
contributed to an increase in their overall happiness. 
As CTs are a relatively new area of social protection programming primarily in 
Sub Saharan Africa, the evidence on effectiveness of communication 
strategies in CT programmes is currently limited. However, a qualitative and 
research analyses of the economic effects of CT programmes in Sub Saharan 
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Africa conducted by FAO (2015:49) found that “communication strategies in 
all [evaluated programmes] generally operated below expectation; however, 
where they operated adequately, they could promote improved well-being 
among beneficiaries.” In Lesotho’s Child Grant Programme, lack of 
communication negatively affected the programme for example, in some 
cases beneficiaries did not have warning or notice that payments will be 
delayed resulting in households incurring debts or defaults in repayments. In 
Ethiopia the research study revealed information asymmetries within 
beneficiary communities – information about the CT programme was provided 
only during payment days at some pay-points and only for a limited time in the 
day (one hour in the early morning) (ibid.). The research findings from the 
FAO study have important implications for the role that cash transfers can 
have on different dimensions of social capital within communities. The study 
suggests that communication is an important feature of a CT programme and 
lack of communication or weak communication strategies can create 
disharmony between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries thus undermining 
bridging forms of social capital. In addition, poor communication can weaken 
interpersonal trust and undermine informal networks as can be inferred from 
the case of Ethiopia where beneficiaries failed to pay debts on time due to 
shifts in pay debts. 
3.4.7 Effects on community social relations 
The study by Adato (2000) has striking findings on the effects of Mexico’s 
PROGRESA on community social relations – an important form of social 
capital. Adato used qualitative research methods to assess the effects of 
PROGRESA’s beneficiary targeting method and system on community social 
dynamics and social relationships (ibid., 7). The study found that PROGRESA 
had mixed social effects: the household targeting system had adverse effects 
on community collective action, created social cleavages between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, created few conflicts, and social tensions. 
However, the study reports some positive social effects on sharing benefits 
and information, and strengthening social relationships among women 
benefiting from the programme.  
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Non-beneficiaries living in areas receiving cash transfers from PROGRESA 
reported their resentment, envy and frustration created by being “wrongly 
excluded” from the programme and lack of adequate information and 
understanding of the selection criteria (ibid., 18). Non-beneficiaries perceived 
that they shared a common identity (all poor) with beneficiaries of the 
programme. There were also indications of beneficiaries’ discomfort with the 
social differentiation created by the programme. Some beneficiaries felt their 
poverty circumstances were no different from non-beneficiaries. 
Consequently, the community perception of the targeting system was 
negative as it was felt it had not been done accurately and had left out some 
deserving households. Social divisions took the form of non-beneficiaries 
refusing to cooperate and participate in rural community activities particularly 
communal activities “where people come together to perform volunteer labour 
for the benefit of the community” because they were not part of PROGRESA 
(ibid., 22). 
Adato (2000:16) found that although it was not clear how common this 
phenomenon was, some beneficiaries shared programme benefits and 
information with non-beneficiaries.  The information shared was mainly from 
beneficiaries’ participation in health groups. A similar finding on sharing of 
programme benefits is reported by AIR (2014a:33). The study reports that 
Zimbabwe’s HSCT programme has stimulated the purchase of agricultural 
assets in the form of livestock such as goats, donkeys, mules; and small 
farming implements such as yokes, sickles and axes. The qualitative data 
from the study “indicated that beneficiaries share agricultural assets with non-
beneficiaries” (ibid.). 
The study by Adato (2000:16) shows evidence of new social relationships 
among women beneficiaries in the PROGRESA CCT programme. Monthly 
meetings, health groups, cash collection points, and communal activities 
where people volunteered labour for community programmes created useful 
opportunities for new social networks where women gathered together and 
spoke about other issues, shared problems and solutions. The study suggests 
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that the new social networks for beneficiary women appear to be “new forms 
of social capital among them” (ibid., 30). 
3.4.8 Effects on civic participation and membership of associations 
Attanasio, Pellerano and Reyes (2009) combine survey and experimental 
methods to examine the effects of Familias en Acción, Colombia’s flagship 
conditional cash transfer programme, on social capital. Using a public goods 
experimental game played by individuals from poor households in two 
neighbourhoods in Cartagena, Colombia, the authors investigate CCT effects 
on “individual and group behaviour and their ability to obtain better social and 
economic outcomes” (Attanasio et al. 2009:143). Households in one of the 
neighbourhoods received conditional cash transfers for over two years 
(treatment group), while in the other neighbourhood the programme had not 
yet started (control group). The game is a version of the Voluntary 
Contribution Mechanism often used to examine dimensions of social capital: 
trust and cooperative behaviour. The game is designed in such a way that 
individuals face a social dilemma: “whether to invest a token in a private 
account with private benefits or to invest the token in a group account (public 
good) where the benefits for all members increase with the number of 
contributors” (ibid.). The total return on investment in the group is higher than 
the return on private investment. However there is no incentive to invest in the 
group scheme due to the higher individual payoff that can be obtained from 
investing in a private account. Consequently, individuals face a strong private 
motivation to avoid investing in the public good which undermines the social 
optimum. The outcome of the experimental game depends on the ability of 
individuals to trust each other and act as a group (ibid.). The study’s measure 
of social capital is behaviour in a public goods game defined as percentage of 
individuals who resist the temptation to invest in a private account for personal 
gain, and who opt to trust others and act as a group to maximise group social 
outcomes (ibid.). The dominant strategy is often not to contribute or cooperate 
at all (ibid., 144).  
Results from the study indicate effects of the CCT programme on social 
capital. The measure of social capital, that is, percentage of participants 
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contributing towards the public project, is higher at 33 percent in El Pozón, the 
neighbourhood that received CCTs for over two years, and low at 6.6 percent 
in Ciénaga, the neighbourhood with potential beneficiaries (ibid., 153). The 
post-game survey examined the programme’s effects on other dimensions of 
social capital namely civic participation and membership of social groups and 
organisations. The descriptive evidence shows that “[w]hile the differences 
between membership of associations in El Pozón and Ciénaga are not always 
significant, participation in religious, voluntary, environmental management 
and, to a lesser degree, state-sponsored associations is higher in the former 
than in the latter” (ibid., 167). Representatives from Ciénaga neighbourhood 
who played the public goods game were more involved in the most 
institutionalised spaces for civic participation in Colombia, that is, 
neighbourhood committees, and school parents’ associations compared to 
players in  El Pozón who showed intense civic participation in new non-
traditional associations. The results suggest that the CCT programme may 
have influenced the formation of new associations and networks (ibid.). 
Results further reveal that the quality of player’s membership is more intense 
in the treatment neighbourhood than in the control group. Players in El Pozón 
are likely to spend more time in their membership organisations in terms of 
attendance at meetings and time spent in the meetings. The same players 
were more likely to take up roles of responsibility within the associations and 
organisations and to contribute money or voluntary work (ibid.). 
3.4.9 Effects on electoral participation 
Attanasio et al. (2009:167-168) analysed another proxy measure of social 
capital widely used in the literature – electoral participation – and found that 
electoral participation was significantly higher in El Pozón than in Ciénaga. 
Presidential elections recorded the highest difference, “where 35 percentage 
points more [CCT] beneficiaries voted than non-beneficiaries.” The authors 
suggest that this points to the political value of the programme (ibid., 168). On 
the social capital dimension of trust, players in the treated group showed 
higher scores on the trust index which takes the value 2, 1 or 0 respectively if 
the player claims to trust the majority, a few or none of her neighbours (ibid.). 
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The findings from this study are significant as the evidence shows that in the 
specific study context the CCT seem to have had a strong effect on a range of 
social capital measures. The social capital measures discussed here are 
relevant for the present study. 
3.4.10 Distilling the evidence of the social effects of cash transfers 
The evidence described above comes from a variety of studies in different 
contexts, CT programmes and regions. It shed light on some of the ways cash 
transfers can affect various dimensions and proxy measures of social capital. 
The evidence suggests both positive and negative effects of cash transfers on 
social capital – diversity of effects. The diversity of social effects is informed 
by the differences in CTs’ design and implementation features, institutional 
settings of programmes, social and cultural factors and political dynamics.   
On the positive side, cash transfers strengthened bridging social capital by 
enabling recipients to re-enter social networks within their communities. In this 
way cash transfers reduced the social distance between beneficiaries and 
other community members. In this regard cash transfers facilitate social 
inclusion of previously isolated poor people within communities. Similarly, 
cash transfers strengthened linking social capital by providing opportunities 
for beneficiaries to meet with programme officials as well as people from local 
institutions. Cash transfers also generate positive psycho-social outcomes 
through effects on the status, happiness, confidence, dignity and self-esteem 
of beneficiaries.  
Drawing on Mkandawire’s notion of transformative social policy, it can be 
argued that cash transfers have a transformative social effect on beneficiaries 
and generate a sense of citizenship among recipients (Mkandawire 2004). 
This arguably comes through the effects of CTs on social relations and the 
psycho-social dimensions of social capital described above. The social 
inclusion of beneficiaries into community social institutions and membership 
groups would not be feasible without the transformative elements of social 
cash transfers – particularly in relation to transforming social relations and 
local institutions. 
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Evidence in the CT literature also points to adverse effects of cash transfers 
on social capital especially in terms of generating social divisions, jealousy, 
tensions, conflicts and weakening the will and capacity for community 
collective action (Adato 2000). The extent to which such effects are triggered 
is strongly linked to cash transfer design and implementation features 
particularly the choice and effectiveness of targeting methods. 
The evidence discussed in this section shows that the effects of CTs on the 
structural dimensions of social capital (social relations and social networks), 
and cognitive dimensions of social capital (psychological) are interlinked. For 
example, the re-entry of previously excluded people into social networks is 
associated with increased trust, self-confidence, dignity and sense of worth 
induced in beneficiaries through the cash transfer. There is strong evidence in 
the social capital literature, which shows an intrinsic connection or relationship 
between structural and cognitive dimensions of social capital. This will be 
discussed in detail the next section. 
3.5 Unintended effects of cash transfers 
There is an extensive body of published literature documenting strong 
evidence of the positive effects of cash transfers on the main targeted 
outcomes mainly human development and economic dimensions. As cash 
transfers can serve multiple objectives, it means their effects can be found 
everywhere with intended and unintended consequences. A review of the CT 
literature shows that this is mainly the case with unconditional cash transfers 
as recipients are not required to follow pre-specified course of action, that is, 
there are no specific behavioural requirements. This section of the literature 
review explores the unintended consequences of the introduction of cash 
transfers. Unintended consequences are also referred to as indirect effects in 
the CT literature. A review of the literature shows that the unintended or 
indirect effects of cash transfers have been discussed less extensively. 
3.5.1 Effects on crime 
Chioda, Mello, and Soares (2013:1) investigated the effects of Bolsa Familia 
on crime using school and crime data from the city of São Paulo. To the 
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authors’ knowledge, their study was only the second available on the effect of 
conditional cash transfers on crime. Loureiro (2012) is considered to have 
done the first study which found “a strong effect of Bolsa Familia on poverty, 
but only mild and non-robust effects on crime” (ibid.). Chioda et al. (2013:13) 
found that Bolsa Familia had a negative effect on crime in the school 
neighbourhood, that is, it resulted in reductions in crimes. The findings 
suggest that the income effect from the CCT is an important channel through 
which Bolsa Familia affects crime. Two other channels were thought to be 
important: changed peer groups and reorganisation of household routines - 
due to an indirect income effect. However the study suggests additional 
research is needed to provide robust evidence on the channels through which 
CCTs affect crime (ibid., 21). 
Cameron and Shah (2013:381) examined the social effects of poor targeting 
in Indonesia’s Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) cash transfer programme. The 
authors test the hypothesis that poor targeting reduces levels of trust within 
the community and leads to an increase in antisocial behaviour and crime 
(ibid., 382). The study uses a smaller, supplementary data set with more 
information on social capital than in the national representative data and finds 
that inaccurate targeting which resulted in significant errors of inclusion 
adversely affects several important dimensions of social capital within the 
community. The research findings confirm the hypothesis and strongly 
suggest that poor targeting in the programme reduces the level of trust in the 
community and is associated with increased crime (ibid., 407). The greater 
the proportion of ineligible households that receives the BLT cash transfers, 
the higher the crimes reported in the village (ibid.). 
3.5.2 Effects on adult labour 
With regards to adult labour, “conventional economic theory suggests that 
social grants may undermine labour force participation by reducing the real 
cost of not working” (Samson 2009:134). A study by Samson et al. (as cited in 
Samson 2009:134) found that in South Africa adult “workers in households 
receiving both pensions and child support grants looked for work significantly 
more extensively and intensively, and found employment more successfully. 
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Disaggregated analysis into urban and rural areas and by gender documented 
that these effects are particularly strong for rural women.” The study also 
found that unemployment rates fell over the same time period in households 
receiving social transfers – yet it rose in those that did not. These are 
unintended outcomes yet important and relevant for social policy in South 
Africa. The results suggest that South Africa’s social grants are associated 
with improved labour market activity. In addition and more fundamentally 
these findings contradict the economic theory hypothesis stated earlier. 
Gumede (2016:179-180) offers a view of what the possible unintended 
consequences of South Africa’s social assistance programme could be. While 
noting that the social grants have considerably raised income levels of those 
in the lower socio-economic quintiles with about 16.6 million people receiving 
social grants during 2014/15 Gumede’s principal argument is that there 
should be more people in gainful employment than on social assistance in 
South Africa. This is the case with countries like Brazil and Latin America 
(ibid., 180). Gumede seems to be suggesting that social grants may create a 
dependency syndrome amongst poor and vulnerable South Africans. This in 
turn may overwhelm the cash transfer system and could lead to financial 
sustainability challenges. 
Borraz and Gonzalez (as cited in Kabeer, Piza & Taylor 2012:18) investigated 
the effects of Uruguay’s IC conditional cash transfer programme on the labour 
market activities of household members aged 22-55 years. The results show 
that the CT programme had a significant negative effect on hours worked in 
urban areas outside Montevideo: women and men in households receiving 
the transfer worked on average 6.4 and 2.5 hours less a week, respectively. 
This amounted to a decrease of 17 percent in women’s labour supply and 5 
percent in men’s. The study does not offer any explanation for this apparent 
disincentive to adult work effort. However, economic theory suggests that 
disincentive effects on adult labour supply could be partly due to the generous 
nature of cash transfer levels (Samson 2009:134). 
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3.5.3 Effects on remittances and private transfers 
Some studies investigated whether cash transfer programmes crowd out 
transfers from other sources such as remittances or private transfers. The 
FAO (2015:39) found that some CT beneficiaries in Lesotho and Zimbabwe 
reported reductions in remittances from their relatives working in South Africa 
once they started to receive cash transfers. Covarrubias et al. (as cited in 
FAO 2015:39) reported a 32 percent reduction in private transfers including 
remittances and cash/in-kind gifts in Malawi following the introduction of a CT 
programme.  
Remittances are a major source of foreign currency for many currencies in 
Central America. Albarran and Attanasio (as cited in Fiszbein and Schady 
2009:120) used one round of ex post evaluation data and found that Mexico’s 
Oportunidades programme “show[ed] some indication of crowding out ….”  
Nuclear family and kin-based relations are central to the practice of 
remittances. Most remittances come from sons, daughters and family 
members working abroad or in urban centres in the case of domestic 
remittances to poor families in rural communities of Africa. Remittances 
constitute an important informal social protection instrument. Indeed, when 
some beneficiaries report a reduction in remittances received from their family 
and relatives once they started to receive cash transfers, this suggests a 
negative unintended consequence of cash transfers with adverse effects for 
bonding social capital between family members. In this regard the CT could 
be weakening kinship ties. Ideally, remittances should could to flow into the 
cash transfer households thereby increasing the income levels of the poor.  
However, an alternative view in the CT literature states that the decrease in 
remittances from abroad or elsewhere is not necessarily a bad thing. The 
reduction is seen as “demonstrating how the CT relieves stresses to the 
nuclear-family support system” (FAO 2015:39). 
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3.5.4 Effects on fertility and household composition 
Several authors Godblatt, Hochfeld, Plagerson, Holmqvist, and Richter (as 
cited in Palermo, Handa, Peterman, Prencipe, & Seidenfeld 2015:6) highlight 
a common unintended consequence and critical barrier to scaling up cash 
transfer programmes: that transfers targeted to households with young 
children could provide incentives for increased fertility which could result in 
households having more children. Policy makers fear that this could be the 
case in settings where poverty and fertility are high. Palermo et al. point to the 
theoretical notion that “… the mere perception that transfers are given to 
households with young children may be an incentive for current recipients to 
have additional children in an effort to maintain eligibility, or for non-
beneficiaries to qualify for future payments.” The empirical evidence to date 
ranges from modest to no programme effects on fertility. Stecklov et al. as 
cited in Fiszbein and Schady (2009:121) examined the fertility effects of three 
Latin American CCTs: Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico. The study found that 
Honduras’ PRAF programme appeared to increase the fertility rate among 
beneficiary households by between 2 to 4 percentage points. The authors 
suggest that this increase in fertility rates could be explained by the design 
features of the PRAF programme. The size of the cash transfer could be 
increased immediately by the birth of a child as the amount of transfers 
depended on the number of young children (ibid.). This unintended 
consequence means the design of the programme needs to be reviewed to 
address this challenge. 
3.5.5 Effects on trust in institutions 
Trust in institutions and trust in programme officials involved in the 
implementation of CTs by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries allows 
coordinated actions for effective and efficient implementation, and social 
accountability in CT programmes. It also allows for the meaningful and active 
involvement of community groups in CT programmes. Trust in institutions 
leads to efficient functioning of formal institutions by reducing transaction 
costs (for example less enforcement mechanisms for compliance with 
conditions of a cash transfer). The absence of institutional trust may hinder 
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the achievement of the goals of CT programmes because people may have 
no basis to cooperate with those administering the programme. People may 
think that decisions made by those in authority are not in the best interests of 
the poor for example, targeting decisions may result in significant exclusion 
errors thus defeating the goals of CT programmes. 
Evidence from Peru’s Juntos programme shows that the CCT has a negative 
and significant effect among non-eligible households on trust in the national 
ombudsman’s office (Camcho 2014:12). The ombudsman’s office is a state 
institution that is in charge of safeguarding citizens' rights (ibid., 15). The 
results suggest that the negative feelings towards the ombudsman’s office are 
likely caused by non-eligible households’ exclusion from the programme – a 
consequence of targeting. Some of the non-recipients filed complaints against 
the Juntos programme through the ombudsman’s office (ibid., 12). Kumlin and 
Rothstein; and Rothstein and Stolle (as cited in Camacho 2014:12) argue that 
“targeting can lead citizens to have disappointing interactions with state 
institutions and to a corresponding decline in trust”. 
3.6 Social capital 
The literature on social capital is vast, highly dispersed and reflects the 
diversity of intellectual opinion on the subject. The concept has been 
popularised by economists, sociologists and political scientists. Most studies 
fall exclusively into one or the other of the two categories and several other 
works contain both theory and empirical studies, an indication that the 
concept seems to lend itself to methodological pluralism or a “combined 
treatment” (Krishna 2000:71). 
This section outlines the historical development of the concept, discusses its 
many and varied definitions, and critically examines the main dimensions, 
types and concepts associated with social capital. The section also discusses 
the measurement of social capital, and the positive and adverse effects of 
social capital.  
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3.6.1 Historical development and conceptual origins of social capital 
The concept of social capital, its dimensions and its variations in different 
cultures and societies are not new as these have been part of the social 
sciences literature for a long time. The idea of social capital was discernible 
as early as the philosophical thoughts of Aristotle. An excerpt from Aristotle’s 
book, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, 9.61 cited in Durlauf and Fafchamps 
(2004:1) highlights some aspects of beneficial social capital, for example, that 
“in every community there seems to be some sort of justice and some type of 
friendship.” Aristotle placed emphasis on the importance and benefits of 
friendships in communities.  The concept of social capital also appears in the 
nineteenth century economic writing but with a very different meaning from 
how it is now commonly understood. 
The earliest use of the concept of social capital that is closely related to the 
ways in which the concept is currently understood and used today dates back 
to nearly a century ago and can be found in Lyda J. Hanifan cited in Woolcock 
and Narayan (2000:228). According to Woolcock and Narayan (2000:228-
229) Hanifan wrote on the importance of community participation in enhancing 
school performance. Hanifan explained the positive link between community 
participation and school performance through the notion of social capital. 
Hanifan’s emphasis was that, by “social capital,” he meant the progressive 
way in which a community - its spirit and its joint activities - is built. He 
highlighted the important role that community gatherings play in communities, 
“first for general entertainment, and later for more constructive purposes.” 
Hanifan’s work showed an earlier theoretical insight by identifying social 
capital with social connections and sociability (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb 
2008:2). A key point worth noting about Hanifan’s use of the term, social 
capital, is that, his definition bears considerable resemblance to definitions 
that are current today thus reinforcing the sense of continuity between past 
and present thinking.  
Although Hanifan’s early insights on the concept of social capital were 
remarkable, the concept remained both underdeveloped, unexplored and 
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there was no consistency in its use for close to seventy years. In fact the idea 
of social capital disappeared for a few decades before reappearing in the 
1950s and 1970s in works contributing to the literature on human capital and 
urban development. The most commonly cited works contributing to this re-
invention of the idea of social capital are those of Seely et al. 1956; Jacobs 
1961; Loury 1977 (ibid.). Some of the conceptual dimensions of social capital 
began emerging in Granovetter’s seminal studies on social networks in 1973 
and 1985 (ibid.). The literature on the conceptual origins of social capital 
points to the concept acquiring its distinctiveness in studies in the fields of 
education, human capital, neighbourhood and networks. An economist, (Loury 
1977) is credited for introducing the concept of social capital in to modern 
social science research (Durlauf & Fafchamps 2004:3). 
3.6.2 Defining social capital 
A key observation in the contemporary literature on social capital is that there 
is no consensus on a single and concrete definition of the concept of social 
capital. The concept is defined in several ways and authors disagree on the 
meaning and interpretations of it. The definition remains nebulous despite the 
significant amount of research on social capital. A major reason for the lack of 
a common definition cited in the literature on social capital is the fact that 
social capital is a multi-dimensional concept applicable across different fields. 
For example, the concept has been applied in studies in fields of political 
science, economics, sociology, health and education. There is no field has 
managed to create and impose a definition of the concept that captures the 
interests of different researchers from different disciplines. 
Some authors have identified social capital with features of social 
organisations as trust. Other scholars think of it in normative terms while 
others view it as social networks, associations, institutions and there are 
authors who think of social capital as a combination of all dimensions. It is 
therefore profound and apparent in literature that the concept has not been 
nailed down sufficiently with the consequence being that social capital means 
different things to different people. 
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Box 3.1: Definitions of social capital by influential authors on the subject 
Robert Putnam (1993:167): “Features of social organisation, such as trust, norms 
and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions.” 
Robert Putnam (2000:19): “Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and 
human capital refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to 
connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to 
what some have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that “social capital” calls 
attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a sense 
network of reciprocal social relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated 
individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital.” 
James S. Coleman (1990:S98): “Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a 
single entity, but a variety of different entities having two elements in common: that 
all consist of some element of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of 
individuals – whether persons or corporate actors – who are within the structure.” 
Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2001:4): “Institutions, relationships, attitudes and 
values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and 
social development.” 
Lin (2001:24-25): “… social capital may be defined operationally as resources 
embedded in social networks and accessed and used by actors for actions. Thus, 
the concept has two important components: (1) it represents resources embedded 
in social relations rather than individuals, and (2) access and use of such resources 
reside in actors.” 
Woolcock (1998:153): “the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in 
one’s social networks.”  
Burt (1992:9): “friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you 
receive opportunities to use your financial and human capital.”  
There are six main underlying issues and ideas that can be distilled from the 
eight definitions of social capital stated above: 
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1. Social capital incorporates diverse phenomena, that is, there are different 
types, or at least different dimensions of social capital. They include (a) 
structural elements of social capital which refer to the extent and intensity 
of associational links and activities embedded in organisations, 
associations, groups and networks; (b) cognitive elements in the form of 
attitudes, norms, shared values, reciprocity, generalised or personal trust.  
2. Social capital may be understood as an individual, household or 
community asset. It is an individual benefit through social connections or a 
collective resource that benefits communities or societies. 
3. Social capital may consist of horizontal, vertical and linking relationships, 
or links of bonding and bridging social capital. Narayan (1999), Putman 
(2000), and Szreter and Woolcock (2004) cited in Poortinga (2006:256) 
distinguished between bonding, bridging and linking social capital. These 
types of social capital are discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
4. The common thread running across most of the definitions is that like other 
forms of capital, social capital is largely considered productive and 
beneficial making possible the attainment of certain goals that in its 
absence would not be possible. It helps improve the effectiveness of 
development projects. By most definitions, social capital is always 
desirable because of its association with beneficial consequences. A 
detailed discussion of the benefits of social capital is provided later in this 
chapter. 
5. It seems that the study of social capital is fundamentally about social 
network-based processes, social relations, institutions, trust, norms, 
values, mutually beneficial collective action and cooperation – all deemed 
as generating beneficial outcomes. Woolcock (2002:24) makes a 
fundamental distinction between the sources of social and human capital. 
He asserts that “in essence, where human capital resides in the individual, 
social capital resides in social relationships.” 
6. The diversity of the definitions of social capital point to the context-specific 
nature of the concept. It largely depends on the field in which one is 
writing, conceptualising and operationalising the notion of social capital. It 
is evident in literature that definitions are informed by the background and 
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frameworks of influence for example political science, education, health, 
economics and sociology. 
3.6.3 Measuring social capital 
Despite the huge amount of research on social capital, the concept’s 
definition, conceptualisation and operationalisation remain nebulous or at 
worst muddled up. Virtually every researcher, scholar, writer and practitioner 
in the field of social capital begins with acknowledging the challenges arising 
from the multidimensionality of the concept, multiple definitions and 
conceptual ambiguity of social capital. Durlauf and Fafchamps, (2006) cited in 
Sabatini (2009:431) noted that in addition to conceptual vagueness, the 
coexistence of multiple definitions, “the chronic lack of suitable data” is also 
“an impediment to both theoretical and empirical research of phenomena in 
which social capital may play a role”. At the operational level the concept of 
social capital still lacks a common or universal understanding of measures, 
outcomes, indicators or dimensions. Schuller, Baron and Field (2000:26) 
observe that with a lack of consensus about its meaning, and its 
multidimensional nature, a direct consequence of this is the heterogeneity of 
measures used. Durlauf (2002:22) is less sympathetic in his views about the 
difficulties associated with the study of social capital: “The empirical social 
capital literature seems to be particularly plagued by vague definition of 
concepts, poorly measured data, absence of appropriate exchangeability 
conditions, and lack of information necessary to make identification claims 
plausible”. 
There is consensus amongst scholars, researchers and practitioners in the 
social capital literature that it is fundamentally impossible to provide a 
universal method of measurement or a single indicator for social capital, 
which can be used in empirical research or as operationalisation of social 
capital. Krishna (2008:445) argues that “social capital is a quality that exists 
inside people’s heads and it can never be observed and measured directly”.  
Collier (2002) supported this view by identifying that social capital is difficult to 
operationalise and impossible to measure directly. For these reasons, most 
empirical studies measure social capital through proxy or indirect indicators, 
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leaving the choice of proxy a matter of judgement and frequent contention. 
Some researchers have used proxy indicators such as hours spent 
volunteering; proportion of the population who read newspapers; associational 
membership; tolerance of diversity; voting trends; feelings of trust and safety 
and charitable involvement, to assess the level of social capital within a group 
or society. Different proxy measures are likely suitable within different 
community settings or contexts. Some studies influenced by Putman’s work, 
use density of membership in voluntary organisations as a proxy for 
measuring social capital. The argument by Putman et al. (1993) cited in 
Sabatini (2009:432) is that in contexts with “stronger, dense, horizontal and 
more cross-cutting networks, there is a spill over from membership in 
organisations to the cooperative values and norms that citizens develop”. This 
view is contested in literature. The value of social capital measures simply 
based on density of voluntary organisations is doubted because “the 
possibility exists that people self-select into association groups, depending on 
their original levels of generalised trust and reciprocity and that the group 
experience [and resources] may be more pronounced in their impact when 
members are diverse and from different backgrounds” Sabatini (2009:432).  
Krishna (2008:446) supports the criticism levelled against the usefulness of 
social capital measures simply based on the density of membership in 
voluntary associations by stating that, “it is not simply the fact of membership 
in any number of associations that induces a propensity for mutually beneficial 
collective action…a person might trust her neighbours implicitly and she might 
engage with them in collective efforts to clean and improve the neighbourhood 
– without the help of any formally registered association of neighbours”. 
Density of membership in formal associations has been used as a proxy 
measure of social capital primarily in the West. This is because formal 
associations are prevalent in huge numbers in the West. Their existence is 
quite muted in developing countries. Krishna (2008:445) observes that “proxy 
measures of social capital that are relevant for one set of cultures can be 
quite irrelevant for others”. 
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A number of authors in the social capital literature have relied on broad sets of 
proxy indicators some of which do not represent the social capital’s key 
structural and cognitive dimensions identified in the theoretical literature - 
commonly social networks, trust, norms and values. For example, Putman 
cited in van Deth (2008:153) used indirect indicators such as voting turnout, 
blood donations, and churchgoers. Other examples of proxy indicators which 
are frequently used in empirical research include crime rates, teenage 
pregnancy and participation rates in tertiary education (Sabatini 2009:432). 
The message coming out of the use of these types of proxy indicators is that 
anything that facilitates cooperation or mutually beneficial collective action can 
be conceptualised as social capital. According to Fine (2001) cited in Sabatini 
(2009:432), referring to the indirect indictors, “their use has led to 
considerable confusion about what social capital is, as distinct from its 
outcomes, and what the relationship between social capital and its outcomes 
may be”. Krishna (2008:445) makes a similar argument that, “a considerable 
misunderstanding results, however, if [a] proxy measure is equated with the 
concept itself”. Grootaert (2002:43) presents a view that is consistent with 
arguments from other authors: “Indeed, one must be careful not to equate the 
measurement variables with the underlying social capital. Not every 
association or collective action reflects the presence of social capital; take for 
example, associations or collective actions that are the result of government 
force.” 
Many empirical studies in literature have measured trust using the ‘standard’ 
survey question, which probes the extent to which most people in a given 
community, nation or region trust each other: “Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people?” The responses are coded as: (1) Most people can be trusted; 
(2) Can’t be too careful; and (3) Don’t know. The question has a long history. 
It has been asked in surveys for more than four decades, most notably in the 
World Values Survey, and in the General Social Survey and American 
National Election Studies in the United States, where they have the longest 
time series on trust (Uslaner 2008:105). 
 193 
 
3.6.4 Positive effects of social capital 
There is abundance of empirical evidence in the literature on social capital 
that the existence and presence of social capital has many benefits for 
individuals, communities and nations. The presence of social capital is noted 
as key to economic development, efficiency of social exchange, social 
learning, information sharing, and population health outcomes. Research 
findings further indicate that investments in local social capital should be part 
of poverty alleviation programmes since returns to investments in social 
capital are larger for the poor and marginalised populations than for others 
(Grootaert 1999:65). The concept of social capital is increasingly becoming 
attractive to development practitioners, and policy makers and government 
agencies because of the available evidence that social capital is in many 
cases associated with efficiency and probability of success for development 
initiatives. Evidence in literature suggests points to “observed associations 
between desirable development outcomes and the existence of social roles 
and networks of certain kinds of values and norms (Uphoff 2000:231).  
Putnam (2000:20) highlights some positive factors associated with social 
capital: 
1. It allows citizens or community members to resolve collective 
problems more easily. People often may be better off if they 
cooperate with each doing their share. 
2. Social capital greases the wheels that allow communities to 
advance smoothly. Where people are trusting and trustworthy and 
where they are subject to repeated interactions with fellow citizens, 
every day business and social transactions are less costly. 
3. Social capital improves society by widening people’s awareness of 
the many ways in which our fates are linked. Joiners become more 
tolerant, less cynical and more empathetic to the misfortunes of 
others. When people lack connections to others, they are unable to 
test the veracity of their own views, whether in the give or take of 
casual conversation or in more formal deliberation. 
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4. The networks that constitute social capital also serve as conduits for 
the flow of helpful information that facilitates achieving of our goals. 
Engagement and participation in voluntary associations has the potential of 
building and strengthening social capital. According to Putnam (2002) quoted 
in Paffenholz (2010:72), it is crucial that not only ‘bonding ties’ within specific 
groups of society are built, but mainly ‘bridging ties’ across different and 
adversary groups. The objective is that these groups learn to live together in 
peaceful coexistence. 
The findings of a World Vision research project (O’Reilly 1998) confirm the 
importance of bridging social capital. Exploring the community peace building 
effects of Area Development Programmes (ADPs) in different countries, the 
research identified how the ADPs increased levels of contact, interaction and 
communication across geographic, religious, ethnic, cultural and class 
divides, and how this in turn led to improved cooperation, unity and 
interdependence between different groups. 
3.6.5 Adverse effects of social capital 
Social capital can have negative consequences. Ostrom (2000:176) supports 
this view and states that, “there is a dark side to social capital as well as to 
physical and human capital.” Woolcock (2002:23) makes a similar observation 
and notes that, “… social capital has costs as well as benefits, that social ties 
can be a liability as well an asset”. The same forms and characteristics of 
social capital that facilitate beneficial and productive outcomes such as trust, 
cooperation and collective action can also lead to the development of 
perverse social capital. Although it is widely acknowledged in the literature 
that social capital can produce negative externalities, most research studies 
have tended to give more attention to the positive effects. American 
sociologist, Alejandro Portes (1998) cited in Pantoja (2000:125) identified four 
potential negative effects of social capital: exclusion of outsiders, excess 
claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedom, and downward 
levelling of norms. Other negative externalities commonly identified in the 
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social capital literature include: conformism, political corruption, gangs, 
crimes, religious intolerance, ethnocentrism and racism. 
One persistent finding in social network research which according to Kadushin 
(2012:172) is “often ignored in the excitement about the utility of social 
networks and networking” is the exclusionary and unfair nature of social 
networks. People tend to associate with others similar to themselves as in 
bonding social capital and the homophily principle. For people with lower 
prestige, lower socio-economic status, or are the target of discrimination, then 
their networks will tend to be composed of people with similar characteristics. 
It primarily follows that the social capital network resources available to the 
poor in a community will be less potent than the beneficial resources that are 
available in a network of wealthy people. Cross and Lin (2008) cited in 
Kadushin (2012:172-173) found in their United States data that “racial or 
ethnic homophily led to a deficit in social capital among the disadvantaged 
that limited their opportunities and chances for upward mobility and integration 
into the wider U.S. community”. 
There are many other examples of empirical studies that illustrate the ‘bad’ 
consequences of social capital. Warren (2008:130-132) uses cases from 
three countries, Colombia, Italy and the United States of America to illustrate 
how social capital appears to support ‘systems of negative externalities’ in the 
areas of organised crime, political corruption, and political inequality 
respectively. In the coffee-growing region of Antioquia, Colombia, an analysis 
of social networks the problem of organised crime is built, in part, on social 
capital. Some of the cultural characteristics that facilitated the creation of 
social capital forms such as trust were also responsible for negative 
externalities such as the formation of the Medillin cartel. Illegal ‘exports of 
cocaine from Medillin were based on trust relationships among shipping 
partners’. Other negative effects of accumulated social capital in Antioquia 
included ‘localised capacity for quasi-political violence, which in turn 
undermined attempted democratic reforms in the early 1990s’. 
In the case of Italy, the study of ‘a system of negative externalities’ rooted in 
political corruption, was done by Della Porta and Vannucci cited in Warren 
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(2008:130-132). The analysis brings to the fore the close relationship between 
networks, associations and corruption. In this example, ‘political parties 
functioned as social networks, linking businesses to government offices in 
exchange for political contributions. The parties also functioned as guarantors 
of corrupt exchanges, so that the system of corruption did not have to depend 
upon personal relationships alone’. The incentives to participate in the 
corruption networks were structural, with the observation that businessman, 
politicians and government officials considered corruption as not ‘right’ but as 
inevitable and beyond the capacity of any individual to change.  
Warren (2008:131) underscores a fundamental point that shows the 
relationship between the cognitive and structural elements of social capital 
and the negative externality of corruption. He observes that “since the rules 
and norms of this kind [political corruption] could not be enforced by law, 
corrupt exchanges were dependent upon trust and reciprocity among 
participants. These relationships were themselves developed and maintained 
through associations”. The net effects of the negative externalities of 
accumulated social capital were ‘expensive public projects, substandard 
public performance and accountability …’ and were borne by the ordinary 
people in Italy. 
A common observation in the development literature is that women are 
historically disadvantaged and based mainly on strong tie evidence, have less 
social capital. Pantoja (2000:123) describes how mining operations limited the 
economic and income opportunities for women in the study areas, ‘and 
correspondingly increased their level of dependency and vulnerability within 
the household and the community’. Women had been active agricultural 
workers and earned income from collecting forest produce before the mines 
opened. With access restrictions to forests, a significant decrease in 
agricultural work for women, and limited employment opportunities for women 
in mining economy in the study areas due to cultural considerations, the 
female employment rate went down significantly. The study also found that 
while social capital resources may be abundant in the two study areas, 
particularly social trust, the resources largely corresponded to bonding social 
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capital, which is not always supportive of a community’s social cohesion. 
Bonding social capital often comes at a cost to building bridges and vertical 
linkages. 
[The] exclusionary mechanisms in the study areas discourage the 
formation of bridging social capital and simultaneously promote the 
emergence of closed groups. Significantly the closed nature of these 
groups tends to exercise excessive claims on some of their members, 
notably women and disenfranchised social groups. Ethnic and caste 
divisions constitute and important factor affecting social interaction in 
the study areas, which has hindered the emergence of generalised 
trust and increased the transaction costs of social and economic 
exchanges. 
To summarise, social capital should not be assumed to always generate 
positive externalities. There are certain circumstances where some forms of 
social capital may have detrimental effects. Burt (1997) cited in Pantoja 
(2000:136) asserts that, “social capital may have a different meaning and use 
value for individuals and groups, depending on their specific social, economic, 
cultural and political context.” Studies should endeavour to identify the 
positive and negative externalities of social capital for particular stakeholders 
taking into account contextual conditions. 
3.6.6 Dimensions of social capital 
Many concepts have a number of different dimensions and sub dimensions, 
and social capital is no exception. A recurring and consistent message in the 
literature on social capital is that the concept is multidimensional and that it 
could possibly include nearly every aspect of the social environment. The 
most comprehensive definitions of, and the main approaches to social capital 
are multidimensional, incorporating different levels and units of analysis.  
Reading the contemporary literature on social capital, it is immediately 
apparent that there is increasing consensus that social capital has at least two 
core dimensions, which are: (1) structure of social relations – social networks 
and (2) cognitive social capital – norms. The two dimensions have various sub 
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dimensions. Comparing the structural and the cognitive aspects of social 
capital, Poortinga (2006:255) posits that “the structural component comprises 
the more ‘objective’ organisational structures that form social capital in a 
social group, while the cognitive component refers to the more subjective 
perceptions of the available social capital.” Structural and cognitive forms of 
social capital work alongside each other in that structures help in translating 
norms, values and beliefs into well-coordinated and objective-focused 
behaviours. 
3.6.6.1 Structural dimension of social capital 
The structural dimension of social capital is identified with a social structure 
consisting of resources embedded in that structure and a network of 
relationships, that is, who interacts with whom, how frequently and on what 
terms. The social structure reflects the connectedness of social units 
(positions) that possess differential amounts of one or more types of valued 
resources; and that are hierarchically related relative to authority (control of 
and access to resources); and share certain rules and procedures in the use 
of the resources; and are entrusted to occupants (agents) who act on these 
rules and procedures (Nan Lin 2001:33). The structure of a network imposes 
a burden on the flow of resources through that network. Individuals occupying 
key and strategic positions in the network can be said to have more social 
capital than their peers, mainly precisely because their network position gives 
them heightened access to more and better resources (Burt 2000).  
Social networks are a key component of the structural dimension of social 
capital. A comprehensive discussion and analysis of social networks is 
provided in a separate section. 
3.6.6.2 Cognitive dimensions of social capital 
The cognitive dimension of social capital derives from mental processes and it 
is about people’s mindsets and consists of trust, norms, values, beliefs and 
attitudes. Cognitive forms are invisible and intangible because they are 
interior, within the mind, though when they are spoken of they become 
somewhat external (Uphoff 2000:219). The ideas that result from cognitive 
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processes are reinforced by culture and ideology, specifically norms, values, 
attitudes and beliefs that contribute to cooperative behaviour and mutually 
beneficial collective action, which are the stream of benefits that result from 
social capital.  
This section discusses the key concepts of the cognitive dimension of social 
capital: trust, norms, and reciprocity.  
Trust is the most studied dimension of cognitive social capital and its role is at 
the centre of most discussions on social capital in the literature. Trust itself is 
not a form of social capital but it is the key link between forms of social capital  
and outcomes Ahn and Ostrom (2008:80). Fafchamps (2006:1183) defined 
trust as ‟an optimistic expectation or belief regarding other agents’ behaviour.” 
Lelieveldt (2008:330) states that trust ‟refers to personal and social trust and 
tells us something about an individual’s outlook on fellow citizens, which may 
have important implications for one’s own behaviour.” Trust lets people have 
greater confidence in other people’s promises that they mean what they say 
when they promise to cooperate. The primary sources of trust are a subject of 
debate in trust literature. Platteau cited in Fafchamps (2006:1183) considers 
the origins of trust as varied, sometimes as arising from repeated 
interpersonal interactions, general knowledge about the population of agents, 
the incentives they face and the upbringing they have received. This is 
consistent with Uslaner’s view (2008:101) that ‟trust depends on information 
and experience.” Single encounters do not suffice to develop trust.  
The trust literature discusses several varieties of trust. First is the notion of 
personalised trust which considers trust as a result of repeated interpersonal 
interactions. Uslaner (2008:108) regards this type trust as ‟particularised 
trust.” It is based on experience and has roots in interactions with people one 
knows or people like oneself. Personalised trust asserts that trust is relational, 
takes time and effort to establish, and it continues to develop in the course of 
interactions. A particularised or personalised truster is more risk conscious. 
They are suspicious of strangers and limit trust to those they know. 
Personalised trusters are good builders of bonding social capital. The 
downside of particularised or personalised trust is that it can generate 
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negative externalities such as racism, ethnocentrism and religious intolerance, 
and it is why bonding often comes at a cost to bridges, as observed by 
Simmel (1964) cited in Warren (2008:136).  
The second is the notion of generalised trust, which refers to ‟faith in both 
your own kind and people who are different from you.” It is based on the view 
that most people can be trusted. Unlike personalised trust, which takes time 
and effort to establish, generalised trust is instantaneous and it helps connect 
people to people who are different from themselves. A generalised truster is 
tolerant of immigrants and minorities and supports equal righs for women 
Uslaner (2008:116). The trust of strangers promotes selfless values such as 
mobilising and donating material and monetary resources to charity, in this 
case helping people who are likely different from the volunteers. According to 
Kadushin (2012:179), generalised trust is often measured with the survey 
question, ‟Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you can’t be too careful in life?” The question has been asked in 
surveys, for more than four decades particularly in the World Values Survey. 
Trust is important in many respects. It reinforces fundamental world views and 
lubricates cooperation. Trust acquires an important role in the efficacy of 
resource allocation mechanisms when it is placed within agency relationships, 
that is, when it is relational. Trust is important because its presence or 
absence can have a bearing on what people choose to do, and in many cases 
what people can do Dasgupta (2000:330). La Porta et al. (1998) cited in 
Uslaner (2008:116) affirm that “trusting societies have more effective 
governments, higher growth rates, less corruption and crime, and are more 
likely to redistribute resources from the rich to the poor.” When individuals in 
communities trust each other and the institutions that operate among them, 
they can easier reach collective decisions, agreements, conduct transactions 
and implement collective action. Influence and control can be considered as 
legitimate when people accept directives because the authors of the directives 
are worthy of being obeyed. Trust is a foundation of such authority and is an 
attribute of social capital that allows for various social actions to take place 
Kadushin (2012:176). Several studies, for example, Gambetta (1988), 
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Coleman (1990) and Fukuyama (1995) cited in La Porta et al. (2000:310) 
argue that trust determines the performance of a society’s institutions. The 
studies view trust “as a propensity of people in a society to cooperate to 
produce socially efficient outcomes and to avoid inefficient non- cooperative 
traps such as that in the prisoner’s dilemma.” La Porta et al. (2000:311) 
asserts that trust is most needed to support cooperation in large 
organisations, where members interact with each other only infrequently 
because they are only rarely involved in joint production. For example, finance 
and administrative interactions between staff members of different 
departments in a college or university. In this case, cooperation is less 
sustainable without trust because interactions are too few to allow reputations 
to develop. 
The discussion of the concept of trust in the social capital literature is not 
without its limitations. While the role of trust is central to most discussions on 
social capital, there remains a divergence of views about whether trust is part 
of social capital (Ostrom & Ahn 2001) or whether it is produced by social 
capital (Putman 2000) cited in Raiser (2008:494).  
Norms and values form the second component of the cognitive dimension of 
social capital. Lelieveldt (2008:330) regards norms and values as “obligations, 
democratic orientations and levels of tolerance.” Norms are what people in 
some networks believe to be normal in the network, typical and appropriate 
actions, that is, norms define the forms of behaviour that are considered to be 
beneficial to society and thus are valued and socially approved. Norms are 
held in place by reciprocal expectations, both empirical and normative, of 
people within a network. 
The often-mentioned source of social capital is the norm of reciprocity. 
Reciprocity is understood by Warren (2008:139) as “the basic norm of social 
exchange….” People who hold the norm of reciprocity incur obligations when 
they make claims on others. The norm of reciprocity therefore creates social 
capital in the form of obligations. Putman (2000) cited in Warren (2008:139) 
suggests that norms differ in their objects. Reciprocity can either be specific - 
“obligations are incurred between you and me, or generalised – obligations 
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are incurred between me and everyone else”. In the case of specific 
reciprocity, the expectation is that the obligation will be repaid by the specific 
other and not just anybody. For someone operating on the norm of 
generalised reciprocity, his or her contributions to someone in a time of need, 
will be repaid eventually, by someone else perhaps, should they need 
repayment. Consequently, the obligation to repay is not levelled at a particular 
person but that someone will do the same for the initial helper. One trusts that 
the social system will eventually reciprocate. Warren (2008) suggests that a 
society rich in generalised reciprocity is likely to have a high capacity for 
cooperation. In this sense, “obligations are fungible and flexible, and thus tend 
to multiply cooperative activities over more people, time, space and sectors.” 
It is noted in literature that the norm of reciprocity ‘is at work’ in social 
exchanges associated with negative externalities or bad social capital. For 
example, in corrupt cases of vote buying and commercial contracts in return 
for bribes. In each case, the exchange is regulated by the norm of specific 
reciprocity, and ‘extended over time by a fabric of obligations’ (Warren 
2008:140). Fukuyama (1995) cited in Bofota (2012:12) makes observations 
similar to Warren’s, that “the sharing of values and norms does not in itself 
produce social capital, because the values [and norms] may be wrong ones.” 
For Fukuyama, the norms and values that create social capital must 
substantively embrace values virtues like truth-telling, the meeting of 
obligations and reciprocity. Warren (2008) however, further suggests that ‘not 
all specific forms of reciprocity generate negative externalities.’ Some forms of 
politeness, for example, everyday greetings, are specific, and market 
exchanges are always specific. 
Bofota (2012:12) highlights important benefits deriving from norms:  
They furnish alternative mechanism to a lack of effective legal 
mechanism in enforcing rules and facilitating transactions between 
economic actors. They shape the performance of organisations and 
economies, they help solve the problem of coordination and collective 
action and they enable actors to capture the gains from cooperation. 
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A relationship between norms and trust is discernible. Coleman cited in 
Warren (2008:139) argues that reciprocity is facilitated by trust, that is, one 
trusts a norm because there are expectations that others will conform to those 
norms. However, the dispositions of trust and norms are not the same. Trust 
includes a risk element, which reciprocity does not have. Operating on the 
norm of generalised reciprocity, one does not need trust since the expectation 
of reciprocity does not rest with a specific agent. Coleman argues that 
“generalised reciprocity embodies an altruism that is not necessary to trust.” 
3.6.7 Links between structural and cognitive dimensions of social 
capital 
There is strong evidence in the social capital literature, which shows an 
intrinsic connection or relationship between structural and cognitive 
dimensions of social capital. The two dimensions of social capital are related, 
interactive and reinforcing. Structural social capital assets such as networks 
together with roles, rules and procedures, while extrinsic and observable, 
ultimately all come from cognitive processes (Uphoff 2000:218). The cognitive 
social capital assets, that is, norms, values, attitudes and beliefs are the 
factors that rationalise collective action, reciprocal actions and cooperative 
behaviour in networks.  
According to Rose (2000:151) Inglehart’s view is that networks are a 
consequence of people trusting each other rather than trust emerging as a by-
product of association. People who trust each other interact to form 
associations in situations ranging from choirs and sports groups to the 
workplace, and thereby becoming more trusting. Most discussions of social 
networks in the literature emphasise that networks are held together by 
mutual expectations of benefits, but “they are crucially sustained by 
expectations (that is, norms) of reciprocity” (Uphoff, 2000:219). 
People in a community may share strong feelings of trust and mutual goodwill 
but social organisation, structures and roles will usually be required to 
translate individual attitudes and values into coordinated and goal-oriented 
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behaviours (Krishna 2000:77). In this sense, shared values, norms and 
expectations are part and parcel of all structural arrangements. 
Fukuyama, 1995; Francois and Zabonij, 2005 cited in Bofota (2012:14) while 
agreeing that the structural and cognitive forms of social capital are 
distinguishable, argue that the two forms can evolve independently. People 
may cooperate because of their mental processes or attitudinal features but 
which may not necessarily be reflected in social structures or networks. For 
instance, Collier (1998) cited in Bofota (2012) asserts that “the coordination of 
buyers and sellers into a market with a specific time and location may initially 
involve collective action. Thereafter, this coordination may be persistent even 
if the organisation for collective action is removed: people simply continue to 
expect that there will be a market at the same time and place.” Similarly 
people can be coerced to join groups without any social preparation, that is, 
without gathering information, analysing their situation or without a systematic 
pattern of action-reflection-action, and more fundamentally without any 
inclination to the norm of reciprocity or shared values prevailing in that group. 
3.6.8 Types of social capital 
Three types of bonding, bridging and linking social capital are commonly 
distinguished in contemporary social capital literature. The distinction between 
bonding and bridging social capital is commonly associated with Robert 
Putman (2000). Woolcock (2001:13-14) distinguished between bonding, 
bridging and linking social capital. Narayan, 1999; Szreter and Woolcock, 
2004 further contributed to discussions and debates about the three forms of 
social capital. In rural communities, where formal public institutions like banks, 
insurance mechanisms for dealing with financial, health, employment, climate-
related risks such as floods and droughts are typically weak or unavailable, 
the poor and vulnerable communities are left with only their social networks to 
call upon (Woolcock & Radin 2008:417). Social exclusion, spatial isolation, 
low education, and “different cultural capital” often combine to deny them 
access to resources in the networks of the non-poor, that is, access to 
bridging social capital. 
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3.6.8.1 Bonding social capital  
According to Putman cited in Fennema and Tillie (2008:353) bonding social 
capital refers to networks between persons who are socially alike. The 
defining feature of bonding social capital according to Putman lies in the 
sociological characteristics of persons. Members of the network see 
themselves as similar and are joined by horizontal ties. Warren (2008:133) 
asserts that “bonding social capital is exclusive in nature, and develops within 
in-ward looking and exclusive groups of similar people such as might be found 
in churches, reading groups or ethnic fraternal organisations.”  
A similar definition of bonding social capital is offered by the World Bank 
(2001:128): “The strong ties connecting family members, neighbours, close 
friends and business associates….These ties connect people who share 
similar demographic characteristics.” Woolcock’s definition (1998) cited in 
Raiser (2008:495) corresponds relatively closely to Putman and the World 
Bank’s definitions. Accordingly, “bonding social capital is formed between 
family members and other social groups living in close proximity with a 
significant degree of emotional involvement.” 
There is evidence in the social capital literature linking bonding social capital 
to generation of both positive and negative externalities. Poor communities 
characteristically “have a close knit and intensive stock of bonding social 
capital that they leverage to ‘get by’…and almost no linking social capital 
enabling them to gain sustained access to formal institutions such as banks, 
insurance agencies and courts” (Woolcock 2002:26-27). An analysis of poor 
communities and households in rural North India confirmed the significance of 
bonding social capital for the poor people. The research findings showed that 
social networks played an important in the social protection of the poor 
people’s basic needs and managing risk. Studies that examined the 
relationship between enterprise performance and the structure of the business 
networks confirmed the importance of bonding social capital for poor 
entrepreneurs operating small local firms in traditional industries. They formed 
“solidarity networks,” sharing personal information about members’ conduct 
and intentions in order to minimise risk and uncertainty. Bonding social capital 
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therefore has some benefits which are summarised as creation of strong 
group loyalty, it is good for specific reciprocity, and can provide social and 
psychological resources for the poor and marginalised groups (Warren 
2008:133). 
Some of the main notable negative external effects resulting from bonding 
social capital includes what Putman (2000) cited in Warren (2008:134) 
termed, “strong in-group loyalty often generates strong out-group 
antagonism”. Societal vices such as ‘intolerance’ and ‘sectarianism’ result 
from bonding social capital which is predicated on wrong shared values and 
norms. Putman (2000) cited in Warren suggests that ‘dark sides’ of social 
capital are likely to be prevalent in contexts where bonding social capital not 
‘tampered’ by bridging social capital and other contextual elements like 
economic and political powers and institutions.  
The strong bonds and patterns of loyalty associated with bonding social 
capital can easily be put to criminal or antisocial use. The World Bank cited in 
Lowndes and Pratchett (2008:698) suggests that “drug cartels and other 
criminal gangs are often premised upon strong bonds … and depend upon 
them for on-going success.” Bonding social capital may also reinforce ethnic 
or faith-based identity, thus fostering sectarianism and negating the 
emergence and sustenance of mutually beneficial wider community 
collaboration. Where negative effects of bonding social capital may not 
manifest as sectarianism and ethnicity, they may reinforce patterns of 
unhealthy lifestyles, serious problems of alcoholism, dietary challenges or 
even foster beliefs such as refusal to immunise of vaccinate children against 
disease as is common in some religious sects found in developing countries 
in Africa. 
As the poor tend to bond with others like themselves, the social networks that 
they form tend to be with people who have the same characteristics. While all 
societies are stratified, it is the only extent that differs. As poor people are 
usually at the bottom of a stratified society because of their low prestige 
status, and socio-economic status, the bonding social capital networks that 
they form are less potent than the networked resources that can be accessed 
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by the advantaged and rich groups in society (Kadushin, 2012:172). Women 
are historically disadvantaged and based mainly on bonding or strong tie 
evidence, have less social capital. According to Narayan et al. 2000 cited in 
Woolcock (2002:23), there is research evidence to suggest that in many poor 
communities, women primarily possess intensive “protection” networks 
compared to men who have access to more extensive “innovation” networks. 
3.6.8.2 Bridging social capital 
Bridging social capital refers to the horizontal ties across heterogeneous 
groups of people with different backgrounds, that is, they do not necessarily 
share similar social identities. Bridging in this sense refers to the “ability of 
such networks to create bridges connecting sectors of society that, otherwise, 
would never have come into contact” (Sabatini 2009:430). Bridging social 
capital extends networks, and connects groups to resources they might not 
otherwise be able to access. Warren (2008:133) regards bridging social 
capital as “outward looking and encompassing people across diverse social 
cleavages”. The definition provided by the World Bank (2001:128) is 
consistent with other definitions of bridging social capital found in the social 
capital literature. The term bridging social capital is used to describe “the 
weak ties connecting individuals from different ethnic and occupational 
backgrounds. It implies horizontal connections to people with broadly 
comparable economic status and political power”, irrespective of how well 
they know each other. Poortinga (2006:256) gives three useful examples of 
bridging social capital – perceived levels of social justice, solidarity and 
mutual respect in society as a whole. Putman cited in Fennema and Tillie 
(2008:353) assumes that the white middle class tends to have more bridging 
social capital. This is also common in areas where you have concentrations 
expatriate professionals with different nationalities and backgrounds. They 
usually develop bridging ties through interactions in various professional and 
social forums. Bridging social capital facilitates community markets’ growth, 
information flows and can create broader forms of identities and reciprocity. 
Benefits of cooperation are greater when people have bridging ties since they 
bring together different but complementary resources. 
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The evidence in the social capital literature points to a strong relationship and 
complementarity between the bonding and bridging types of social capital. 
Putman cited in Warren (2008:134) argues that both bonding and bridging 
types of social capital are necessary to social life. It is not an ‘either-or 
distinction, but rather one of more or less’. Deploying both bridging and 
bonding social capital and maintaining a balance between them is an 
important social task for individuals, networks and groups of people in 
everyday life. According to Woolcock and Narayan (2000) cited in Woolcock 
and Radin (2008:417) deploying both types of social capital, and achieving 
and maintaining a balance between them is central to the strategy of 
improving economic opportunities and life chances of the poor. It is also 
possible for networks and groups to bond along some dimensions and bridge 
across others. 
Putman’s work in Italy cited in Prakash (2002:51) is an empirical study whose 
findings suggested important connections between bonding and bridging 
social capital. Putman proposes that membership in civic organisations or 
voluntary associations, which are manifestations of bridging social capital at 
the micro level, have “spill-over” effects that lead to better state-society 
relations Coleman, (1988) and Uslaner, (2000) also cited in Prakash 
(2002:51) argued that ‘it is the family background and conditioning aspects of 
bonding ties at the micro level, that act as a training school for developing 
civic virtues, trustworthiness and social capital’. 
Lin (2001:75) proposed a ‘strong ties’ and ‘weak ties’ distinction, which is 
similar to the bonding and bridging social capital distinction. According to him, 
strong ties conform to the ‘homophily’ principle, which is that people tend to 
associate with others who have similar resources to themselves. This is 
similar to bonding social capital, that is, networks of people with identical 
social characteristics. Weak ties on the other hand bridge across groups, 
strata and classes and provide networks or groups with access to new 
resources.  
Social capital researchers recognise that bonding and bridging social capital 
are necessary but insufficient for sustainable development. The World Bank 
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(2001:129) notes that a participatory poverty assessment carried out in Kenya 
found more than 200,000 community groups and networks in rural Kenya, but 
most were not linked to external resources. The groups’ capacities to leverage 
resources, ideas and information from institutions and communities beyond 
their areas were limited and therefore unable to help poor people move out of 
poverty. The missing connection was ‘linking’ or ‘vertical’ social capital. The 
creation of linking social capital is essential for helping poor people increase 
their voice and economic opportunities. 
3.6.8.3 Linking social capital 
The third type is the vertical or linking social capital, describes the vertical ties 
connecting individuals or networks to formal, and institutionalised power or 
authority structures in society (Poortinga 2006:256). The definition is 
consistent with Woolcock’s (1998) conceptual understanding of the term cited 
in Raiser (2008:495), that, “linking social capital supports the hierarchical 
relationships between citizens and people in authority, most usually in 
government”. The World Bank (2001) provides a definition that draws from an 
understanding that poverty is largely a function of powerlessness and 
exclusion. It describes linking social capital as “consisting of the vertical ties 
between poor people and positions of influence in formal organisations 
(banks, agricultural extension offices, police). This dimension captures a 
vitally important additional feature of life in poor communities: that their 
members are usually excluded by overt discrimination or lack of resources 
from places where major decisions relating to their welfare are made”. The 
capacity to leverage resources, ideas and information from formal institutions 
beyond communities is a key function of linking social capital (Woolcock 
2002:27). Sabatini (2009:430) provides a useful example that illuminates the 
importance of linking social capital. Sabatini suggests that civil society 
organisations allow citizens to come into contact with the institutions to carry 
out advocacy activities through collective action. Such vertical linkages allow 
groups access to resources, ideas and information from institutions of power, 
enabling group members to ‘scale up’ micro-level social capital and social 
action to a politically and economically effective level. 
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Woolcock (1998) and Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock cited in Raiser 
(2008:495) emphasise the importance of linking social capital for determining 
whether a national government will likely succeed in the implementation of 
economic policies to improve growth prospects and living standards of its 
citizens. This seems to suggest whether a government connects with its 
citizens to the extent that the latter can demand accountability through 
mechanisms such as parliaments and civil society organisations and resident 
associations. 
The World Bank (2001:129-130) emphasises the importance of external 
support in the creation of linking social capital for poor communities. Myrada, 
an Indian non-governmental organisation that delivers microfinance services 
and acts as a medium term intermediary between poor people and 
commercial banks provides a useful and important example of the role of 
external support from civil society organisations in the creation of bonding, 
bridging and linking social capital. The organisation first mobilised the bonding 
social capital within village communities to form credit management groups, 
and then over time to form regional federations made up of representatives 
from each credit group, thereby enhancing bridging social capital connections 
between the networks. From the outset, the credit management groups held 
bank accounts with commercial banks but had lacked enough confidence and 
skills to participate independently in formal institutions. They lacked the linking 
social capacity. After five years of capacity development through training and 
experience, group members were able to manage their bank accounts with 
the formal institutions, and even arranged for annual external financial audits, 
without the involvement of Myrada staff. Thus Myrada had successfully 
facilitated the creation of linking social capital between the credit management 
groups and the commercial banks (World Bank 2001:130). 
Researchers and practitioners of social capital, for example, Szreter and 
Woolcock (2004) cited in Poortinga (2006:256), argue that all the three types 
of social capital are important for people’s health and well-being. It is the 
different combinations of bonding, bridging and linking social capital that are 
responsible for the range of development outcomes observed for poor people.  
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Different development interventions including giving cash to the poor relate to 
different types of social capital: bonding (family and relationship support); 
bridging (business-community networks); and linking (neighbourhood 
governance, community service credit schemes). Getting the social capital 
analysis wrong prior to the design of development projects aimed at reducing 
poverty for poor communities, or failure to do a social capital diagnosis can 
lead to wrong types of interventions and consequently the absence of positive 
outcomes for poor people, perhaps even to perverse effects (Lowndess & 
Pratchett 2008:693). 
The World Bank (2002) suggests that in a developing country context, support 
for bonding social capital at the level of the family and household is vital to 
ensuring daily survival of poor people. The facilitation of the development and 
strengthening of village associations to support a range of activities, for 
example, education, micro-finance and economic development, environmental 
and agricultural sustainability - all enable the poor to put their social capital to 
work in more productive ways. Interventions that connect such associations to 
the wider social networks and economic markets can help build forms of 
bridging and linking social capital that can facilitate the poor out of poverty. 
Key interventions at this level are usually made by non-governmental 
organisations, with the support of the national and local governments and 
donor countries, as is the case with Zimbabwe’s Harmonised Social Cash 
Transfer Programme, which involves all the key actors mentioned here. 
3.6.9 Social network concepts and definitions 
John A. Barnes (1954), an anthropologist who studied the connections among 
people living in a Norwegian island parish was the first researcher credited 
with using the term social network. Barnes viewed social interactions as a “set 
of points some of which are joined by lines to form a total network of relations” 
Barnes drew influence from Moreno’s pioneering work about sociograms. 
Network ideas and methods spread from anthropology and sociology to other 
disciplines over fifty years ago (Knoke & Yang 2008:9). 
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There are several definitions of social networks in the social capital and 
networks literature. For Wellman and Berkowitz (as cited in Knoke & Yang 
2008:9), “a social network is a structure composed of a set of actors, some of 
whose members are connected by a set of one or more relations.” A network 
is defined as a set of relationships between objects which could be people, 
organisations, nations (Kadushin 2012:3). The term is sometimes used to 
describe the entire set of links among a finite collection of agents (Fafchamps 
2006:1183). Social networks begin with people, and evolve from individuals 
interacting with one another but produce extended structures that they had 
not imagined. Social networks are both indicators of social capital and are 
also a process that leads to social capital (Kadushin 2012:177). There is 
significant evidence in the social networks literature supporting the notion that 
social networks have beneficial utility, have many forms and that the values 
they produce are varied. Kadushin (2012:182) identifies two levels of social 
networks, community or group and individual. 
A fundamental starting point about social networks is the idea that social life is 
created mainly and most importantly by relations and the patterns formed by 
these relations (Marin & Wellman 2011:11). Wasserman and Faust (1994) 
cited in Marin and Wellman (2011:11) formally defined social networks as “a 
set of nodes (or network members) that are tied by one or more types of 
relations.” Christina Prell (2012:8) offered a similar formal definition by stating 
that, “a social network can be defined as a set of relations that apply to a set 
of actors as well as any additional information on those actors and relations.” 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2000) cited in the published work of 
Bofota (2012:14) define a network as, “the personal relationships which are 
accumulated when people interact with each other in families, workplaces, 
neighbourhoods, local associations and a range of informal and formal 
meeting places.”  
Most definitions and discussions in the literature on social networks 
emphasise that the presence of relational or connections is a critical and 
defining feature of social networks. Actors and relations are two indispensable 
elements of any social network. These two fundamental components are 
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common to most network definitions. Their combination jointly constitutes a 
social network.  
At the heart of social network studies are fundamental concepts and 
terminology namely; actors, nodes, vertices, actor attributes, finite set of 
actors, ties, relation, group, ego and egocentric networks, socio-centric 
networks, open system networks and density. 
Box 3.2: Social networks – key concepts and measures 
In the social network analysis literature, there are multiple terms for the same 
concept. For example, actors, vertices and nodes are the social entities 
linked together according to some social relation (Prell 2012:9). Marin and 
Wellman (2011:11) provide a similar description by stating that “nodes or 
network members are the relations or units that are connected by the relations 
whose patterns we study.” The actors or nodes are commonly persons or 
organisations, although any units that can be connected to other units can be 
studied as nodes. 
Tie is defined as “what connects A to B for example, A is friends with B = A is 
tied to B” (Prell 2012:9). Similarly according to Wasserman and Faust 
(1994:20), actors are linked to one another by social ties and the defining 
feature of a tie is that it establishes a linkage between a pair of actors. 
Relation is defined by Wasserman and Faust (1994:20) as the collection of 
ties of a specific kind among members of a group. Prell (2012:9) offers a 
similar definition of relation, which is that, “a relation is a specified set of ties 
among a set of actors. For example, friendship, family etc.” Different types of 
relations identify different networks even where observations are restricted to 
the same set of actors. For example, a friendship network among a set of 
office employees most likely differs from their advice-seeking network (Knoke 
& Yang 2008). 
Group is defined as a collection of all actors on which ties are to be 
measured, (Wasserman & Faust 1994:20). 
Actor attributes represent the additional information on each actor, for 
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example, age, gender, and socio economic class Prell (2012:9). 
Finite set of actors – the restriction to a finite set of actors is an analytic 
requirement in social network analysis. 
A social structure is defined as consisting of (a) a set of social units 
(positions) that possess differential amounts of one or more types of valued 
resources and that are (b) hierarchically related relative to authority (control of 
and access to resources) (c) share certain rules and procedures in the use of 
the resources and (d) are entrusted to occupants (agents) who act on these 
rules and procedures. In simple terms, the structure of a given network 
consists of who interacts with whom, how frequently and on what terms (Lin 
2001:26).  
Socio-centric networks are networks in a box, for example, connecting 
children in a classroom or between executives or workers in an organisation 
(Kadushin 2012:17). 
Density is a measure of how many connections there are between actors 
compared to the maximum number of connections that could exist between 
actors. The higher the proportion, the more dense the network (Kilduff & Tsai 
2003:30). Density is central to community, social support, and high visibility. 
Density facilitates the transmission of ideas, rumours and diseases. All things 
being equal, the greater the density, the more likely is a community to be 
considered a cohesive community, a source of social support and an effective 
transmitter of information. Agricultural communities or villages have greater 
density than modern urban communities. People tend to know each other in 
many contexts, that is, as relatives, co-workers, church attendees etc. In 
comparing different networks in terms of density, it is important to take into 
account their sizes. Smaller networks will have greater density. 
Structural hole. Burt (1992) developed the idea of a structural hole. Burt 
defines structural holes as “the empty spaces in social structure.” These 
empty spaces result from actors not having a tie between them, that is, lack of 
a connection (Prell 2012:122). Burt used the notion of a structural hole to 
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discuss how some network structures can give individuals a strategic 
advantage over others. Networks which have structural holes hold a greater 
diversity of information than those without. Information becomes redundant 
when many of the same actors have ties with one another, that is, much of the 
same information and generally advice would be circulating between the 
actors. Connecting to individuals who are unconnected themselves is 
connecting to non-redundant pieces of information (Prell 2012:123). Structural 
holes, as a concept and analytical technique, have gained research 
popularity.  
Reciprocity. One important issue about networks concerns whether or not 
they are highly structured. The degree of structuring can be assessed in part 
by measures of balance that comprise both reciprocity and transitivity. A 
network with a high degree of reciprocity is one in which ties between two 
people tend to be symmetric (Kilduff & Tsai 2003:32). For example, if A likes 
B, then B also likes A. Ties can either be symmetric, that is, reciprocated or 
asymmetric, that is, non-reciprocated. For example, Alex nominates David as 
a friend and David nominates Alex as a friend. In contrast, in the non-
reciprocated or asymmetric matrix, Susie sends Lynn a watch and Lynn 
reciprocates that watch, but Susie also sends Jane a watch and Rose does 
not reciprocate that watch. Networks with low reciprocity may be hierarchical 
with some actors receiving many nominations which they do not reciprocate. 
Tie multiplexity. When actors share more than one kind of relational tie with 
one another, they exhibit a multiplex tie (Prell 2012:140). Kadushin (2012:36) 
shares a similar notion, that is, a multiplex relationship arises when actors 
have more than one kind of relationship with one another. Members could 
relate to one another in many different contexts such as going to the same 
church, same education classes, they are friends and also work partners. A 
tie can therefore represent many interests between actors. The concept of 
multiplexity is used in the network literature in two related senses: role 
multiplexity and content multiplexity. According to Beggs, Haines and Hurlbert 
(1996) cited in Kadushin (2012:36), role multiplexity “refers to the possibility 
that two nodes occupy more than one position that ties them together, 
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typically a situation in which two nodes have an organisational relationship, for 
example supervisor and assistant (to the supervisor), but are also friends.” 
Typically, this occurs in village societies in which people are simultaneously 
kin, labourers on the same farm, and are also members of the same church.  
Informal networks: Rose (2000:149) asserts that “social networks of an 
informal nature are face to face relationships between a limited number of 
individuals who know each other and are bound together by kinship, 
friendship or propinquity. Informal networks are “institutions” in the 
sociological sense of having patterned and recurring interaction.” La Porta et 
al. (1997) cited in Bofota (2012:14) provide a similar suggestion that “informal 
networks include relationships people have with their families, partners, 
friends and neighbours.”  
Formal networks: La Porta et al. (1997) cited in Baende Bofota (2012:14) 
state that “formal networks include relationships at work, within community 
groups and churches, and with formal bodies such as businesses and 
governments.” According to Rose (2000:149), formal networks are rule-
bound, bureaucratic and they have a legal status and secure revenue from 
the market or the state. A formal network can have individuals as its 
members, for example, a professional association of bee-keepers or its 
members can be organisations, for example, an association of hospitals.   
After specifying the network boundaries, that is, identifying the network 
members, the next stage that researchers follow is the identification of the 
relations between the network members. Relations differ in terms of their 
content, direction and intensity. Relations could include collaborations, 
friendships, trade ties, information flows, ideas and money. 
• Transaction relations: Actors exchange control over physical or 
symbolic media, for example, giving gifts or economic sales and 
purchases. 
• Communication relations: Linkages between actors are channels 
through which messages may be transmitted. 
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• Boundary penetration relations: Ties consist of membership in two or 
more social formations, for example, corporate boards of directors with 
overlapping members. 
• Instrumental relations: Actors contact one another in efforts to secure 
valuable goods, services or information such as a job, political advice 
or recruitment to a social movement. 
• Sentiment relations: Actors express their feelings of affection, 
admiration, difference, loathing or hostility towards one another. 
• Authority or power relations: The ties in these relations indicate the 
rights and obligations of actors to issue and obey commands. These 
types of relations often occur in formal hierarchical organisations. 
• Kinship and descent relations: These ties are bonds of blood and 
marriage reflecting relations among family roles. 
3.7 Theoretical framework 
This section presents the main theoretical perspectives or lenses through 
which to analyse the effects of the HSCT on social capital. The theories used 
in this study are drawn from the field of sociology. The study gives special 
emphasis to social capital and social network theories. These two theories 
allow a focused analysis of how the HSCT affects different dimensions of 
social capital such as social relations, social networks, community collective 
action, norms of reciprocity, and trust in individuals and institutions.  
The HSCT operates through and affects different social capital dimensions 
through its implementation processes and social components which include, 
targeting, mobilisation, payment and communication. The effects of these 
processes must be analysed to determine whether they are good or bad for 
the participating communities in social capital terms. CT beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries are embedded within a web of social relations, processes 
and institutions in their communities. Accordingly, social capital and social 
network theories provide a suitable framework of analysis to understand the 
wider social implications of the processes of intervening in beneficiaries’ and 
non-beneficiaries’ lives. The sections below discuss the theories that inform 
the present study. 
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3.7.1 Social capital theory 
The three prominent writers highlighted in the contemporary literature on 
social capital in terms of their foundational influence in developing theories of 
social capital are Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam. Their 
works were enough to encourage wider and interdisciplinary attention to the 
notion of social capital.  
Sociologists, James Coleman (1987 and 1988) and Pierre Bourdieu (1980 
and 1986) are credited for independently offering the first systematic 
conceptualisation and treatments of the concept of social capital. Their 
seminal studies placed social capital at the centre of research in sociology. 
Coleman and Bourdieu like Hanifan were particularly interested in the field of 
education. They seemed to have developed a theoretical definition of social 
capital which they used to systematise the effects of social relations, which 
they observed in their applied research. Coleman and Bourdieu were both 
stirred by the effects of the social environment and social connections on 
educational performance.  
Despite their common interest, Coleman and Bourdieu pursued different 
theories on social capital with different aims in mind. The influential French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu was the first social scientist to formulate definitions 
of social capital that were structural (Kadushin 2012:175). Bourdieu’s interest 
in social capital originated from his attempt to develop a general theory of 
social reproduction, and how the dominant classes in society retain their 
position. Bourdieu distinguished between three forms of capital: economic, 
cultural and social. His basic concern was to investigate the processes that 
made for unequal access to resources and power differentials, and the ways 
in which these factors were linked to class formation and the creation of elites. 
For Bourdieu, economic factors alone could not explain social reproduction 
and elite dominance in society. Bourdieu defined social capital as “the 
aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession 
of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu 1985:248). According to Bourdieu 
and Wacquant (1992) cited in Kadushin (2012:175), “social capital resources 
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might accrue to either groups or individuals”. A fundamental view according to 
Bourdieu is that the possession of social capital was an attribute of the middle 
class and elites making sure that their circles remained exclusive, that is, the 
rich may use these networks to reproduce unequal systems of domination. 
While a large number of social capital theories in the literature view it as a 
positive notion, Bourdieu’s theoretical perspective pictures it as exclusionary, 
unfair and as an instrument of social inequality although the elites would see it 
positively.  
The American sociologist James Coleman’s theory of social capital is broader 
than Bourdieu’s approach to social capital. Coleman (1988) argued that social 
capital is not viewed only as stock held by elites but that it has value for all 
kinds of communities including the non-elite groups living in poor or 
marginalised communities who could also benefit from social capital derived 
from their social connections. Coleman’s central argument is that social 
capital is defined by its function and that it is linked to the nature of social 
structures. Coleman understood social capital as: “it is not a single entity, but 
a variety of different entities, having two characteristics in common: they all 
consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of 
individuals who are within the structure” (Coleman 1990:302). In Coleman’s 
view (1988:95), social structure consists of “norms, rules, and obligations” and 
relationships. Coleman argued that “social structure becomes social capital 
when it is appropriated to further an actor’s goals” (Kadushin 2012:176). 
Coleman’s theory asserts that social capital is a potential resource which an 
actor can use alongside other resources such as human, physical and 
economic capital (Gauntlett 2011). “… [S]ocial capital is not necessarily 
owned by the individual but instead arises as a resource available to them 
[the actor]” (ibid.).  
Sandfleur and Laumann (1998) cited in Kadushin (2012:176) identified three 
kinds of benefits embedded in Coleman’s theory of social capital:  source of 
information; influence and control; and social solidarity. The theory is that 
mutual trust and commitment arise from group norms, from repeated 
interaction, or both. Since the development of trust and values is a process 
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that takes place over time and feeds into the development of social networks, 
it is a process that generally cannot be directly observed (ibid.). 
John Field (2003:28) compared Coleman and Bourdieu’s contributions to the 
notion of social capital and brought out useful aspects. Bourdieu’s central 
emphasis is on connections between privileged individuals in society. 
Coleman’s view is broad as it discerns value of social capital for different 
actors in a society: individual and collective, privileged and marginalised. 
Coleman’s treatment of social capital is almost entirely optimistic. According 
to Field (2003:28), “Coleman’s view is also naively optimistic; as a public 
good, social capital is almost entirely benign in its functions, providing for a 
set of norms and sanctions that allow individuals to cooperate for mutual 
advantage and with little or no dark side. Bourdieu’s usage of the concept, by 
contrast, virtually allows only for a dark side for the oppressed, and a bright 
side for the privileged.” 
Bourdieu (1980, 1983, 1986); Coleman (1988, 1990), Lin (1982, 1995a), Flap 
(1991, 1994), Burt (1992), Erickson (1995, 1996), and Portes (1998) cited in 
Nan Lin (2001:24) “all shared the understanding that social capital consists of 
resources embedded in social relations and social structure, which can be 
mobilised when an actor wishes to increase the likelihood of success in a 
purposive action.” According to this shared view, social capital thus 
represents an investment in social relations through which resources of other 
actors can be accessed and borrowed.  
It is widely recognised in the literature on social capital that sociologist Robert 
Putnam’s two most cited works; Making Democracy Work (1993), and 
Bowling Alone (1995) have largely been responsible for popularising the 
concept of social capital and provided inspiration for most of the current 
academic and policy debates on social capital. “Social capital as a social 
system attribute is a notion popularly associated with Robert Putnam’s 
Bowling Alone” (Kadushin 2012:177). Putnam’s contributions were influenced 
by the writings of de Tocqueville and derived from insights from Coleman’s 
contributions. Putnam wrote from a political science background. He placed 
emphasis on the significance of civic community and association. 
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In Making Democracy Work, Putnam adapted and extended Coleman’s 
understanding of social capital. Putnam writes on the causes of differential 
performances of democratic institutions across Italian regions. He argued for 
the significance of social capital and the quality of civic life in the creation of 
democratic societies. According to Putnam (1993), Northern Italy developed 
faster than Southern Italy because the former was rich in social capital as 
measured by memberships in groups and clubs. Putnam compared the 
existence of a strong web of associations and cooperative organisations in the 
North of Italy, combined with a higher awareness of the importance of the 
public issues and a stronger trust in institutions, to the lack of the same two 
elements in the South of Italy. Putnam posited that those differences 
explained the condition of underdevelopment in the southern regions of Italy 
and the wealth of the Northern regions. Citizens of the more civic areas of the 
country learnt through time to trust each other and to cooperate. Thus, the 
explanatory variable in Putnam’s analysis of regional development and 
institutional performance across regions in Italy is the “civic virtue” or “civic 
community”. 
In Bowling Alone (1995), Putnam highlighted evidence of a decline in United 
States of America’s (USA) social capital as measured by membership in 
informal and formal clubs, voter turnout, newspaper readership, volunteerism, 
neighbourliness, religious affiliations and participation levels in civic and 
political life over the post 1950s period.  
Putnam’s core idea of social capital then is that: “… participation in political, 
civic, religious, workplace activities, volunteering and informal networks leads 
to a culture of social trust and to networks with generalised reciprocity that 
bridge different groups. The outcomes of social capital are democracy, 
tolerance, and civic community participation and collective action. Social 
capital also results in low crime, safer neighbourhoods, less tax evasion, 
better schools and economic growth” (Kadushin 2012:177). According to 
Putman, social networks are both indicators of social capital and are also a 
process that leads to social capital (ibid.). Social participation facilitates the 
creation of social networks. In Putnam’s view, participation leads to trust. 
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Trust is therefore an attribute of social capital. In similar fashion to Coleman’s 
theory of social capital, Putnam points out: “what concerns us [is] not just any 
network but those characterised by reciprocity and trust…. Reciprocity is best 
when it is generalised…. One does something for another person but does 
not expect something directly in return. Rather, one trusts that the social 
system or group will eventually reciprocate” (ibid.). 
Putnam’s theory of social capital is criticised in the social capital literature on 
many grounds. Portes (1998) cited in Kadushin (2012:178) highlighted that: 
“Some of the indicators, such as those involved in democracy, are both 
causes of democracy and also outcomes of the social capital process, which 
has led to an accusation that the arguments are circular”. Other grounds of 
criticism are: Putman’s theory is not concerned sufficiently with issues of class 
distinction and power, Fine 2001, Harriss 2001 cited in Mansuri and Rao 
(2004); the theory ignored reverse causality with the link going from wealth to 
more group activity rather than the other way Portes 1998; Durlauf 2001 
(ibid.); and for not recognising that social capital can be destructive as well as 
constructive Portes 1998 (ibid.). The delinking of power and social relations 
has been criticised as one of the main challenges with Putnamian social 
capital. “A more nuanced understanding sees social capital as part of the 
relations within a social system and recognises that different groups within a 
social system can have different types of social capital. It recognises that 
social capital must be viewed contextually because it is embedded within 
structures of power and can be used to facilitate collective action for the 
common good or to perpetuate symbolic or actual violence against others” 
(Mansuri & Rao 2004). Krishna 2002; and Rao 2001; cited in Mansuri and 
Rao (2004) argued that “notions of trust and norms are not generalisable, and 
that means that social capital has to be understood within its cultural and 
political context.” 
3.7.1.1 The link between cash transfers and social capital theory 
This section distils the theoretical essence of Bourdieu’s, Coleman’s and 
Putnam’s works for this study. I develop a suitable framework for analysing 
the effects of the HSCT on social capital primarily from the theoretical 
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contributions of the above-mentioned prominent scholars. However, on a 
limited scale, I incorporate into the analytical framework the relevant 
theoretical contributions from other social capital theorists such as Platteau, 
Uslaner and Kadushin. 
Social capital theory deriving from the works of Bourdieu, Coleman and 
Putnam has the advantage of being multi-dimensional. Their definitions and 
conceptualisations of social capital identify social relations, trust and the 
practice of reciprocity as central tenets of social capital. This facilitates a 
multi-dimensional approach to the analysis of the effects of the HSCT on 
social capital. The theory allows for a broad analysis of the effects of the 
HSCT on structural, relational and cognitive dimensions of social capital in the 
study communities. Different forms of social capital not only pre-exist HSCT 
programme implementation, but they also play a role in the functioning of the 
programme itself. The HSCT can also have effects on building or modifying 
existing forms, types and dimensions of social capital. 
Coleman and Bourdieu developed a theoretical definition of social capital 
which they used to systematise the effects of social relations. The scholars 
were both stirred by the effects of the social environment and social 
connections on educational performance. It is worth pointing out here that in 
contrast to the sequencing of issues in Coleman and Bourdieu’s theoretical 
approaches, the present study modifies their approach in that the interest is in 
the effects of a cash transfer programme on the social capital and social 
environment in which the HSCT is implemented. In their approach they were 
interested in the effects of social capital on educational outcomes. 
Putnam’s conceptualisation of social capital is on the benefits accruing at the 
community level. According to Krishna and Uphoff cited in Krishna 
(2008:442), at the community level, social capital is regarded by Putnam as 
an asset and an important catalyst for mutually beneficial collective action. 
Communities are endowed with social capital to diverse extents (ibid.). 
Bourdieu and Coleman provide a conceptualisation of social capital at the 
individual level. The authors argue that social capital exists between 
individuals and by extension can be accumulated by the individuals (Esser 
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2008:24). Their view suggests that social capital is all about establishing 
relationships purposefully and making use of them to generate benefits. The 
benefits could be tangible or intangible and may include information, ideas, 
and money. Cash transfers operate through individual and community level 
social capital and affect social capital at the two levels. The 
conceptualisations of social capital by Putnam, Bourdieu and Coleman are 
complementary and provide useful analytical bases to examine the effects of 
HSCT on individual beneficiaries’ social capital, and effects on households 
and the wider community. The individual-level conception of social capital is 
particularly useful for analysing the effects or contributions toward status 
attainment by individuals receiving the HSCT in the study communities. I 
analyse how some HSCT beneficiaries may have improved their personal and 
social status through access to resources embedded in social relations or 
networks which they may have (re)joined following the introduction of the 
HSCT in their communities. At the community level conception of social 
capital, the study employs the theoretical notion advanced by Putnam to 
examine whether some of the design and implementation features of the 
HSCT, for example, targeting, and grievance and complaints management 
systems may have strengthened or weakened social capital in the recipient 
communities. By employing the community conception of social capital as 
suggested in Putnam’s theory, this study can demonstrate how the 
possession of high or low social capital may be associated with better or worst 
social outcomes in terms of community well-being, for example, collective 
goodwill to address a community problem, labour-sharing groups, or negative 
social capital manifesting as increased levels of crime, social exclusion and 
less community cooperation.  
Social relations are the heart of the social capital theory. They represent a key 
component of the structural dimension of social capital discussed in an earlier 
section. MacAuslan and Riemenschneider (2011:3) suggest thinking about 
cash transfers as ongoing processes of intervention in a complex system of 
social relations. The authors argue that “individuals are embedded within 
institutions at several levels: households, communities and national political 
and social institutions.” Cash transfers build on social relations and are likely 
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to affect them (ibid.). In analysing the effects of the HSCT on social relations, 
the study invokes Putnam’s (2000) theoretical notions of “bonding” and 
“bridging” social capital. The distinction between bonding and bridging social 
capital is commonly associated with Putnam (ibid.). The present study 
analyses the effects of the HSCT on the ability of cash transfer recipients to 
build or strengthen “social bonds” between different members of the same 
household, that is, intra-households social relations between genders and 
generations. In addition to analysing the effects on social bonds, the study 
uses the theoretical notions of Putnam to analyse the effects of the HSCT on 
the ability of cash transfer recipients to build or strengthen “social bridges” or 
social relations with other households (recipients and non-recipients). 
According to Prakash (2002:51), Putnam makes the point that membership in 
civic groups or voluntary associations are manifestations of bridging forms of 
social capital. The present study analyses HSCT beneficiaries’ participation in 
membership associations or groups as one of the indicators of the presence 
of bridging social capital. The analysis of the effects of the HSCT on social 
relations will determine the types of social relations affected by the 
introduction of the HSCT. Social relations differ in terms of their content, 
direction and intensity. Social relations could include collaborations, 
friendships, trade ties, information flows, ideas and money. 
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social capital notion is useful in analysing 
adverse effects of the HSCT on social networks particularly whether or not 
existing social networks are accessible to HSCT beneficiaries. A fundamental 
view in Bourdieu’s theory of social capital is that the non-poor have better 
social networks than the poor and that the possession of social capital is an 
attribute of the former. The non-poor use their networks and social circles to 
reproduce unequal systems of domination. Thus, their networks are closed 
and exclusive. In this regard, the study employs Bourdieu’s theory to examine 
whether the introduction of the HSCT in the recipient communities reproduced 
any forms of inequalities or does not alter existing forms of inequality and 
social exclusion. For example, the analysis explores if HSCT beneficiaries are 
able to enter or to join social networks of the elites in the study communities. 
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In this regards, Bourdieu’s social capital theory is useful to examine the 
relations between HSCT recipients (poor) and non-recipients (non-poor). 
Trust is an important dimension of cognitive social capital. Ahn and Ostrom 
(2008:80) aver that trust is the key link between forms of social capital and 
outcomes. Platteau cited in Fafchamps (2006:1183) theorises that trust arises 
from varied sources but importantly from repeated interpersonal interactions, 
general knowledge about the population of agents and the incentives people 
face. This is consistent with Uslaner’s view (2008:101) that “trust depends on 
information and experience”. Single encounters do not suffice to develop trust. 
Similar to Platteau and Uslaner views about the origins of trust, Sandfleur and 
Laumann (1998) cited in Kadushin (2012:176) make the point that Coleman’s 
theory of social capital supports the notions that mutual trust arises from 
repeated interactions. Coleman adds that the development of trust and values 
is a process that takes place over time and feeds into the development of 
social networks (ibid). Putnam makes similar points although his concern is at 
the collective level by stating that participation in community-based activities 
and informal networks leads to a culture of social trust and to networks with 
generalised reciprocity that bridge different groups (Kadushin 2012:177).  
Deriving from the above-mentioned theoretical suggestions about the sources 
of trust, this study examines utility of repeated interactions of HSCT 
beneficiaries for the development of trust and bonding and bridging forms of 
social capital. The HSCT uses a physical cash delivery method whereby 
HSCT beneficiaries travel to designated payment points at central points in 
the community to receive their cash transfers every two months. The 
theoretical assertion according to the trust theory is that the repeated 
interactions among HSCT beneficiaries; the frequent interactions between 
programme officials and beneficiaries; and the repeated interactions between 
HSCT community focal persons and beneficiaries should lead to the 
development of different types of trust.  First, the study analyses if the 
repeated interpersonal interactions of HSCT beneficiaries lead to the 
development of “personalised trust” (Uslaner 2008:108); and secondly if the 
repeated interactions between HSCT programme officials; beneficiaries and 
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focal persons leads to trust in institutions. The study further explores 
Putnam’s theoretical assertion that participation in the HSCT by beneficiaries, 
and community volunteers leads to the formation of norm and trust-based 
social networks, and whether the trust that is generated acts as a catalyst for 
collective community action. From these analyses, the study determines 
whether the HSCT weakens or strengthens an important cognitive dimension 
of social capital – trust. 
3.7.2 Social network theories 
Social network theory is at the heart of theoretical frameworks for network-
based social capital studies. Social network analysis has also emerged as a 
key analytical technique in sociology, anthropology, social psychology and 
economics. The present study uses the social network theory to analyse the 
type, structure and relational elements of cash transfer-based social networks.  
There are several theoretical perspectives within the umbrella of social 
network theory. This section focuses on the social selection network, and the 
strength of weak tie theories. These two theories contribute to the overall 
theoretical framework that informs this study. 
The social selection network theory integrating the concept of homophily 
(Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954a; McPherson et al. 2001; Mercken et al. 2009; 
Robins et al. 2001) cited in Prell (2012:28) is tested in the present study. 
Social selection network theory looks at how individuals with similar 
characteristics are attracted to one another. Similarity is seen as the main 
basis upon which selection processes occur, Byrne cited in Prell (2012:63). 
Homophily is a relatively old concept or principle in sociology introduced into 
social network theory by Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954 (Lin 2008:60). The 
concept refers to a social situation of actors preferring to have social relations 
with other actors similar to them (Prell 2012:129). People with the same 
values and attitudes tend to associate with one another. Interaction, in turn, 
leads to greater likelihood of common values. People in the same structural 
position or location, for example, the same class, occupation and education, 
tend to have the same values and engage in common activities and so come 
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to associate with one another. The concept thus embeds a folk proposition 
that “birds of a feather flock together” Kadushin (2012:18). The principle 
proposes that there is a strong correspondence between intensity of 
interactions, shared sentiment and shared resources. The concept applies 
equally to groups, organisations, countries or other social units. Homophily is 
a process as well as an outcome. There are two kinds of arguments regarding 
how homophily takes place. The first argument, according to Coleman et al. 
Feld, 1981, 1982 cited in Prell (2012:129) posits that organisational or social 
settings determine that ties will form among similar actors, that is, the 
availability of similar attributes is a function of social structure. Two examples 
will help to show this, first “one is more likely to find people interested in 
solving mathematical problems in a physics class than in a class on English 
literature Kadushin (2012:20). Secondly, a social protection programme such 
as a cash transfer programme will draw in beneficiaries who share similar 
attributes, and this similarity amongst the actors will also most likely coincide 
with other similarities. Consequently, the group composition produces 
homophily. Other examples of this kind include churches, and sports clubs 
Prell (2012:129). The second argument, according to Skvoretz, 1985, 1990 
cited in Prell (2012:129) states that nodes are drawn to form ties with others 
who are similar to themselves. This implies that the organisational or social 
setting does not matter as individuals will seek out and find others who are 
similar to themselves and form ties with these others. For example, friendship 
ties will develop as a result of individuals being in a similar age group or 
coming from a similar educational background. In sum, it seems that there are 
four processes involved with the principle of homophily. If people flock 
together, it could mean: (1) the same kinds of people come together, (2) 
people influence one another and in the process become alike, (3) people can 
end up in the same place, and (4) once they are in the same place, the very 
place influences them to become alike Kadushin (2012:20). Homophily is not 
necessarily a good thing. Social networks based on homophily may be unfair 
as it can bring about segregation. 
A common issue of concern in the social network literature is that it is difficult 
to measure and account for the causal direction of homophily. The key 
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question is: “Is it that people come together and become more similar over 
time, or is it that they are attracted to similar others and form a social tie 
accordingly?” A classic example is a study of adolescent girls, Hutchinson and 
Raspee 2007 cited in Kadushin (2012:19), which found that students 
belonging to the same clique tended to have similar scores on various 
measures of behaviours such as alcohol use, dietary restraint and binge 
eating. However, it could not be established whether adolescent girls hang 
around together because they share similar habits, or they have become 
similar to each other while hanging around with one another. The concept of 
homophily is relevant to the present study and is applied in analysing the type 
of social networks and similarity bases upon which ties are formed among 
HSCT beneficiaries in the two study communities. The similarity bases include 
common identities as “HSCT beneficiaries” and “non-beneficiaries”. 
Probably the most cited social network analysis theory is “The strength of 
weak ties”, published in The American Journal of Sociology (Prell 2012:76). 
Granovetter (1973) studied how professionals in Massachusetts used their 
personal networks to find out information on new job opportunities. In 
particular, Granovetter was interested in the nature and strength of 
relationships existing between respondents and the respondent’s contact 
persons. Granovetter (as cited in Kilduff and Tsai 2003:33) defined the 
strength of an interpersonal tie as “a combination of the amount of time, the 
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) and the reciprocal services 
which characterise the tie.” Erickson cited in Prell (2012:140) provides a 
similar definition: “… refers to strong ties as ones exhibiting strong feelings of 
liking, intimacy, and friendship.” The strength of the tie was measured by 
frequency of contact, where respondents rated their contact person as 
someone they met with often, occasionally or rarely. Granovetter asserted 
that the strength ranges from weak, defined as relationships that are 
infrequent and distant, to strong, defined as frequent, long lasting and affect-
laden relationships.  
Granovetter’s study findings showed a significant pattern pertaining to 
personal contacts, the strength of tie, and the success of respondents in 
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landing a new job. Granovetter concluded from the study findings that weak 
ties as measured through frequency of contact were a more important 
resource for individuals in locating information on new jobs than were stronger 
ties. According to Granovetter cited in Kadushin (2012:31), weak ties have 
several interesting consequences. “First they facilitate the flow of information 
from otherwise distant parts of a network. Individuals with few weak ties will 
be deprived of information from distant parts of the social system and will be 
confined to the provincial news and views of their close friends.” Social 
systems lacking in weak ties are generally fragmented and incoherent, and 
new ideas spread slowly. Granovetter’s conclusion was premised on the idea 
that strong ties tend to exist among close friends and family members, and 
that information among such closely tied members tends to become 
redundant.  
3.7.2.1 The link between cash transfers and social network concepts 
and theories 
Social networks are both indicators of social capital and a process that leads 
to formation or destruction of social capital (Kadushin 2012:177). The 
introduction of a cash transfer intervention into a community can lead to the 
formation of new social networks or modification of existing networks. Cash 
transfers can operate through social networks and in the process affect 
different features of the networks. As the review of literature demonstrated, 
cash transfers can enable entry and re-entry of poor people into social 
networks and can facilitate beneficiary access to resources embedded in 
those networks. 
The present study employs the social selection network theory to examine if 
similarity factors are the main bases upon which social connections among 
HSCT beneficiaries are established. The theoretical assertion is that people in 
a social situation prefer to form social relations or connections with other 
people similar to them, that is, people are attracted to similar others and form 
social ties (Prell 2012:129). The HSCT beneficiaries share many similarity 
characteristics, a majority of which may be related to the design features of 
the programme. For example, (1) they are all categorised as “beneficiaries” on 
 231 
 
the basis that they meet the targeting and selection criteria: food-poor and 
labour- constrained, (2) they may be receiving the same amount of cash 
transfer, and (3) demographic factors such as age and gender of cash 
recipients. The social selection network theory posits that social networks 
based on the principle of homophily may be unfair through exclusion. The 
study uses concepts that are fundamental to social network theories to 
examine the characteristics of social networks deriving from HSCT-based 
similarity factors. For example, I analyse the purpose of the networks, actor 
attributes; type of relations within the networks; whether the networks are 
restricted to a finite set of members; type of networks – egocentric or socio-
centric networks; and whether the networks exhibit tie multiplexity. 
According to Putnam (2000:19), norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness are 
positive consequences of social networks. He suggests that people who have 
active and trusting relations with others develop and maintain character traits 
that are good for the rest of the community. This theoretical assertion implies 
that HSCT beneficiaries who have active and trusting connections to others in 
their communities are “more tolerant, less cynical, and more empathic to the 
misfortunes of others” (ibid., 288). Social networks and local community 
associations help improve coordination of action by creating a structure within 
which individuals interact repeatedly and enhance trust among members 
thereby reducing opportunistic behaviour by individuals Dasgupta (as cited in 
Dasgupta & Serageldin 2000:48). Sorensen (2000:2) makes a similar 
observation by suggesting that, “when individuals meet and do business on a 
regular basis, the interaction enhances trust and reduces uncertainty as well 
as provides a forum for ostracism toward opportunism, as members learn 
about the behaviour of other members. This creates an environment more 
likely to lead to solutions to common property problems.” I use this theoretical 
assertion to examine whether the participation of HSCT beneficiaries in social 
networks and local membership associations makes them more willing to 
cooperate and participate in collective action-based community activities. 
The ideas in Granovetter’s “strength of weak ties” theory are relevant to the 
present study. Granovetter asserts that weak ties were more important 
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resources for beneficial outcomes of individuals.  I apply this theoretical 
assertion in analysing the nature and strength of the ties that HSCT 
beneficiaries have with their connections within and outside their 
communities. I also examine the beneficial effects (if any) arising from the 
connections. The fundamental implication of Granovetter’s theory for the 
HSCT beneficiaries is that they access important benefits from connections 
that are infrequent and distant than they would from nuclear family, kin-based 
and close-friends networks. A key observation in the social capital literature is 
that without connections to resources beyond poor communities, poor 
people’s networks and connections serve a survival and defensive function – 
a struggle to meet daily needs (Narayan et al. 2000:57). 
3.8 Chapter summary and conclusion 
The chapter provided a comprehensive discussion and analysis of social cash 
transfers and the concepts of social capital and social networks. The key 
debates associated with various aspects of cash transfers and social capital 
were highlighted. An analytical framework for the study deriving from social 
capital and social network theories was developed.  
The review of the CT literature shows that cash transfer schemes are 
important social protection instruments for addressing poverty, vulnerability 
and inequality. Latin America’s experience with conditional cash transfers 
galvanised interest CT programmes across most of the developing world 
including in Sub Saharan Africa where the CTs are primarily unconditional. 
There is intense debate in the CT literature about whether CTs should be 
conditioned or not. There are strong pros and cons for each option with some 
CT scholars preferring that contextual factors and programme objective guide 
design options. Other scholars make a point that there is little distinction 
between conditional and unconditional. The variation is in the intensity of 
conditionality. 
Cash transfers are located in the alternative development strategies family 
which favoured a more direct, targeted and predictable approach to assisting 
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the poor and vulnerable populations. Cash transfers can serve multiple 
objectives depending on how and what they are designed to achieve. 
A point is made that while different country and regional contexts demand 
their own shapes, forms and content of CT programmes, there are common 
design and operational features across countries and regions. These features 
include targeting, transfer size, payment method, frequency of payment and 
type of recipient. Grievance and complaints mechanisms are important 
components of CTs and form the basis of a programme’s social accountability 
system. There are variations in the systems used across programmes with 
some making use of community structures while others define formal and 
hierarchical systems. The main debates on design and implementation 
features of CT schemes are about whether CT should programmes should be 
targeted or be universal in their reach. Proponents for targeting argue on the 
basis of efficiency outcomes in redistributing limited cash resources while 
those against targeting see it as an expensive and ineffective redistributive 
mechanism which can also have negative social and political consequences. 
The review of the CT literature further shows that cash transfers are some of 
the well-researched and evaluated instruments of social protection. However, 
there is limited but growing evidence of the effects of CTs on social outcomes. 
The evidence shows a mixed picture of positive and negative effects on a 
range of social capital dimensions including social networks, risk-coping 
strategies, trust, participation in community activities, and social relations. CTs 
also have unintended consequences which should be considered at design 
and implementation stages, for example effects on crime, disincentives for 
adult labour, trust and remittances. 
The review of the social capital literature shows that the concept is very old, 
its definition is nebulous, it is multi-dimensional and there are diverse theories 
associated with the concept. Social capital is understood as an attribute at 
different levels: individual, household and community. It is primarily viewed as 
a productive asset which increases with use unlike other forms of capital. 
However, it can also have adverse effects. The three main types of social 
capital are bonding, bridging, and linking or vertical social capital. A balance 
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of the three types of social capital is necessary optimum functioning of 
communities as for example; too much bonding social capital could lead to 
failure to access resources beyond social bonds.  There are two interrelated 
dimensions of social capital – structural and cognitive. The theories of social 
capital are fundamentally about the interactions of structural and cognitive 
dimensions mainly: social relations, trust norms of reciprocity, social networks, 
and collective action. Putman, Bourdieu and Coleman are widely recognised 
as having significant influence in developing seminal theories of social capital. 
Social capital can both be a consequence of processes linked to development 
interventions, and a catalyst for the success or failure of the interventions. The 
social capital literature does not yet incorporate the relationship between the 
concept and cash transfers as the latter is a relatively recent poverty reduction 
instrument in the developing world. Instead the social capital literature has 
examined the link between social capital and microfinance. However, the 
expanding CT literature now integrates various dimensions of social capital 
primarily examining the effects of the former on the latter. CT programmes 
operate through and affect different social capital dimensions through 
implementation processes and design features such as targeting, actual 
payment and programme communications. These CT processes have 
implications for the social organisation of CT recipients and non-recipients in 
their communities.  
In order to analyse the effects of the HSCT on the social organisation of 
recipient households and communities, the study chose an analytical 
framework that incorporates social capital theories deriving mainly from 
Putman, Bourdieu and Coleman. In addition to the use of social capital 
theories, and for the purpose of analysing social connections between HSCT 
beneficiaries and the strength of their social relations with others within and 
outside of their immediate communities, the study makes use of the social 
selection network theory and the notions of Granovetter’s “strength of weak 
ties” theory. 
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The next chapter is a detailed presentation of the research approach and 
design used in this study. It describes the study population, sampling 
procedure, data collection, analysis, and ethical considerations. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter addresses the methods and techniques that were used in 
collecting, processing and analysing primary and secondary research data. 
The research paradigm; approach; design; and methodology - data collection 
methods, study populations, sampling, research instruments and data 
analysis techniques are outlined.  
A brief overview of research paradigms is provided in the following section. 
4.2 Research Paradigm 
The philosopher Thomas Kuhn is credited for introducing the notion of 
research paradigms more than 50 years ago. Kuhn argued that scientific 
research is organised around philosophical systems denoting ideas, 
frameworks and set of beliefs that shape the way researchers see the world 
(Neuman 2007:41). Babbie (2010:33) identified a paradigm as “a model or 
frame of reference through which to observe and understand.” Denzin and 
Lincoln (1998:4) offer a similar definition suggesting that paradigms “represent 
belief systems that attach the user to a particular world view.” According to 
Neuman (2007:42) there are three main research paradigms namely: 
interpretive, positivism, and critical. Denzin and Lincoln (1998:26) make the 
point that each of the three philosophical perspectives denote particular 
ontologies (set of ideas - frameworks/theories), epistemologies (set of 
questions), and methodologies (methods of inquiry). 
The interpretive paradigm adopts a constructionist view of social reality. The 
paradigm “… holds that human social life is based less on objective, hard 
factual reality than on the ideas, beliefs and perceptions that people hold 
about reality” (ibid., 43). Reality is socially constructed and subjective. Central 
to the interpretive paradigm is the notion of verstehen or empathic 
understanding. The concept of verstehen is largely attributed to Max Weber. 
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Neuman (2007:44) states that through the notion of verstehen, researchers 
have a desire to capture the inner world and personal perspectives of their 
research subjects and to accurately represent how people being studied view 
the world, feel about it, and act. According to Glass (2005:3) verstehen follows 
four steps by which researchers can arrive at empathic understanding. The 
steps are: imagination, abiding, discovery and expression. In reality the steps 
are not linear but iterative. The interpretive paradigm emphasises the 
inseparability of understanding from interpretation. Researchers seek to 
understand and then interpret social reality.  
Interpretive researchers interact with those they study. Data collected is rich 
and context specific. The data is typically qualitative although quantitative 
data can be collected as well. Interpretivist research methods include focus 
groups, interviews, observations, and case studies. Surveys can also be used 
in this approach. The range of methods used in the interpretive paradigm 
allows for many variables to be investigated. The interpretive research 
process is inductive, that is, the researcher constructs theory from the ground 
up (Neuman 2007:30). Researchers who use an inductive approach adopt 
grounded theory. In grounded theory, the “...researcher builds ideas and 
theoretical generalisations by closely examining and creatively thinking about 
the data” (ibid.). Patterns and theories are developed to describe and explain 
phenomena (Puvenesvary, Rahim, Naidu, Badzis, Mat Nayan & Abd Aziz 
2011:7). 
The positivist paradigm was introduced by French philosopher, Auguste 
Comte (Babbie 2010:34). He coined the term “positivism” to describe a 
philosophical system grounded on objective, measureable and replicable 
reality (ibid., 35). To the positivist researcher, “social reality is made up of 
objective facts that value-free researchers can precisely measure and use 
statistics to test causal theories.” Positivists rely on law or law-like principles 
and use logical deduction to explain reality. The majority of studies that use 
the positivist approach adopt quantitative methods and use scientific 
experiments (Neuman 2007:42-43). The ontological premise is that reality is 
objective and factual; epistemological issue is the researcher is separated 
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from subjects of study – human behaviour is considered controlled and 
determined by the external environment; and the methods of enquiry are 
experiments and tests. 
The critical approach seeks to put knowledge into action in order to influence 
change. In this regard it carries an activist orientation linked to a political 
agenda. The critical approach favours action research methods. It is similar to 
interpretivism in that it asserts that research is not value-free (ibid., 44). 
4.2.1 Research paradigm used in the present study 
This study is located primarily within the interpretivist paradigm. However 
some aspects of the present study adopt principles of phenomenology and 
positivism. According to Hancock and Algozzine (2006:9) the 
phenomenological paradigm explores the meaning of several people’s lived 
experiences about a specific event, situation or phenomenon. It addresses the 
issue of an experience of a phenomenon as perceived by people who 
participated in it in order to make sense of the reality of these people, and 
interpretation is vital in understanding that experience (Puvensvary et al. 
2011:5). The key assumption in this approach is that there is a central 
meaning of an experience shared by several individuals for example, 
beneficiaries’ participation in the HSCT programme that can be investigated 
and explained through research (ibid.). The perceptions and experiences of 
HSCT beneficiaries are analysed to describe the essence of the programme 
in their social lives. Phenomenological studies typically use qualitative 
methods for collecting data mainly observations and interviews.  
The interpretivist paradigm is considered appropriate for this study not least 
because the study is non-experimental; uses small samples; data is 
predominantly context-specific and qualitative and the social reality is 
constructed from research subjects’ subjective experiences. The table below 
displays features of the interpretivist approach as used in this study 
categorised into the purpose of the research, ontological premise, 
epistemology, and the methodological premise. 
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Table 4.1: Features of the interpretivist paradigm as applied to the 
present study 
Feature Description 
Purpose of 
research 
• Purpose is to explore, describe, understand and 
interpret effects of the HSCT on social capital from 
the perspectives of beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, 
community leaders, community volunteers and 
programme officials. Make sense of the evidence 
using social capital and social network theories. 
Ontology 
(nature if 
reality/truth) 
• Reality is subjective and multiple as seen by HSCT 
beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, community leaders, 
and programme officials. 
• Social reality is a product of negotiations within 
cultures and social settings of HSCT beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries. 
• People in the HSCT’s programme communities 
assign meanings to the programme, their experience 
with the programme, and its effects. 
Epistemology • Researcher interacts with research subjects in the 
HSCT programme settings (Epworth and 
Goromonzi). 
• Social phenomena are understood and interpreted 
using an inductive process. 
• Knowledge is socially constructed and it is value-
laden. 
• The inquirer and the known are engaged in an 
interactive and iterative process of discussing, 
writing, listening and reading. The process is not 
linear.  
Methodology • Methodology is non-manipulative, non-controlling 
and unobtrusive. 
• Data collection methods: document text review, 
FGDs, key informant interviews, field observations 
for example at pay points, and case studies. 
• Methods allow data to be collected on many 
variables 
• Data collection methods ensure dialogue between 
the researcher and subjects in order to construct 
meaningful social reality 
• Meanings, patterns, themes emerge from the 
research process. 
• Verification of data done through triangulation. 
• Findings can be generalised from one setting to 
similar settings 
 
While the dominant research paradigm is the interpretivist approach, the 
household survey component of this study brings in limited aspects of the 
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positivist approach. Survey research was developed within the positivist 
approach to social science and the researcher usually follows deductive 
reasoning (Neuman 2007:167-168). However, in this study there was no 
theory testing but data was collected using the survey method in order to 
examine multiple variables with respect to effects of the HSCT on social 
capital in the study communities. 
4.3 Qualitative and quantitative research approaches differentiated 
A useful organising framework in research involves developing an initial 
understanding of the differences between qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches. Qualitative and quantitative researches differ in many 
ways, but they complement each other, as well. According to Babbie 
(2010:23), “the distinction between quantitative and qualitative data in social 
research is essentially the distinction between numerical and non-numerical 
data.”  
Qualitative research involves in-depth investigation of a small group of 
respondents by using various techniques such as interviews, focus groups, 
participant and non-participant observation, oral history, ethnography, archival 
or document analysis (Puvenesvary et al. 2011:2). Qualitative researchers 
often work within an interpretive research paradigm, which uses data 
generation methods that are flexible, nonlinear and sensitive to social 
contexts. Qualitative researchers speak a language of “cases and contexts” 
and emphasise conducting detailed examinations of cases that arise in the 
natural flow of social life (Neuman 2007:84). Typical research questions in 
qualitative research include: How did a certain condition or situation originate? 
What are the processes by which a condition/situation changes, develops, or 
operates? A different type of question tries to confirm existing beliefs or 
assumptions. Another type of question tries to discover new ideas. If little is 
known about an issue, a qualitative approach may be more useful. In 
qualitative research, researchers interact with the object of study to find out 
the views of those involved in the events under study. The number of cases 
studied is normally small and therefore, they are not generalisable beyond the 
case studies. However, the findings can be transferred to a different context 
 241 
 
which has similar characteristics to the cases studied. The research strategy 
is inductive and theory is built from data or grounded in the data. Data 
analysis proceeds by extracting themes or generalisations from evidence and 
organising data to present a coherent, consistent picture (Neuman 2007:88).  
Quantitative research can be defined as the systematic scientific investigation 
of phenomena and their relationships. It is theory-driven, uses fixed research 
designs and involves the collection of numerical and statistical data 
(McCandless & Bangura 2007:138). Quantitative research operates within a 
positivist research paradigm which applies a deductive research strategy 
where the language of variables and hypotheses testing is common 
(Puvenesvary et al. 2011:1).  It often involves instruments such as surveys 
and tests, to measure specific variables, such as students’ source of 
disenchantment, from large groups of people. These instruments typically 
produce useful data in short time periods (Hancock & Algozzine 2006:7). A 
key objective of quantitative research is to develop and employ mathematical 
or representational models designed to indicate systematic patterns of 
relations, time sequences or causal connections in data. The process of 
measurement is central to this research approach because it provides 
fundamental connections between empirical observation and the 
mathematical expression of quantitative relationships (McCandless & Bangura 
2007:139). Thus, quantitative research is characterised by three basic 
phases: finding variables for concepts, operationalising them in the study, and 
measuring them. This type of research tends to describe, make generalisation 
from particular samples or test hypotheses. Data is collected from a large 
population of subjects. Quantitative research is concerned about validity, 
reliability and objectivity. Researchers do not physically interact with the 
subjects and they claim that they offer value-free analysis although no one 
can be fully detached from any type of research as our knowledge about the 
world is based on our assumptions about it. The common methods used in 
quantitative research are questionnaires, structured interviews (choices 
provided), structured observation (predetermined schedule) and content 
analysis (predetermined categories). In summary, quantitative researchers 
are usually interested in identifying relationships among variables, comparison 
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and causality (discovering independent variables that cause variance or 
change in the dependent variable), testing hypothesis and theories, and make 
predictions based on their findings (Puvenesvary et al. 2011:2).  
Using standardised data gathering procedures means that the research can 
be replicated and then analysed and compared with similar studies. A 
criticism levelled against quantitative research is that research is often carried 
out in an unnatural, artificial environment, so a level of control needs to be 
applied to the data collection process. The level of control may not normally 
be realistic in the participants’ daily lives, thereby yielding laboratory results 
that are opposed to the real world experience. The development of standard 
questions by researchers can lead to structural bias and false representation, 
resulting in the data that reflects the views of the researchers instead of the 
participating subjects. In addition, quantitative methods collect narrower and 
sometimes superficial data sets. Results are limited, as they provide 
numerical descriptions, rather than detailed narrative, and generally provide 
less elaborate accounts of human perception (McCandless & Bangura 
2007:140). 
Clearly, qualitative and quantitative research approaches differ in many ways, 
each with its own unique features. Neither approach is right or wrong, 
although one approach may be more appropriate than the other depending on 
the nature of the research questions and the predisposition of the researcher. 
In some cases, researchers implement activities of both approaches in the 
same research study. 
4.4 A mixed methods approach for the present study 
This section sets out the research approach for the study and the justification 
for the selected approach.  
The study used a mixed-methods approach combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods in the research design.  
The aim of this research study was to investigate the social effects of an 
unconditional cash transfer programme targeting the poorest segments of the 
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population in a rural and an urban project setting in Zimbabwe. The concept of 
social capital and its associated dimensions and concepts of social networks, 
social relations, happiness, trust, norms of reciprocity, and collective action 
provided the lens through which to analyse the social effects of the HSCT. 
The research sought to contribute to, and fill gaps in the empirical knowledge 
base about the social effects of UCT programmes with particular focus on 
dimensions and types of social capital. The body of evidence on this subject is 
currently limited though expanding. 
The advantage of the mixed-method approach for the present study was that 
the investigator got a richer picture of what was happening in the social 
environment during the HSCT intervention. The goal was not just to produce 
two sets of data (one quantitative and one qualitative) but to increase the 
understanding of the research questions by combining the research data from 
the two methods. The approach allowed for triangulation of findings from one 
set of data with another thus increasing the confidence in the reliability and 
interpretation of the findings. Rossman and Wilson (1985, 1994) cited in 
Krishna and Shrader (2002:22) observe that: “complementary methodologies 
allow researchers to confirm and corroborate results, elaborate or develop 
analysis, provide richer detail and initiate new lines of thinking by studying 
surprising results or paradoxes.” 
Social capital is a multi-dimensional concept. Research studies on social 
capital should be able to capture this multi-dimensionality. Making use of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods allowed this study to richly explore and 
describe the social effects of the HSCT programme across different 
dimensions of social capital. The qualitative and quantitative methods further 
allowed for a construction of a detailed picture of the context of the 
communities in which the HSCT programme is implemented. The researcher 
gained a more nuanced understanding of the social effects of the HSCT on 
beneficiary households, communities’ social institutions, and social structures. 
The HSCT is implemented in social settings where there is natural flow of 
social life. It is embedded in a complex web of social structures and relations. 
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It is through these processes and structures that ultimately results in observed 
effects of the HSCT programme. 
In analysing approaches to measuring social capital, Grootaert and van 
Basterlaer (2002:9) point to the growing empirical evidence, “which indicates 
that social capital is best measured using a variety of qualitative and 
quantitative instruments”. The two authors argue that “the concept of social 
capital cannot be comprehended strictly … using quantitative methods …. 
Neither can it be investigated solely through anthropological and sociological 
case studies.” Krishner and Shrader (2002:22) make a similar point by 
asserting that integrating qualitative and quantitative instruments is more 
useful and reliable than studies based on only one type of research 
methodology. 
Harpham (2003) cited in Van Deth (2008:165) “pleads” for the use of mixed 
methods in studies that examine the concept of social capital and its various 
dimensions. Roche (2004) cited in the same chapter “strongly suggests the 
combination of survey techniques with ‘more qualitative elements such as in-
depth interviews and focus groups’, whereas Stone (2001) adds the collection 
of local documents and histories.” Other empirical studies, for example, De 
Hart and Dekker (2003) include records from local authorities and statistics 
from the police. 
Dudwick et al. (2006:39) assert that “mixed-method research is extremely 
useful for revealing how people and households use relationships and social 
networks for survival and/or mobility”. 
According to Pozarny (2012) the evidence from the few social cash transfer 
impact evaluations that have used mixed methods indicates that mixed-
methods are associated with the following advantages: 
• Interpretation and contextualisation of results through triangulation: 
robustness of findings when consistent across methods, 
• Deepen understanding by combining sources of information to 
assess how programmes work, why effects vary and the what, 
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• Untangle complexities – catch averages but also variation and 
heterogeneity, 
• Explain patterns and trends – indications of future pathways for 
households and local economies, 
• Understand cash transfer effects on different categories of 
population (women, men, children, youth, and households), 
• Deepen understanding of intra-household, community dynamics as 
well as attitudinal, empowerment and social relations dimensions, 
and, 
• Use of inductive and open approach. 
 
Despite the strong points supporting use of mixed-method approaches, the 
difficulty with this method is that it is hard to do well. Combining the qualitative 
and quantitative methods requires researchers who understand approaches, 
their limitations and how they can complement each other. In addition 
researchers could face a possible dilemma if the qualitative and quantitative 
data conflict, for example people’s perceptions may be different to quantitative 
measurements of a social process. Such conflicts require careful 
interpretation and handling. 
4.5 Research design 
According to Hancock and Algozzine (2006:86) a research design is “the 
element used to structure the research and showing how all the major parts of 
the research are designed to address the key research questions.” It is a 
framework in which a research study is undertaken and consists of methods 
used to collect and analyse research data. A research design is closely 
connected to the aim of the research, that is, what one wants to find out 
(Puvenesvary et al. 2011:3). The main purpose of the research design is to 
help avoid the situation in which the evidence does not address the initial 
research questions. In this sense, a research design deals with a “logical 
problem and not a logistical problem” (Yin 2009:27). 
The type of research design chosen depends on the type of problem, the 
knowledge already available about the problem and the resources available 
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for the study (Varkevisser et al. n.d:119). Several classifications of research 
designs are possible. Different research designs generate different types of 
data. 
As part of the research design, one or more research methods (qualitative or 
quantitative) may be used to collect and analyse data. 
4.5.1 Case study design 
The study adopted a case study design focusing on selected wards in 
Epworth and Goromonzi districts. Within the case study design, the research 
employed qualitative methods (document reviews, interviews, structured 
observations, HSCT beneficiaries’ and non-beneficiaries’ case studies and 
focus group discussions) and a quantitative household survey for the head of 
every beneficiary household sampled in the selected wards in the two 
districts. 
Babbie (2010:309) defines a case study as “the in-depth examination of a 
single instance of some social phenomenon, such as village, a family, or a 
juvenile gang.” The case study can be a rigorous research method, 
empirically investigating a contemporary occurrence within its context (HSCT 
programme) and using multiple sources of evidence. The strength of case 
study research is its capacity for utilising a broad scope of evidence: artefacts, 
documents, interviews and observation, thus making it more inclusive 
(McCandless & Bangura 2007:165). Case study research means doing 
research in an actual and real life setting, generally including the gathering of 
evidence; conducting and recording interviews; interpreting collected data; 
amassing newspaper articles, documentation, records, minutes of meetings; 
searching archival records, organisational and governmental records; 
discussing actions and events with inside participants. Yin (2003:58) 
emphasises that “the demands of a case study on your intellect, ego, and 
emotions are far greater than those of any other research strategy. This is 
because the data collection procedures are not routinised.”  Hancock and 
Algozzine (2006:31) point out that, types of case study research designs 
include exploratory, explanatory and descriptive.  
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The case study design chosen for this research was exploratory, descriptive 
and interpretive. Exploratory and descriptive research often blur together in 
practice. It is exploratory because it investigated an under-studied area: 
effects of an unconditional cash transfer on social capital. There is currently 
limited empirical evidence, and gaps still exist in this subject. The HSCT is an 
unconditional CT programme. Effects of UCTs can be found across many 
outcome areas. In this regard exploratory dimension of the study came into 
play since there were no predetermined effects as is the case with the CCTs 
where effects are commonly found in human development and economic 
dimensions. In addition there was scope to generate ideas for further 
research.  
The descriptive dimensions of the study allowed for the description and 
analysis of the design and implementation features of the HSCT programme; 
social relations; community events; social networks; membership associations 
and clubs; trust; norms of reciprocity; community collective actions; and 
processes occurring in the HSCT programme and research settings. In this 
exploratory, descriptive and interpretive case study, the researcher analysed, 
interpreted and related findings to the existing body of theory, practice and 
research as laid out in the theoretical framework and literature review 
presented in preceding chapters. 
Yin (1994:4) set important conditions to help establish when to use a case 
study research design: (1) the type of research questions posed, (2) the 
extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and (3) 
the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. 
This case study which is mainly qualitative and descriptive was considered a 
suitable research design in this study for reasons which fulfil the benchmarks 
set by Yin (1994), and additional factors. The full justification is set out below: 
▪ The type of research questions answered in the study – what, why, 
where, how, and which, require in-depth examination of processes, 
states, events and context. 
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▪ There was no control of behavioural events by the investigator in the 
study settings. The primary data and the design and implementation 
features of the HSCT programme which were investigated could not be 
manipulated by the researcher. 
▪ The study was an in-depth empirical enquiry on a contemporary 
intervention – the HSCT programme within its real context (social, 
cultural, economic and political situation) as opposed to examining 
historical events. 
▪ The case study design provided a strong basis for in-depth analysis 
and insights into the perceptions and experiences of HSCT 
beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, HSCT focal persons, community 
leaders and programme officials. The rich contextual information from 
qualitative data deepened understanding of the HSCT’s effects on 
households, individuals and communities. 
▪ One of the objectives of the research was to describe and analyse the 
HSCT programme’s design and implementation features. Yin (1994) 
states that a case study model can be applied when dealing with 
descriptions of interventions. 
▪ The focus of attention was on two selected cases (districts) – rural and 
peri-urban settings in which there are wards with targeted beneficiaries, 
and not on the whole population of cases: that is, not all 19 districts 
currently in the HSCT were subjects of the study, Research evidence 
generated was therefore case and context-specific.  
▪ The case study design was effective at giving a comprehensive picture 
of the specific processes or series of events associated with various 
dimensions of social capital (social networks, social relations, collective 
action, and information flows) triggered by the introduction of a targeted 
cash transfer intervention in the study settings. 
▪ The cash transfers are targeted at specific cases of the poorest people 
in selected communities and contexts. The introduction of a targeted 
cash transfer intervention means different things to different people and 
groups and will likely induce different perceptions and outcomes across 
contexts. 
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▪ The researcher directly observed social phenomenon in the selected 
wards particularly the interactions among HSCT beneficiaries, and 
between beneficiaries and programme officials at cash payment 
collection points, and beneficiaries’ behaviours at their households 
during data collection. 
▪ Case studies involve data collection through multiple sources. The 
present study dealt with a variety of evidence from multiple sources of 
primary and secondary data. The investigator collected a large volume 
of primary (new) data through various data collection techniques 
(qualitative and quantitative), and secondary data mainly from 
programme documents, survey reports, progress reports and policy 
documents and project proposals. Approximately 80 per cent of the 
research data sources were primary and 20 per cent secondary. 
 
A purely quantitative study using regressions for example would not have 
been appropriate to generate useful data to describe the effects of the HSCT 
on dimensions and types of social capital in context-specific settings. In 
addition, the study was not focused on case and effect relations. This is 
addressed mainly through impact evaluations methods using for example 
randomised control trials and regression discontinuity designs. 
 
Despite the strengths of the case study design, there are limitations 
associated with the design, for example the narrowness of a case study 
makes it difficult to generalise with respect to other cases. In this study 
findings are only relevant to the particular research settings of Epworth and 
Goromonzi although transferable to similar contexts. In addition the 
interpretation of qualitative data is more interpretative and subjective. This 
may render the conclusions of case studies open to contestation.   
4.6 Study populations 
For research purpose, a population is defined as the theoretically specified 
collection or aggregation of individuals, elements or objects known to have 
similar characteristics (Babbie 2010:199). All elements within a certain 
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population usually share common traits. “All local government officers” is a 
well-defined group of individuals which can be considered as a population. 
There are two types of population in research. According to Neuman 
(2007:146) a target population refers to “a specific pool of cases that a 
researcher wants to study.” It is the entire group or collection of cases 
(universe) to which researchers wish to generalise research findings. A target 
population is also known as the theoretical population. The target population 
meets set of criteria of interest to the researcher. Examples of target 
populations include: all HSCT districts, all people with cancer, and all left-
footed footballers. The study population also known as the accessible 
population is a subset of the target population to which the researcher has 
reasonable access and it is that collection of elements, objects or individuals 
from which the sample is actually drawn (Babbie 2010:199). The accessible 
population may be limited to region, district, city or ward. Examples of study 
populations include: all HSCT districts from phase one of the programme; all 
left-footed footballers playing in the Absa premier soccer league in South 
Africa. 
In this study the accessible populations were: 10 HSCT districts from phase 
one of the programme; all wards included in the HSCT programme in Epworth 
and Goromonzi districts; and all HSCT beneficiary households in wards 4 and 
15 in Goromonzi district and wards 1 and 5 Epworth district. The other 
relevant study populations for this research were WCPC members; 
community leaders; HSCT programme officials; non-beneficiary households; 
and community shop operators.  
4.7 Sampling approach and methods 
A research problem has a bearing on some or other population. As a result of 
the size of a population, it is usually neither practically nor economically 
feasible to involve all the members of a population in a study. Researchers 
therefore have to rely on data obtained from a sample of the study population. 
Neuman (2007:373) defines a sample as “a smaller set of cases or elements 
a researcher selects from a large pool and generalises to the population.” 
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Samples can be persons, groups, organisations, written documents or even 
social actions such as arrests, rallies or divorces. The process of selecting 
study units, cases, elements or observations is called sampling. 
Qualitative and quantitative researchers approach sampling differently. The 
primary goal of sampling in quantitative research is to get a representative 
sample or a small collection of cases from a large population, such that the 
researcher can study the small group and produce accurate generalisations 
about the population. Quantitative research designs tend to use sampling 
based on probability sampling. Probability sampling is a term used for defining 
samples selected in accord with probability theory, typically involving some 
random selection mechanism. Specific types of probability sampling include 
simple random sampling and systematic sampling (Babbie, 2010:196). 
Neuman (2007:161) identifies other types of probability sampling as stratified 
and cluster sampling. 
Qualitative research focuses less on a sample’s representativeness. Instead 
the purpose of sampling is to collect cases, elements or activities that clarify 
and deepen understanding. The concern is about processes of social life in 
specific contexts as is the case in the present study. For this reason, 
qualitative research situations usually call for a second method or type of 
sampling called non-probability sampling. Types of non-probability sampling 
techniques include haphazard, quota, purposive, snowball, deviant and 
sequential sampling (Neuman, 2007:141). 
The study used both non-probability and probability sampling methods. The 
sampling approach followed a multi-stage sampling procedure. The non-
probability sampling methods used are purposive technique, also known as 
judgemental sampling, and snowball sampling. According to Huysamen 
(1994:44) a primary advantage of non-probability purposive sampling is that it 
is less complicated and more economical in terms of time and financial 
expenses than probability sampling methods. In addition purposive sampling 
allows for specific choices to be made about which people and cases to 
include in the study. These advantages applied to the present study as well. 
In this study non-probability sampling was used in combination with probability 
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sampling methods. The probability sampling technique that was applied in the 
study is the simple sampling random technique. 
Stage 1 – Sampling of districts 
The HSCT programme is operating in 19 districts, which were selected and 
enrolled into the programme in two phases. During Phase One between 
October 2011 and January 2012 the first 10 districts were selected into the 
HSCT programme. The first cash transfer payments to beneficiary households 
were made in all the first 10 districts between March and April 2012. The roll 
out of the HSCT to the second phase districts followed an incremental 
approach and took place at least 18 months after Phase One districts were on 
board, between June and December 2013.  
The first 10 HSCT districts provide the first level of selection for this research 
study because the districts have been participating in the HSCT programme 
longer than the Phase 2 districts. The districts have had several years of 
experience with the HSCT programme. There is a difference of at least nine 
bi-monthly payment cycles that is, 18 monthly CT payments between Phase 
one and phase two districts. Beneficiary households in Phase one districts 
have received more CT payments than Phase two beneficiaries. There are 
likely to be differential effects on beneficiary households partly on this basis – 
duration of participation in the HSCT programme. 
Case studies cannot be randomly selected but rather are chosen on the 
bases of known attributes. Epworth and Goromonzi districts were purposively 
sampled as case study areas from the first 10 districts (Phase 1 districts) for 
the following reasons.  
From the first 10 HSCT districts the study aimed at selecting two contrasting 
research districts. This purposive selection was designed to reflect broad and 
deep site differences in terms of socio-economic and demographic conditions; 
social infrastructure and amenities; settlement histories, and structure of local 
government authority. The aim was to investigate variation and to gain an 
understanding of how the HSCT operates in different contexts. 
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Goromonzi district was chosen to represent a predominantly rural community 
with diverse socio-economic and livelihood activities including: agriculture 
production, livestock; formal employment in public service institutions, 
availability of functional basic service facilities, and business centres. In terms 
of local government authority Goromonzi district is run by a rural district 
council and a District Administrator. The district’s traditional authority 
comprises appointed traditional leaders – chiefs and headmen. All of the 
above mentioned attributes define the context in which the implementation of 
the HSCT programme occurs in Goromonzi district. 
The other research site aimed to select a district with less favourable socio-
economic and demographic conditions. Epworth settlement was sampled on 
account of the following attributes: 
• The district is the only peri-urban settlement in the HSCT programme.  
• High levels of informality present a complex social environment for the 
implementation of the HSCT programme. Access to basic services – 
education, health, electricity, water and sanitation is severely 
constrained because the settlement was not originally planned as an 
urban residential area.  
• A majority of the settlement’s people are employed in the unregulated 
informal sector – street vendors 
• The settlement’s is run by a Local Board which is a different type of 
local governance structure from all other local government 
arrangements in the other HSCT districts. 
• The HSCT programme has been subject to a number of evaluation 
studies. Researchers have deliberately not covered Epworth district 
due to its peri-urban setting and the predominantly informality of the 
settlement. The present study takes a different perspective and 
purposively selects Epworth district as a research district. The peri-
urban and informal nature of the settlement makes the context of 
Epworth unique, and was an opportunity to richly explore the social 
effects of the HSCT. The present study was the first HSCT-related 
research to select Epworth as a research site. 
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• In Epworth, the HSCT is embedded in a web of complex social 
relationships because of the settlement’s long history and pattern of 
evolution. There are important identity issues in Epworth as described 
earlier in chapter 3. Epworth has three groups of settlers: (1) early 
settlers or “originals,” (2) settlers who came in during and immediately 
post war of liberation, and (3) the “free riders” (mostly informal and 
illegal occupants). Identity is an important factor in the social 
environment and will likely influence how the HSCT is perceived by 
different groups, how it operates in practice, and its social effects in the 
district. It is partly on this basis that Epworth district is selected for the 
present study. 
 
Stage 2 – Selection of wards 
In the present study, wards were selected as the lowest level of sampling 
units in order to have units of analysis with reasonably high number of HSCT 
beneficiary households to richly explore and understand the effects of the 
HSCT on different dimensions of social capital. In each district two wards 
were purposively selected for the study. A careful analysis of the socio-
economic characteristics of the wards in each district, and beneficiary 
households’ profiles was done prior to selection of the wards. In addition it 
was necessary to ensure that selected wards provided the optimum 
household sample sizes that would meet the requirements of statistical 
methods used in the analysis of quantitative data gathered through the 
survey. 
In Goromonzi district two wards were purposively selected based on the 
following criteria: 
1. There are 25 wards in the district. Wards 11 and 21 were not 
considered for selection because they were part of a study carried out 
by the Oxford Policy Management in 2013. The study was a qualitative 
research and analyses of the economic effects of cash transfer 
programmes in Sub Saharan. It was necessary to consider other wards 
which have not been included in any HSCT-related study in order to 
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broaden our understanding of the effects of the HSCT in different 
contexts. 
2. Wards 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, (and 21), 23, 24, and 25 were also 
not considered for selection because the number of beneficiary 
households in these wards is 31 or less with the lowest being ward 19 
which has two beneficiary households. The study requires a sample 
size of 30 percent of beneficiary households in each selected 
household. A ward with 31 beneficiary households does not provide an 
adequate pool of reserve households to consider in the event that 
some of the selected households are not located for various reasons. 
3. Wards 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18 and 22 provided the first level of 
selection for wards included in the study. From these 11 wards, ward 4 
and 15 were purposively selected for the present study because of the 
following informative attributes: 
4.  Ward 4: 
a. Largest ward in the district by population size and number of 
households – 30,124 and 7,189 respectively. 
b. Highest number of poor and non-poor households in the district 
– 4,927 and 2,262 respectively. 
c. There are 194 beneficiary households in the ward – sufficient to 
provide a sampling ratio of 30 percent, and a pool of reserve 
households for the study.  
d. The ward has the largest number of household members in the 
HSCT beneficiary households – 962. 
e. The ward has the highest number of males fit for work (19 to 59 
years of age) – 87, in the HSCT beneficiary households. 
f. Ward has the second largest number of HSCT beneficiary 
households headed by the elderly – 131 households in the 
district. Largest number is 141 in ward 10. 
g. The ward is home to a national monument site of cultural and 
botanical importance – Domboshava. It is a large granite hill with 
cave paintings which date back to thousands of years. There is 
a famous cave which is a short distance from the rock 
formations. These features make the ward unique in the district 
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and are especially informative for the present study because 
they form part of the socio-cultural context of the HSCT 
programme. 
h. Good degree of economic markets integration proxied by a 
transport network with a major road, secondary, feeder and 
connector roads in the ward. 
i. A main river flows through the ward 
j. The ward is a microcosm of a wide range of livelihood activities 
in the district: crop farming, horticulture, livestock farming, small 
business enterprises, petty trading and self-employment.  
k. Proximity to Harare city and Marondera town for markets, 
services and employment. 
5. Ward 15: 
a. The ward is close to Harare – about 27 kilometres east of the 
city. It is easily accessible for the purpose of the research. 
b. The ward is close to a major road (Harare-Mutoko highway), and 
there are secondary and feeder roads in the ward – proxy 
indicators for market integration. 
c. A main river flows through ward. 
d. Means of livelihoods include crop production, horticulture, 
livestock rearing, trading of small goods, casual labour, and 
formal employment in the public sector, for example education 
and health. 
e. Like ward 4, Harare is the main market for goods, services and 
source of formal employment for local residents. 
f. The ward has one of the highest poverty prevalence rates in the 
district – 71.9 percent and it is above the district’s average 
poverty prevalence rate – 62.4 percent. 
g. Presence of social infrastructure and amenities built primarily by 
the Catholic Church 
h. Ward 15 is a largely homogenous community via the agency of 
religion as described below. 
i. Ward 15 community is rich in Catholic traditions. Prominent in 
the area is Chishawasha mission station – a Catholic-Jesuit run 
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mission founded and established in 1891. The mission 
community includes 3 major schools, Chishawasha mission 
primary school; Saint Dominic’s secondary school; and Saint 
Ignatius College. Other Catholic supported schools are Saint 
Ignatius primary school; Saint Joseph primary school; and Saint 
Peter’s Claver primary school. The ward is home to a Regional 
Seminary for diocesan priests, and also a social centre at 
Silveira House. 
j. The presence and influence of the Catholic Church is a major 
footprint in the ward’s social and cultural environment, which 
makes the ward a unique and especially informative case in the 
district for the purpose of the research. In addition this religious 
dimension adds to the number of different variables that will be 
examined in data analysis. 
k. According to the HSCT MIS, there are 95 beneficiary 
households in ward 15 – sufficient to provide the required 
sampling ratio of 30 percent, and a pool of reserve households 
for the study. 
 
In Epworth district, wards 1 and 5 were purposively selected for this study. As 
described in chapter 3, Epworth settlement is characterised by a high degree 
of informality. While a formal Local Board is in place to manage the affairs of 
the settlement, the regularisation and planning of the district as an urban 
residential settlement has been hampered by a lack of resources and the 
continued influx of illegal and informal settlers. There are few clearly defined 
and numbered blocks of houses and streets. Sampling in such contexts is 
difficult. For the purpose of the present research, sampling of wards in 
Epworth relied on data from the Zimbabwe Poverty Atlas; 2012 national 
population census; HSCT MIS; a District and Ward analysis of social 
deprivations done by ZimStat and UNICEF; studies conducted by other 
researchers in the settlement; key informants and the present researcher’s 
knowledge of the area.  
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Epworth is divided into 7 administrative wards. From these 7 wards, wards 1 
and 5 were purposively selected for the present study using the following 
criteria: 
1. Wards 1 and 4 share similar socio-economic characteristics and 
historical backgrounds. The two wards are the original settlements of 
Epworth and people who live here have something to do with the 
earliest settlers who came in to the district through the Methodist 
church. The wards were established before the ELB was set up. 
However, ward 4 was not selected for the purpose of this study 
because key social infrastructure and amenities are not located in this 
ward. 
2. Wards 2, 3 and 5 share common characteristics – they are all adjacent 
to wards 1 and 4 and are all commonly referred to as “extensions” of 
the original settlements in wards 1 and 4. The people moved in during 
the peak of the liberation struggle and immediately after Zimbabwe’s 
independence. Wards 2 and 3 were not selected for the present study 
because the numbers of HSCT beneficiary households are low at 39 
and 36 respectively. The required sample size is 30 and this leaves 
fewer reserve households in the event that some beneficiaries are not 
located during the course of the study. Based on the knowledge 
provided by key informants in Epworth and findings from other studies 
carried in the settlement, the population in Epworth is highly mobile and 
samples should be large enough to provide a pool of reserve 
households. 
3. Ward 6 was not considered because the settlement is informal and 
broadly shares similar social and tenure characteristics with ward 7 
describes below. 
4. Ward 7 was not considered for selection because the residents are 
illegal occupants and are not recognised by the Epworth Local Board. It 
is the most informal and unplanned ward in Epworth district with high 
mobility rates. Data collection for the purpose of this research will be 
difficult in such an environment. In addition ward 7 is a hideout for 
criminals, and a hotbed of political activism in Epworth district. There 
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are issues of safety and security for the research team. Following 
advice from key informants in Epworth district, ward 7 was not selected 
for the present research. 
5. Ward 1: Chiremba/Muguta area – attributes considered in selecting 
the ward as a research site: 
a. The ward has a profound footprint on the historical origins of 
Epworth district. The early settlers lived here and had something 
to do with the Methodist Church. They colloquially called 
themselves “originals”. Studies which have been done in 
Epworth for example Chirisa and Muhomba (2013:951); DSHTZ 
(2009); and Chitekwe-Biti et al. (2012) show that the current 
residents of ward 1 are have kept the “originals” identity. This 
implies direct or indirect connections with the Methodist Church 
either as followers, employees at the church or as relatives of 
the early settlers. The HSCT beneficiaries living in ward 1 are 
likely to have rich knowledge of the social dynamics in the 
settlement. 
b. The settlement is legally and formally recognised by the Local 
Board. Residents signed lease agreements with the ELB pay 
monthly rates to the local authority. 
c. Houses are numbered and streets have names. The HSCT 
beneficiary households are easily accessible for the purpose of 
the present study. 
d. There is portable water, sewer reticulation infrastructure and a 
largely surfaced road network in the ward – typical of a planned 
and serviced urban settlement. Some areas have electricity. The 
ELB collects refuse in this ward. 
e. There are two legally registered schools: Chiremba primary and 
Muguta secondary schools. 
f. Ward 1 performs poorly and is in the red category with regards 
to the net attendance rate at secondary school level. National 
figures show that ward 1 has an index of 59 percent. 
g. There is a health facility (clinic) built and run by the Methodist 
church. 
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h. According to the HSCT MIS, there are 44 HSCT beneficiary 
households in ward 1. Of the 7 HSCT wards in Epworth, ward 1 
has the highest number of beneficiary households headed by 
the elderly (29); highest number of HSCT households headed by 
women (30); and households headed by children (2). 
i. Ward 1 has the second largest population with 31,302 people. 
6. Ward 5: Chinamano extension/Maseko area - ward profile attributes 
considered in selecting the ward as a research site: 
a. Residents in ward 5 have a common identity. They are primarily 
people who settled in Epworth during Zimbabwe’s struggle for 
independence and the early years after independence; (1970s 
through to 1983). They settled on land sold to them by the 
“originals.” Like the residents in ward 1, residents in ward 5 
moved into Epworth before the ELB was established. 
b. Ward 5 is formally recognised by the ELB. Residents have lease 
agreements with the ELB and they pay rates to the local 
authority. 
c. There are two schools in the ward: Chinamano Extension and 
Kubatana primary schools. 
d. There are no health facilities in the ward. Residents use clinics 
in other wards – the nearest being Epworth clinic in 
Domboramwari. 
e. The ward has water infrastructure but no running water. 
Residents rely on wells and boreholes for water. 
f. There are no surfaced roads in the area. The road network 
which is there is gravel. 
g. According to ZimStat (2015:212) ward 5 has the highest poverty 
prevalence rate pegged at 66.6 percent. 
h. According to UNICEF and ZimStat (2015:32) ward 5 is in the 
worst category among all wards in Zimbabwe with regards to the 
indicator on “children under 5 in possession of a birth 
certificate”. Its index is 25 percent. 
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i. In Harare province and in the whole country, the proportion of 
the population under 5 is highest in Epworth’s ward 5 (and 6). Its 
index is above 18 percent. This is a proxy indicator for poverty. 
j. According to the HSCT MIS there are 41 HSCT beneficiary 
households in ward 5. Of the 41 households, 25 are headed by 
the elderly; 22 headed by women; and 1 household is child-
headed. 
 
Stage 3: Selection of beneficiary households in the 4 research wards 
The simple random sampling method was used select HSCT beneficiary 
households for the study. The method was applied with slight variation in 
Goromonzi and Epworth districts because of the differences in how the 
settlements are organised. Goromonzi is a rural district and below the ward 
subdivision there are villages. Epworth is a peri-urban informal settlement 
which is in the process of being regularised as an urban residential 
settlement. Below the ward level are household units. 
In the two research wards (4 and 15) in Goromonzi district, the villages within 
the two wards and the HSCT beneficiary households in those villages were 
selected using simple random sampling. The study applied a common 
principle used in deciding on sample sizes. Neuman (2007:162) suggests that 
for small populations (below 1000) a researcher needs a large sampling ratio 
of at least 30 percent in order to achieve a high degree of accuracy. For 
example, Goromonzi’s ward 15 had 95 beneficiaries on the HSCT’s 
management information system. A sampling ratio of 30 percent resulted in 
28.5 beneficiaries but the number was increased to 32 respondents because 
it was feasible to do so. The higher the sampling ratio, the better the accuracy 
of data. 
In Epworth district the village subdivision of households did not apply as 
stated above. The simple random sampling method resulted in the selection 
of 31 beneficiary households in each ward. The main advantages of using 
random sampling in selecting beneficiary households was that each 
household had an equal chance of being selected into the study sample, 
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method is easy to use and yields accurate representation of the larger 
population. 
The selected HSCT beneficiary households in each of the four research 
wards comprised the sample for the household survey. There was a reserve 
list of HSCT beneficiary households from which replacements could be drawn 
if the need arose. The intention was to manage the risks that some 
respondents may not be located for the purpose of the research, or some of 
those located did not agree to be interviewed during the survey.  
Stage 4: Selection of respondents from sampled HSCT beneficiary 
households 
The household survey respondents were purposively selected. The 
respondents were the heads of HSCT beneficiary households, or their 
registered representatives (proxies) where this was the case. These are 
people with in-depth knowledge about the HSCT programme, and are in 
constant contact with the programme’s officials, and the CPC focal persons 
on matters to do with the HSCT. For example, they go to pay-points every two 
months to collect cash transfers for their households. They interact with other 
beneficiaries. They are also people who are involved in making spending, 
investment, collective action and social networking decisions for their 
households.  
The information about the heads of HSCT beneficiary households was 
available and accessible on request from the administrators of the HSCT MIS 
in the MOPSLSW. 
Stage 5: Selection of key informants 
Two methods were used to select key informants – purposive and 
snowballing. Snowball sampling was applied at community level through 
consultations with respondents from the HSCT beneficiary households during 
the course of administering the household survey; and consultations with 
WCPC members and local opinion leaders. A review of the HSCT 
programme’s Manual of Operations; combined with consultations with 
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MOPSLSW and UNICEF, and the researcher’s knowledge of the HSCT 
programme identified the following individuals as key informants for this study: 
1. District Social Services Officers. Each district has one DSSO. They 
are accountable for the implementation of the HSCT programme at 
district level. They are involved in all aspects of the implementation of 
the programme from targeting to payments, and are present at pay-
points to give the pre-disbursement speech to beneficiaries; monitor 
the payment process; and to respond to queries from beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries. 
2. Senior Social Welfare Officer based at MOPSLSW headquarters. 
The Officer is a key informant on account of her role and participation 
in the design of the HSCT. In addition the position ensures effective 
implementation of the HSCT at national and district levels and to 
enhance coordination of various tasks required within the MOPSLSW 
and among key stakeholders including the payment delivery agent, 
NGOs and UNICEF. 
3. Child Protection Specialist responsible for the HSCT in UNICEF: 
UNICEF staff members provide operational and technical assistance to 
the DSS for effective implementation of the HSCT programme. The 
views of UNICEF staff members were important in gaining useful 
insights into the design, implementation, management, and monitoring 
of the HSCT programme. The Child Protection Specialist in UNICEF is 
the point person for all HSCT programme and operational issues. He 
was a member of the HSCT’s design team in 2010 and has since then 
been involved with the programme. In this regard, the Child Protection 
Specialist is purposively selected among UNICEF staff members as a 
key informant for the present study.  
4. Community leaders are considered “gatekeepers of knowledge [who] 
facilitate the researchers’ access to community-level information” 
(Krishna & Shrader 2002:25). Community leaders were drawn from 
local administrative and traditional authorities in the research sites. The 
community leaders are respondents with useful knowledge of social, 
economic, religious and cultural issues in their community settings. 
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They are well-versed with development projects in their areas; social 
organisation of their communities; trust issues; social norms, values 
and beliefs; information flows; community assets and services; use and 
control of community resources. Their roles and responsibilities 
including decisions they make or perspectives they give on particular 
phenomena have important implications for the dimensions and types 
of social capital found in their communities. The respondents included 
in this purposive sample were: village-heads and ward councillors. 
Some of the key functions of ward councillors and traditional leaders 
are highlighted below:  
a. 4 Ward councillors (administrative leaders). Ward councillors 
are elected local representatives. They lead and champion the 
interests of their local communities and are expected to 
effectively represent the interests of the ward and its members. 
They are in regular contact with their communities on 
development issues. They are members of Ward Assemblies 
chaired by headmen in rural areas.  
b. Traditional leaders – village-heads (applicable to Goromonzi 
as this is a rural district). Traditional authority in Zimbabwe is 
vested in chiefs, headmen and village heads. The 
responsibilities of chiefs and headmen include: promoting and 
upholding cultural values among members of their community; 
reservation of the family unit; overseeing collection of levies; 
rates and taxes payable in terms of the law within their areas of 
jurisdiction; management of community assets; preside over 
ward assemblies; and mediate in local disputes. Chiefs and 
headmen have considerable power over who resides in an area. 
5. Community shop/business operators near HSCT pay points: 
Establishing the nature of the relationship between shop/business 
operators and HSCT beneficiaries provided useful insights into the 
linking dimension of social capital. In addition, it revealed important 
information about the level of trust between community members and 
business in the research wards. CT impact evaluations in the literature 
have largely evaluated the economic impacts of CTs on business 
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incomes with little attention paid to the social relations between 
business operators and CT beneficiaries. In this study two 
shop/business operators were purposively selected in each of the 2 
research wards in Goromonzi district. Consideration was given to the 
type of business activity (agriculture, retailing, service for example 
grinding mill; production), degree of market linkage; how long the 
business has operated in the community; and the importance of the 
business/shop to the local community economy. The sample excluded 
business operators who were participants in the household survey. 
This was important for the study because in many communities in 
Zimbabwe, businesses are linked to families and households. The 
shop/business owners constituted key informants for the in-depth 
interviews with community businesses.  
a. The situation is different in Epworth. According to DSS and 
UNICEF, and also on the basis of the researcher’s knowledge of 
the HSCT programme, there is only one pay point in Epworth 
catering for all the seven HSCT wards. The pay point is located 
at a school. There are no shops nearby. In addition the 
settlement is characterised by high informality. This meant that 
Epworth required a different approach to from Goromonzi 
district. Respondents in this category were informal traders 
operating within the neighbourhoods of HSCT beneficiaries in 
Epworth. The respondents were identified during the course of 
the household survey with the referral assistance of survey 
respondents, and consultations with WCPC members. 
 
Stage 6: Selection of FGD participants 
1. Respondents from non-beneficiary households in each of the 
HSCT wards that were selected for research: These were Focus 
Group Discussions’ (FGD) respondents from households that are 
ineligible to receive HSCT transfers. Each FGD had between 5-8 
respondents. The selection of the FGD participants was done 
purposively because of the difficulty to find people who knew enough 
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about the HSCT programme to form informed perceptions. The study 
identified non-beneficiary respondents living within the proximity of 
HSCT beneficiaries. These people knew about the HSCT programme 
than non-beneficiaries living furthest from beneficiary households. The 
number of respondents in each FGD with non-beneficiaries aimed for 
gender balance. The respondents were adults from a non-beneficiary 
household, and who knew about the HSCT programme. 
2. Ward Child Protection Committee (WCPC) HSCT lead focal 
persons. These were purposively selected because their role is 
important in the implementation structure of the HSCT at community 
level. They provide the direct link between the programme and 
beneficiaries. They are known to both beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries of the HSCT programme; assist in the community 
verification of targeting survey results; provide a channel through which 
programme information is passed on to beneficiaries; assist the 
incapacitated heads of beneficiary households to access cash; follow 
up when households have failed to access payments; inform the DSSO 
when the head of a beneficiary households has died or has relocated; 
inform the DSSO when a representative of a head of beneficiary 
household (proxy) has to be changed; and assist and protect child 
headed households. Within the broad membership of the WCPC there 
are on average 8 CPC members (HSCT focal persons) involved 
directly with the implementation of the HSCT. All the 8 members were 
selected for the FGD in each ward. Each FGD sought to achieve a 
gender balance in its group composition. The DSS assisted the 
research team to identify and locate WCPC HSCT focal persons for the 
FGDs.  
3. Local membership associations, clubs and social networks: The 
FGDs with members of community associations and social networks 
were aimed at gaining understanding of the type of networks that 
enable people to access resources and collaborate to achieve 
individual and community goals in the research wards. In addition they 
were intended to understand the nature and extent of HSCT 
beneficiaries’ participation in various types of informal and formal social 
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clubs, associations and networks at community level. Snowball 
sampling method was used to identify network respondents for the 
FGDs. The HSCT household survey instrument included questions on 
membership to community groups, associations and networks. The 
information about networks that HSCT beneficiaries belong to or knew 
about within their communities formed the basis for establishing formal 
and informal membership associations that exist within research 
communities. An estimation of the number of people in various 
associations and social networks was established through 
consultations with key informants and information from survey 
respondents. Once the numbers were known, a sample of respondents 
was drawn for the purposes of the FGDs. 
4.8 Data collection techniques and instruments 
The use of multiple sources of evidence converging on the same set of issues 
is necessary within the case study design. The strength of case study 
research is its capacity for utilising a broad scope of evidence: artefacts, 
documents, interviews, and observation making more inclusive than other 
research strategies. The choice of data collection methods depends on the 
research questions that a study seeks to answer. The selection also depends 
on the actual research situation and what will work most effectively in that 
situation to give the researcher the data that he/she needs (Puvenesvary et 
al. 2011:9). In this study quantitative and qualitative data were both 
considered relevant. The present study used key informant interviews; focus 
group discussions; field observations and photography; documentary review 
and analysis; case studies and the survey method to gather data.  
4.8.1 Review of documentary evidence 
The reviews of relevant literature, programme documents and existing cash 
transfer evaluations constituted sources of secondary data for this study. 
Scott (1990:5) defines ’document’ as “an artefact which has as its central 
feature an inscribed text”. Documents take many forms and vary in their 
usefulness. They are invaluable in promoting wider understanding of social 
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phenomena as they provide us with a glimpse of the past that can influence 
the present and guide the future (Puvenesvary et al. 2011:83). Documents will 
constitute secondary data sources. When planning to use documents, a 
researcher asks: Who has the information? What part of it is needed? Where 
is it? When was it prepared? How will it be collected? (Hancock & Algozzine 
2006:51). 
Several types of documents were identified as useful for the present study. 
The main documents included but were not limited to the following: HSCT 
programme design documents including the manual of operations; previous 
cash transfer impact evaluation studies; social protection and social transfers 
policy documents; NAP for OVC III; HSCT progress reports; MIS HSCT pay 
schedules; MIS HSCT change management documents; programme 
monitoring reports; pay review cycle reports; independent programme 
verification reports; HSCT targeting survey reports; Community verification 
reports; and MIS HSCT beneficiary profile data. Information gaps which were 
identified during the review of documents were noted and used in the 
development of tools that were used during the collection of primary data in 
the field. 
The limitations of document reviews were considered in this research. Some 
of the problems associated with documentary research included the 
extensiveness of documents, availability of documents and when to stop 
searching and start analysing the evidence and data from documents. Some 
documents were not available for legal and security reasons. For example, 
some government documents contained confidential information which was 
restricted to the public and were therefore not used (Puvenesvary et al. 
2011:94). Internet sources vary greatly in quality and reliability. It was 
necessary to first determine the authenticity and legitimacy of an internet 
source before relying on information derived from that source. A researcher 
has to practice good judgement when considering which documents to use 
and how to ensure that the reliability and validity in analysing these 
documents are upheld. 
4.8.2 Key informant interviews 
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Interviews are a common form of gathering information in case study designs. 
An interview is a data collection encounter which involves gathering of data 
through direct oral interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. 
Interviews are interactional in nature because there is an exchange or sharing 
of roles, feelings, beliefs and information (data, fact and opinion) between the 
interviewer and interviewee (Puvenesvary et al. 2011:19). Interviewing is 
typically done in a face-to-face encounter and may also be conducted by 
telephone (Babbie 2010:274). Interviews of individuals or groups allow the 
researcher to attain rich, personalised information.  
Interviews have a predetermined purpose. They are planned in advance and 
may be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. However, what is planned 
can be a fully scripted (structured interview) or half-scripted – questions only 
partially prepared in advance and will be improvised as the interview proceeds 
as in the case of semi-structured interviews (Puvenesvary et al. 2011:21). The 
type of interview structure or format to be employed in a research will depend 
on the research questions and the type of answers the researcher expects to 
receive from respondents. Semi-structured interviews are particularly well-
suited for a case study research.  
This study used in-depth semi-structured interview guides for key informants. 
Semi-structured interviews allow researchers to ask predetermined but flexibly 
worded questions. In addition use can be made of follow up questions to 
probe widely and deeply issues of interest to the researcher. In this way, 
semi-structured interviews create an environment where interviewees can 
freely and openly express themselves (Hancock & Algozzine 2006:40). 
The key informant interviews took the form of face to face interviews 
containing thematic and sub-thematic questions designed to gain deeper 
insights into individual experiences with the HSCT programme, and individual 
perceptions on the effects of the HSCT programme on social relations, norms, 
networks, trust, collective action and other important dimensions of social 
capital. Key informant interviews with WCPC, community leaders and shop 
owners also allowed the research to explore past events and behaviours 
within the study communities before the introduction of the HSCT programme, 
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for example, how people related and treated each other. The key informant 
interview method was an invaluable tool for observing interviewees’ non-
verbal communication signals like pauses, physical appearance, facial 
expressions, gesture and postures. 
In the present study, the key informant interviews were used to collect 
research information at two levels: 
1. Community level –community leaders (ward councillors and village 
heads); community shop/business operators in Goromonzi, and 
informal traders in Epworth. 
2. HSCT programme level – DSS officials with a direct and regular role 
in the implementation of the HSCT programme, and who have direct 
and regular contact with programme beneficiaries at different stages in 
the cycle of the HSCT programme for example, targeting, community 
verification, pay points, and during programme monitoring. The DSS 
officials identified as key informants in this study were: (1) District 
Social Services Officers; and (2) Senior Social Welfare Officer based at 
MOPSLSW’s national office in Harare. The Child Protection Specialist 
at UNICEF was also a key informant for the study. The rationale for the 
selection of these interviewees as key informants for this study is 
explained in the preceding sections. 
 
The advantages and limitations of key-informant interviews for this study are 
summarised below. They were drawn from the work of Puvenesvary et al. 
(2011:36-37). 
▪ Interviews were suitable for use with respondents who are illiterate 
especially in the rural communities, and permitted clarification of 
questions on the spot. A review of the HSCT beneficiary profiles, and 
evidence from field monitoring reports showed that a majority of the 
household heads are elderly (>59yrs old) and some of them rely on 
proxies (representatives) to collect their bimonthly cash transfers. The 
choice of the interview method was therefore relevant and appropriate 
in this regard. 
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▪ Interviews permitted the researcher to obtain rich information from 
people of diverse backgrounds, who had particular perspectives 
relevant to the present study: community members and HSCT 
programme officials.  
▪ Key informant interviews were useful for triangulating information 
provided in the focus group discussions with WCPC focal members, 
and membership groups and networks. 
▪ Interviews are a flexible data collection technique and allowed for 
greater insights and depths into learning about the effects of the HSCT 
programme on various dimensions of social capital in research 
communities. 
▪ They presented opportunities to capture both the verbal and non-verbal 
messages in a face-to-face interaction. The research observed non-
verbal cues from interviewees, and even used that information to probe 
appropriately. 
The limitations of key informant interviews included the following: 
▪ Interviews addressed the experiences and perceptions of a small group 
of people; 
▪ While interviews yielded significant amounts of information from an 
individual’s perspective, they were time-consuming to conduct, 
transcribe and analyse data; 
▪ The interviews in some cases self-censored information that was too 
personal or controversial; 
▪ Interpretation of results was left to the researcher and therefore prone 
to potential biases. 
4.8.3 Focus group discussions 
The focus group is a group interview data gathering method and is essentially 
a qualitative technique (Babbie 2010:322). The focus group is also known as 
focused interview and group depth interviews and it is conducted by a 
moderator. It is called “focused” because of the pattern of questioning. During 
the interview, the moderator would start asking questions at a broad and 
general level, and then gradually proceed to core specific questions 
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(Puvenesvary et al. 2011:46). According to Vaughn et al. (1996) cited by 
Puvenesvary et al. (2011:46), focus groups are best used when conducting 
exploratory research. Babbie (2010:323) supports this notion by advancing 
the view that the purpose of studies using focus groups is to explore rather 
than to describe and explain in any definitive sense. Participants in focus 
groups are not likely to be chosen through rigorous probability sampling 
methods. This means that the participants do not statistically represent any 
meaningful population. They do not generate quantitative information that can 
be projected to a larger population. 
The size of focus group is important. The group in a focus group interview is 
small, 6 to 12 members, and is relatively homogeneous. The more complex 
the issue under discussion, the more prudent it is to have a smaller group, 
such as five to seven participants. Literature has diverse views regarding the 
ideal size of the focus group. Babbie (2010:322) suggests 5 to 15 participant 
members. Morgan (as cited in McCandless & Bangura 2007:190) 
recommends 8 to 10. 
Key characteristics of focus groups include: 
▪ The group is an informal assembly of target persons whose points of 
view are requested to address a selected topic; 
▪ The goal of focus group interviews is to elicit perceptions, feelings, 
attitudes, ideas of participants, socio-cultural characteristics about a 
selected topic; 
▪ Focus groups are guided or unguided interviews designed to address 
particular issues or topics; and 
▪ A trained moderator with prepared questions and probes sets the stage 
and induces participants’ responses. The participants are free to talk 
with those in the group. 
In this study, focus group discussions were conducted in order to capture 
community members’ perceptions, feelings, and attitudes towards the HSCT 
programme; its perceived effects on social relations, social networks, 
community membership associations and groups, trust, and collective action. 
 273 
 
For the purpose of this study focus group discussions were done with the 
following participants:  
1. Adult respondents from households that are ineligible to receive HSCT 
transfers (non-beneficiaries) staying within a radius of one kilometre 
from beneficiary households. 
2. WCPC HSCT focal persons 
3. Members of social networks, and clubs and associations in the 
research wards. 
Vaughn et al. (1996) cited in Puvenesvary et al. (2011:48) suggests that 
homogeneous participants usually lead to successful focus group discussions 
as compared to heterogeneous participants because they share similar 
characteristics that have been predetermined. Homogeneity was in the form 
of ineligibility into the HSCT programme; WCPC membership and HSCT 
roles; and network membership.  
In planning what to ask the participants in focus groups, the study used the 
questioning route approach. A questioning route is a sequence of questions in 
the form of complete sentences. Some of the advantages of the questioning 
route are: it can increase one’s confidence, produce efficient analysis and 
increase consistency (Puvenesvary et al. 2011:49). 
Each focus group had a moderator and an observer. The moderator facilitated 
discussions and the observer took notes on the content of discussions, the 
groups’ social dynamic processes and composition of the groups.  
There were several advantages of using focus groups in this study. Among 
them, according to Puvenesvary et al. (2011); Babbie 2010; Neuman (2007); 
McCandless and Bangura (2007); and Adato (2000) are the following: 
▪ Various dimensions of social capital came into play and could be 
observed during FGDs, for example, how participants reacted to each 
other’s responses. In addition trust and social norms aspects of social 
capital were in some cases evident in FGD settings. 
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▪ Opinions are dynamic, and individuals’ comments triggered 
recollections and opinions of other group members in some cases. 
▪ Based on evidence from the literature on social capital, collective action 
and solidarity cases could be successfully probed through FGDs. 
Krishna and Shrader (2002:26) found it useful to use FGDs to discuss 
case studies of collective action and solidarity. They assert that FGDs 
could be used to probe specific instances of cases in which the 
community worked collectively to resolve an issue, whether or not the 
outcome was positive. 
▪ Focus groups offered opportunities for direct contact with a range of 
important stakeholders for the study: ineligible households; men; 
women; youth; and elderly. Each group’s perspectives provided 
valuable insights into the different social effects of the HSCT 
programme in the study communities. 
▪ The format allowed the moderator to probe key issues, elicit comments 
from all participants and to focus the discussion on issues of interest;  
▪ The focus group method provided the means to collect data in a one-off 
situation making it useful for engaging highly mobile groups. 
▪ Focus groups enabled researchers to capture real life data in a social 
environment; 
▪ Focus groups were low cost and time-efficient, as more individuals 
were interviewed at a lower cost and in less time than through 
individual interviews. 
▪ In some cases, participants queried one another and explained their 
answers to each other. 
Besides the advantages highlighted above, focus group interviews also have 
some limitations. Among them, according to Babbie (2010:323); Neuman 
(2007:301); Puvenesvary et al. (2011:52) and Adato (2000) are the following: 
▪ The researcher had limited control in the focus group method as 
compared to the individual interview; 
▪ The technique required carefully trained interviewers and moderators; 
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▪ In some cases, some individuals were less inclined to speak out due to 
social dynamics within the group; and 
▪ Focus groups rarely reported all the details of the study. 
4.8.4 Survey 
Surveys are quantitative research methods. The key feature of survey 
research is the systematic collection of data in a standardised form from a 
relatively large population. Survey research samples usually have many 
respondents who answer the same questions. It is probably the best method 
available to the social researcher who is interested in collecting original and 
primary data for describing a population too large to observe directly (Babbie 
2010:254). The researcher asks people questions in a written questionnaire, 
mailed, handed to people or during an interview and then records answers 
(Neuman 2007:20). Surveys produce information that is inherently statistical 
in nature typically summarising answers to questions in percentages, tables or 
graphs. Surveys give the researcher a picture of what many think or report 
doing. It seeks to measure people’s self-reported attitudes, beliefs or 
behaviours. Other categories of issues that can be asked in a survey include 
orientations in a large population, characteristics, expectations, self-
classification and knowledge issues (Neuman 2007:167). Surveys produce 
generalised findings about a population and can either be cross-sectional or 
conducted over a period of time (McCandless & Bangura 2007:160). 
According to Babbie (2010:254), surveys may be used for descriptive, 
explanatory or exploratory purposes. 
Surveys include the use of a survey questionnaire, defined by Babbie 
(2010:255) as: “an instrument specifically designed to elicit information that 
will be used for analysis.” In creating survey questionnaires, options include 
using questions or statements and choosing open-ended or closed-ended 
questions. Open-ended questions ask questions to which respondents can 
give any answer, for example, “What is your favourite radio programme?” A 
closed-ended question both asks a question and gives the respondent fixed 
responses from which to choose, for example, “Is the national soccer team 
captain doing a good job, good, fair, or poor job, in your opinion?” (Neuman 
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2007:177). Each form has advantages and disadvantages. Closed-ended 
questions are popular in survey research because they provide a greater 
uniformity of responses and are more easily processed than open-ended 
questions. 
The present study used the household survey method in each of the four 
research wards. The household survey was the main instrument used in this 
study. Survey respondents were the heads of HSCT beneficiary households 
or their representatives (proxies) where appropriate. Sixty-two (62) HSCT 
households were surveyed in Epworth district and 92 in Goromonzi district 
bringing the total number of respondents in the survey to 154. The sampling 
procedure for the beneficiary households and respondents from the selected 
households was presented in a preceding section. 
The household survey method was considered appropriate for this study 
because of the following factors: (1) There are many precedents of empirical 
studies in the social cash transfer and social capital literature that used the 
survey data collection method. (2) Survey methods generate data about 
individual perceptions, values, beliefs and attitudes. (3) HSCT beneficiary 
households are the channels through which cash is introduced into the 
community. (4) Households are useful pathways for assessing the effects of 
the HSCT on social capital at individual and community levels.  
The household survey contained questions on a range of useful variables: (a) 
house characteristics; (b) demographic profile of HSCT beneficiary 
households; (c) design and operational features of the HSCT; (d) structural 
and cognitive dimensions of social capital; (e) types of social capital; and (f) 
Crime information. In this regard, the survey method was particularly relevant 
for gathering data to address most of this study’s objectives. In generating 
quantitative data on various dimensions of social capital, the study developed 
new questions and adapted some of the standard survey questions from the 
integrated questionnaire for the measurement of social capital suggested by 
Grootaert, Narayan, Jones and Woolcock (2004). Additional questions were 
adapted from the social capital assessment tool developed by Grootaert and 
Van Basterlaer (2002). With respect to the data on the design and 
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implementation features of the HSCT, the study developed a core set of 
questions and adapted some of the questions from instruments developed 
and used by The Transfer Project (2016) in other countries. Data collected on 
additional variables was useful for triangulation with data collected through 
field observations, photography, in-depth interviews and FGDs. 
The study mixed open-ended and closed-ended questions in the survey 
questionnaire. This approach helped to reduce the disadvantages of either 
question forms. Periodic probes with open and closed-ended questions 
helped reveal respondents’ reasoning. The type of survey used in this study 
was the administered questionnaire survey in which the researcher asked 
questions directly to respondents in an interview setting, and then recorded 
their answers. 
There were many advantages of using the survey method in this study. 
Among them (Babbie 2010; Neuman 2007; and McCandless & Bangura 2007) 
are: 
▪ The study was exploratory and descriptive in purpose. The survey 
method was especially appropriate for the descriptive aspects of the 
research design and was used for exploratory purposes as well. The 
survey data generated useful causal inferences by a careful 
comparison of characteristics of cases; 
▪ The survey was an important source of socio-economic data in the two 
study sites; 
▪ In contrast to a laboratory setting, the survey method benefitted from a 
real world assessment of the households selected for the study; 
▪ Standard data was collected from all the sampled households, making 
it easier to process the collected data; 
▪ Questions on many variables about the research topic were asked 
giving the researcher considerable flexibility in analysis of the data; 
▪ The household survey instrument collected individual level data on 
members of the HSCT household as well as household level 
characteristics; 
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▪ The survey method gathered extensive data on beneficiaries’ 
perceptions and experiences with the HSCT for example: targeting, 
eligibility criteria, payment collection points, transfer size, 
complementary services, grievance mechanisms, frequency and 
predictability of payments. 
▪ The household survey method captured data on a range of useful 
dimensions and types of social capital for example; friendships; social 
networks; trust; collective action; norms of reciprocity; happiness; social 
relations; bonding, bridging and linking forms of social capital.   
Surveys also have limitations. Below are some of the weaknesses drawn from 
Babbie (2010), Neuman (2007) and McCandless and Bangura (2007): 
▪ Using surveys to gain a full sense of social processes in their natural 
settings is difficult. In general survey research is comparatively weak 
on validity and strong on reliability; 
▪ Surveys provide data of only what a person or organisation says, and 
this may differ from real practice. In this regard survey responses may 
have little connection to the actual reality; 
▪ Respondents can feel obligated to answer questions in a way that puts 
them in good light either by skewing their answers or responding to 
topics about which they have little knowledge; and 
▪ In extreme cases households interviewed first may influence responses 
of those not yet interviewed either or to refuse the survey altogether. 
4.8.5 Field observations and photography 
The observation method is a qualitative technique of data collection and a 
frequent source of information in case study research (Hancock & Algozzine 
2006:46). It is concerned with watching, systematically investigating and 
involves making judgements about what is seen. The observation method can 
be used in experimental and exploratory studies and can also be used for 
several other purposes either as a primary method of data collection or as a 
supportive or supplementary technique (Puvenesvary et al. 2011:55). 
Observation generates richly detailed descriptions of what people do, with 
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whom and how often. Data is written down as field notes and expanded later. 
There are no rigid criteria for observation and this allows researcher to gain a 
nuanced understanding of the physical, social, economic, and cultural 
contexts in which study participants live, including social norms and taboos. 
Observations in this study were undertaken overtly (when subjects are aware 
that they are being observed). This was done to avoid raising ethical issues in 
the study. In addition, this approach made it possible to take field notes. The 
researcher made use of a checklist or observation guide for aspects of 
behaviours and events that will be recorded.  
The researcher observed the following events linked to the HSCT programme: 
▪ Programme settings – physical, economic, social and cultural 
environments of participant communities in Epworth and Goromonzi 
districts; 
▪ HSCT beneficiary household settings; 
▪ The locations of HSCT payment collection points, and the operational 
processes involved in the delivery of cash 
▪ The nature of interactions between HSCT programme officials and 
HSCT beneficiaries particularly how the HSCT programme officials 
treat beneficiaries at payment points 
▪ The interactions between HSCT beneficiaries at payment points 
▪ The interactions between HSCT focal persons and programme officials 
Photography is a useful technique in exploring socio-economic, physical and 
cultural aspects of a society. This technique complemented the field 
observation method. Photography served two key purposes: (1) to aid 
recollection of events, places and respondents encountered during the course 
of research, and (2) aid the construction of cases. Permission was sought on 
all occasions where photographs were taken. 
In this study information collected using the observation and photography 
methods complemented information obtained through other primary methods 
such as the household survey, key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions. In this regard, data from field observations was used to validate 
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or corroborate the information obtained through use of other methods 
(Puvenesvary et al. 2011:56). 
4.8.6 Case studies and life histories of selected HSCT recipients 
The case studies and life histories were intended to provide an in-depth 
account of respondents’ lives before and after they were enrolled on to the 
HSCT programme as beneficiaries. The purpose was to enable selected 
interviewees to recover experiences across periods and to better understand 
the social effects of the HSCT on individual respondents’ lives and livelihoods. 
The life histories were used in this study as complementary qualitative data 
collection methods. The interviewees for the case studies were identified and 
selected during the course of administering the household survey 
questionnaire. The selection was done purposefully to include the following 
household categories: female-headed, male-headed and a polygamous 
household. An in-depth unstructured interview guide was used in collecting 
life history information. The in-depth unstructured interview was appropriate 
because it allowed for collection of rich personalised information, and use of 
probes. 
The study recorded one case study of a non-beneficiary woman who is the 
second wife in a polygamous marriage in Goromonzi’s ward 4. This was an 
opportunistic encounter as the focus of the survey was on the first wife who is 
a registered HSCT beneficiary and had been randomly selected as a 
respondent. Through this case study, the research gained useful insights into 
how the HSCT affects inter-household social relations in a polygamous 
marriage. 
4.8.7 Recruitment and training of research assistants 
The principal researcher recruited three (3) research assistants to help 
administer the survey questionnaires, assist with photography, recording and 
note-taking during the focus group discussions in the four research wards. 
The research assistants also provided support to the data capturing process.  
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The research assistants were recruited from unemployed graduates. They 
attended a three-day classroom training covering key topics including: topic of 
investigation; the study’s aims and objectives; roles and responsibilities; data 
collection methods; effective interviewing techniques; ethics of research 
including confidentiality and privacy; and data capturing. The training of 
research assistants was important for ensuring the quality of data collected; 
reducing respondent burden and preserving the confidentiality of data 
collected. The field work experience was an opportunity to enhance their 
research skills. Some of them may in future develop ideas for their own 
dissertation topics on the basis of the knowledge, skills and experience they 
gained in this study. This is a useful indicator which would demonstrate the 
usefulness of their participation in this study. 
4.8.8 Pre-testing of data collection instruments 
According to Maxwell (1998) cited in Mayanga (2008:54), researchers could 
pre-test their data collection instruments in order to familiarise themselves 
with the data collection exercise and to help the researcher to better 
understand the topic of investigation. For example, the survey questionnaire 
can be piloted-tested with a small set of respondents similar to those in the 
final survey. The semi-structured interview schedule can be pilot-tested. The 
researcher will ask respondents in the pilot test whether the questions were 
clear, and explore their interpretations to see if the intended meaning was 
clear. Translation of instruments will take in to account cultural backgrounds 
of respondents and interviewees. Swartz (1998:210) makes the point that 
translation of instruments requires finding out whether the meanings 
researchers attach to instruments are the same for respondents. All the data 
collection instruments in this study were pre-tested in two HSCT programme 
wards (one in Goromonzi district and one in Epworth settlement) which were 
not part of the study. The pre-test subjects were drawn from people to whom 
the data collection instruments are relevant. After the pilot tests of 
instruments, there were adjustments made to the survey questionnaire to 
remove ambiguity in some of the questions. In addition, there were 
adjustments to the sequencing of some questions. 
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4.9 Data analysis 
Analysis of data in a research study involves summarising the mass of data 
collected and presenting the results in a way that communicates the most 
important features (Hancock 1998:16). A detailed analysis of data ensures 
that readers are able to replicate a study independently if they want to. 
Walcott (1990) cited in Puvenesvary et al. (2011:122) states that researchers 
must avoid using unclear language; making sweeping generalisations; 
repeating similar ideas and giving insufficient details during the process of 
analysing collected data. Other researchers such as Blaxter et al. (1999) cited 
in Puvenesvary et al. (2011) argue that data analysis is affected by two basic 
issues that need to be considered: 
1. The conditions under which data have been collected; and 
2. Where, and with what facilities, the researcher is able to analyse the 
data. 
A distinction is made in literature between qualitative and quantitative 
analyses. 
Babbie (2010:394) defines qualitative analysis as “the non-numerical 
examination and interpretation of observations, for the purpose of discovering 
underlying meanings and patterns of relationships.” This is consistent with the 
definition put forward by (Neuman 2007:335) that “data analysis means a 
search for patterns in data – recurrent behaviours, objects or a body of 
knowledge.” Once a pattern is identified, it is interpreted in terms of a social 
theory or the setting in which it occurred. Qualitative data analysis is less 
standardised. Qualitative researchers look for patterns or relationships, but 
they begin data analysis early in a study, while they are still collecting data. 
The results of early data analysis guide subsequent data collection. Thus, 
data analysis in qualitative research is less a distinct final stage of research 
than a dimension of research that stretches across all stages (Neuman 
2007:329). For the relationship between data and social theory, qualitative 
researchers create new concepts and theory by blending together empirical 
evidence and abstract concepts. Qualitative analysis does not draw on a 
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large, well established body of formal knowledge from mathematics and 
statistics. The data are in the form of words, which are relatively imprecise, 
diffuse and context-based, and can have more than one meaning. 
The wide variety of data collection methods in qualitative research is matched 
by the many approaches or techniques to data analysis. Onwuegbuzie and 
Leech (2006) cited in Muboko (2011:138) describe many qualitative data 
analyses techniques such as: constant comparison; key words in context; 
word count; classical content analysis; cross case analysis; and domain 
analysis. Babbie (2010:394-399) describes qualitative data analysis 
techniques such as, discovering patterns; grounded theory method; semiotics 
and conversation analysis. Neuman (2007:335) outline four strategies 
researcher use in analysing qualitative data: the narrative, ideal types, 
successive approximation, and the illustrative method. Onwuegbuzie and 
Leech (2006) cited in Muboko (2011:138) concede that it is impossible to 
match research questions to their most appropriate analysis techniques 
because the same research questions can be analysed in multiple qualitative 
ways. “Hence, they recommended researchers to analyse their data using at 
least two procedures in order to triangulate findings and interpretations” 
(ibid.). 
A key process in the analysis of qualitative data is coding. A researcher codes 
by organising the raw data into conceptual categories and creates themes or 
concepts. Coding encourages higher level thinking about the data and moves 
a researcher toward theoretical generalisations. Three common processes of 
coding; open coding, axial coding and selective coding; are discussed in the 
qualitative data analysis literature. 
4.9.1 Quantitative data analysis  
Babbie (2010:422) defines quantitative data analysis as “the numerical 
representation and manipulation of observations for the purpose of describing 
and explaining the phenomena that those observations reflect.” Quantitative 
researchers choose from a specialised, standardised set of data analysis 
techniques. Quantitative analysis is highly developed and builds on applied 
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mathematics (Neuman 2007:329). Quantitative analysis is almost always 
handled by computer programmes such as SPSS and MicroCase to generate 
tables, graphs and charts to analyse and present numerical data. To conduct 
a quantitative analysis, researchers must often engage in a coding process 
after the data have been collected. Coding is defined by Neuman (2007:362) 
as “the process of converting raw information or data in to another form for 
analysis, and in quantitative data analysis, it is a means for assigning 
numbers.” For example, open-ended questionnaire items result in non-
numerical responses, which need to be coded before analysis. The key 
features that distinguish quantitative analysis from qualitative research are 
that: quantitative researchers do not begin data analysis until they have 
collected all of the data and condensed them into numbers. The numbers are 
then manipulated to see patterns or relationships. Quantitative researchers 
manipulate numbers that represent empirical facts to test theoretical 
hypotheses. In addition, quantitative researchers assume that social life can 
be represented by using numbers. When they manipulate the numbers 
according to the laws of statistics, the numbers reveal features of social life. 
There are three forms of quantitative data analysis: univariate analysis, which 
involves describing a case in terms of a single variable, for example, if gender 
were measured in a study, a researcher would look at how many of the 
subjects were men and how many were women; bivariate analysis is the 
analysis of two variables simultaneously for the purpose of determining the 
empirical relationship between them, for example, computation of a simple 
correlation coefficient; and multivariate analysis which looks at simultaneous 
relationships among several variables for example examining the effects of 
age, gender, and social class on religion. 
4.9.2 Data processing and analysis for this study 
The data collected during this study was mainly quantitative from the survey 
questionnaires. A sizeable part of the study was qualitative with information 
obtained through in-depth interviews with key informants, documentary 
evidence, focus group discussions, field observations, case study notes, and 
photography. The data were processed and analysed as described below.  
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Quantitative data 
The survey questionnaires were numbered. This enabled the researcher to 
easily track the processing of every questionnaire. Data capturing screens 
were developed using the Census and Survey Processing System (CSPro) 
software. The CSPro is a specialised data capturing software package that 
combines the features of Integrated Microcomputer Processing System 
(IMPS) and the Integrated System for Survey Analysis (ISSA) in a single 
windows environment. The CSPro enabled the primary investigator to easily 
monitor and control the data capturing process in this situation where multiple 
data capturers were used.  
The three research assistants were trained on how to capture data using the 
CSPro software. Double data entry was used and all entries were checked 
against the original questionnaires in order to ensure accuracy. Once the data 
from all questionnaires was captured, the data file was exported to SPSS for 
statistical analysis. Standard data cleaning techniques were implemented for 
example, confirming all missing values against original questionnaires, 
checking for data integrity and cross-checking outliers on individual variables. 
The clean data file was then used for interpretation and analysis. During data 
analysis pie charts, bar charts, frequency and percentage tables and cross-
tabulations were generated using SPSS version 22.  
Cross-tabulations were performed on the data using the demographic 
variables for example gender, household size, age groups, districts, and in 
few cases wards. Where it was considered appropriate to analyse data 
further, cross-tabulations were also done using transfer sizes. The data were 
presented in the form of tables and graphs. Quantitative data interpretation 
was triangulated with the qualitative data in situations where this was deemed 
feasible and appropriate.  
Qualitative data 
Qualitative data, in the form of transcripts produced from audio-recordings 
made during FGDs and in-depth interviews were analysed using the content 
analysis procedure to identify key themes that emerged from the data, guided 
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by the research objectives and questions under investigation in this research. 
The use of content analysis permitted the researcher to identify core themes 
and nodes from the data, allowing the researcher to proceed from the 
particular to the general.  Additionally, and in many cases specific quotes 
which were relevant for providing deeper insights into the patterns observed 
from both qualitative and quantitative data were extracted and are included in 
the results chapter findings section of this thesis.  
The tape-recorded sessions of the focus group discussions, in-depth 
interviews with national and community level stakeholders were transcribed. 
Moderators’ oral summaries from focus group interviews and discussions from 
the debriefing of the moderator team were taken into account in analysing 
focus group interviews. The qualitative processes of identifying the main 
ideas, categories and themes were done and the significant themes were 
distinguished from the less significant ones. The analysis of the focus group 
discussions involved moderators, and observers, that is, more than one 
analyst. Where appropriate, focus group interview data were correlated with 
data from other methods and also combined with relevant quantitative data. 
Data collected using the interview method was voluminous and measures 
were taken to manage the data collected before analysis began. The data 
was organised first by ensuring that interview transcripts were complete 
responses and grouping responses according to their specific questions.  
Field notes, based on observations during fieldwork were also used to gain a 
deeper understanding of the contextual issues emerging from the study.  
4.10 Ethical considerations 
This study ensured that there was no violation of ethical principles by strictly 
adhering to legal and ethical requirements for all research involving people. 
The researcher asked for ethical review feedback from respected colleagues 
and peers. The following sections summarise the ethical issues that were 
observed in this study. 
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In relation to the interview method of data collection, the following ethical 
principles were considered: informed consent, privacy, anonymity and 
confidentiality, do no harm and consequences.  
Informed consent is a fundamental ethical principle in social research. 
People need to know what they are being asked to participate in so that they 
can make an informed decision. Before each interview, the interviewer 
provided a brief description of the purpose and procedure of the research, 
including the expected duration of the study; a statement of any risks or 
discomfort associated with participation; a guarantee of anonymity and the 
confidentiality of records; a statement that participation is completely voluntary 
and can be terminated at any time without penalty; the identification of the 
researcher, debriefing by the researcher after the research has ended, and an 
offer to provide a summary of the findings (Neuman 2007:55). Participants 
were made aware of their rights and what they were getting involved in when 
they read and signed a statement giving informed consent. The interviewers 
got written informed consent from interviewees before each interview was 
started. However, in some cases, and depending on the preference of 
beneficiaries after explaining the research purpose, context and procedure, 
verbal instead of written consent was used. The research complied with 
interview consenting based on the laws of Zimbabwe and conformed to 
international best practice of research ethics. 
The study protected people’s privacy by not disclosing a participant’s 
identity after information was gathered. This took two forms, both of which 
required separating an individual’s identity from his or her responses: 
Anonymity means people remained anonymous or nameless. This was 
achieved in this study as neither the researchers nor the readers of the 
findings can identify a given response with a given respondent (Babbie 
2010:67). Confidentiality can include information with participant names 
attached, but the researcher holds it in confidence or keeps it secret from 
public disclosure. Fictitious names were used and sometimes changes to the 
interviewees’ characteristics ought to be made when publishing the results in 
order to protect the individuals’ privacy. Thus, according to Babbie (2010:67), 
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a research guarantees confidentiality when the researcher can identify a given 
person’s response but promises not to do so publicly. Confidentiality is 
important as it can sometimes protect research participants from legal or 
physical harm. Anonymity and confidentiality usually go together. Anonymity 
without confidentiality occurs if all details about a specific individual are made 
public, but the individual’s name is withheld. Confidentiality without anonymity 
occurs if detailed information is not made public, but a researcher privately 
links individual names to specific responses (Neuman 2007:58). 
Mary Anderson (1999) cited in McCandless and Bangura (2007:131), 
articulates well the principle of do no harm, which refers to how research 
projects can unintentionally produce negative outcomes, while trying to do 
good. In this study, the do no harm principle was about being careful not to 
reveal information that would embarrass participants or endanger their home 
and community lives, friendships, jobs et cetera. This meant looking for the 
subtlest dangers that could have made subjects feel at least uncomfortable, 
and guard against them. 
The ethical issues that were considered when using focus group discussions 
are similar to the ethical issues in relation to interviews.  
Major ethical issues in survey research included voluntary participation by 
respondents, and the potential invasion of privacy. Respondents could agree 
to answer questions and could refuse to participate any time. The survey 
component of this study depended very much on respondents’ voluntary 
cooperation. Thus, the survey asked well-developed questions in a sensitive 
way and treated respondents with respect and guaranteed confidentiality. 
Because surveys are popular research methods, some people use surveys to 
mislead others. Another ethical issue in surveys is when people misuse 
survey results or use poorly designed or purposely rigged surveys. The 
present research guarded against this by conducting a methodologically 
rigorous survey research (Neuman 2007:197). 
All respondents at all times during the data collection process, were reminded 
that their participation remained voluntary and that they had a right of refusal 
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to answer some or all of the questions without any negative consequences. 
During the interview process with respondents, it was necessary for the 
researcher to identify and respond to any adverse effects. A decision guide for 
detecting adverse events or potential risk had been prepared. The purpose of 
the guide was to outline appropriate responses to potential risks. The best the 
researcher was prepared to do, if it became necessary, in situations of 
potential adverse effects was to provide an appropriate referral to counselling 
service providers. 
The observation method of data collection is one in which the researcher is 
considered as a ‘data-gathering instrument’. The main ethical issues 
considered in observations were: intrusion given the researcher’s potential 
substantial presence in the lives of the subjects; secrecy; deception; and 
responsibility to participants. According to Adler and Adler (1998) cited in 
Puvenesvary et al. (2011:62), the midpoint of the roles of researcher as an 
observer is to balance involvement with detachment, familiarity with 
strangeness, and closeness with distance. 
4.11 Summary 
This chapter addressed the research design and methodology for this study. It 
presented the research paradigm, distinguished between quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches, outlined the study population, sampling 
procedures, data collection methods and instruments, data analysis methods 
and discussed ethical considerations. The research design for this study is an 
exploratory and descriptive case study located within the interpretivist 
research paradigm with some phenomenological aspects. The next chapter 
presents the results obtained from field work and secondary data. 
 
 
 290 
 
CHAPTER 5:  
RESULTS – PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a detailed presentation of findings obtained from primary and 
secondary data sources. The study is based on a mixed-methods design. The 
use of a mixed-methods approach provided a basis for a comprehensive 
analysis and insights into the social effects of the HSCT, and served as a 
means of triangulating the study’s findings. Quantitative data comes from the 
HSCT beneficiary household survey, while qualitative data are generated from 
in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, field observations, case studies, 
and an extensive desk review of relevant documents. The study was intended 
to investigate the role of an unconditional cash transfer scheme, in 
strengthening or weakening social capital in a rural, and a peri-urban setting 
in Zimbabwe.  
The results are organised into themes and sub-themes and are presented 
under a number of sub-sections that are linked to the research objectives 
questions outlined in chapter one. Findings are primarily from the two district 
cases of Epworth and Goromonzi, and are combined with evidence from other 
sources as highlighted above to provide rich contextual information and useful 
insights into the effects of the HSCT on social capital. Results generated 
through qualitative data are in many cases integrated with relevant parts of 
the findings generated from quantitative data. However, in fewer cases, some 
of the findings from qualitative research are separately reported on. 
The chapter begins by providing sample profiles of the study’s respondents. 
This is followed by a presentation of findings on the demographic 
characteristics of the HSCT’s beneficiary households that participated in the 
study. Then the findings which respond to the research objectives are 
presented and interpreted. The results are presented in the form of text, 
figures, tables, case studies, quotes, and pictures. The results reflect the 
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perceptions, views, experiences, attitudes and practices of respondents in 
study areas. 
5.2 Sample description 
The profile of respondents plays an important role in providing information that 
contributes to answering research questions. A total of 217 respondents were 
interviewed. Sixty-four percent (64%) of them are female and thirty-six percent 
(36%) are male respondents. In all cases respondents were adults. Of the 217 
respondents, 154 (71%) were HSCT household survey respondents. A 
detailed analysis of the demographic characteristics of the HSCT households 
that participated in the survey is presented separately in a following sub-
section. Table 5.1 below shows the stakeholders and districts; corresponding 
data collection methods used; and number and sex disaggregation of the 
respondents who participated in the qualitative component of the study. 
Table 5.1: Samples of respondents included in Key Informant Interviews 
and Focus Group Discussions 
Organisation/Government 
Department/District 
Data gathering 
method and 
number covered 
Respondents, number 
covered and sex 
disaggregation  
Ministry of Public Service, Labour 
and Social Welfare  
Key Informant 
Interview (1) 
Senior Social Welfare 
Officer: national level. (1 
Female) 
UNICEF  Key Informant 
Interview (1) 
Social Protection 
Specialist: national level. 
(1 Male) 
Epworth district  Key Informant 
Interviews (2) 
Ward 1 Councillor (1 
Female) 
Ward 5 Councillor (1 
Female) 
Focus Group 
Discussions (4) 
 
Ward 1: 6 non-
beneficiaries (3 Females & 
3 Males) 
Ward 5: 9 non-
beneficiaries (6 Females & 
3 Males) 
Ward 1: 6 HSCT 
community focal persons 
(4 Females & 2 Males) 
Ward 5: 7 HSCT 
community focal persons 
(4 Females & 3 Male) 
Goromonzi district Key Informant 
Interviews (4) 
Ward 4 Councillor (1 Male) 
Ward 15 Councillor (1 
male) 
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Organisation/Government 
Department/District 
Data gathering 
method and 
number covered 
Respondents, number 
covered and sex 
disaggregation  
Ward 4: Muta Village Head 
(1 Male) 
Ward 4: Chitate Village 
Head (1 Male) 
Ward 15: Mareke Village 
Head (1 Male) 
Ward 15: Mandaza Village 
Head (1 Male) 
Focus Group 
Discussions (4) 
Ward 4: 6 non-
beneficiaries (3 Females & 
3 Males) 
Ward 15: 6 non-
beneficiaries (4 Females & 
2 Males) 
Ward 4: 8 HSCT 
community focal persons 
(4 Females & 4 Males) 
Ward 15: 6 HSCT 
community focal persons 
(3 Females & 3 Males) 
It is evident from Table 5.1 that a majority of the interviewees were female. 
The HSCT focal persons are the frontline volunteers who support the 
implementation of the HSCT at community level. Most (56%) of the HSCT 
focal persons who participated in the FGDs were women in their mid-forties to 
mid-sixties. While the gender representation of HSCT focal persons in the two 
study wards in Goromonzi was 50:50, the gender profile of HSCT focal 
persons at district levels is skewed towards more females, and this suggests 
that women are the face of community volunteer work in the selected study 
sites. One woman in an FGD in Goromonzi’s ward 4 said: “Typically, we have 
more women participating in community support activities than men in our 
communities since time immemorial. While it is predominantly a gender 
division of labour issue, community support work involves considerable 
volunteer time which most men do not have.” The evidence from the FGDs 
with the focal persons in both districts confirmed that men’s interest in doing 
voluntary community work is limited as they prefer paid work or activities that 
generate income which they use to support their families.  
Ward councillors are influential positions of authority in local community 
governance. Notable is the fact that in the two selected wards in Epworth 
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district, the Ward Councillors were women. Thus, in the two selected wards in 
Epworth, the two women participate in decision-making at community level, a 
feature which is non-existent in the two selected wards in Goromonzi as all 
the councillors there were men. However, the study found no evidence to 
suggest that this gender differentiation in community leadership had any 
social effects on the HSCT in both Epworth and Goromonzi study sites. 
The formal structures of traditional power (chiefs, headmen and village heads) 
in Zimbabwe are male-dominated. Village heads are appointed on the basis of 
custom which is governed by hereditary. Patriarchy is a central feature in 
deciding traditional leadership succession in Zimbabwe. Unsurprisingly all four 
village heads in the study sample are males. 
The interviewees who were selected for the qualitative component of the 
study were knowledgeable and informed individuals about the topic   under 
investigation. They represented a diverse stakeholder base, and provided 
useful information and insights about their experiences, perceptions, 
practices, processes and trends of the study issues and settings. 
Respondents had been directly or indirectly associated with the HSCT, or at 
the least knew about the HSCT and other social protection interventions in 
their communities. 
5.3 Demographic characteristics of HSCT households surveyed 
This section presents demographic information on HSCT beneficiary 
households’ members such as sex disaggregation, age, education levels, 
marital status, and dwelling characteristics. In all, data from 154 survey 
respondents in the two study districts were analysed. The survey respondents 
were heads of HSCT beneficiary households. The survey contains individual 
and household-level variables.  
Table 5.2 below shows the fieldwork sampling of the household survey 
respondents by selected province, district, ward, and by sex disaggregation. 
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Table 5.2: Field work sampling of respondents by province, district, 
ward, and sex disaggregation  
Province District Ward Number of 
male 
respondents 
Number of 
female 
respondents 
Total 
number of 
respondents 
Harare Epworth 1 9 22 31 
  5 10 21 31 
Sub total   19 43 62 
Mashonaland 
East 
Goromonzi 4 21 39 60 
  15 9 23 32 
Sub total   30 62 92 
Grand total     154 
Table 5.2 shows that 68% of the household survey respondents were females 
while 32% were males. In all, Goromonzi district had a higher number of 
respondents than Epworth district. This is consistent with national beneficiary 
profile data from the HSCT MIS which shows high numbers of HSCT 
beneficiaries in rural than in urban districts. Two main factors help explain this 
situation. Extreme poverty is relatively low in urban areas compared to rural 
areas in Zimbabwe. Goromonzi is a bigger district than Epworth by land and 
population size. 
5.3.1 Marital status of household survey respondents 
The details of the marital status of the heads of every household that 
participated in the household survey are presented in table 5.3 below.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Table 5.3: Marital status of the heads of HSCT households in the sample 
 Ward 
Number 
Married Divorced/Separated Widow/widower Total 
Epworth 1 13.6% 5.6% 26.7% 31 
5 23.7% 38.9% 13.3% 31 
Goromonzi 4 42.4% 38.9% 37.3% 60 
15 20.3% 16.7% 22.7% 32 
Total  59 18 75 154 
Table 5.3 shows that about 49% of heads in HSCT households were widows 
or widowers, 38% were married and the remaining 12% were divorced or 
separated. 
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5.3.2 Structure of HSCT beneficiary households 
The table below shows data on several variables observed for the HSCT 
beneficiary households in the sample. Table 5.4 shows the structure of the 
HSCT beneficiary households. The demographic characteristics shown in 
table 5.4 indicate a profile similar to the national profile of all HSCT 
beneficiary households. HSCT beneficiary households in the sample are 
mostly headed by elderly people (69%). Most HSCT household heads are 
women (60%), mainly widows. Eighty percent of the HSCT households 
include children between in the 0-17 age range. According to the MOPSLSW 
(2016a), nationally, 63% of all HSCT beneficiary households are headed 
women, 65% are headed by elderly, and 78% include children most of whom 
are orphans.  
Table 5.4: Structure of HSCT households in study sample 
 HSCT beneficiary households 
District Ward Households 
surveyed 
No of HHs 
headed by 
Elderly (60+) 
No of 
HHs 
headed 
by 
Women 
No of HHs with 
children (0-17) 
Epworth 1 31 23 (74%) 20 (87%) 24 (77%) 
5 31 21 (68%) 20 (65%) 21 (68%) 
Goromonzi 4 60 41 (68%) 33 (55%) 53 (88%) 
15 32 21 (66%) 20 (63%) 25 (78%) 
Totals 154 106 (69%) 93 (60%) 123 (80%) 
The characteristics of the HSCT households in Epworth and Goromonzi as 
shown in table 5.4 above also confirm the gender dimension of poverty in 
Zimbabwe. According to ZimStat (2013b:53) the highest prevalence of poverty 
in Zimbabwe is observed in women-headed widowed households. 
5.3.3 HSCT beneficiary household size 
Most of the beneficiary households in Epworth and Goromonzi district have 4 
plus people, suggesting that most of the HSCT beneficiaries in the two 
districts receive the highest cash transfer size that is payable in the HSCT 
capped at USD50 bimonthly. The prevalence of 1-person households in both 
districts is low. In some cases interviewees in 1-person households confirmed 
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that there have been changes to the demographic structure of their 
households due to natural attrition resulting from deaths of family members. In 
fewer cases some household members relocated to stay with relatives outside 
the districts. In these cases where the size of the household has decreased, 
there were no corresponding changes to the size of the cash transfer received 
by the affected households. Beneficiaries stated that they had not reported 
the changes to HSCT programme officials who should the effect change 
management processes to the data held in the HSCT MIS in accordance with 
HSCT’s operational procedures. 
Table 5.5: HSCT beneficiary household size 
Household size 1 person 2 people 3 people 4+ people Total 
Epworth 1 9,70% 6,50% 3,20% 80,60% 31 
5 0,00% 3,20% 19,40% 77,40% 31 
Goromonzi 
15 3,10% 6,30% 9,40% 81,30% 32 
4 0,00% 5,00% 5,00% 90,00% 60 
Table 5.5 indicates a profile that is similar to the national profile in household 
size. Households in rural areas are larger than in rural areas. Goromonzi 
district depicts relatively higher percentages of households with two or more 
people. Larger households are more vulnerable and poor than smaller size 
households. They usually have higher dependency ratios. 
5.3.4 Characteristics of people in HSCT beneficiary households 
The demographic characteristics of HSCT households shown in Table 5.6 
below indicate a profile that is typical of extremely poor households in 
Zimbabwe and Sub Saharan Africa. HSCT beneficiary households in 
Goromonzi and Epworth have some members, both adults and children, who 
are disabled and/or chronically ill. These statistics show that HSCT in some 
ways reaches some of the most vulnerable and poorest people in the two 
districts. However, the data in table 5.6 suggests that some HSCT households 
have some level of labour capacity. The implications of this finding for HSCT 
targeting are discussed in detail under the targeting theme. 
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Table 5.6: Characteristics of people in HSCT households in Goromonzi 
and Epworth 
 
5.3.5 Age of people in HSCT households 
It is evident from the data in table 5.7 below that HSCT household members 
in the study sample are mostly children (48%), and adults in the 19-59 years 
category (36%). The elderly constitute 16%, although most of them are heads 
of HSCT households as shown in table 5.4 above.  
Table 5.7: Age of HSCT household members in Goromonzi and Epworth 
districts 
Age range 0-18 years 19-59 years 60+ years Total 
Epworth 1 45,9% 38,2% 15,9% 157 
5 43,6% 35,0% 21,4% 140 
Goromonzi 4 49,9% 36,1% 14,0% 371 
15 51,2% 31,3% 17,5% 166 
Total 
 
403 295 136 834 
The data in table 5.7 compares well with the national HSCT data from the MIS 
which shows that 52% of all HSCT household members in the HSCT’s 19 
districts are children below 18 years, 29% are adults 19-59 years, and 19% 
are elderly people of 60+ years. 
5.3.6 Education levels of adults 18+ years in HSCT households 
The study finds that HSCT household members have much lower education 
levels, and this is consistent with households coming from the poorest deciles 
of the welfare distribution in Zimbabwe. Table 5.8 and the associated figure 
5.1 below show the education levels of adult household members in the 
sampled districts. 
District Ward
Households 
Surveyed
Number of 
Disabled 
Household 
Members
Number of 
Disabled 
HH 
Members 
(Adults)
Number of 
Disabled 
HH 
Members 
(Children)
Number of 
chronically 
ill HH 
members
Number of 
chronically 
ill HH 
members 
(Adults)
Number of 
chronically 
ill HH 
members 
(Children)
Adults 
Fit for 
Work 
19to59
Males 
Fit for 
Work 
19to59
Females 
Fit for 
Work 
19to59
1 31 6 6 0 19 15 4 60 29 31
5 31 10 6 4 29 25 4 49 23 26
4 60 32 25 6 66 52 13 134 61 73
15 32 9 7 1 31 20 9 52 21 31
Characteristics of people in HSCT Beneficiary Households
Epworth
Goromonzi
 298 
 
Table 5.8: Education levels of adult household members (18 years and older) in 
HSCT beneficiary households  
 
Illiterate, 
no 
schooling 
Literate, 
no 
schooling 
Primary 
incomplete 
Secondary 
incomplete 
Vocational 
college University Other Total 
Epworth 28,80% 9,90% 66,70% 62,80% 7,20% 1,40% 23,10% 138 
Goromonzi 18,70% 6,20% 64,10% 96,00% 1,10% 0,60% 13,30% 246 
Total 41 15 123 164 7 2 32 384 
 
Figure 5.1: Education levels of adult household members in HSCT 
households 
 
Most (43%) adults of 18 years and older in HSCT beneficiary households 
failed to complete secondary school. Thirty-two percent (32%) did not 
complete primary education, and exposure to vocational skills education is 
low at 1.8%. Higher education attainment is not a characteristic feature of 
extremely poor and vulnerable households. In the study sample, it is a low 
0.5%. Eleven percent (11%) of the adults in HSCT households are illiterate, 
no schooling. The data in Figure 5.1 suggests that breaking the inter-
generational poverty cycle in HSCT beneficiary households through 
investments in human capital should be a priority if these households are to 
move out of poverty in the long term. Brazil and Mexico, two of the pioneers of 
social cash transfer schemes in Latin America, introduced conditional cash 
transfers with dual objectives, combining long-run human capital development 
with short-term poverty alleviation. As highlighted in the literature review 
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chapter, evidence shows that this dual policy strategy is a key factor for 
success in breaking intergenerational poverty cycle.  
5.3.7 Possession of national Identification cards 
Survey data in table 5.9 below shows that most of the adult members in 
HSCT beneficiary households in Goromonzi and Epworth districts possess 
national identification cards – a requirement for one to receive the HSCT. In 
Epworth district, ward 5 had a higher percentage (14.5%) of adults in HSCT 
households who did not possess a national identification card. Qualitative 
evidence from FGDs with HSCT focal persons in Epworth suggest that some 
HSCT beneficiaries face challenges in acquiring national identification 
documents because they originally came from Mozambique and Malawi. They 
still cannot get Zimbabwean identification cards even though their rights to 
Zimbabwean identity are guaranteed in the below constitution. 
Table 5.9: Possession of national identification cards by adult members 
in HSCT households 
Do adult household members have a National ID card? 
  
Yes No Total 
Epworth 1 91.9% 8.1% 74 
5 85.5% 14.5% 76 
Goromonzi 4 92.1% 7.9% 177 
15 94.7% 5.3% 75 
The effects of non-possession of national identification documents by adults 
often leads to challenges with acquisition of birth certificates for children, and 
consequently failure to access basic services such as health and education. 
The most vulnerable children will be those with no birth certificates. According 
to UNICEF and ZimStat (2015:26) Epworth is among the worst districts with 
regards to children under 5 who do not possess a birth certificate. 
5.3.8 Dwelling characteristics 
The data presented in table 5.10 below shows the type of houses HSCT 
beneficiaries in Epworth and Goromonzi live in. A majority of the beneficiaries 
in both districts live in separate houses. There are no beneficiaries who live in 
“room within a house” in the study locations in Goromonzi district. The 
 300 
 
situation is different in Epworth where about 19% of HSCT beneficiaries live in 
“room within a house”. They are more likely to be lodgers renting rooms within 
a house. 
Table 5.10: Type of houses HSCT beneficiaries live in 
 
Separate 
house 
Semi-
detached 
house 
Rooms/compo
und house 
Room within a 
house 
Several 
huts/buildings 
same compound 
Several 
huts/buildings 
different 
compounds Total 
Epworth 
1 35.5% 3.2% 32.3% 19.4% 6.5% 3.2% 31 
5 45.2% 22.6% 29.0% 0.0% 3.2% 0.0% 31 
Goromo
nzi  
4 58.3% 16.7% 13.3% 0.0% 11.7% 0.0% 60 
15 45.2% 22.6% 29.0% 0.0% 3.2% 0.0% 32 
The pictures in boxes 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 below show the different types of 
houses that HSCT beneficiaries live in. The quality of houses in which some 
of the HSCT beneficiaries occupy in Epworth does not meet construction 
standards and building by-laws. Some of the houses as seen in the pictures 
below are in states of disrepair and may pose safety risks to beneficiaries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 1: A semi-complete house belonging to the Mucha family (not their 
real family name) in Goromonzi's ward 4. They currently live in one room, 
and are constructing another room using savings from their bimonthly 
HSCT. 
 
Box 5.1: A semi-complete house belonging to an HSCT beneficiary 
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Picture 2: A type of separate main house in ward 1, Epworth district. In this picture, 
Mrs Mayo (not her real identity) and two out of her four grandchildren sit in front of 
their two-roomed house. The house was constructed using mud bricks with cement 
plastering, and has a corrugated iron sheet roof. 
 
 
 
Picture 3: A main house and a kitchen hut in ward 15, Goromonzi district. In this 
picture, the Masimba family (not their real family name) stand in front of their 
homestead where they have lived for more than 25 years. Their main house was 
constructed using brick and cement and has asbestos roofing. Mud bricks with cement 
plastering were used in constructing the kitchen hut. 
 
 
 
Picture 4: Several buildings in the same compound in Epworth's ward 1. 
Box 5.2: Types of houses HSCT beneficiaries live in 
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5.3.9 House ownership of beneficiaries 
Table 5.11 below shows that most of the HSCT beneficiaries in Epworth and 
Goromonzi districts have their own houses, and few beneficiaries either 
rented or they were living in squatter dwellings. All respondents who reported 
either paying rent or living in squatter dwellings were from Epworth. Data 
shows that beneficiaries were paying housing rent to different accommodation 
providers. Approximately 13% of the respondents said they were paying 
rentals to the local authority (ELB), 25% to landlords who are also their 
parents while most beneficiaries paid rent to friends who owned the houses or 
rooms they lived in. The mean rental paid by beneficiaries in Epworth was 
thirty-one United States dollars and fifty-four cents ($31.54) per room per 
month.  
The data suggest that housing as a basic need of most HSCT beneficiaries in 
both districts has largely been met although the quality and standard of 
housing is poor for most HSCT beneficiaries. The HSCT beneficiaries who 
live in squatter settlements are likely to shift location if their housing 
circumstances change, for example, if the ELB decides to evict them. This 
     
Picture 5: This makeshift shelter is what remained of Juliet’s (not her real 
identity) hut following heavy rains which affected most parts of Zimbabwe 
during the 2016-2017 rain season. Juliet is an HSCT beneficiary in 
Goromonzi’s ward 15 and has been staying in this makeshift shelter for 
nearly 4 months. The original hut was built from mud bricks. The 
constructed part of the hut collapsed causing the thatched roof to fall and 
rest on the ground. She said that her immediate community is trying to 
mobilise resources and labour to help her construct a new hut. 
 
Box 5.3: Makeshift shelter for a beneficiary who was affected by floods 
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could result in the affected beneficiaries missing HSCT payments as the CPC 
members may have difficulties locating them. 
Table 5.11: House ownership of HSCT beneficiaries 
 Is owned 
and 
completely 
paid for  
Is owned with 
a mortgage  
Is rented  Is a 
squatter 
dwelling  
Other Total 
Epworth 1 58.1% 0.0% 25.8% 16.1% 0.0% 31 
5 80.6% 0.0% 16.1% 3.2% 0.0% 31 
Goromonzi 4 96.6% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 59 
15 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 31 
5.3.10 Access to digital satellite television, mobile phones and personal 
computers 
It is evident from Table 5.12 below that the overwhelming majority of 
respondents in Epworth and Goromonzi have access to mobile phones. This 
is unsurprising because current statistical data from the Post and 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (POTRAZ) (2017:6) shows that 
nationally mobile phone penetration rate stands at 97%. Mobile phones and 
phone cards which used to be scarce and expensive have become more 
widely available and at low costs in recent years. The present study found no 
evidence to suggest that the high percentage of HSCT beneficiaries with 
access to mobile phones could have been induced by the HSCT. 
Table 5.12: Percentage of respondents who reported access to DSTV, 
mobile phones and personal computers 
  
Digital Satellite Television (DSTV) Mobile phone Personal computer  
Epworth 1 0.0% 89.7% 0.0% 
5 0.0% 87.1% 0.0% 
Goromonzi 4 10.2% 88.1% 2.1% 
15 3.4% 96.7% 0.0% 
 
The data in table 5.12 also shows that few beneficiaries had access to DSTV 
in Goromonzi while none of the respondents reported that the household had 
access to DSTV and personal computer in Epworth. Qualitative data obtained 
through probes suggest that DSTV and personal computers were luxuries that 
most of the HSCT beneficiaries could not afford, and were not necessities in 
their basic survival kits. 
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5.4 Empirical findings on HSCT design and implementation features 
This section presents findings of both quantitative and qualitative studies on 
the key design and implementation features of the HSCT programme. The 
section explores in detail the HSCT beneficiaries’ views, experiences and 
perceptions of the programme’s key design and implementation features. The 
findings presented in this section draw heavily from primary data gathered 
through the household survey, observations, individual interviews and focus 
group discussions with key stakeholders at national and community levels. 
The quantitative household survey had more than 70 variables on design and 
implementation features of the HSCT. Secondary data from official 
programme documents including the HSCT’s manual of operations are 
integrated with findings from primary data. 
The HSCT’s key design and implementation features identified and analysed 
in this section are: 
1) Targeting method and eligibility criteria 
2) Payment system and operations 
3) Unconditional cash transfer (includes use of the HSCT) 
4) Grievance and complaints system 
5) Transfer size 
6) Frequency and predictability of payments 
7) Duration of transfer 
8) Complementary services 
5.4.1 Targeting method and eligibility criteria 
The findings confirm that the HSCT scheme indeed targets households. 
According to the HSCT’s manual of operations beneficiary households are 
eligible for assistance under the scheme if they meet two criteria, that is, they 
are simultaneously food-poor and labour-constrained. The household 
targeting is conducted through a proxy means test methodology administered 
by enumerators who are external to the community. The HSCT follows a two-
stage targeting process to identify food-poor and labour-constrained 
households. First, enumerators collect census data on demographic and 
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poverty proxy indicators from all households in all wards in the selected 
geographic district. During the data collection exercise enumerators do not 
specifically mention the HSCT and if asked by respondents about the purpose 
of the survey, they explain that the data is used for “targeting, coordination 
and harmonisation of different programmes”. 
The table 5.13 below shows that most of the HSCT beneficiaries in 
Goromonzi and Epworth perceive the HSCT’s targeting and selection process 
as fair. Qualitative data gathered through probes reveal that beneficiaries who 
viewed the targeting process as fair attributed the fairness to the fact that the 
exercise was carried out by people who were independent and external to 
Goromonzi and Epworth communities. In this way the beneficiaries felt that 
the targeting and selection process did not present opportunities for 
manipulation of data or elite capture of the process where community leaders 
may choose beneficiaries on considerations other than actual need.  
Furthermore, the beneficiaries said that the targeting and selection processes 
were done in such a way that it was not possible to tell what the purpose of 
the exercise was as the ZIMSTAT enumerators did not state the purpose of 
the targeting survey beforehand. In this regard, it was unlikely that 
respondents could have manipulated information about their socio-economic 
situation.  
The MOPSLSW staff said they carried out household verifications by 
randomly selecting 10 households from 50% of the wards targeted in all of 
HSCT’s first ten districts which include Goromonzi and Epworth. This type of 
verification was replaced by the introduction of the community verification 
process adopted for phase 2 districts. According to MOPSLSW staff the 
community verification process involves members of the community Child 
Protection Committees (CPCs) reviewing the results of the targeting and 
selection process for beneficiaries of the HSCT. The CPC members check the 
identification of eligible and ineligible beneficiaries and make their own 
assessments based on their local knowledge of the communities they 
represent. Where they disagree with the results from the ZIMSTAT surveys, 
further assessments are carried out. Thus, the community verification process 
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acts to complement and validate the proxy means test in order to identify 
those who meet the HSCT eligibility criteria.  
UNICEF and the MOPSLSW staff who were interviewed in this study agreed 
that verification of targeting survey and proxy means test data used in the 
HSCT are good practices and are consistent with methods used in other 
social protection schemes implemented by the government of Zimbabwe such 
as the Public Assistance scheme, and the Assisted Medical Treatment Orders 
(AMTOS). However, they also admitted that the implementation of proxy 
means tests require substantial administrative and logistical resources. The 
Ministry staff said they had also received queries from some Members of 
Parliament (MPs) and other politicians in some of the areas where the HSCT 
is being implemented about how the proxy means test method works in 
practice, and its reliability as a targeting method. Politicians were said to 
prefer community-based targeting and selection methods because they made 
use of local knowledge and local perceptions of poverty. 
Table 5.13: Beneficiaries' views on the HSCT's targeting/selection 
process 
 
District 
Total Do you think targeting/selection process for the 
HSCT is fair? 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Yes 80,6% 97,8% 139 
No 19,4% 2,2% 14 
Total 62 91 153 
A majority of the household survey respondents correctly identified the 
HSCT’s eligibility criteria. The data in table 5.14 below shows respondents’ 
understanding of why their households were selected to receive the HSCT. 
They cited poverty and demographic factors as eligibility criteria into the 
HSCT scheme. The poverty criterion was cited by all respondents in Epworth 
and Goromonzi. All respondents in Goromonzi district said they were either 
disabled or were caring for a disabled or chronically ill household member. 
Not all households in the two districts said they were selected because they 
have no able-bodied member (18-59 years) fit for work. This finding of some 
HSCT households not citing the labour-constraint reason for being selected to 
receive the HSCT could be interpreted in many ways. First, the finding may 
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indicate that the demographic structures of those households may have 
changed since the HSCT started in 2012. There may have been no household 
members between 18-59 years who were able to generate an income at the 
time the household was selected into the HSCT. However, this may have 
changed since then, for example, some household members who were 
children when the HSCT started are now adults who are able to generate an 
income. Secondly, the finding could suggest that the households always had 
labour capacity but could have been wrongly included in the HSCT as they do 
not meet the labour-constraint criteria.  
Table 5.14: Reasons for being selected into the HSCT 
Respondents who said YES to the reasons for being 
selected to receive the transfers among those that 
receive HSCT transfers. 
Epworth Goromonzi N= 
I am very poor & unable to meet the most urgent basic 
needs of my household 
100,0% 100,0% 123 
My household has no able-bodied member (18-59yrs) fit for 
work  
85,7% 86,7% 29 
I am disabled, or I have disabled/chronically ill member(s) 
in my household whom I look after. 
89,5% 100,0% 65 
I am old 100,0% 94,6% 71 
Take care of many orphans/children  96,4% 95,3% 71 
An important point mentioned by most beneficiaries who correctly identified 
the HSCT’s eligibility criteria was that they considered as effective the initial 
communication by the MOPSLSW staff during the inception of the 
programme. They also said the MOPSLSW officials repeat the targeting and 
selection messages regularly at payment points during the pre-disbursement 
speech. In this way, beneficiaries have been able to internalise the HSCT’s 
targeting and selection methods. 
HSCT beneficiaries were asked whether or not they thought there were 
people in their communities who met the HSCT eligibility criteria but were 
wrongly excluded. The table 5.15 below shows their responses to the 
question.  
Table 5.15: Beneficiaries' perception of exclusion errors 
Do you think there are people who are very poor and need the HSCT programme but were 
wrongly excluded from the programme? 
 
Yes No Total 
Epworth 80,3% 19,7% 61 
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Goromonzi 84,8% 15,2% 92 
Total 127 26 153 
An overwhelming majority of beneficiaries in the two districts said they knew 
of people who are very poor and need the HSCT but were wrongly excluded. 
The study gathered views of non-beneficiaries, community leaders, and HSCT 
focal persons on targeting and selection of HSCT beneficiaries. The 
qualitative data shows that local community perceptions of the HSCT’s 
targeting and eligibility criteria differ in many areas from the views expressed 
by beneficiaries on the same subject. Village heads in Goromonzi district, and 
ward councillors in the two districts reported receiving complaints from some 
non-beneficiaries who felt they were ‘wrongly excluded’ from the HSCT.  
There were concerns from HSCT focal persons in Goromonzi’s ward 4 that 
the targeting survey done by ZimStat and JIMAT in 2011 did not go deep into 
the remotest parts of ward 4 as this is where some of the poorest and 
vulnerable community members lived. They said many of the HSCT 
beneficiaries in ward 4 were people who lived in villages and homesteads that 
were easily accessible by road, and close to markets. The HSCT focal 
persons said they got to know of these “deserving, poor and vulnerable” 
community members through their outreach work on child protection issues.  
The revelations by the HSCT focal persons support views shared by some 
HSCT beneficiaries who said they knew of other poor and vulnerable people 
and who were excluded from the HSCT. 
Some of the non-beneficiaries who participated in focus group discussions in 
Goromonzi and Epworth districts said their welfare circumstances were not 
different from those of HSCT beneficiaries. They perceived themselves as all 
poor and all in need of the HSCT. One non-beneficiary from Mareke village in 
Goromonzi’s ward 15 said:  
The targeting survey enumerators visited my household in 2011. They 
collected data on socio-economic characteristics of my household. I 
never received feedback from the enumerators and to this day I do not 
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know the reasons for my exclusion. Looking at my welfare 
circumstances, I think I meet the eligibility criteria. 
Another non-beneficiary from the same FGD said:  
When the targeting survey team visited households in our village, I 
was not at home on the day. I was working in my field which is a 
distance from my homestead. Where the team found no people, they 
never returned to those households. I am confident that if they had 
found me at my home stead, I would not have missed out on the 
HSCT.  
The sentiments were different in some ways to the views expressed by FGD 
participants in Epworth. One non-beneficiary said:  
I understand why I was not selected to receive the HSCT. My 
neighbours who are HSCT beneficiaries are deserving recipients of 
the HSCT. I used to see them struggle to meet their basic needs. My 
wish is to see those who deserve to be in the HSCT get enrolled on to 
the programme in the future. 
Some non-beneficiaries in FGDs in Epworth said they withheld information 
about their socio-economic circumstances and this in turn may have 
contributed to their exclusion from the HSCT. They said that they were not 
sure why ZIMSTAT enumerators were collecting information about their 
welfare situation as they never explained beforehand the purpose of the 
targeting survey in 2011. Other non-beneficiaries said they felt there was a 
risk that their privacy was going to be compromised if they gave away their 
welfare information. Still others thought they could be removed from 
benefitting from other social welfare programmes in the community and 
therefore decided not to give information to the targeting survey teams. Non-
beneficiaries in an FGD in Epworth raised an interesting point about why 
some of them avoided the targeting survey:  
Epworth is a hotbed of politics. People here are involved in a lot of 
politics to the extent that there is always suspicion about processes 
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that involve recording people’s socio-economic and demographic data. 
Some people shy away from surveys whose objectives are not clear.  
Some of the non-beneficiaries in the FGDs said they had taken up their 
exclusion queries with programme officials at the HSCT payment points but 
got unsatisfactory responses. However, approaching programme officials at 
payment points is an indication that the HSCT payment points are also 
accessible to non-beneficiaries. The Senior Social Welfare Officer at the 
MOPSLSW confirmed that the Ministry had received queries from some of the 
non-beneficiaries particularly from those who “just missed” meeting the 
eligibility criteria. The officer said a majority of the non-beneficiaries are 
generally never satisfied by the responses given by programme officials to 
their exclusion queries. They are often of the view that the HSCT should find 
ways of accommodating them. 
Non-beneficiaries who participated in FGDs in both districts suggested that 
the HSCT’s coverage should be scaled up so that more deserving 
beneficiaries may be included. Some said there should be a waiting list of 
potential beneficiaries so that the MOPSLSW could make in-year changes (in-
between targeting rounds) by enrolling new beneficiaries to replace those who 
would have exited the programme through death or migrated. 
The FGDs with HSCT focal persons highlighted cases of inclusion errors in 
the HSCT targeting and selection process. HSCT focal persons in 
Goromonzi’s ward 15 said they knew of well-to-do people such as 
headmasters and school teachers who had been erroneously included as 
HSCT beneficiaries. They said they informed MOPSLSW’s district staff about 
it and some of the non-deserving beneficiaries were subsequently removed 
from the programme. 
Community leaders – village heads and ward councillors suggested that they 
should be included in the verification of targeting survey results as they have 
better local knowledge about who is poor, and who was not poor in their 
communities. The basis of their view was that they interacted with their 
subjects on a regular basis and lived in the same communities and villages 
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with them. However, they made the point that their non-involvement in the 
initial targeting and selection process in 2011 did not in any way undermine 
their authority over their subjects. They said when they called for meetings or 
collective community activities such as road rehabilitation, both HSCT 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries attended. 
On the issue of exclusion errors in the HSCT, the MOPSLSW and UNICEF 
staff said the exclusion errors were more a programme coverage issue (due 
to budget constraints) rather than how good the proxy means test is or how 
well it is being implemented. They said that there were many people who met 
the food poverty and labour constraint criteria but the limited resources 
prevented the HSCT from reaching out to all deserving cases. In the words of 
the UNICEF staff member:   
Communities understand the HSCT targeting criteria but are not 
convinced it is the best method to use. Beneficiaries selected in the 
HSCT deserve the transfers but there are many people similar to them 
in socio-economic circumstances and who also deserve assistance. 
This is the main reason why when other benefits for example food, 
come into communities, HSCT beneficiaries tend to be excluded 
because communities want many other poor and vulnerable people to 
benefit too. 
A review of HSCT documents, and interviews with MOPSLSW and UNICEF 
revealed that the HSCT is still using phase 1 targeting data from the survey 
and proxy means tests done in 2011 and 2012 for Goromonzi and Epworth 
districts yet the latest retargeting data, though from 2014, are available. 
5.4.2 Awareness of HSCT as a right 
Beneficiaries’ views on whether they receive cash transfers as entitlements or 
gifts/loans have important implications for the effectiveness of social 
accountability mechanisms. The HSCT’s manual of operations states that the 
HSCT is an entitlement and this means that beneficiaries receiving the cash 
have the right to receive the transfers. Using a four-point Likert scale, this 
study explored beneficiaries’ opinions on whether or not they understood 
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receiving the HSCT as a right or gift/loan. The Likert scale responses give 
insights into what HSCT beneficiaries think and how they feel about the cash 
they receive.  
Figure 5.2 below shows the distribution of opinions across the respondents in 
the two study districts. The findings indicate that a majority of the responses 
were in the positive categories suggesting that most HSCT beneficiaries in 
both districts viewed receiving the HSCT as an entitlement. The intensity of 
this positive perception is evident in Goromonzi district where 47.3% of the 
respondents “strongly agreed” with the Likert item. However, it is apparent 
from the data that there are differences in beneficiaries’ perceptions of the 
HSCT. These differences appear to indicate gaps in the HSCT’s 
communication with beneficiaries on the subject. Beneficiaries need to have a 
common understanding of the issue. 
A beneficiary from Epworth’s ward 1 said: “I think receiving the HSCT money 
is a right because I do not have any other source of income or support. I 
believe the State has a duty to care of those who are too poor to take care of 
themselves.” 
One beneficiary from Goromonzi’s ward 4, and who did not see receiving the 
HSCT payments as a right said: “I disagree with the statement. Receiving the 
HSCT is not a right. We are just being assisted by the government of 
Zimbabwe. I cannot demand the cash transfer from government. The 
assistance can be stopped anytime. I therefore have no basis to declare 
receiving the cash transfer as my right. 
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of opinion across respondents on whether 
receiving HSCT payments is a right or gift by district 
 
Figure 5.3 below shows responses by age group and district of respondents. 
The results suggest that in the two study districts, the majority of older people 
(60-99 years) view receiving the HSCT payments as an entitlement than is the 
case with the younger generation (19-59 years). Of the 153 respondents 
interviewed on the Likert item in the two districts, 73 (approximately 48%) of 
the responses were positive outcomes and were in the age group 60-99 
years.  
A beneficiary from ward 4 in Goromonzi said: “I am old and feel entitled to 
receive the HSCT money. When I was young and in my productive years, I 
contributed to the development of my country and community. Now it is the 
duty of government to provide for its senior citizens. Without the HSCT 
money, I will die my grandson.” 
A female beneficiary from ward 5 in Epworth said: “I am old and have no 
means to care and provide for my household. My children died a long time 
ago but left me orphans to look after. As I have no other form of support, I see 
receiving the HSCT as an entitlement not only for myself but also for the 
orphans I look after.” 
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of opinion across respondents on whether 
receiving HSCT payments is a right or gift by age and district 
 
5.4.3 Perceptions of (un)conditionality 
The design of cash transfer schemes can be conditional or unconditional as 
discussed in the literature. Conditional cash transfers require that 
beneficiaries regularly meet set conditions in order for them to continue 
receiving payments while in unconditional CTs, recipients do not have to 
comply with any rules. Understanding beneficiaries’ perceptions of whether 
conditions are in place or not in the HSCT was one of the variables of interest 
in this study. Table 5.16 below shows results obtained for the conditionality 
variable. 
Table 5.16: Beneficiaries' perceptions of (un)conditionalty in HSCT 
Do families participating in the HSCT programme have to follow any conditions in order to 
continue receiving payments 
 
Yes No Total 
Epworth 3,2% 96,8% 62 
Goromonzi 4,4% 95,6% 91 
Total 6 147 153 
Almost all of the respondents in the two districts (Epworth 96.8% and 
Goromonzi 95.6%) said they did not have to comply with any conditions in the 
HSCT for them to continue receiving the cash payments. The result 
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demonstrates that beneficiaries understand that decisions on how and when 
to use the HSCT payments were not subject to any programme rules, and this 
is consistent with the HSCT guidance as stated in the manual of operations. 
This finding indicates that the HSCT appears to have been effective in 
communicating this design aspect of the programme.  
Of the three respondents who believe there are set conditions in the HSCT, 
one respondent in Epworth district said she learnt about the conditions from 
the MOPSLSW staff at the HSCT payment point. One respondent from 
Goromonzi said he learnt about the HSCT conditions from MOPSLSW staff, 
while the other respondent cited the HSCT focal persons in the community as 
her source of information. The three beneficiaries who said they were 
expected to follow conditions in order to continue receiving the HSCT 
suggested that the perceived conditions were (1) sending their children to 
school, and (2) buying food for the household. Results are shown in table 5.17 
below. 
Table 5.17: Perceived conditions for HSCT payments by district 
If yes, can you please list the conditions that you think HSCT households have to follow or 
comply with in order to continue receiving HSCT payments 
 
Send children to school Buy food Total 
Epworth 100,0% 0,0% 1 
Goromonzi 50,0% 50,0% 2 
 
2 1 3 
 
5.4.4 Duration of HSCT payments 
Household survey data indicate that most HSCT beneficiaries in both districts 
expect to continue receiving HSCT payments for a longer period or better still 
for the rest of their lives. The table 5.18 below shows the data for this variable. 
Table 5.18: Beneficiaries' perceptions of the duration of HSCT payments 
by district 
How long in the future do you expect to continue receiving HSCT payments? 
Total 
  
6months 1 year 2 years 5 years Longer/for the rest of life 
District 
Epworth 1,6% 3,2% 1,6% 3,2% 90,3% 62 
Goromonzi 8,8% 1,1% 3,3% 3,3% 83,5% 91 
Total 
 
9 3 4 5 132 153 
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Further analysis of results by age group presented in table 5.19 below, shows 
that a majority of the respondents (88.6%) in the 60-99 years age group 
believe that they will continue to receive the HSCT for the rest of their lives.  
Table 5.19: Beneficiaries' perceptions of the duration of HSCT payments 
by age range 
How long in the future do you expect to continue receiving HSCT payments? 
Total 
 
6months 1 year 2 years 5 years Longer/for the rest of life 
19 to 59 years 2,1% 0,0% 8,3% 8,3% 81,3% 48 
60 to 99 years 7,6% 2,9% 0,0% 1,0% 88,6% 105 
Total 9 3 4 5 132 153 
Qualitative findings from interviews with some of the HSCT beneficiaries in 
the 60-99 age range suggest that they do not expect to exit or graduate from 
the HSCT primarily because they are unlikely to have other sources of income 
if the HSCT scheme ended. They cited old age, and sickness and disability in 
some cases as primary vulnerability factors that make them unfit for 
productive work. To them the HSCT is like a social pension scheme. As one 
female respondent from ward 15 in Goromonzi district said: “I am old now and 
I do not see myself exiting the HSCT. Exiting means I will fall back into 
extreme poverty and no one will help me.” 
5.4.5 Transfer size 
The value of the HSCT payments varies by household size with a 1-person 
household receiving US$10 cash per month and capped at US$25 cash per 
month for a 4 or more persons household. Payments are done every two 
months which means that a household with 4 or more persons receives a 
lump sum of US$50 per cycle. The study sought views of beneficiaries on the 
adequacy of the transfer sizes. Table 5.20 below shows the results obtained 
from the household survey. 
Table 5.20: Adequacy or inadequacy of the transfer amount to meet 
household needs by district 
The cash transfer amount that I receive is adequate to meet the needs of my household 
 
District 
 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Adequate 19,7% 17,6% 
Inadequate 80,3% 82,4% 
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Total 61 91 
.An overwhelming majority of HSCT beneficiaries in the two study districts 
(Epworth 80.3% and 82.4% for Goromonzi) said the transfer value is not 
adequate to meet the needs of their household. The figure below shows 
results for the entire study sample. A majority of beneficiaries (81.6%) stated 
that the transfer size is inadequate for their households while 18.4% said it’s 
enough to meet the needs of their households. 
Figure 5.4: Distribution of opinions on whether or not the transfer 
amounts are adequate for the entire study sample 
 
Further analysis of the transfer size variable by household size in figure 5.5 
below indicates that a majority (87.5%) of respondents who said that the 
HSCT was inadequate were from two-person household that receive a 
bimonthly transfer of US$30 followed by three-person household (83.3%) and 
four-person household (81.3%) and one-person household (75%). Results 
show that there is broad consensus among HSCT recipients of all household 
sizes that the transfer amounts are not adequate to meet the needs of 
recipient households. 
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Adequate Inadequate
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Figure 5.5: Adequacy of transfer amount by household size for the entire 
study sample 
 
Respondents cited several reasons for the inadequacy of the transfer 
amounts. They said the transfer values were set at the inception of the HSCT 
between 2011 and 2012 and have not been adjusted for inflation and other 
changes in the social and economic environment that have occurred since 
2012. Furthermore, some of the respondents said their household 
membership has increased since 2012 as they took in new household 
members. The table 5.21 below confirms that indeed beneficiary household 
composition for some beneficiaries increased between 2012 and 2016. 
Goromonzi has the highest percentage of households that reported taking 
new members (28.3% in ward 4).  
Table 5.21: Number and percentage of HSCT beneficiary households 
that reported taking in new household members between 2012 and 2016 
by district 
 
Ward Yes No 
 Epworth 1 12,9% 87,1% 31 
5 25,8% 74,2% 31 
Goromonzi 4 28,3% 71,7% 60 
15 18,8% 81,3% 32 
Total 
 
35 119 154 
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Respondents cited several reasons which account for new members joining 
their households. Table 5.22 below shows that the primary reasons for joining 
HSCT households were: new members moving in to live with their relatives 
(33.3% for Epworth and 31.8% for Goromonzi); births of new babies (33.3% 
for Epworth and 22.7% for Goromonzi); and deaths of caregivers resulting in 
children becoming orphans who had to move and be cared for in HSCT 
households The break-up of former household is one of the main reasons for 
joining HSCT households in Goromonzi cited by 13.7% of HSCT beneficiaries 
who reported new members joining their households. 
Table 5.22: Reasons why new household members joined HSCT 
households by district 
 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Moved for work 0.0% 4.5% 
Moved for schooling 0.0% 4.5% 
Moved to live with relatives 33.3% 31.8% 
Death of caregiver(s)/orphaned 8.3% 9.1% 
Death of person living in this household 8.3% 4.5% 
Marriage 0.0% 4.5% 
Came home from living elsewhere 8.3% 0.0% 
To follow other family members 8.3% 0.0% 
Recover from illness 0.0% 4.5% 
Break-up of former household 0.0% 13.6% 
New born 33.3% 22.7% 
Totals 12 22 
The reasons cited for joining households by new household are likely to have 
increased welfare costs for the affected households. For example, the birth of 
a new baby in a household increases the dependency ratio in that household. 
Consequently, expenditure on consumption, clothing and health increases. 
Table 5.23 below gives beneficiaries’ accounts on the inadequacy of transfer 
amounts. 
Table 5.23: Accounts of beneficiaries on the inadequacy of the HSCT 
transfer amounts 
District Examples of beneficiaries’ accounts of the inadequacy of transfer 
amounts 
 
Epworth “The transfer amount is not adequate to cater for all the domestic needs of the 
household, for example, medication expenses for my wife, clothing, food and 
school fees” – male beneficiary, ward 1, Epworth district. 
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“The HSCT is a gift. It’s not enough. However, asking for more money is a sign 
of lack of gratitude” – male beneficiary, ward 1, Epworth district 
“I have too many responsibilities which include sending my orphaned grand-
children to school, buying food, and agricultural inputs for my field” – male 
beneficiary, ward 5, Epworth district. 
“I would like the HSCT amount to be increased so that I can start my own 
income-generation project. I used to operate a small tuckshop but closed it due 
to the poor economic environment. I use the HSCT money on food and health 
care expenses. I have none to save or invest, and this limits my household’s 
capacity to withstand shocks in the future” – male beneficiary, ward 5, Epworth 
district. 
“When we enrolled into the HSCT, my household was small. We were only two. 
The household membership has grown to 4 after we took in our two grand-
children following the divorce of their parents. The transfer amount is no longer 
enough to cater for 4 people” – female beneficiary, ward 5, Epworth district. 
Goromonzi “The money is never enough. However, we are thankful for the little money that 
we receive. Half a loaf is better than nothing” – female beneficiary, ward 4, 
Goromonzi district. 
“My household size has grown from an initial membership of three to nine 
people. The food budget has significantly gone up. I owe money at the local 
hospital where my two children were born. Because of this debt, I am unable to 
secure the birth records for my two children. Consequently, they have no birth 
certificates. I also owe school fees at the school where my children go to. I 
would be thankful if they could review the HSCT amounts upwards” female 
beneficiary, ward 4, Epworth district. 
“I have three school-going age children and they all need school uniforms, and  
fees to be paid for every term. Secondary school fees at Parirewa cost US$30 
per term. Primary school fees cost US$18 per child per term. My kitchen hut 
was badly damaged by thunderstorms. I don’t know where I will get the money 
to replace the door and the grass thatch. If the HSCT amount is revised 
upwards, I will be able to fully cover school fees for children and to repair my 
hut” female beneficiary, ward 4, Goromonzi district. 
“I am on anti-retroviral treatment and I travel to Epworth every month to get my 
medication. I use part of the HSCT money to cover these transport costs. I also 
use the HSCT money to pay school fees for two of my school-going age 
children. The fee for each child is US$25 per school term. As you can tell, the 
US$50 is easily eaten up by school fees. However, I prioritise food needs of the 
household and this takes up most of the HSCT leaving me with school fees 
debts” – female beneficiary, ward 15, Goromonzi district. 
“I receive US$30 from the HSCT every two months. I buy food, hire casual 
labour for the field, and pay for health care expenses. When one is as old as I 
am, welfare costs are usually high. Prices of most basic goods and services 
have gone up. I lost three goats to thieves, and I am yet to recover from the 
loss. The transfer is not enough for me and I wish it would reviewed upwards” – 
female beneficiary, ward 15, Goromonzi district. 
“We are a five-person household. I receive US$50 from the HSCT. It is not 
enough for me to fully meet all household needs. I pay US$45 for child who is 
doing secondary school. I have to look for an extra US$25 to pay school fees 
for another child in primary school. We are left with nothing to buy food and 
meet other needs. One of my daughters failed to complete secondary school 
as I could not get money to pay her examination fees. I also take care of a 
niece who should be in school but is not because there is no money for her 
fees” – female beneficiary, ward 15, Goromonzi district. 
“Our household needs cost more than the US$50 we receive from the HSCT. 
Tuition and levy fees cost me US$25. Food costs per month are US$30. We 
are left with no money to cover the land levy and grinding mill costs” – female 
beneficiary, ward 15, Goromonzi district. 
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Using cross-tabulation, the study examined the association between the 
transfer size variable and two other variables: (1) household capacity to 
provide money or goods to persons who are not members of the HSCT 
beneficiary household, and (2) the ability of the household to purchase on 
credit if they asked. The results are provided in tables 5.24 and 5.25 below. 
For respondents who said the transfer amount was not adequate, findings for 
Goromonzi district suggest that the inadequacy of the transfer amount may 
have contributed to limiting the household’s capacity to provide money or 
goods to persons who are not members of the HSCT beneficiary household in 
the last 12 months. The finding that 54.7% of respondents said their 
household members did not provide money or goods to other persons who do 
not live with them in the last 12 months seem to support this view. Qualitative 
data from interviews with some beneficiaries in Goromonzi ward 15 seem to 
support this view. As one male beneficiary said:  
I had two neighbours from my village who visited me separately in 
2016. They know I am an HSCT beneficiary who receives cash 
payments every two months. The first neighbour came and asked me 
for $2 to use at the grinding mill. I was not able to help him. The 
second came while I was working in my field and he asked if I could 
help him with transport money so he could take his sick child to the 
clinic. Again I was not able to help. I told both neighbours that while I 
sympathised with their situations, I had nothing to spare from the 
HSCT money to help them with. The transfer is not even enough for 
my own household’s needs. 
Table 5.24: Remittances and transfers to other persons who are not 
members of HSCT beneficiary households 
During the past 12 months, has any member of your household provided money or goods, 
including clothing, food, livestock or medicines to persons who are not members of your 
household? 
 
Yes No Total 
Epworth 57,1% 42,9% 49 
Goromonzi 45.3% 54.7% 75 
A large majority of beneficiaries who reported that the HSCT transfer amounts 
were inadequate also said they could not purchase on credit if they asked. 
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Results in table 5.25 below show that 69.4% of respondents in Epworth and 
82% in Goromonzi who said the HSCT amounts were inadequate could not 
purchase on credit if they asked. Respondents said the size of transfer 
amounts did not give them the flexibility to go into debt arrangements with 
community shop operators or service providers. They may fail to pay for the 
goods and service bought on credit because the HSCT is not adequate for 
them. A female beneficiary from Epworth’s ward 1 said: “I will not even 
attempt to purchase goods on credit because I know I will not find the money 
to pay for the goods. It’s risky to buy goods on credit when I get so little. It’s 
better to live within my means.” 
Table 5.25: Purchases on credit 
Could you purchase on credit if you asked? 
 
yes no Total 
Epworth 30,6% 69,4% 36 
Goromonzi 18,0% 82,0% 61 
HSCT beneficiaries who said the transfer amounts were not adequate 
suggested that the transfer amounts should be revised upwards. The results 
in table 5.26 below are shown by household size and indicate that a majority 
of households across all household sizes prefer to receive transfer amounts 
between US$51 and US$100 on a bimonthly basis. 
Table 5.26: Suggested transfer ranges by households who said the 
HSCT amounts are not adequate 
Suggested HSCT Amount for household who said the transfer was not adequate 
 
1-50 Dollars 51 - 100 Dollars 101-150 151-300 Total 
1 person 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2 
2 people 33,3% 50,0% 16,7% 0,0% 6 
3 people 42,9% 57,1% 0,0% 0,0% 7 
4+ people 4,0% 77,0% 15,0% 4,0% 100 
Total 9 86 16 4 115 
The intensity of this view is high amongst all one-person households (100%) 
who are currently receiving US$20 bimonthly, followed by four-person 
households. Results show broad consensus across households that the 
transfer amounts should be in the US$51-US$100 range. Beneficiaries said 
this range would be adequate for them to spend, save and invest transfers 
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and move them towards building resilience which could help them deal with 
future shocks that may affect their households. 
5.4.6 Frequency and predictability of HSCT payment 
Household survey data indicate that a large majority of HSCT beneficiaries in 
Goromonzi district (92.4%) and most of the HSCT beneficiaries in Epworth 
district (79%) were happy with the bimonthly frequency of HSCT payments. 
Qualitative data indicates that beneficiaries appreciate the bimonthly cycle 
because it allows them to get lumpier amounts which they can spend, save or 
invest. As one beneficiary from ward 15 in Goromonzi district said: “A bi-
monthly frequency is okay for as long as the payments are predictable. In this 
way I get a bit more cash which I can use for many things including buying 
small livestock.” 
Results were also analysed by transfer size and 81.8% of those who said they 
were happy with the bimonthly frequency in Epworth district were respondents 
receiving US$50, that is, respondents from households with four or more 
members. In Goromonzi the results show that most of the respondents across 
all transfer sizes were happy with the bimonthly frequency except for 
beneficiaries receiving US$20, of whom only 50% were happy with the current 
payment cycle of two months. 
Beneficiaries who said they were not happy with the bimonthly frequency 
suggested a monthly frequency which they said would give them greater 
flexibility to plan and budget for their regular expenses for daily needs. A male 
beneficiary from ward 5 in Epworth said: “I prefer monthly cash transfer 
payments so that I can pay for my household’s expenses in the month we 
incur them. Bimonthly payments create gaps and I end up incurring debts 
which I have to offset when I receive the transfer after two months. I am 
unable to deal with emergencies and shocks that may occur while I wait to 
receive my transfer after two months.” In the words of a male beneficiary from 
ward 4 in Goromonzi: “Two months is a long payment cycle for an old and frail 
person like me. I need to buy my medicines for diabetes regularly. I prefer to 
receive my transfer monthly.” 
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UNICEF and MOPSLSW staff said changing the frequency of HSCT 
payments from bimonthly to monthly would result in huge logistical and 
administrative challenges. Consequently, this would result in huge operational 
costs to deliver the cash transfers. They said the aim is to keep operational 
costs down so that more money can go to beneficiaries.  
On whether the MOPSLSW explained to beneficiaries the rationale behind a 
bimonthly pay cycle, 57.4% of respondents in Epworth and 53.3% of 
respondents in Goromonzi said no explanation was given. This finding 
suggests gaps in the HSCT’s communication strategy and its social 
accountability mechanisms. For beneficiaries who perceive the HSCT as a gift 
and who may not be happy with a bimonthly frequency, they may not have the 
courage to either ask for an explanation or change to their preferred 
frequency. 
According to the MOPSLSW and UNICEF staff, the last HSCT payment 
cycles for Goromonzi and Epworth districts were done in December 2016. 
Data indicate that 93.5% of respondents in Epworth and 95.7% in Goromonzi 
confirmed receiving payments in December 2016.  
With respect to the predictability or regularity of payments, data indicate a 
mixed picture. On when beneficiaries expected to receive the next HSCT 
payments, there was a marked difference of opinion between respondents in 
Epworth and those in Goromonzi. Table 5.27 below shows that an 
overwhelming majority of beneficiaries in Epworth district expected to receive 
the next HSCT payments “in the next two months” in line with the established 
bimonthly frequency. The finding in Goromonzi suggests pessimism as only 
49.5% of respondents said they expected to receive payments “in the next 
two months”.   
Table 5.27: Beneficiaries' views on when they expected to receive the 
next HSCT payments 
When do you expect to receive the next HSCT payment? 
 
In the next 2 months In the next 6 months In the next 12 months Never Total 
Epworth 91,9% 4,8% 0,0% 3,2% 62 
Goromonzi 49,5% 14,3% 1,1% 35,2% 91 
Total 102 16 1 34 153 
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It is notable that 35.2% of survey respondents in Goromonzi said they did not 
expect HSCT payments to continue. Qualitative data indicates that the less 
optimistic expectation of receiving the next HSCT payments stems from two 
instances of payment delayed experienced by beneficiaries in both districts. 
The first instance was a 6-month delay between March and September 2016, 
and the second one experienced between March and April 2017 following the 
December 2016 payments. According to the beneficiaries, the two payment 
delays suggest that the established frequency and regularity of payments 
have been broken. Beneficiaries in both districts also said that they had been 
clearly informed by the MOPSLSW about the possible long delay experienced 
in between March and September 2016. In this situation, beneficiaries may 
have covered the six month gap by either taking out credit, or finding 
alternative sources of income. This could suggest that the negative effects of 
first payment delay may have been minimal. However, some beneficiaries 
said the six-month payment delay forced them into negative coping strategies 
such as reduction of meals eaten per day; distress sale of some of their 
livestock, and accumulation of debts. There was an indication that the 
payment delay could have led to breakdown in interpersonal trust 
accumulated over years. 
5.4.7 HSCT payment delivery method and process 
The study collected data on the following eight variables under this heading: 
(1) payment method; (2) payment currency; (3) communication about 
payment dates and venues; (4) proxy representation; (5) location of payment 
points; (6) means of transport used by beneficiaries to and from payment 
points; (7) waiting time at the payment point; procedures for handling missed 
payments; and (8) pre-cash distribution speech at payment points. 
The HSCT uses a cash-in-transit payment method whereby cash is physically 
delivered by an armoured private security company, Securico, and 
MOPSLSW staff to beneficiaries on specified dates and from specified 
locations.
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The majority of beneficiaries in Epworth (95.1%) and Goromonzi (96.7%) said 
they were happy with the current payment method. Further analysis of the 
data by age group and for the entire study sample shows that a large majority 
of the respondents (97.1%) who said they were happy with physical cash 
delivery are in the 60-99 years age group. Qualitative data show that with the 
current cash shortages in Zimbabwe, beneficiaries are happy that the HSCT 
is still able to give them physical cash. They prefer the method to continue. 
They said the challenges with mobile transfers are that they are not 
guaranteed to get their cash when they cash out because mobile money 
transfer agents do not always have the cash due to the liquidity crisis. If they 
have to access their cash from community shops, they are forced to buy 
goods first and then get the balance in cash, which is a rip off to them. 
Sometimes they have to transact multiple times to cash out which means they 
lose a portion of their cash transfer to transaction charges. A female 
beneficiary from ward 4 in Goromonzi said: “I prefer physical cash delivery. I 
am very old and mobile money transfers will not work for me because I will not 
be able to use my cellphone easily to access my money or to transact. It will 
be difficult for me to remember the secret pin codes associated with mobile 
money transactions.” In addition, beneficiaries said there is always a risk that 
  
  
Beneficiaries are informed of the payment date, location and time at least seven 
days before. On the day, they travel to the payment point, often arriving earlier 
than the payment team made up of MOPSLSW district officials and Securico staff. 
On the left side picture, beneficiaries wait patiently for the payment process to 
commence. On the right side picture, beneficiaries stand in an orderly queue and 
proceed to receive their cash transfer as soon as their names are called out. 
 
Box 5.4: HSCT payment delivery method - cash-in-transit 
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they could easily forget pin codes that come with electronic payment. Thus, 
survey data supported by qualitative data suggest a strong preference for 
physical cash delivery over e-payments in both districts. 
The few beneficiaries in Goromonzi (3.3%) and Epworth (4.9%) who said they 
were not happy with the current HSCT payment method preferred electronic 
transfers which they said are safer than hard cash, and that they would not 
have to walk long distances to payment points. 
In terms of how beneficiaries were informed about the payment date and 
place of collection of their last payment, data in table 5.28 indicate that 
beneficiaries were informed through various ways. The majority of recipients: 
79% in Epworth and 84.8% in Goromonzi said they were informed in private 
by HSCT focal persons. This finding is consistent with the operational 
procedure set out in the HSCT’s manual of operations which states that it is 
the responsibility of CPC HSCT focal persons to notify all beneficiaries of the 
payment dates and times. Data show few cases of beneficiaries being 
informed in public by either CPC HSCT focal persons or by another 
beneficiary. 
Table 5.28: How beneficiaries were informed about the date and place of 
payment collection 
 
Informed in public Informed in private Total 
CPC HSCT 
focal 
persons 
Another 
beneficiary 
CPC HSCT 
focal 
persons 
Another 
beneficiary 
A neighbour who 
is not a 
beneficiary 
 
Epworth 1.6% 0.0% 79.0% 17.7% 1.6% 62 
Goromonzi 0.0% 3.3% 84.8% 10.9% 1.1% 92 
Total 1 3 127 21 2 154 
It is interesting to note that there were some beneficiaries who learnt about 
payment dates and places from neighbours who were not HSCT beneficiaries, 
and more importantly from other HSCT beneficiaries: 17.7% in Epworth and 
10.9% in Goromonzi district. These findings have important implications for 
social capital, and the implications will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Beneficiaries were asked whether they thought the way they were told when 
and where to collect their last payment was appropriate. Data indicates that a 
large majority of HSCT recipients in Epworth (96.8%) and Goromonzi (97.8%) 
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thought the way they were told when and where to collect their last payment 
was appropriate. 
Qualitative data from FGDs with CPC HSCT focal persons in both districts 
show that when the HSCT started, the focal persons would carry out physical 
visits to a majority of the beneficiaries to inform them about the payment date, 
place and time. They had bicycles which they could use for that purpose. 
Many of the bicycles have since broken down and now the CPC members 
send messages to beneficiaries via whatsapp, mobile phone texts or call a 
few beneficiaries who then shared the messages with other beneficiaries 
living in their neighbourhoods.  
As one female CPC HSCT focal person from Epworth’s ward 1 said in an 
FGD:  
The MOPSLSW gave us bicycles in 2012 to use in our HSCT outreach 
work. There was no maintenance plan and budget for the bicycles. A 
lot of the bicycles have broken down and need spares. This has 
constrained our ability to reach out to all beneficiaries with HSCT 
information. We are sacrificing the limited personal resources that we 
have to ensure that the HSCT remains in contact with beneficiaries. 
Similar views were shared by a male HSCT focal person from Goromonzi’s 
ward 15: 
Our ward here is vast and has many villages. Communication with 
HSCT beneficiaries was much easier when the programme started in 
2012. We felt we were well supported and incentivised to do our HSCT 
work in the communities. We would visit and check on beneficiaries on 
a regular basis. Now we cannot because bicycles have broken down. 
In my case, I contact beneficiaries to inform them about payment 
collect dates and places using whatsapp messages. For beneficiaries 
who do not have mobile phones especially the old-aged, I convey 
messages through other HSCT beneficiaries. It has worked well as 
messages are reaching all beneficiaries in my area.  
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The study examined the HSCT’s system of proxy representation whereby 
beneficiaries can identify and register a second representative to collect 
payments on their behalf if they are unable to do so on account of old age, 
sickness or disability. The findings indicate that 27.1% of respondents in 
Epworth and 32.6% in Goromonzi have a registered proxy representative. A 
majority (35.6%) of beneficiaries who have registered proxy representatives 
are in the 19-59 age group. Qualitative data shows that beneficiaries 
considered issues of trust and reliability in selecting their proxies. Survey data 
supports this view as in most cases in both districts the proxy representatives 
were usually other household members or relatives as shown in table 5.28 
below. 
Table 5.29: Relationship between main recipient and their registered 
representative 
What is your relationship to the proxy representative you have identified for the HSCT 
programme 
 
Family 
member/relative 
that lives in your 
household 
Family 
member/relative that 
lives outside of your 
household 
Friend/Neighbour 
who is not a 
beneficiary Total 
Epworth 93.3% 0.0% 6.7% 15 
Goromonzi 88.5% 7.7% 3.8% 26 
Total 37 2 2 41 
Data further indicate that of those who said they had a registered proxy 
representative, 73.3% of these respondents in Epworth and 65.4% in 
Goromonzi have at one point or another sent their proxy representative to 
collect HSCT payments on their behalf from the payment point. Survey data 
further show that there are costs associated with proxy representation. For the 
last time they sent their proxy representative to collect cash payments on their 
behalf from the HSCT payment point, 36.4% of the main beneficiaries in 
Epworth and 11.8% in Goromonzi said they paid transport or accommodation 
expenses for their proxies while 17.6% of respondents in Goromonzi reported 
paying for transport and/or accommodation costs, and other payments in cash 
or in-kind. Household survey data show that 11.6% and 15.3% of respondents 
who said they do not have a proxy representative would not be willing to 
identify and designate one. These expenses associated with proxy 
representation reduce main beneficiaries’ transfer amount and value and 
 330 
 
could possibly explain why some beneficiaries may be unwilling to identify and 
designate a representative to collect the payment on their behalf.  
The study also examined the means of transport used by recipients to travel 
and from the payment locations. The variable contained multiple responses. 
The majority of beneficiaries 85.5% in Epworth and 88.8% in Goromonzi said 
their trip to and from the payment point involved walking. Other means of 
transport used by beneficiaries are bus/minibus and bicycle as shown in table 
5.29 below. In some cases beneficiaries said they used multiple means to and 
from payment points. For example, a number of beneficiaries in Goromonzi’s 
ward 15 said they walked to the payment point and used part of their cash 
transfer to board minibuses to travel back to their homesteads. 
Table 5.30: Percentage of beneficiaries who said they used different 
means of transport to travel from their houses to HSCT payment points 
and back 
 
District 
Total 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Walk 85,5% 88,4% 129 
Bus/Minibus 29,0% 26,7% 41 
Bicycle 11,3% 1,2% 8 
Total 62 86 148 
The finding that only 1.2% of respondents in Goromonzi district reported that 
their journey to and from the payment point involved cycling is somewhat 
surprising. Use of bicycles as means of transport is common in many rural 
parts of Zimbabwe yet the finding in Goromonzi, a predominantly rural district, 
appear to contradict this practice.  
Round trip travel time is less than one hour for 50% of recipients in Epworth 
while a majority (63%) of the recipients in Goromonzi take 1 to 3 hours to 
travel to and from HSCT payment points. This indicates that beneficiaries in 
Goromonzi travel a longer distance to the HSCT payment points than those in 
Goromonzi.  
With respect to beneficiaries’ perceptions about the journey to and from 
payment point data in table 5.31 below indicates that 37.5% of the female 
respondents find traveling to and from payments easy while an almost similar 
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proportion 32.5% said the trip is difficult. The pattern of responses in 
Goromonzi shows that there are nearly equal percentages of females who 
had positive opinions (easy and very easy) and those who generally found the 
trip challenging (difficult and very difficult). While most male respondents in 
Epworth found the trip easy, a majority (41%) of the male respondents in 
Goromonzi felt the journey to and from the HSCT payment points was very 
difficult. 
Table 5.31: Beneficiary perceptions of the journey to and from HSCT 
payment points by district and gender 
How do you or your representative feel about the journey/trip to and from the HSCT 
payment point?  
 
easy very easy difficult very difficult Total 
Epworth 
Male 54,5% 18,2% 13,6% 13,6% 22 
Female 37,5% 20,0% 32,5% 10,0% 40 
Goromonzi 
Male 20,5% 20,5% 17,9% 41,0% 39 
Female 41,5% 9,4% 22,6% 26,4% 53 
Total 57 25 35 37 154 
The pattern of responses in both districts changes when data is analysed by 
age group. In Epworth, 55.6% of respondents who find the journey easy are in 
the 19 to 59 years age group while 38.6% in the 60-99 years report that the 
journey is easy. The results from Goromonzi district contrast the pattern in 
Epworth with most of the respondents in the 19-59 age group (36.7%) 
reporting that the trip to collect their cash is very difficult while 32.3% in the 
60-99 age group find the trip easy. The results for the 60-99 age group in 
Goromonzi are insightful. The divide between recipients who had positive 
onions about the trip to collect cash (easy and very easy) and recipients with 
negative response (difficult and very difficult) is even.    
According to the MOPSLSW and UNICEF staff, HSCT payment points are 
mostly located at central points in wards, for example at business centres, 
near local government offices, at community health centres or at local schools 
in the community. Despite this general principle, there are still few 
beneficiaries who travel long distances to the payment point. Box 5.5 below is 
a case study of the only payment point in Goromonzi’s ward 4. 
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In Goromonzi’s ward 15, the HSCT payment point is located on the side of the 
main entrance of a high school in the ward – St. Peter’s. The payment 
process appears to be a public affair. The MOPSLSW negotiated with the 
school and they were allowed to use an open space outside the school’s 
premises as a payment point. While the general opinion about the location of 
 
   
Murape Hall - HSCT payment point in ward 4, Goromonzi district.  
 
The location of the payment point is at an open and public space. The payment 
point serves all the 194 HSCT beneficiaries in ward 4. Murape hall is considered 
central in ward 4 although some of the HSCT beneficiaries think it is a considerable 
distance from where they live. For example beneficiaries from Nyamande villages 
said they walked long distances to and from the payment point. They said the long 
distances they walk exposed them to potential risks of theft and mugging. During a 
focus group discussion, some of the HSCT focal persons from ward 4 reported that 
there had cases of muggings of beneficiaries as they travelled back home after 
collecting their cash. Some of the focal persons reported having been victims of 
muggings because they were perceived to be recipients of the HSCT when in fact 
they are not. They also said they were exposed to the risk of muggings because 
they were the last people to leave the HSCT payment point after assisting 
MOPSLSW and Securico staff with the payment processes. 
 
The overwhelming view shared by some beneficiaries and HSCT focal persons 
was that the acts of mugging were likely committed by people who are non-
beneficiaries from the area.  
 
The Ward 4 Councillor shared similar concerns about long distances walked by 
some of the HSCT beneficiaries particularly from Gutsa village, whom he thought 
lived the farthest from the location of Murape payment point. The Councillor said 
one HSCT payment point was not adequate to cover ward 4. It is the biggest ward 
in Goromonzi district by population size and number of households. The Councillor 
suggested two options to address the distance issue: (1) that the MOPSLSW sets 
up a second HSCT payment point to serve beneficiaries from Nyamande and 
Gutsa villages, or (2) MOPSLSW increases the cash transfer size to cater for 
transport costs for beneficiaries who live farthest from Murape payment point. 
Box 5.5: Case study – location of the HSCT payment point in ward 4, 
Goromonzi district 
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the payment point is positive amongst most beneficiaries because of its 
perceived centrality, the HSCT focal persons and village head from Mareke 
highlighted concerns about the location. They said that the location of the 
payment point is too open and lacks privacy for beneficiaries from the general 
public. They suggested that beneficiaries should receive their cash transfers 
inside the school premises. One male HSCT beneficiary from ward 15 
contradicted this view: “The location of the payment point seems appropriate 
for me as the payment process does not interfere with the school’s activities 
during the learning times. If the payment point was inside the school yard, we 
would disturb learning as teachers’ and students’ attention would be drawn to 
the noise and activity at the payment point. Despite legitimate concerns from 
both sides, the choice of the location appears to be good example of 
collaboration and cooperation between two government Ministries: Public 
Service, Labour and Social Welfare; and Primary and Secondary Education. 
In Epworth district, the HSCT payment point is located at Makomo primary 
school. It is the only HSCT payment point that serves all the seven wards in 
the district. Unlike the locations of the payment points in Goromonzi district, 
the HSCT payment point in Epworth is located inside the school yard and 
provides some privacy for beneficiaries. As shown in table 5.30 above, most 
of the HSCT beneficiaries in Epworth both males and females thought the trip 
to the payment point was easy as it was within reasonable walking distance.  
The study investigated how long beneficiaries have to wait at the HSCT 
payment points to get their HSCT money. Survey data show in table 5.32 that 
most beneficiaries in Epworth and Goromonzi district wait between 1 to 3 
hours before they receive their money. The mean and median waiting times 
are largely the same for beneficiaries in both districts. 
Table 5.32: Waiting times at payment points by district 
Hours they wait to get HSCT payment  
 
less than 1 hour 1 to 3 hours more than 3 hours Total Mean Median 
Epworth 6,60% 72,10% 21,30% 61 2,5 2,0 
Goromonzi 5,70% 75,00% 19,30% 88 2,4 2,0 
Total 9 110 30 149  
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While data suggest that most HSCT recipients in both districts do not wait for 
more than three hours before they can collect their cash, there is a possible 
risk that those who said they waited for more than three hours may be 
exposed to harsh weather conditions of heat or rains depending on the 
season. They may also incur accommodation and sustenance expenses if 
they have to stay overnight in situations where they stay far away from the 
payment points and where transport is not reliable. Staying longer at a 
payment point can make them vulnerable targets for thieves too. 
One of the important operational aspects of the HSCT is the procedure for 
handling beneficiaries who miss collecting their payments on the day of cash 
disbursement. The HSCT’s operations manual states that CPC HSCT focal 
persons should follow up on beneficiaries who miss collections, to understand 
why they missed payments. This is meant to prevent the risk that if a 
beneficiary misses payment three consecutive times, they will be removed 
from the HSCT payment register. The results of a follow-up visit including 
recommendations from the responsible CPC members are passed on to the 
district social welfare office for processing. The study investigated whether 
there had been any recipients who missed collecting their HSCT payments at 
one point or another, and whether there had been a follow up as laid down in 
the HSCT’s manual of operations. Household survey data presented in table 
5.33 below indicate that 32.3% of recipients in Epworth and 31.9% in 
Goromonzi missed collecting HSCT payments at some point since the 
inception of the programme. After missing collection of payments, 31% of the 
respondents in Goromonzi said they were followed up while 20% of 
respondents in Epworth confirmed someone had followed up on them to 
understand reasons for missing collection of their payment. 
Table 5.33: HSCT beneficiaries who reported missing payments at one 
point or another 
Have you ever missed an HSCT payment 
 
Yes No Total 
Epworth 32,3% 67,7% 62 
Goromonzi 31,9% 68,1% 91 
Total 49 104 153 
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For the beneficiaries who reported that they were followed up after missing 
collection of a payment, the study investigated who had followed them up to 
ascertain whether their responses were consistent with expectations in the 
manual of operations. Results in table 5.34 indicate that all respondents in 
Epworth said CPC HSCT focal persons followed up on them indicating 
consistency with the laid down process. Data from Goromonzi show that 
different people had followed up on beneficiaries who had missed collecting 
their payments. Two of the named categories of people who had followed up 
on beneficiaries missing collections, that is, “another beneficiary” and 
“community leader” are categories of people with no formal roles on the 
HSCT. This indicates inconsistency of practice with laid down procedure.  
Table 5.34: Beneficiaries’ accounts of the identity of the person who 
followed up on them after missing collection of a payment 
Who followed up on you? 
 
CPC 
member/HSCT 
ward focal person 
District Social 
Services 
(DSS) 
Another 
beneficiary 
Community 
leader Total 
Epworth 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4 
Goromonzi 55.6% 22.2% 11.1% 11.1% 9 
Total 9 2 1 1 13 
Reasons for missing collection of payments which were cited by beneficiaries 
included attending funerals, cash payments dates coinciding with visits to 
health care centres or school activities and sickness. One female beneficiary 
from ward 4 in Goromonzi said on the one occasion she had missed collecting 
a payment, it was because she had not been informed of the cash distribution 
date. However, she knew that she would still receive the full amount of the 
missed payment during the next payment round. 
Qualitative data from FGDs with CPC members show that in some cases 
where they do not follow up on beneficiaries missing payments, the primary 
reason is often that they have no means of transport to get to those 
beneficiaries especially those who stay in remote parts in a rural district like 
Goromonzi. This is where the effects of broken down bicycles discussed 
earlier are noticeable. 
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One of the main activities at the cash distribution point is the delivery of a pre-
cash distribution speech by MOPSLSW district officials. The purpose of the 
speech is to remind beneficiaries about the purpose of the HSCT, targeting 
and selection criteria, transfer sizes and grievance handling procedures. Most 
beneficiaries in Epworth (83.9%) and Goromonzi (92.4%) confirmed that at 
the last HSCT payment round in December 2017 the MOPSLSW officials 
delivered a pre-distribution speech at the payment point. The topics that were 
covered are shown in table 5.35 below. 
Table 5.35: Topics covered in pre-cash distribution speeches at HSCT 
payment points 
 
District 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Purpose of the HSCT programme 73,1% 69,9% 
Targeting/selection criteria 7,7% 1,2% 
Volume of transfers 7,7% 2,4% 
Grievance handling procedures 9,6% 4,8% 
Advice to beneficiaries on use of cash 
transfer payments 63,5% 68,7% 
Child protection issues 38,5% 45,8% 
Total 52 83 
Most beneficiaries in both districts said the following themes were covered: 
purpose of the HSCT, advice on use of the transfer, and child protection 
services. Grievance mechanisms had low percentages in both districts. This is 
a somewhat surprising finding given the emphasis the MOPSLSW and 
UNICEF place on theme. This finding suggests two possibilities: (1) a memory 
issue with beneficiaries remembering mainly those themes directly connected 
to the cash, and (2) that the theme is not prioritised in the pre-cash distribution 
speech. Survey data also show that almost all beneficiaries in Epworth 
(98.1%) and in Goromonzi (97.6%) were happy with the range of topics 
covered in the pre-distribution speech. Similarly, a large majority of 
respondents in Epworth (96.2%) and Goromonzi (98.8%) said they were given 
an opportunity to ask questions or clarifications during or after the pre-
distribution speech. 
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Despite the overwhelming endorsement of the pre-cash distribution speech by 
beneficiaries in Goromonzi and Epworth, qualitative data from interviews with 
beneficiaries suggested improvements to the pre-cash distribution speech. 
For example some beneficiaries would like to hear about the date of the next 
payment round; advice on how they can start-up small businesses; long term 
future of the HSCT; information about other social welfare schemes they 
could benefit from, and child care issues. 
UNICEF and the Ministry officials said that they have renamed the “pre-cash 
distribution speech” to “pre-cash distribution dialogue” emphasising the point 
that it is a dialogue between programme officials and beneficiaries, and an 
opportunity to discuss the HSCT more broadly, and to bring beneficiary and 
community perspectives on the performance of the HSCT. 
 
 
 
An official from the MOPSLSW delivering the pre-cash distribution 
speech to HSCT beneficiaries before the commencement of the 
actual cash payment process at a payment point. 
Box 5.6: Pre-cash distribution speech delivery at an HSCT 
payment point 
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5.4.8 HSCT grievance and complaints mechanisms 
According to the HSCT’s manual of operations, and qualitative data from 
MOPSLSW, the HSCT has different but complementary mechanisms of 
receiving and addressing grievances and complaints from beneficiaries. The 
MOPSLSW refers to these mechanisms as “mechanisms to promote social 
accountability” in the HSCT. The mechanisms include: help desks at payment 
points, independent verification of payment processes, field monitoring visits 
by MOPSLSW and UNICEF staff, and community verification of beneficiary 
targeting. 
In exploring beneficiaries’ views, experiences and perceptions of the HSCT’s 
grievance and complaints mechanisms, the present study drew on some of 
the dimensions proposed by Barca et al. (2012). The study examined a 
number of variables: beneficiaries’ awareness of how and to whom to raise 
complaints related to the HSCT; willingness to raise grievances and 
complaints; whether or not they the confidence to raise queries; and the 
nature of grievances and complaints that were raised. The findings are 
combined with qualitative evidence gathered from key informant interviews 
with community leaders, MOPSLSW and UNICEF staff, and FGDs with HSCT 
focal persons. 
Quantitative data from the household survey in table 5.36 below show gaps in 
beneficiaries’ awareness of how to raise a grievance or complaint about 
problems with the HSCT. The distribution of awareness results across the two 
districts are almost similar with 59.7% of respondents in Epworth, and 52.2% 
in Goromonzi saying they were aware of how to raise complaints. 
Table 5.36: Beneficiaries' awareness of how to raise complaints and 
grievances in the HSCT by district 
Are you aware of how to raise a grievance or complaint about problems with HSCT payments 
or other parts of the HSCT programme 
 
Yes No Total 
Epworth 59.7% 40.3% 62 
Goromonzi 52.2% 47.8% 92 
Total 85 69 154 
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The above data were analysed by age groups for the entire study sample. 
Results show that in the old age category (60-99) 47.2% of respondents were 
not aware of how to complain in the HSCT while 39.6% said they did not know 
how to raise a complaint in the HSCT. These findings suggest that 
programme communication efforts aimed at improving beneficiaries’ 
understanding of how to raise grievances or complaints in the HSCT may 
need to give special attention to older recipients. 
In terms of awareness of to whom to raise a grievance or complaint in the 
HSCT, 59.7% of respondents in Epworth and 52.2% in Goromonzi said they 
were aware. Of those who reported that they were aware of how and to whom 
to raise grievances and complaints about the HSCT, 22.4% and 17.6% of 
respondents in Epworth and Goromonzi respectively reported that they had 
contacted someone. The HSCT programme officials at the payment point help 
desk were the most frequently contacted in Epworth (91.7%) while CPC 
HSCT focal persons were frequently mentioned as the point of contact for 
grievances and complaints in Goromonzi (62.5%). These findings are 
consistent with grievance procedures laid down in the HSCT manual. The 
manual states that “CPC HSCT focal persons can also assist beneficiaries 
with grievances by making sure that complaints are brought forward and 
presented to the appropriate programme representative if there is no help 
desk available or if the beneficiary does not feel comfortable to approach the 
help desk.” 
With respect to the nature of complaints or grievances raised by beneficiaries, 
data shows a variation across the study districts as indicated in figure 5.6 
below. The most common complaints in Goromonzi were to do with change 
management (60%). Examples of change management complaints include 
cases when a recipient’s representative cannot collect a payment because 
they are not a registered proxy, when the name of a recipient was skipped on 
a payment schedule, lost identity documents or instances where the 
household structure has changed. In Epworth the most typical complaint had 
to do with recipients missing previous payments and asking to be paid 
outstanding payments. This finding in Epworth could indicate the mobility of 
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beneficiaries in the district. Qualitative evidence from HSCT focal persons in 
Epworth suggests that some beneficiaries changed places of residents often 
particularly those who are lodgers. Consequently, they missed payments as 
they could not be easily located for the purpose of informing them about 
payment dates, place and time of collection. 
Figure 5.6: Nature of grievances and complaints raised by beneficiaries 
and shown by district 
 
While all complaints or grievances are important and should be attended to, 
there are two problems raised by HSCT respondents in Epworth and 
Goromonzi, which should be of particular concern to HSCT programme 
officials. Survey data shows that 9.1% of the complaints raised in Epworth 
concerned fraud or bribery while 6.7% in Goromonzi have to do with 
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beneficiaries’ unhappiness with the conduct of MOPSLSW officials at district 
levels. The two complaints have reputational and integrity risks for the HSCT 
and need to be addressed. 
Unsurprisingly, travel time is one of the complaints raised in Goromonzi 
(6.7%). As indicated in earlier findings, there were some beneficiaries from 
Goromonzi who said they found the journey to and from the payment point 
difficult to very difficult. 
Beneficiaries were asked whether or not they were confident that if they 
raised a grievance through the help desk at the payment point, it would be 
addressed properly and to their satisfaction. Table 5.37 below shows findings 
to each response category. Of concern are the proportions of the neutral 
responses (30.6% and 45.7%) to a key design aspect of the HSCT where one 
may expect categorical responses to the subject. In addition, beneficiaries 
may have seen the neutral option as an easy one when they are unsure which 
would still be a worrying finding.  
Table 5.37: Respondents' confidence with the HSCT help desk as a 
grievance and complaints resolution mechanism 
Are you confident that if you raised a grievance through the HSCT Help Desk at Payment 
point, it would be addressed properly and to your satisfaction 
 
Yes No Don’t know/can’t say Total 
Epworth 33.9% 35.5% 30.6% 62 
Goromonzi 35.9% 18.5% 45.7% 92 
Total 54 39 61 154 
The above results suggest gaps in the HSCT’s grievance system as seen by 
the proportion of “no” and don’t know/can’t say responses. Combining the two 
response categories gives higher percentages than for the positive 
responses. 
On beneficiaries’ perceptions of whether complaints are addressed and 
feedback provided by MOPSLSW staff, responses show an interesting pattern 
across the two districts. The responses show a similar to that evinced by the 
confidence variable discussed above with a higher proportion of responses in 
the neutral category. Nearly 50% of respondents in Epworth and 41.3% in 
Goromonzi said they neither agree nor disagree. Less than 50% of 
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respondents in the two districts respondent positively to the statement 
“complaints are addressed and feedback provided by DSS staff”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top picture: A help desk at an HSCT payment point in Epworth. The desk is 
manned by programme officials from MOPSLSW. Bottom picture: Another 
example of an HSCT help desk with an MOPSLSW official attending to an 
HSCT recipient. Grievances are called “zvichemo” in the local shona language. 
 
Box 5.7: Pictures showing examples of HSCT help desks 
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The household survey explored beneficiaries’ views on whether they think 
there are adequate numbers of HSCT programme officials at the payment 
point help desk. Respondents’ opinions were in the positive categories 
(strongly agree and agree). As with the other grievance variables discussed 
above, the proportion of responses in the neutral category are concerning with 
37.1% of respondents in Epworth and 36.3% in Goromonzi stating they 
neither agree nor disagree on an important subject.  
The study further explored beneficiaries’ views and experiences with three 
additional and important variables for assessing the effectiveness of the 
HSCT’s grievance and complaints mechanisms. The findings are shown in 
figure 5.7 below. The results show mixed views with high proportions of 
neutral responses in both districts across all three variables mirroring similar 
concerns highlighted for other grievance variables above. Goromonzi 
registered the highest proportion (69.2%) of neutral responses on the 
protection of beneficiaries from potential negative repercussions through 
confidential handling of sensitive complaints. 
Figure 5.7: Beneficiaries' views' on willingness to complain, protection 
from negative repercussions, and privacy at the help desk: by district 
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Epworth too has a relatively high proportion of neutrals at 54.8%. Qualitative 
data from interviews with some of the beneficiaries show that beneficiaries 
were concerned there was no privacy at the help desk. Some other 
beneficiaries could actually hear complaints or queries raised by others. 
However, some respondents felt that there is nothing private about grievances 
or queries that are raised as the issues are common to most beneficiaries, for 
example, delayed change management processes, transfer size, and missed 
payments. Thus, they saw no problems with the location of the help desk. 
On the issue of protection of beneficiaries from potential negative 
repercussions of complaining including through confidential handling of 
sensitive complaints, qualitative data indicate that beneficiaries were not 
confident of this as they had a perception that if found out, they could be 
removed from the HSCT suggesting that these respondents perceive 
receiving the HSCT payments as gift and not an entitlement. 
The high numbers of neutral responses across a number of grievance and 
complaints mechanisms’ variables could suggest two possibilities: (1) that 
grievance and complaints handling is a sensitive issue in the HSCT with many 
beneficiaries unwilling to freely express categorical responses on the subject, 
and (2) that some beneficiaries may be unsure of how the system actually 
works in practice and what their rights are in that system. Despite this possibly 
being the case, it is interesting to note from figure 5.7 that slightly more than 
50% of respondents in Epworth (54.8%) and Goromonzi (51.6%) are willing to 
raise grievances and complaints through the system, are not afraid and do not 
see doing so as futile. 
Survey data reveal that most respondents in Epworth (58.1%) and almost half 
the number of respondents in Goromonzi (48.9%) stated they had no opinion 
or had not thought about whether or not there is a clear grievance escalation 
pathway in the HSCT. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 below show the pattern of 
beneficiaries’ opinions on the grievance escalation pathway variable. 
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Figure 5.8: Respondents' opinions on whether or not there is a clear 
grievance escalation pathway in the HSCT: Epworth results 
 
Figure 5.9: Respondents' opinions on whether or not there is a clear 
grievance escalation pathway in the HSCT: Goromonzi results 
 
Figure 5.9 shows that the proportion of respondents in Goromonzi who stated 
that the HSCT’s grievance escalation is not clear is nearly 50% suggesting 
that this is an issue of importance to them and which requires attention. A 
clear grievance escalation pathway is necessary as it assures beneficiaries 
that they can appeal against responses they perceive to be unsatisfactory or 
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escalate complaints beyond the initial point of reporting, for example in cases 
where feedback is unjustifiably delayed. 
Data from key informant interviews with community leaders (village heads and 
ward councillors) indicate that community leaders also receive complaints and 
queries about the HSCT from both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In 
most cases they referred these to CPC HSCT focal persons who either took 
the cases up with programme officials or clarified matters at local levels. It is 
surprising yet interesting to note that village heads and ward councillors who 
have no formal role on the HSCT were informal channels through which some 
beneficiaries raised complaints and grievances to do with the HSCT. This 
could suggest that some beneficiaries feel more comfortable and confident to 
raise HSCT grievances and complaints through existing community 
leadership structures. 
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Qualitative evidence from FGDs with HSCT focal persons in Goromonzi an 
Epworth indicates that while the HSCT’s grievance and complaints 
mechanisms have primarily focused on beneficiaries, HSCT focal persons 
also have complaints and grievances. They cited complaints which if left 
unattended to could hinder them from doing their HSCT work. For example, 
they complained about broken down phones and bicycles, worn out uniforms, 
and unpaid reimbursements. However, they had no formal entry point to raise 
their complaints in the HSCT and requested that the current HSCT grievance 
and complaints mechanisms be expanded in scope to include them too. 
1. Beneficiaries’ complaints were recorded in a note book, and not 
registered officially on a form with a serial reference number to ensure 
follow up and then case closure. There should be an official recording 
process with the date, name of receiving officer, and identity of the 
beneficiary. 
2. Help desk was manned by junior officers (interns in the MOPSLSW). 
This may not be appropriate as most of the beneficiaries who raised 
grievances and complaints were people of old age (60-99 years) and 
who may require sensitive and compassionate attention. 
3. Help desk primarily served the purpose of receiving complaints but not 
to resolve them. 
4. Some grievances and complaints were dating back to December 2014, 
including one female beneficiary who had not been paid for the 
previous six HSCT payment cycles and had repeatedly raised her 
case but with no solution. 
5. There was no privacy at the help desk. It was in an open area and 
within the audio and visual fields of other beneficiaries and programme 
officials. 
6. The most typical complaints raised by beneficiaries were missed 
payments, misspelt names of beneficiaries on the HSCT payment 
schedule, and beneficiaries who said they had been paid during 
previous cycles but whose names were not appearing on the current 
payment schedule. 
7. There seemed to be a conflation of change management issues and 
grievances. People who have straightforward change management 
issues go to the same desk and this often consumed MOPSLSW staff 
time to deal with real grievances and complaints. 
8. The grievance and complaints escalation pathway is not clear to 
beneficiaries. Some of the beneficiaries were repeatedly raising old 
complaints with the same MOPSLSW district officials but with no 
solution forthcoming. 
Box 5.8: Field observations at an HSCT help desk in Epworth 
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Currently there is no entry point for non-beneficiaries to complain, for example 
about their exclusion, to give feedback about effects of the HSCT in the 
community, or to seek information about the HSCT. Non-beneficiaries have 
an indirect stake in the HSCT due to spill-over or secondary effects of the 
HSCT in their communities. FGDs with non-beneficiaries show that they have 
limited and often inaccurate information about the HSCT. 
According to MOPSLSW and UNICEF officials, they were aware of the 
challenges with the HSCT’s grievance system and had begun to address 
them. They have developed and introduced a Standard Operating Procedure 
(SOP) which sets out specific and practical procedures for handling 
complaints and grievances in the HSCT. The SOP are expected to contribute 
to improved effectiveness of grievance handling and to strengthen social 
accountability to beneficiaries (and non-beneficiaries where appropriate). In 
addition UNICEF and the MOPSLSW have introduced and internal audit of 
the HSCT by the MOPSLSW’s internal audit department, and are currently 
exploring the introduction of community grievance focal persons in all HSCT 
districts. It is expected that the improved grievance system will ensure that the 
proposed grievance focal persons at community level are open to receiving 
comments and feedback from HSCT beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and 
other stakeholders too, for example, community leaders..  
5.4.9 Complementary services 
The implementation of the HSCT in communities incorporates provision of 
complementary services to HSCT beneficiaries who travel to the payment 
points to access their cash transfers. The services are provided by other 
government departments such as Civil Registry, and selected Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) contracted by UNICEF and the 
MOPSLSW. This “cash plus services” model is aimed at contributing to 
improvements in the social well-being of beneficiaries. The service providers 
access HSCT households through recipients at the payment point. The 
service providers give short descriptions of the type of services that are 
available from them and where they could be accessed for example, one 
organisation, Childline, provides confidential child protection reporting 
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mechanisms such as helplines and child-friendly spaces. The complementary 
services observed at HSCT payment points were: information sessions on a 
range of topics including HIV and AIDS, disability, child protection, and birth 
registration. Beneficiaries’ views and perceptions of the “cash plus services” 
model were mixed. Household survey data show that some beneficiaries are 
happy with the provision of complementary services and would like to see 
other types complementary services introduced at payment points. They 
suggested provision of the following services or information: vocational skills 
and financial literacy; information on parenting and nutrition; health services 
such as immunisation, blood pressure and diabetic checks; agricultural 
extension;  immunisation; mobile birth registration; career guidance for 
youths; microfinance; and funeral insurance. 
Some beneficiary respondents said the range of the current services and 
topics covered at payment points is appropriate and adequate. Yet other 
beneficiaries had different views about provision of complementary services at 
HSCT payment points. They suggested de-linking the provision of 
complementary services from cash collection emphasising that an HSCT cash 
pay day should be no different from payment days for formal employees 
where the latter simply go to the bank, cash out their salaries, do a few things 
in town and return home. The focus, they argued, should be on cash 
collection and other services could be provided separately on a different day. 
The beneficiaries pointed that the focus of attention of most of the HSCT 
beneficiaries at the payment point is on collection of their cash, purchasing of 
a few goods from the nearby shops, and going back home. 
According to the UNICEF staff member interviewed in this study, the HSCT 
payment points are being “transformed into social service points,” as services 
provided now go beyond just cash collection. 
The HSCT focal persons in Epworth said expanding the range of 
complementary services provided at payment points needs careful 
consideration because this may expose beneficiaries to health and safety 
concerns if they have to stay longer at payment points. They argued that 
some of the young and old age beneficiaries are on medication for ailments 
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such as diabetes and hyper tension, conditions which require them to be in 
good care and well fed. The focal persons also suggested that HSCT 
payment points be limited to beneficiaries only as opening them up to many 
people who have little or nothing to do with the HSCT may expose 
beneficiaries to security risks. They cited one case of a food aid beneficiary 
who lost a 50 kilogram bag of maize to thieves at a distribution point in 
Epworth. It appeared this had to do with the fact that the grain distribution 
points were open to everyone including non-beneficiaries. 
5.5 Empirical findings on effects of HSCT on dimensions and types of 
social capital 
This section presents and interprets quantitative and qualitative findings of the 
social effects of the HSCT in Epworth and Goromonzi districts. The focus of 
attention is on the positive and adverse effects of the HSCT on structural and 
psychosocial dimensions of social capital, and the three main types of social 
capital – bonding, bridging and linking or vertical. The section also identifies 
evidence of unintended effects of the HSCT. Findings are presented and 
discussed with the aim of understanding social changes at individual, 
household and community levels in the two districts. The section draws 
heavily from the perceptions, and experiences of HSCT beneficiaries, non-
beneficiaries, community leaders, HSCT programme officials, HSCT focal 
persons, and researcher’s field observations from the two districts.  
The section also identifies the specific design and implementation features of 
the HSCT that seem to influence the effects of the HSCT on dimensions and 
types of social capital. 
5.5.1 Social relations 
The study examined the social organisation within which the HSCT is 
operating in the two districts, and identified a diverse set of social 
relationships which could have been affected positively or adversely following 
the introduction of the HSCT. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, the 
study identified nine types of social relationships and examined the effects of 
the HSCT on the relationships. The identified social relations are listed below: 
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i. Intra-household social relations between members in the HSCT 
households 
ii. Inter-household social relations between HSCT households (social 
relations between beneficiaries) 
iii. HSCT beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries,  
iv. HSCT beneficiaries and CPC HSCT focal persons; 
v. HSCT beneficiaries and HSCT programme officials 
vi. HSCT beneficiaries and community leaders  
vii. Non-beneficiaries and CPC HSCT focal persons; 
viii. Non-beneficiaries and HSCT programme officials 
ix. Social relations between HSCT focal persons  
5.5.1.1 Social relations within HSCT households 
The findings of the research suggest both positive and negative effects of the 
HSCT on intra-household social, gender and generational relations in 
beneficiary households. Household survey data was collected on several 
variables which give insights into the effects of the HSCT on social relations 
within HSCT households.  
Respondents were asked about who made the decision on the use of cash 
within the household. Table 5.38 shows that in a majority of HSCT 
households in Epworth (80.6%) and Goromonzi (77.2%), the head of 
household is the main decision-maker. In this study 60% of all HSCT 
beneficiary households surveyed are headed by women, effectively making 
most of them the main decision makers on how the HSCT is used. 
Table 5.38: Main decision-maker on what the HSCT money is used for 
 Epworth Goromonzi Total 
Head of household 80,6% 77,2% 121 
Wife/ husband 17,7% 20,7% 30 
Son/ daughter 0,0% 2,2% 2 
Adopted/ foster child 1,6% 0,0% 1 
Total 62 92 154 
Data in table 5.38 show that there are some HSCT households where the 
head of the household is not the decision-maker on use of cash suggesting 
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that the responsibility is deferred to someone else either by choice, delegation 
or household circumstances. 
Respondents were asked who the main decision-maker identified in table 5.38 
consulted with when deciding how to use the cash transfer. While data in 
table 5.39 below shows that in most (62.9%) of the HSCT households in 
Epworth and 50% in Goromonzi, the decision maker decided alone, there are 
positive results showing that the main decision maker in the remainder of the 
households in both districts consulted someone before deciding on the use of 
the HSCT money. In Goromonzi district data shows that the main decision 
maker consults with other adult family members (46.7%), with children (2.2%), 
and with all family members (1.1%). 
Table 5.39: Who the main decision consults with when deciding how to 
use the HSCT money 
 
Epworth Goromonzi Total 
Alone 62,9% 50,0% 85 
In consultation with other adult family members 37,1% 46,7% 66 
In consultation with children 0,0% 2,2% 2 
In consultation with ALL family members 0,0% 1,1% 1 
Total 62 92 154 
Results further show that in most of the HSCT households in the two study 
districts, all household members benefit from the HSCT payments received by 
the household. Only in a few HSCT households does the transfer benefit 
specific categories of people. This might suggest a lack of understanding of 
the purpose and intended objectives of the HSCT particularly where some 
beneficiaries may perceive the HSCT to be some form of child grant which 
should benefit children only or in some cases orphans and vulnerable children 
only. In such cases where the HSCT is not benefitting all household 
members, it is possible that the HSCT may be a source of tensions within the 
household as some members may feel unjustifiably excluded. 
Household survey data show that HSCT beneficiaries in Goromonzi and 
Epworth were using HSCT payments positively. The main uses of the HSCT 
reported by beneficiaries in the two districts are shown in figure 5.10 below. 
Data shows that HSCT payments are mainly used to meet food and nutrition 
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needs (87.1% in Epworth and 93.5% in Goromonzi); school fees and 
associated costs (Epworth 46.8% and Goromonzi 58.7%).  
Other common uses of HSCT payments were states as health care, 
shelter/rent, clothing, savings, investment in productive activities such as 
livestock purchases, and membership subscription fees for social networks 
and associations. These results show that each of the expenditure choices 
depicted in figure 5.10 improves household well-being in some way, a 
demonstration of rational decision-making on expenditures. This finding is 
consistent with the rationale of the unconditional nature of the programme’s 
design that the transfers are aimed at smoothing consumption in beneficiary 
households. The positive uses of the HSCT further suggest that most of the 
HSCT beneficiaries in the two districts are largely following the advice from 
MOPSLSW officials and HSCT focal persons on responsible use of the cash 
transfers. 
Figure 5.10: Main uses of HSCT payments by district 
 
An overwhelming majority of HSCT respondents in Epworth and Goromonzi 
said that the HSCT transfers have helped them to live better, and have also 
made it easier for them to look after their families as results in table 5.40 
below show. This suggests that their well-being situation prior to receiving the 
HSCT was less favourable. 
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Table 5.40: Positive social effects of the HSCT on recipients 
 Epworth Goromonzi 
yes no yes no 
The HSCT transfers have helped me to live 
better 
100,0% 0,0% 98,9% 1,1% 
The HSCT transfers make it easier for me to 
look after my family 
100,0% 0,0% 98,9% 1,1% 
Qualitative data support the survey findings on the positive effects of the 
HSCT on social relations within HSCT beneficiary households.  Box 5.9 is a 
case study of a female beneficiary from Goromonzi’s ward 4. 
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Box 5.9: Case study: Uses of HSCT payments by a female-headed HSCT 
beneficiary household, ward 4, Goromonzi district 
          
 
          
 
Jane (not her real name) is a 44 year old widow. Jane went as far as 
primary school, which she could not complete due to financial problems. 
She has sole care of eight children. Her oldest is 26 and her youngest child 
is 13. School fees are clearly a challenge for Jane with this number of 
children to care for. Jane pays secondary school fees for four of her 
children. Jane receives HSCT of US$50 every two months and uses her 
HSCT mainly to meet the food needs of the household and to pay for some 
of her children’s school fees. Since receiving HSCT, Jane has been able 
start her family’s income-generation projects – a small poultry project and 
vegetable vending business by the roadside. She started with three 
chickens and the number has since grown to more than ten. Some of the 
chickens are currently sitting on eggs and she expects that the total number 
of chickens in her fowl run will grow to sixty by year end. Her family is 
benefitting from the eggs and some of the chickens which they slaughter for 
meet.  
 
Through the HSCT, Jane was also able to join a local community water 
project whose members made small but regular financial contributions 
towards installing piped water in their community. With her financial 
contributions to the project, she has been able to install piped water at her 
homestead. With this reliable supply of water, she started growing 
vegetables for consumption, and sells the surplus to the community. Jane 
explains that her children are proud of what she has achieved for the family 
through responsible and positive use of the HSCT. In the words of Jane, 
“Using the HSCT in a responsible way has strengthened the social bonds 
between me and my children. My children now can eat chicken meat, and 
have eggs for breakfast, something they had never dreamed of prior to the 
introduction of the HSCT. We are happy as a family.” 
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One male head of household from Goromonzi’s ward 4 in Chibanda village 
described the HSCT transfers as improving social relations within his 
household because it reduced sources of tensions and stress: 
The HSCT transfers lubricate social relations within my family. We 
used to struggle to put food on the table and my wife and children 
looked up to me to provide for them. I had nothing to help the family 
with. We survived on begging and handouts from good Samaritans. 
We ate one meal per day and sometimes went to bed hungry. My 
children were often sent back home from school because we could not 
raise money for their school fees. The atmosphere in the household 
was one of unhappiness and despair. When we started receiving the 
HSCT, and each time I returned from the payment point with 
groceries, I could see happy faces among my family members. We 
now eat at least two nutritious meals per day, and we eat together as a 
family. Now my children are at peace with their education, and I can 
see improvements in their performance as the HSCT has enabled 
them to attend and concentrate on their studies.  
Survey data indicate that heads of beneficiary households or registered cash 
recipients shared information about the HSCT with other households or family 
members. This sharing of HSCT information within the beneficiary household 
is an important proxy indicator which demonstrates strengthening of intra-
household social relations. Data in table 5.41 indicate that 71.7% of 
respondents in Epworth and most (82.6%) of the respondents in Goromonzi 
said they shared HSCT information they received from programme officials at 
HSCT payments with other household members. 
Table 5.41: Sharing of HSCT information with other household members 
 
District 
Total 
Epworth Goromonzi 
In the last 2 years, have you shared any HSCT 
information with your household/family members? 
Yes 71,7% 82,6% 119 
No 28,3% 17,4% 33 
Total  60 92 152 
Qualitative data show that they shared information relating to the design and 
operational features of the HSCT and other subject areas, for example: 
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purpose of the HSCT; advice on responsible use of the HSCT payments, child 
protection services, birth registration; payment point procedures; payment 
dates; transfer sizes; help desk and change management issues. This 
information is obtained primarily from the payment point and usually conveyed 
through the pre-cash distribution speech delivered by MOPSLSW officials.  
The research documented sources of support on which HSCT beneficiaries 
would call on in times of need, for example personal and family situations or 
problems that they must deal with, Findings show that most of the HSCT 
beneficiaries in Epworth (45.2%) and in Goromonzi (49.5%) count on other 
family members within their households in a situation in which they were sick 
and not able to carry out their usual activities for at least a week. This finding 
is a useful proxy indicator for positive social relations that exist in most of the 
HSCT beneficiary households for it would be unlikely that beneficiaries could 
turn to immediate family members within the household for support on an 
important situation such as illness if they did not have positive social relations. 
The study identified some negative effects of the HSCT on intra-household 
social relations. A focus group discussion with HSCT focal persons from ward 
1 in Epworth cited one case in which the HSCT seems to have contributed to 
the weakening of a beneficiary household’s bonding social capital. In this 
household the registered recipient was the husband, a widower. Each time he 
collected the HSCT, he would not return home but would go and spend the 
money with his concubine, colloquially referred to as a “small-house” in 
Zimbabwe. His household was not benefitting from the cash transfer yet it was 
the household selected to receive the HSCT. His children raised complaints 
with the HSCT focal persons about their father’s neglect of them. The focal 
persons referred the case to the HSCT programme officials. The programme 
officials decided in the best interest of the household’s children to change the 
recipient of the cash from the man to one of the HSCT focal persons who is a 
neighbour to the household. When the man realised that he could no longer 
collect the cash from the payment point, he moved out of his household and 
went to live with his “small house” leaving his children in the care of 
neighbours and the HSCT focal person. The CPC member confirmed that she 
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is now the registered recipient for the family as a temporary measure while 
the household looks for a trusted adult relative to collect cash on behalf of the 
children. In this case therefore, the HSCT appears to have driven negative 
relational consequences between the man and his children, thus weakening 
the social bonds between them. 
5.5.1.2 Gender relations within the HSCT households 
The views expressed by respondents on the effects of the HSCT on intra-
household gender relations in the two districts were mixed. Household survey 
data show that a majority of beneficiaries in Epworth (63.3%) and Goromonzi 
(58.9%) said the HSCT had not changed the relations between men and 
women in their households. One male from ward 4 in Goromonzi said: “We 
always understand each other on matters to do with management of finances 
in my household. There have been no changes in our relationship as husband 
and wife.” Yet other respondents from the two districts were neutral on the 
subject. For example, one female beneficiary from Epworth’s ward 1 said: 
“We are all females in this household and so the gender relations question 
does not apply to my household.” Qualitative data indicates that respondents 
who said the HSCT had changed gender relations in their household based it 
on the following accounts highlighted in Box 5.10 below. 
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Qualitative data shows that some men from beneficiary households in which 
the wife was the registered recipient of the HSCT said they gave control and 
decision-making powers over HSCT allocations, expenditures and savings in 
the household to their wives, The commonly cited reasons for this 
“empowerment of women” was that the HSCT was a social welfare grant to 
help meet the needs of the household and women knew best a households’ 
welfare needs. In addition, the male spouses said they had confidence their 
wives could manage well the household income from the HSCT. However, 
one male respondent said he would retain control and decision-making 
powers over household income that he generated from doing paid activities 
“We quarrel a lot over the use of the HSCT money in the house, and 
sometimes we go for days without actually talking to each other. My wife has 
her own priorities and I have my own over the use of the cash. The change 
has rather been negative in my household” – male beneficiary from ward 4 in 
Goromonzi. 
 
“I plan the use of the HSCT cash with my adult son who stays with me here. I 
consult him on how we should divide the money across different needs in the 
house. This is something I never used to do before” – female beneficiary from 
ward 15 in Goromonzi. 
 
“Ours is a polygamous marriage. I am always fighting my husband over the 
conduct of the first wife as she takes all the HSCT money that we receive in 
this household” – female beneficiary from ward 4 in Goromonzi. 
 
“My husband appreciates the HSCT because it has reduced the burden on 
him to provide all for the family. He said to me the HSCT is welfare income 
and as such he decided that I should manage it for the good of the family. I 
feel empowered and respected by his flexibility to allow me to manage the 
income from the HSCT. So far this arrangement is working well for us” – 
female beneficiary from ward 15 in Goromonzi. 
 
“When I was still in paid employment, I used to make all decisions about how, 
and what I should use my salary for. My wife had no say at all. The HSCT is a 
different form of income. It is household income and not personal income. We 
agreed with my wife that we should plan and decide together the use of the 
HSCT” –male beneficiary from ward 1 in Epworth. 
 
“The HSCT has improved my relationship with my four sons. They feel happy 
that through the regular HSCT income, I have been able to buy them food, 
and pay their schools. They used to perceive me as a parent who is 
incapable of providing them the basics for survival” – female beneficiary 
from ward 1 in Epworth.  
 
  
Box 5.10: Beneficiary accounts of effects of the HSCT on intra-
household gender relations 
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such as casual labour. His justification was that he did not want to interfere 
with household income that was tied to specific welfare objectives for the 
family. His opinion was that there could be consequences on him from the 
programme officials were he to decide on how the cash transfer should be 
used, particularly if used outside of the areas suggested or advised by 
programme officials at HSCT payment points. The respondent also said he 
thought the HSCT was “protected income” which could not be spent anyhow. 
The FGD with HSCT focal persons from ward 15 in Goromonzi cited a 
domestic violence case involving a male registered HSCT beneficiary who 
physically abused his wife for questioning the man’s decisions on the use of 
the HSCT. Disagreements between the husband and wife over the use and 
control of the HSCT income were said to have been a regular problem in the 
household, and this led to frequent acts of domestic violence. The husband is 
reported to have often told the wife that the HSCT income was his money as 
he was the registered beneficiary. According to him, the HSCT benefitted 
individuals and not households. He compared the HSCT to a social pension. 
The wife contacted one of the CPC members in the ward and informed her 
about the acts of domestic violence perpetrated against her by her husband 
and that decisions over use and control of the HSCT were sources of the 
domestic violence. CPC members addressed the case in two ways: (1) they 
held meetings with the couple and clarified to the man that the HSCT is a 
household transfer that should benefit all household members; (2) they 
referred the case to HSCT programme officials who then changed the 
registration details of recipient of the cash from the man to the wife. CPC 
members said that the change was explained to the husband prior to taking 
effect. According to CPC members the man did not object to the idea that his 
wife could receive the HSCT cash directly. He is said to have accepted that 
his wife was probably better positioned to manage the HSCT cash to the 
benefit of the household. 
Focus groups discussion with HSCT focal persons in ward 4 of Goromonzi 
revealed a similar case of domestic violence to the one cited above. The case 
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was resolved by changing the beneficiary registration details from husband to 
wife. 
While the two cases of domestic violence appear to be isolated cases in the 
programme, they suggest that the characteristics of the main recipient of the 
HSCT, that is, whether male or female may have social effects on intra-
household gender relations and decision-making processes. In both cases 
women were seen by HSCT programme officials as more likely to spend the 
HSCT on meeting the household’s welfare needs resulting in them becoming 
de facto heads of household. In this way, the HSCT seems to have 
challenged or transformed the dominant social and cultural norm which views 
the man as the head of the household with significant control or influence over 
resource allocation decisions. 
5.5.1.3 Generational relations within HSCT households 
In the HSCT beneficiary households that were interviewed, the HSCT was 
described as improving social relations between children and their elderly 
caregivers. The elderly caregivers share information about the HSCT with 
their children and grand-children. The cash recipients said their children and 
other household members knew about the purpose of the cash transfer, size 
of the transfer and payment dates. One elderly beneficiary aged 91 and from 
ward 15 in Goromonzi district described her relationship with the younger 
generation members of her household as “mutually beneficial”. She said the 
young members of her household cared for her and helped her by doing most 
of the household chores which she can no longer actively do on account of 
age such as cooking, washing, and fetching water from the communal water 
point located a distance away from the household. In turn, she collected cash 
from the HSCT payment point which was used to buy food for the family, pay 
fees for the primary school-going orphans in the household, and occasionally 
to hire casual labour during the cropping season. She reported buying clothes 
and school uniforms for her grandchildren – something that have made them 
proud of her. She also said she told her grand-children that her old age and 
their orphanhood status were the reasons they were receiving the HSCT 
suggesting they both contributed to the household’s eligibility to receive the 
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HSCT. She asserted that this was the basis upon which the strong social 
bonds between her and the children in the household were founded.  
5.5.1.4 Strengthening social bonds between HSCT beneficiaries 
Household survey data in table 5.42 below show that a majority of HSCT 
beneficiaries in Epworth and Goromonzi preferred travelling to the HSCT 
payment point with other HSCT beneficiaries from their village or 
neighbourhoods. However, considerable numbers of beneficiaries in the two 
districts said they travelled alone to the payment points to collect their 
transfers. 
Table 5.42: Travel to the HSCT payment point: results shown by district 
 
Epworth Goromonzi Total 
I travel alone 41,9% 39,1% 62 
I travel with other household members 9,7% 4,3% 10 
I travel with other HSCT beneficiaries from 
my village/neighbourhood 
48,4% 51,1% 77 
I travel with non-beneficiary 
neighbours/friends from my village 
0,0% 5,4% 5 
Total 62 92 154 
The most common reasons cited by beneficiaries for their preference to travel 
with fellow beneficiaries to the payment point include: (1) safety and security 
risks reduced when travelling with others, (2) to discuss and share HSCT and 
life experiences, (3) companionship makes the trip easy and short, (4) to 
develop and new strengthen friendships; (5) to learn more about the socio-
economic situation in other villages; and (6) health and disability reasons. In 
the words of a female beneficiary from ward 5 in Epworth: “We share similar 
socio-economic characteristics as HSCT beneficiaries, so we finding it easy to 
travel to and from the payment together. I do not trust travelling to the 
payment point with people I have nothing in common with.” Another female 
beneficiary from ward 4 in Goromonzi said: “I am too old to travel alone to the 
payment point. I also have problems with my sore feet. I walk to the payment 
point with other HSCT beneficiaries from my village just in case I may need 
emergency health care along the way.” 
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Household data in table 5.43 but for the entire survey sample were analysed 
by gender to establish whether or not there is a gender pattern on who 
preferred to travel to the payment point with fellow beneficiaries. 
Table 5.43: Travel to the payment point: results for the entire sample 
shown by gender 
 
Male Female Total 
I travel alone 39,3% 40,9% 62 
I travel with other household members 6,6% 6,5% 10 
I travel with other HSCT beneficiaries from my 
village/neighbourhood 47,5% 51,6% 77 
I travel with non-beneficiary neighbours/friends from my 
village 6,6% 1,1% 5 
Total 61 93 154 
The results show that slightly more females (51.6%) than males (47.5%) said 
they travelled to the payment point in the company of other HSCT 
beneficiaries suggesting that gender does not appear to be a factor in 
beneficiaries’ decisions about who to travel with to the payment. 
Survey respondents were asked if they had made new friends at the HSCT 
payment points. Table 5.44 shows that most of the HSCT beneficiaries in the 
two study districts made new friendships at HSCT payment points. This result 
points to the social function of the payment point beyond its primary purpose 
of cash collection. 
Table 5.44: Respondents who stated they made new friendships at HSCT 
payment points 
 
District 
Total 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Yes 58,3% 56,7% 86 
No 41,7% 43,3% 64 
Total 60 90 150 
 
On where the new friends were from, results in table 5.45 indicate that most of 
the survey respondents in Epworth said their new friends were from my 
village/area (localised), while in Goromonzi a majority of the respondents said 
their new friends were from other villages/areas in my ward. These findings 
indicate that the social network of new friendships is wide in Goromonzi as the 
new friendships are with people from “other villages/areas in my ward”.  
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Table 5.45: New friends: where are they from? 
Where are these friends from? 
District 
Total 
Epworth Goromonzi 
My village/area 57,1% 33,3% 37 
Other villages/areas in my ward 31,4% 64,7% 44 
Other wards in the districts 11,4% 2,0% 5 
Total 35 51 86 
 
Beneficiaries cited a number of important benefits arising from these new 
friendships. Qualitative evidence show that they include but are not limited to: 
(1) sharing information and ideas about productive use of the HSCT, (2) the 
excitement about the expansion of one’s social network thereby reducing 
feelings of isolation and loneliness for some, (3) source of support and 
comfort, and knowing that they have similar life experiences, (4) social 
solidarity, (5) exchange of ideas and experiences on crop and livestock 
farming, (6) exchange information about different types of income-generation 
projects to supplement our HSCT income, (7) share information about funeral 
insurance schemes, (8) share food while waiting ate the payment point, and 
(9) spiritual information including thanking the lord for “granting them the 
favour of being selected to receive the HSCT money”. 
In the words of one male beneficiary from ward one in Epworth:  
We motivate each other to find other productive economic activities to 
help our families so that we are not overly dependent on the HSCT 
payments. One day the scheme will not be there, and we might not 
have a safety net to help us. 
Another male beneficiary from ward 5 in Epworth said:  
I got to know about the importance of investing in a funeral insurance 
scheme from a new friend of mine who is also an HSCT beneficiary. 
He lives here in my area but I didn’t know him until we met at Makomo 
Primary school from where we collect our HSCT. As a result of my 
friendship with him, I have now joined Nyaradzo funeral insurance 
scheme, something that will help my family when I am no longer there. 
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A female beneficiary from ward 15 in Goromonzi said:  
We encourage each other to go for HIV tests, and share information 
about where to access antiretroviral treatment and counselling. In this 
way we have helped each other to live positively with HIV. 
One female beneficiary from ward 4 in Goromonzi was less positive about 
how she has benefited from these new friendships. “We just exchange 
greetings. There are no benefits from these temporary and spatial 
friendships.” 
Qualitative findings indicate that some of the women beneficiaries formed new 
membership groups that have social and economic benefits effects for their 
households. The case study in box 5.8 below provides evidence to support 
this finding. 
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Maria (not her real name) aged 41, and from ward 15 in Goromonzi 
district set up an Internal Savings and Lending (ISL) club with eight (8) 
fellow HSCT beneficiaries, most of whom she met and made friends with 
at St. Peter’s payment point. The ISL is called Kushinga, which translates 
to “bravery” in English language. The membership of the club is all 
women and they are from three different villages – highlighting the 
bridging nature of their social ties. Maria is the founder, and treasurer of 
the group. Leadership positions are assigned on a rotational basis and 
each member has a chance to be the club’s secretary, treasurer or chair. 
The Kushinga ISL members meet monthly, and in the month of HSCT 
cash distributions – the members take advantage and the convenience of 
meeting on the payday. Through the ISL activities, members in the group 
have got to know each other better and have built trust-based social 
relations through their repeated interactions, and beyond the core 
objectives of the club. 
Box 5.11: Case study - formation of a subscription-based membership 
club by HSCT beneficiaries in ward 15, Goromonzi district 
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The study examined social relations between male and female beneficiaries 
at HSCT payment points. When asked whether beneficiaries of different 
genders got along well with each other at the HSCT payment points, an 
overwhelming majority of HSCT beneficiaries in Epworth (95.2%) and in 
Goromonzi (94.6%) said social relations were positive between male and 
female HSCT beneficiaries at the payment point, They attributed this to 
several reasons including: (1) trust built over time through repeated 
interactions between beneficiaries at payment points; (2) the HSCT gave 
beneficiaries a common social identity and as such beneficiaries considered 
themselves as “socially-alike,” (3) most beneficiaries said they knew each 
other back in the villages, and the HSCT had only served to strengthen their 
social ties since they now meet more frequently, 
When asked whether beneficiaries of different generations (young and old) 
get along well with each other at HSCT payment points, there was positive 
agreement amongst nearly all respondents in the two districts (Epworth 95.2% 
and Goromonzi 94.4%) that the young and old beneficiaries get along well 
with each at payment points. Household survey findings indicate several 
beneficiary accounts explaining why social relations between generations at 
the payment point were cordial. One female beneficiary from ward 4 in 
Goromonzi said: “We live together back in the villages and neighbourhoods 
and our social relations are not affected by temporary change of location as 
we go and collect our HSCT money from Murape hall”. A male respondent 
from ward 1 in Epworth said:  “The HSCT makes all of us feel happy and we 
share this excitement at payment points”.  In the words of a 91 year old 
respondent from ward 15 in Goromonzi: “The HSCT payment point is a social 
meeting place and people reconnect with old friends and relatives they would 
have last seen a long while ago.” One male beneficiary aged 28 years and 
also from ward 15 in Goromonzi  said he was happy to reconnect with his old 
uncle at the payment point stating he had he had last met him in 2011 prior to 
the introduction of the HSCT. Every time he goes to collect his cash transfer 
at St. Peter’s secondary school in ward 15 of Goromonzi, he makes sure he 
arrives early so that he has time to “tap on his uncle’s wisdom,” and to hear 
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stories from his village – an indication that the HSCT payment point has 
important social value for beneficiaries. 
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Payment point observations indicate that the HSCT programme has not changed deep 
socio-cultural norms in the recipient communities particularly the traditional sitting 
arrangements between males and females at community gatherings or social events, 
While waiting for cash distribution to start, women sit on one side, and men on the other 
side. However, the social distance between the two is small. In some cases males and 
females from the same households go to the payment points together. When they arrive, 
they split with the males joining their counterparts, and the females doing the same. One 
male beneficiary from ward 5 in Epworth said of the sitting arrangement: “We uphold our 
social and cultural values even at the HSCT payment points. The way we socially-
organise ourselves at the payment point is similar to how we would organise ourselves 
back in our communities, for example, at funerals, community events and even at 
church. These are values we hold dearly on to. I am glad that the HSCT is reinforcing 
these values”. 
 
The HSCT payment points bring together beneficiaries and ordinary people of different 
generations and age groups. In this sense, the payment point can be described as a 
demographic hub. About 69 percent of the HSCT households interviewed are headed by 
the elderly (60+) with most of them travelling to the payment points to collect their 
bimonthly transfer. Some physically disabled and sick beneficiaries also attend payment 
points and are often helped by other beneficiaries to navigate the payment process. 
 
HSCT beneficiaries highlighted the value of attending pay points in person from a social 
relations perspective as a way of connecting with fellow beneficiaries, formation and 
strengthening of bonding and bridging social ties, exchanging information and accessing 
complementary services.  
 
Box 5.12: Social relations of beneficiaries - payment point observations 
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5.5.1.5 Social relations between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
The study collected and analysed quantitative and qualitative data on several 
variables in order to establish whether or not the HSCT had affected social 
relations between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in recipient 
communities. The evidence is mixed as shown in the results presented below. 
HSCT beneficiaries were asked whether the social differentiation arising from 
the HSCT targeting and selection process and leading to the creation of 
categories “HSCT beneficiaries” and “non-beneficiaries” is a source of social 
tensions, conflicts or social divisions in the communities. Household survey 
data in table 5.46 show that respondents’ views on the matter are somewhat 
balanced between those who said the categorisation indeed resulted in social 
tensions and divisions, and those who said there were no problems 
associated with the labels in their communities. 
Table 5.46: Beneficiaries' views on the creation of categories 
"beneficiary" and "non-beneficiary" 
Do you think the creation of categories HSCT beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
leads to social tensions, social divisions and/or conflicts in your community 
 
District 
 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Yes 49.2% 49.4% 
No 50.8% 50.6% 
Total 59 89 
In cases where beneficiaries cited social tensions as prevalent, household 
survey findings indicate several reasons that were behind the tensions 
between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. A female beneficiary from ward 
5 in Epworth said the social differentiation of who deserved the HSCT and 
those who were not eligible to receive the HSCT is a source of tensions 
between the two groups in her community. She said non-beneficiaries were 
unhappy that HSCT beneficiaries were also receiving grain from the 
Government scheme. She said for much of the time, most non-beneficiaries 
did not know the identities of HSCT beneficiaries until the “lid” was lifted 
during a grain distribution scheme. The officials at the distribution point had 
asked HSCT beneficiaries to stand in a separate queue while the rest of the 
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community members (who are not HSCT beneficiaries) stood in another. It 
was at this point that the recipients of the HSCT were publicly identified and 
became known to non-beneficiaries. The non-beneficiaries queried why HSCT 
beneficiaries were also recipients of grain – a case of double benefit. 
According to the respondent, relations between the two groups have never 
been the same since then. 
In the words of a female beneficiary from ward 1 in Epworth: 
Petty jealousies are rife in my area. However, the best solution is to 
ignore them and carry on with life. Many non-beneficiaries whether 
deserving or not would like to be part of the HSCT. 
A male beneficiary from ward 1 in Epworth said: 
Yes, there are tensions between HSCT beneficiaries and non-
recipients. The tensions are noticeable when we go for long periods of 
time without receiving the HSCT as happened during the six-month 
delay between March and September 2016. When we approach the 
non-beneficiaries for temporary help with basic goods such as mealie-
meal and cooking oil, most of them refuse to help us saying when we 
have never shared HSCT benefits with them. 
In the words of a female HSCT recipient from ward 4 in Goromonzi: 
Non-beneficiaries in my area wonder and question how we were 
selected to receive the HSCT money. Every time when we go to 
collect our transfers from Murape payment point, non-beneficiaries 
cannot hide their unhappiness towards us. Some of them have even 
suggested that we were favoured or bribed our way into the HSCT 
scheme. Mitauro inowanda mwanangu kana tave kunotambira. (There 
is too much negative talk from non-beneficiaries during the cash 
collection days). 
A female beneficiary from ward 15 in Goromonzi suggested that non-
beneficiaries lack a correct understanding of the HSCT targeting method and 
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eligibility criteria. Consequently, this had caused jealousy and hatred within 
the community. A male beneficiary from the same ward suggested that some 
legitimate cases of exclusion errors in the HSCT had resulted in bad social 
relations between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. There are extremely 
poor households that were left out yet there are households with full time 
working adults which are receiving the HSCT. 
Additional quantitative and qualitative data were collected on five other 
variables which are useful proxy indicators for examining the effects of the 
HSCT on social relations between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. 
Household survey findings show that most of the HSCT beneficiaries in 
Epworth and Goromonzi reported not sharing any portion of their HSCT cash 
transfer with non-beneficiaries in their villages or areas. Table 5.47 shows the 
distribution of results by district. 
Table 5.47: Sharing HSCT benefits - results shown by district 
 
District 
Total 
Epworth Goromonzi 
In the last 2 years, did you share any portion 
of your HSCT cash transfer with non-
beneficiaries in your village/ neighbour 
Yes 21,0% 20,7% 32 
No 79,0% 79,3% 122 
Total 62 92 154 
Qualitative data indicate that most of those who said they had not shared any 
portion of their HSCT with non-beneficiaries cited three reasons for this: (1) it 
was not easy to share cash compared to in-kind goods such as food; (2) the 
size of the HSCT was too small to spare any to share with others; (3) strained 
social relations. Beneficiaries said if they had some cash to spare from their 
HSCT, they were not going to share it with non-beneficiaries on account of 
limited trust. Non-beneficiaries in focus groups in Epworth and Goromonzi 
said they had no expectation at all to receive a portion of the HSCT from 
beneficiaries because their social relations were not very good. Above all, no 
one has extra cash to spare in these days of social and economic hardships 
in Zimbabwe. Traditionally, people have shared goods and not cash. Those 
who shared a portion of their cash transfer said: “a portion of their HSCT 
money shared with neighbours or non-beneficiaries is a form of social 
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insurance against future risk” when the giver may need that favour to be 
reciprocated in times of need. 
With respect to sharing of HSCT information with non-beneficiaries, most 
beneficiaries in the two districts said they have not shared any HSCT 
programme information non-beneficiaries because they do not trust the latter, 
and in many cases they have had no reasons to do so. Figure 5.11 shows the 
distribution of responses for the “sharing of information” variable. The few 
HSCT beneficiaries who reported sharing information with non-beneficiaries 
said they shared information about HSCT targeting and eligibility criteria, and 
had referred some of the non-beneficiaries to CPC HSCT focal persons for 
queries related to exclusion from the HSCT. In an FGD in Epworth, non-
beneficiaries said they do not dare ask HSCT beneficiaries for information 
about the programme because the latter was suspicious of their intentions 
behind asking for that information. “Beneficiaries do not share information 
about the HSCT. They think we may end up asking them for money, and you 
know, money is the root of evil.” Non-beneficiaries said in most cases if they 
wanted information about the HSCT, they approached HSCT focal persons 
who live in their areas. 
Figure 5.11: Sharing of HSCT information with non-beneficiaries - 
distribution of responses by district 
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HSCT beneficiaries were asked if other people in the community know that 
they (beneficiaries) are receiving payments from the HSCT. In Epworth, 
56.5% of the respondents said other people know about their HSCT payments 
while 41.9% said other people do not know they are receiving HSCT 
payments. In Goromonzi nearly all respondents (91%) said other people in the 
community know that they are receiving cash from the HSCT. Respondents 
were asked a further question: “Is it, or would it be a problem if others in the 
community know that you are receiving payments from the HSCT?” While 
most beneficiaries in the two districts do not think it is or it would be a problem 
if others knew they were receiving cash from the HSCT, 39.4% of 
respondents in Epworth and 38.7% in Goromonzi reported that it is or it would 
be a problem if others in the community knew they were HSCT beneficiaries. 
For these who said YES it would be a problem if others knew they were 
receiving payments, their most important concerns were fears of jealousy; 
safety; that they may be asked for money by others and that they may not get 
additional help in times of need. Table 5.48 shows the distribution of these 
results by district. 
Table 5.48: Most important concerns cited by beneficiaries if others in 
the community knew about their cash receipts 
 
District 
 
Total 
Most important concern Epworth Goromonzi 
May be asked for money by others 7,7% 30,0% 4 
May be asked to care for other family members 0,0% 10,0% 1 
I will be embarrassed 0,0% 10,0% 1 
Concerned for my safety 30,8% 20,0% 7 
Jealousy 38,5% 20,0% 8 
Concerned I will be removed from other social 
support programmes 7,7% 10,0% 2 
May not get additional help in times of need 15,4% 0,0% 2 
Total 13 10 23 
 
While results for the five variables discussed above show that in most cases 
beneficiaries’ responses were generally positive, the negative responses 
provided useful insights into the strained social relations of beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries as a result of the introduction of the HSCT in the 
communities. The unwillingness by most recipients to share any portion of 
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their HSCT benefits, withholding of HSCT information, and concerns about 
jealousy, safety and perceptions of risk of not getting additional help in times 
of need suggest that in some cases the HSCT weakened social ties between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. 
Some HSCT recipients reported that social relations are still the same 
suggesting that the HSCT had not affected social ties between cash recipients 
and non-recipients. The survey asked beneficiaries questions regarding their 
networks of close friends, that is, people one feels at ease with, can talk to 
about private matters, or call upon for help. Results indicate that most HSCT 
recipients in Epworth (36.1%) and in Goromonzi (36.7%) said they had two 
close friends “these days”. Yet, 13.1% of respondents in Epworth and 10% in 
Epworth said they had no close friends. Others, 21.3% in Epworth and 35.6% 
in Goromonzi said they had one close friend.  
The study further explored whether these close friends were mostly other 
HSCT beneficiaries or mostly non-beneficiaries. Results in table 5.49 below 
indicate that HSCT beneficiaries’ close friends were non-beneficiaries with 
whom they developed connections before the introduction of the HSCT. This 
suggests that the HSCT did not affect close friendships between beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries, that is, the HSCT did not weaken pre-existing social 
capital between HSCT beneficiaries and their close non-beneficiary friends. 
This is an important finding which supports the finding mentioned earlier that 
the HSCT had not affected social ties between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries in some of the cases in the two study districts. 
Table 5.49: HSCT beneficiaries’ close friends 
Are these close friends mostly 
District 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Other HSCT Beneficiaries 11,8% 29,9% 
Non-HSCT Beneficiaries 88,2% 70,1% 
Total 51 77 
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Box 5.13 below gives beneficiary accounts suggesting no effects of the HSCT 
on pre-existing social ties between cash recipients and non-recipients. 
 
 “We related well, greet each other as before. There is nothing unusual in 
the behaviour of non-beneficiaries towards us after the introduction of 
the HSCT. I may not know what non-beneficiaries think or say about me 
in private but in public where we meet and interact, I have not 
experienced or come across evidence of social tensions or conflicts.” – 
female HSCT beneficiary from ward 15 in Goromonzi. 
 
“I have not seen or heard about social tensions between beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries. This may be because we are very few 
beneficiaries in my area, and we stay far apart to be known as HSCT 
recipients. I think many of the non-beneficiaries do not know much about 
the HSCT.” – female beneficiary from ward 4 in Goromonzi. 
 
“We generally get along with non-beneficiaries as evidenced by our 
attending funerals and other community events together.” – male 
beneficiary from ward 1 in Epworth. 
 
“There are no social conflicts or tensions because other needy people in 
our community are receiving relief assistance from other social welfare 
programmes such as food aid delivered by Plan International, and 
government’s grain distribution programme.” – Female beneficiary from 
ward 15 in Goromonzi district. 
 
“No one has said anything negative to me as an HSCT beneficiary but 
from time to time there is gossip about tensions in the community.” – 
male beneficiary from ward 5 in Epworth. 
 
“People in my community mind their own business. No one asks another 
about how they live or their means of livelihoods. We have that unwritten 
understanding in this community. As a result there are no social 
tensions caused by the introduction of the HSCT in my village.” – male 
beneficiary from ward 15 in Goromonzi.  
 
Box 5.13: Beneficiary accounts of their social relations with non-
beneficiaries 
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Focus group discussion with non-beneficiaries in Goromonzi and Epworth 
indicate a similar pattern of mixed views on social relations between HSCT 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In Goromonzi’s ward 15, non-
beneficiaries said there were no visible social tensions between beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries and any such tensions that may arise would be 
mediated by religion particularly the Roman Catholic social teachings which 
strongly discouraged people from being envious of other people’s wealth and 
possessions. However, the non-beneficiaries acknowledged that they did not 
have much information about the HSCT including its targeting method and 
eligibility criteria. They indicated that HSCT recipients in their neighbourhoods 
were not so keen to share with them information about the HSCT scheme and 
usually refer them to the community leaders particularly the village heads to 
get information about the HSCT. Some non-beneficiaries in the FGD said they 
were happy to see some of their poorest and most vulnerable neighbours 
benefiting from the HSCT because this was a huge relief to them as begging 
had stopped. Furthermore they pointed that most of the HSCT beneficiaries 
they knew in their area were using the HSCT cash positively. 
In the words of a female non-beneficiary in an FGD in Goromonzi’s ward 15: 
I have seen some beneficiaries buying maize seed and fertiliser, and 
small livestock like chickens and rabbits. They are doing really well 
and I feel happy for them. Some of the HSCT recipients are 
inspirational in what they do. 
A male non-beneficiary in the same FGD had a less favourable view of how 
some of the HSCT beneficiaries were using their cash transfers: 
I have come across two HSCT recipients misusing their money. They 
receive $50 each but get home with less than $10. All they do is spend 
most of the cash transfer on beer drinking and smoking in the 
community beer halls. They end up begging some of us for money to 
use at the grinding mill. I have on many occasions advised them to 
use their cash transfers wisely. I told them the next time I see them 
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drinking beer after collecting their cash transfers from St. Peter’s, I will 
inform Mrs Pox, the CPC HSCT focal person in our village. 
Evidence from an FGD with non-beneficiaries in Epworth appears to suggest 
that the HSCT had led some non-beneficiaries to develop a negative attitude 
towards HSCT beneficiaries. One female non-beneficiary in the FGD said:  
The size of the cash transfer is not large enough for HSCT 
beneficiaries to buy material things such as pieces of furniture or 
assets like cars to show off with. They can only buy very basic 
commodities for survival. In most cases many of us non-beneficiaries 
are still ahead of beneficiaries in terms of wellbeing and wealth. 
Qualitative evidence from an FGD with CPC HSCT focal persons in 
Goromonzi support the view that social relations between beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries are strained in some ways. The HSCT focal persons said 
some of the beneficiaries do not feel comfortable when they see them talking 
to non-beneficiaries or even in cases where they have leave payment date 
and location messages with non-beneficiaries for onward transmission to 
HSCT beneficiaries who are neighbours with them. In the words of one HSCT 
focal person, and supported by other members in the FGD:  
HSCT beneficiaries do not want to see us visiting or interacting with 
non-beneficiaries because they think that we will be conniving with 
non-beneficiaries to remove beneficiaries and replace them with non-
beneficiaries. When we visit a beneficiary household to inform them 
about payment dates and locations, and we do not find them at home, 
we sometimes leave messages with non-beneficiaries. However, we 
have found out that these messages are deliberately not conveyed to 
HSCT beneficiaries – a clear indication of strained social relations 
between the two groups. Consequently, some of the HSCT 
beneficiaries miss collection of their transfers. 
The case study in box 5.14 below is an account of strained social relations 
between a female non-beneficiary and HSCT beneficiaries in a polygamous 
marriage in Goromonzi. 
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A key informant interview with the councillor from ward 15 revealed that there 
had been cases of social tensions between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries in his area. These arose after some of non-beneficiaries 
Memory (not her real name) is not an HSCT beneficiary. She lives in ward 4 in Goromonzi. 
She is the second wife in a polygamous marriage with 4 other wives. Each of the 5 wives 
has her own household within the same compound. They are all widows as their husband 
died in 2012.  Memory said wives number 1 and 5 are related as aunt and niece even 
though they were married by the same husband. Wives 1 and 5 are HSCT beneficiaries 
and receive $50 each every 2 months.  
 
Memory is disabled with blindness and is chronically ill. Her household has 9 members 
being herself, 7 grandchildren and 1 daughter – Letwin (not her real name). She has sole 
care of all household members. Memory had 8 children in total but 5 died. The other 2 
surviving adult children do not live with her. Letwin has 5 children and is separated from 
her husband. Letwin’s 5 children live with Memory. Two of her children are in lower 
primary school grades. One girl is not in school because they failed to get money to pay 
for her school fees. One boy is 4 and half years old and will soon have to start primary 
school but is unlikely to enrol because they cannot raise the his fees. 
 
Memory has a 2-roomed house and a separate kitchen hut. Food, healthcare and school 
fees for her grandchildren are clearly a challenge for Memory. She says her household 
has “survival problems through and through, and is going through deep suffering”. She 
says they survive on begging from neighbours and often get grain handouts from the local 
village head. 
 
Memory says she is aware of the HSCT programme. For her, the HSCT is one of the 
source of social tensions and divisions between families in the compound. She feels her 
household was wrongly excluded as she is more deserving than the other 2 wives’ 
households. According to Memory, the first wife stays with her granddaughter. She has 
eight children who are now working adults and live with their families off the compound. 
One is a teacher while the others are cross border traders. Memory says there is a strong 
likelihood that her exclusion from the HSCT is a result of connivance of wives number 1 
and 5. Memory queries how the HSCT targeting enumerators missed the other three 
wives’ households (including hers) during the targeting survey yet they all live in the same 
compound.  Memory says it is more than a coincidence that the HSCT could only register 
wives number 1 and 5 and who happen to be related. She only learnt of the targeting 
survey after the enumerators had left the compound, and that this information had been 
shared by neighbours. 
 
Memory says the social relations between the wives who are HSCT beneficiaries and the 
other 3 who are non-beneficiaries are strained. Wives number 1 and 5 do not share their 
cash transfers, goods including food, and clothing with other families. The problem is 
made worse by the death of the husband. Before he died, he mediated the allocation of 
resources between his wives and their households. 
 
Memory raised her exclusion complaint with the CPC HSCT focal persons in her ward. 
She said they noted the compliant down and forwarded it to MOPSLSW officials but no 
action was taken. Memory’s case is an example of an exclusion error in the HSCT. She 
blames the other wives and the HSCT’s rules for her exclusion. In the former case, she 
suggested that for polygamous marriages it might be better to share the HSCT 
proportionately between each wife’s household. In the case of HSCT rules, she feels the 
scheme should enrol new households to replace those no longer meeting the eligibility 
criteria, dissolved households or in the case of attrition due to deaths.  
Box 5.14: Case study - non-beneficiary’s account of social tensions and 
divisions triggered by the HSCT in a polygamous marriage 
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identified that known people who are on government’s social pension payroll 
were also benefitting from the HSCT. Non-beneficiaries had questioned the 
inclusion of pensioners in the HSCT yet there were some deserving but 
wrongly excluded people from the community. The pensioners were not 
happy that non-beneficiaries had queried their participation in the HSCT and 
took it as jealousy. 
Distilling the findings on the social relations between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries, it appears that the design and implementation features of the 
HSCT that drive the weakening of the social ties between beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries are: targeting method; non-beneficiary perceptions of the 
HSCT’s eligibility criteria which differ from those represented by the proxy 
means test; non-beneficiaries’ perceptions of exclusion and inclusion errors in 
the HSCT; actual cash benefits, and HSCT programme information. Most 
non-beneficiaries in FGDs noted that the circumstances of many of the 
current beneficiary households had significantly improved with some HSCT 
beneficiaries accumulating small livestock and building brick rooms and 
houses.  
5.5.1.6 Social ties between beneficiaries and HSCT focal persons 
Household survey data supported by qualitative findings from FGDs with 
HSCT focal persons suggest that the HSCT has positive effects on social 
relations between beneficiaries and CPC HSCT focal persons. The focal 
persons provide a vital link between the HSCT scheme and beneficiaries. 
Without this link the HSCT would face operational difficulties at community 
levels. Household survey data indicates that nearly all respondents in Epworth 
(98.4%) and in Goromonzi (96.7%) were happy with the way they are treated 
by HSCT focal persons. Box 5.15 shows picture of HSCT focal persons at a 
payment point in Epworth. Box 5.16 gives beneficiaries’ accounts of their 
social relations with focal persons. 
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Anti-clockwise from top: Picture 1: A team of CPC HSCT focal persons 
at an HSCT payment point in Epworth. A majority of the HSCT focal 
persons in all HSCT districts are women. Picture 2: An HSCT focal 
person helps an elderly HSCT beneficiary to check the correctness of 
her cash transfer before she left the payment point. It is a programme 
requirement for beneficiaries to count their money before they leave the 
payment point. Picture 3: An HSCT focal person helps maintain an 
orderly queue of beneficiaries waiting to receive their cash payments. 
The focal persons also check if beneficiaries have brought the correct 
identification documents which are required to facilitate their access to 
the cash transfers. 
Box 5.15: HSCT focal persons at a payment point in Epworth 
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“The focal persons are helpful to us. They regularly inform us about 
payment dates and locations reminding us to bring our HSCT identity 
cards or national identification documents to the payment point. I trust 
them a lot.” – female beneficiary from ward 15 in Goromonzi. 
 
“When I missed my payment during 24th HSCT payment round due to 
illness, the focal person informed programme officials about it. She 
also came to visit and check on me. She has become a close friend to 
me. I confide in her.” – female beneficiary from ward 4 in Goromonzi. 
 
“Mrs Pox (HSCT focal person) is warm person. She visits very often 
even when we are not yet due to receive our payments. She helped a 
lot of HSCT beneficiaries in my village to start up parenting clubs.” – 
female beneficiary from ward 15 in Goromonzi. 
 
“We relate well with focal persons. They are not just focal persons but 
our neighbours as well. They are well respected in our community. 
The work they do on HSCT is helping our community.” – male 
beneficiary from ward 5 in Epworth. 
 
“I am very old and frail. I rely on HSCT focal persons to accompany 
me to the payment point, and to help me collect my cash transfer and 
checking if it is the correct amount. They show compassion and care 
for me.” – male beneficiary from ward 1 in Epworth. 
 
“I interact with CPC members when they come to inform me about 
HSCT payment dates. I also see them regularly when they facilitate 
sessions in our family clubs. I have developed strong ties with HSCT 
focal persons to the extent that if I have a problem of any nature, I 
approach them. I trust them a lot.” – female beneficiary from ward 15 
in Goromonzi. 
 
“I have never been visited by an HSCT focal person to inform me 
about payment dates. I often get information about payment dates 
and location from other beneficiaries. In December 2016, I missed 
collecting my HSCT payment because no CPC informed me about it. I 
am not sure of the role of HSCT focal persons.” – female beneficiary 
from ward 4 in Goromonzi. 
 
“I knew most of the HSCT focal persons before they joined the HSCT. 
We had developed good social relations before the introduction of the 
HSCT in our community. The HSCT has strengthened my pre-existing 
social ties with them. They pay me home visits although with less 
frequency now because their bicycles have broken down” – female 
beneficiary from ward 1 in Epworth. 
 
“Our relations are friendly. We cooperate well with focal persons, and 
they represent us by forwarding our grievances and complaints to 
programme officials. They also advise us on how to use the HSCT 
money wisely.” – male beneficiary from ward 4 in Goromonzi. 
Box 5.16: Beneficiaries' accounts of their social relations with 
HSCT focal persons 
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Qualitative findings from FGDs with HSCT focal persons support the mostly 
positive views shared by beneficiaries on their social ties with focal persons. 
FGDs with focal persons from ward 4 in Goromonzi and Epworth consistently 
stated that HSCT focal persons had good relations with beneficiaries. They 
said that beneficiaries valued the work they do on the HSCT and supported as 
they carry out their work. One challenge that was raised in an FGD in 
Goromonzi is that some of the beneficiaries do not convey payment 
information to other beneficiaries and this has on occasions resulted in some 
beneficiaries missing out on collecting their cash transfers. In Epworth, the 
HSCT focal persons said in the early stages of the HSCT, some of the HSCT 
beneficiaries falsely believed that they get paid for the voluntary work they do 
on the HSCT programme. This had caused a misunderstanding which led 
beneficiaries to insist that the focal persons should use the “money they 
earned from the HSCT to contact them” in cases where they had challenges 
locating beneficiaries for the purposes of informing them about payment dates 
and locations. The misunderstanding was subsequently addressed during a 
pre-cash distribution speech at Makomo primary school. 
The findings on positive social relations between HSCT focal persons and 
beneficiaries suggest that this is primarily driven by the HSCT’s payment 
method and process, and the role of the focal persons on the programme. 
The payment process requires HSCT focal persons to inform beneficiaries 
about payment dates and locations on a regular basis. They also help 
beneficiaries with the payment process at the payment points, and 
occasionally refer their complaints and grievances to programme officials. 
Through this repeated and systematic interaction, social relations between the 
two groups have been formed and strengthened. This operational feature of 
the HSCT has probably strengthened the symbolic role of the HSCT focal 
persons in their communities as accounts of some of the beneficiaries have 
demonstrated for example, that HSCT focal persons are respected in their 
communities. 
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5.5.1.7 Strong linking social capital between beneficiaries and 
programme officials 
The household survey included a set of questions which represented useful 
proxies for examining the effects of the HSCT on social relations between 
beneficiaries and programme staff – mainly MOPSLSW and payment delivery 
officials. The study examined implications of programme processes and 
personnel conduct towards beneficiaries on social relations between 
beneficiaries and programme officials. Qualitative evidence from key 
informant interviews with MOPSLSW official and FGDs with CPC HSCT focal 
persons is used to triangulate and complement household survey data. 
Table 5.50 presents descriptive findings of beneficiaries’ perceptions of HSCT 
personnel’s conduct in terms of how they are treated at payment points and 
whether or not staff exhibit care, compassion and understanding towards the 
elderly, disabled and sick beneficiaries. 
Table 5.50: Beneficiaries' perceptions of how they are treated by HSCT 
personnel at payment points 
 
While nearly all respondents in the two study districts said they were happy 
with the way they were treated by MOPSLSW and Securico officials at 
payment points, the results are negative for the conduct of payment point staff 
towards the old, sick and disabled beneficiaries. HSCT beneficiaries in the 
two districts overwhelmingly said there is no preferential treatment towards 
the sick, old and disable and payment points. They all stand in the same 
queue organised by wards and wait for their turn when their names listed on a 
payment sheet are called out. This finding contradicts the operational 
procedures and guidance to staff set out in the HSCT manual of operations 
Total (N)
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Epworth 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 25,8% 74,2% 27,4% 72,6% 62
Goromonzi 97,8% 2,2% 98,9% 1,1% 23,9% 76,1% 23,9% 76,1% 92
In general, are you happy 
with the way you are treated 
by the Securico (HSCT 
payment delivery agent) staff 
when you go to collect your 
CT at the payment point
In general, are you happy 
with the way you are 
treated by staff from the 
Department of Social 
Services (DSS) when you 
go to colect your CT at 
the payment point
In general, do you think 
Securico (HSCT payment 
delivery agent) staff exhibit 
care, compassion and 
understanding towards the 
elderly, disabled, sick or 
children who come to collect 
their CT
In general, do you think 
staff from the Department 
of Social Services exhibit 
care, compassion and 
understanding  towards 
the elderly, disabled, sick 
or children who come to 
collect their CT
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and other administrative documents. The procedures require staff sensitivity 
towards that category of HSCT beneficiaries. It is a generally accepted social 
and cultural norm in many societies for special care and treatment to be 
accorded to the old, sick and disabled in the course of day to day life 
activities. For example, in many public services, senior citizens are accorded 
preferential treatment and usually have specially assigned and clearly marked 
desks dedicated to assist them. In the public transport sector in the United 
Kingdom for example, there are reserved seats in buses or trains for the old 
and disabled. It is likely that this finding has important repercussions on the 
physical and psychosocial well-being of the old, sick and disabled 
beneficiaries in the HSCT.  
On the punctuality of HSCT payment officers for arriving at payment points, 
survey data shows that a majority of beneficiaries in Epworth (83.9%) and in 
Goromonzi (87%) said HSCT payment officers arrived on time over the last 
payment cycle which was in December 2016. Qualitative findings indicate that 
beneficiaries valued this punctuality as it demonstrated to them that the HSCT 
payment officers were respectful to beneficiaries and interested in serving 
them, and projected a sense of commitment and professionalism on the part 
of payment officials. For respondents who said the payment officers were late 
to arrive at the payment point, most of them stated that the payment officers 
apologised for their lateness, and provided reasonable explanations such as 
vehicle breakdown or unexpected delays at the previous payment point. 
One HSCT beneficiary from ward 15 in Goromonzi said she appreciated the 
service provided by MOPSLSW officers at the St. Peter’s payment point. 
When her avocados are in season, she often takes some to the payment point 
to give to MOPSLSW officers as her gesture of appreciation for the work they 
do to serve poor people like her. 
5.5.1.8 Weak social ties between beneficiaries and community leaders 
Qualitative evidence indicates that the HSCT appears to have inadvertently 
increased the social distance between beneficiaries and community leaders – 
village heads and ward councillors, suggesting adverse effects on the linking 
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dimension of social capital. Key informant interviews with village heads in 
Goromonzi revealed that the community leaders have little to no contact with 
beneficiaries on HSCT-related matters. The village heads said their non-
involvement in important aspects of the HSCT such as targeting and 
selection, payment point processes, grievance handling, and monitoring 
activities has kept them away from regular contact with beneficiaries. One 
village head from Goromonzi said: “HSCT beneficiaries do not inform us 
about how the cash transfers are helping them improve their wellbeing. I 
would like to see them coming and telling me more about the HSCT as I am 
not in the implementation structures of the programme.” The village head 
pointed out that he had a duty to be familiar with the wellbeing of all 
inhabitants in his village. 
A similar view was shared by a ward councillor from Epworth who said she 
used to help some of the HSCT beneficiaries with basic goods for survival 
such as mealie-meal and cooking oil before the introduction of the HSCT. She 
had regular contact with them and often checked on their wellbeing. However, 
once they enrolled on the HSCT scheme, contact with them has been lost. 
The councillor said she is keen to know how well these beneficiaries are doing 
and hoped that the HSCT programme officials would help her re-establish 
contact with them. 
5.5.1.9 Bonding social capital between CPC HSCT focal persons 
The HSCT programme facilitated the formation of social networks of CPC 
HSCT focal persons in each ward where the programme is being 
implemented. Officers from the Department of Social Services in the 
MOPSLSW convened meetings with community members who then selected 
HSCT focal persons from the wider CPC membership through a voting 
process. All community members had the right to vote in those elections. The 
role played by HSCT focal persons on the programme is critical and 
qualitative evidence from FGDs with the CPC members shows that their role 
gives them some form of symbolic leadership role and power. The HSCT focal 
persons said their role has a positive social effect on their status, for example, 
it enhanced their self-esteem and social standing in the community, and 
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changed their relationships with other community members for the better most 
cases. 
The HSCT focal persons meet regularly in-between payment cycles to 
discuss programme issues, and at payment points during the distribution of 
cash. In this way they spent more time together and have got to know each 
other better. According to focal persons in both districts, they have developed 
strong friendships between themselves and often visit each other when they 
are not involved with HSCT work. They share life experiences, social 
solidarity, and some confirmed they had started their own internal savings and 
lending clubs which are helping improve their lives. 
A detailed analysis of the social bonds developed between the HSCT focal 
persons in the two study district is provided in the next chapter. The analysis 
draws from the social network theory and concepts. 
5.5.1.10 Social ties between HSCT focal persons and non-beneficiaries  
The evidence drawn from separate FGDs with CPC focal persons and non-
beneficiaries point primarily to negative effects of the HSCT on social capital 
between the two groups. The study found that the negative effects are driven 
by three factors: (1) inaccurate information held by some of the non-
beneficiaries on the HSCT targeting and selection process, (2) non-
beneficiaries’ perception of the role of CPC focal persons in the 
implementation of the HSCT, and (3) strong bonds that exist between HSCT 
beneficiaries and CPC focal persons. The HSCT focal persons stated in an 
FGD that non-beneficiaries hold the view that CPC focal persons caused their 
exclusion from the HSCT. According to the CPC members, non-beneficiaries 
perceive the former to wield significant influence in the targeting and selection 
of HSCT beneficiaries. These perceptions were widespread in both 
Goromonzi and Epworth. The strong ties that exist between HSCT recipients 
and CPC HSCT focal persons were cited by the latter as partly contributing to 
the weak ties between focal persons and non-beneficiaries. The fact that 
HSCT focal persons were seen by non-beneficiaries in frequent contact with 
beneficiaries – communicating payment dates and locations, following up on 
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recipients who miss payments and their interactions at payment points – 
seem to have led to feelings of jealousy and resentment by non-beneficiaries 
towards HSCT focal persons.  
The HSCT focal persons in Goromonzi said that they had informed 
MOPSLSW officials about cases of some non-deserving people who had 
been erroneously included in the HSCT for example, village heads and school 
teachers. The MOPSLSW investigated the cases, and subsequently removed 
the undeserving beneficiaries from the HSCT. According to the CPC 
members, this had caused a breakdown in their social relations with the 
affected people in the community. However, the CPC members were not 
concerned about this because they had acted within the dictates of their roles 
and responsibilities in the HSCT. 
CPC members from ward 1 in Epworth said non-beneficiaries viewed them as 
people who were unfair, and did not trust them. One HSCT focal persons 
said:  
I am seen by non-beneficiaries visiting HSCT beneficiaries regularly 
and hardly ever visit non-beneficiary households in the course of my 
HSCT duties. I was once called a witch by a non-beneficiary because 
she thought I am the reason for her exclusion from the HSCT. The 
problem is that non-beneficiaries do not have accurate and adequate 
information about the HSCT’s objectives, targeting and selection 
mechanisms. 
The weak social ties and low levels of trust between HSCT focal persons and 
non-beneficiaries in Epworth were worsened by the fact that at one point the 
focal persons were asked to prepare a list of names of wrongly excluded but 
deserving non-beneficiaries. The list was compiled and forwarded to the 
HSCT programme officials but nothing was done afterwards. The non-
beneficiaries think that the CPC focal persons could have either manipulated 
the list or did not forward the list at all. Consequently, interpersonal trust 
between the two groups seems to have been negatively affected. 
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5.5.1.11 Linking social capital between community leaders and HSCT 
focal persons  
Qualitative findings from FGDs with HSCT focal persons and in-depth 
interviews with community leaders (village heads and ward councillors) in 
Goromonzi and Epworth point to positive effects of the HSCT on the social 
relationship between focal persons and community leaders. Village heads in 
Goromonzi, and ward councillors in both districts spoke of cordial relations 
between them and HSCT focal persons from their wards. They said the HSCT 
focal persons kept them up to date with HSCT information pertaining to: 
progress with implementation, challenges, payment dates and payment point 
locations. They said they attended some of the HSCT payment distributions 
as observers and sometimes to refer complaints that they receive from non-
beneficiaries to HSCT programme officials. As a result of their regular 
interactions with HSCT focal persons they have accurate information and 
knowledge of the implementation of the HSCT in their areas. They 
emphasised that while their interactions with focal persons are on an informal 
basis, they recognise and appreciate the vital role played by the focal persons 
on the HSCT. In addition the community leaders noted that the focal persons 
provide an important “information bridge” between them as community 
leaders and the HSCT programme officials. Village heads and ward 
councillors reported instances where some non-beneficiaries approached 
them to file appeals after being excluded from the HSCT following the 
targeting and selection of beneficiaries. The community leaders reported 
referring some of the cases to the focal persons while in other instances they 
took the cases directly to the help desk at the HSCT payment points in their 
areas. 
On the other hand the HSCT focal persons said that their participation in the 
HSCT had a positive effect on their status and was strengthening their ties 
with community leaders. This had earned them recognition from village heads 
and ward councillors. According to them, this linking social capital has an 
important bearing on their welfare and could be a powerful force for their 
social transformation. In both districts the HSCT focal persons reported 
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receiving 50 kilogram bags of grain monthly from the government’s drought 
mitigation scheme. They said this relief assistance was facilitated by 
community leaders who recommended that they be included on the list of 
beneficiaries as a gesture of appreciation for the good work they do for and 
with the community. The focal persons felt that the HSCT could learn from this 
“act of benevolence” and extend similar incentives to them too. 
The study found that two of the HSCT focal persons in wards 4 and 15 of 
Goromonzi district were also village heads. In both cases the village heads 
said this duality of roles has its advantages mainly around the following 
points:  
• That the HSCT focal persons’ role brings them closer to community 
members and in this way they get to know of different social issues 
affecting their community members.  
• The regular interaction is an important and cost free way of 
strengthening linking social capital with their subjects and could further 
enhance trust;  
• Their participation gives legitimacy to programme activities on the 
ground;  
• Participation in the HSCT enabled them to directly observe HSCT 
effects in their communities; and 
• Direct involvement with the HSCT gives them opportunities to promote 
positive moral and cultural values and to regulate social order among 
members in their communities. 
5.5.1.12 Linking social capital between HSCT focal persons and 
programme officials 
Qualitative findings from FGDs with CPC members suggest that the linking 
social capital between the HSCT focal persons and HSCT programme 
officials is weakening. The HSCT focal persons said they have queries about 
some operational aspects of the HSCT, including queries against programme 
officials. The focal persons in the two study districts said they were facing 
challenges of mobility, communication and financial resources. These 
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constraints were negatively affecting their work on HSCT. They reported 
repeatedly raising specific complaints and grievances broken down bicycles, 
worn-out uniforms, and unprocessed reimbursement claims. Furthermore, 
they used to get US$15 worth of mobile phone time credit to use as they went 
about their regular HSCT work but this arrangement was stopped a few years 
back. They now have to rely on their own airtime credit, which is a cost to 
them, and for which they are not reimbursed. They said the MOPSLSW staff 
did not explain reasons for the withdrawal of airtime credit.  
According to them, the MOPSLSW has not addressed any of their queries. 
Instead, they claimed they are often told by programme officials that they are 
volunteers on the HSCT. The focal persons said they perceived this to 
suggest that their work on the HSCT is no longer valued by the MOPSLSW. 
Box 5.17 below provides accounts of HSCT focal persons on operational 
constraints to their work on the programme.
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Interviews with MOPSLSW and UNICEF revealed that they were aware of the 
challenges faced by CPC HSCT focal persons but that funding constraints 
had prevented them from addressing the queries. They said they are now 
working on a plan to address the concerns from the focal persons. 
“When the HSCT started, we used to get airtime credit from the Ministry but this practice 
was stopped in early 2016. We now have to rely on our limited personal resources to 
keep contact with beneficiaries. We feel this is unfair on us because in a sense we are 
now subsidising the HSCT programme” – FGD in ward 15, Goromonzi district. 
 
“Two of our HSCT focal persons in this ward died from ill-health. They were hard working 
volunteers in our ward. The MOPSLSW officers did not show any compassion or 
solidarity towards these losses. Upon hearing of the loss of the two focal persons, the first 
thing the officers did was to ask through us, for the return of the bicycles the two 
deceased focal persons were using. We all thought this was wrong. We expected the 
MOPSLSW officers to attend the funeral and show recognition and appreciation of the 
HSCT work done by our fellow friends” – FGD in ward 15, Goromonzi district. 
 
“Our ward is the biggest in Goromonzi district. It has 76 villages but only 11 HSCT focal 
persons. The number of focal persons is too small to adequately cover the entire ward. 
There are some remote areas in this districts which we have not been able to reach out to 
on a regular basis because of the limited number of HSCT focal persons. We raised the 
need for more focal persons with the District Social Services office but nothing has been 
done yet to address this challenge” FGD in ward 4, Goromonzi district. 
 
“We would appreciate it if the Ministry acknowledges and rewards the nature and 
intensity of our work. Yes we are volunteers but we also have families to look after. Our 
ideal but modest incentive structure includes: functional bicycles which we should be 
allowed to use for both HSCT and personal activities; US$50 per payment cycle; 2 sets of 
uniforms per year; raincoats, soap, lunch when we are at payment points because we 
spent almost a full day there; and training on how to start and manage our own income 
generation projects” FGD in ward 4, Goromonzi district. 
 
“We are also poor and vulnerable families in our communities. There is a very thin line 
between the nature of our socio-economic circumstances and beneficiaries.  Our sincere 
plea is that the government should consider enrolling focal persons as beneficiaries on 
the HSCT too. We do not mind receiving small transfer sizes. We have very limited time 
to do our own income generation activities because we devote a lot of our time to the 
HSCT programme” – FGD in ward 1, Epworth district. 
 
“We work in unsystematic and seemingly informal ways with the District Social Services 
officers. The DSS officers are frequently changed and as such we have not been able to 
build long term working relationships with them. Unlike HSCT beneficiaries who have a 
formal grievance and complaints mechanism, we have no proper channel through which 
we can raise our queries” – FGD in ward 1, Epworth district. 
 
“We are concerned that our HSCT work in the community is recognised and rewarded by 
other authorities like the District Administrator who has helpfully included us as 
beneficiaries on the grain distribution scheme, yet officials on the HSCT scheme whom 
we work with regularly have not seen the need for a similar gesture of appreciation. If we 
can receive grain from the government’s relief programme, what can we not be given 
small amounts of cash from the HSCT?” – FGD in ward 5, Epworth. 
Box 5.17: Accounts of HSCT focal persons on operational challenges 
they are facing in the HSCT – from FGDs 
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5.5.2 Associational life of HSCT beneficiaries 
Table 5.51 below shows that most HSCT households in the two study districts 
belonged to a religious or spiritual group. A number of beneficiaries in 
Epworth highlighted using their transfers to contribute to informal or more 
formal funeral policies such as a reputable funeral insurance service provide – 
Nyaradzo Funeral Services. Members pay monthly subscriptions for selected 
packages which cater for different income groups. 
 
Two HSCT focal persons’ from Epworth district with bicycles they received 
from the programme in 2012. According to the focal persons in the two 
study districts, most of the bicycles have since broken down. This has 
affected their effectiveness on the HSCT. They said there is no 
maintenance plan for the bicycles. They suggested that the Ministry could 
send a bike maintenance team twice per year to service the bicycles. 
Furthermore, the HSCT focal persons said they would be grateful if the 
Ministry could donate the bicycles to them when the HSCT programme 
ends. 
Box 5.18: Type of bicycles used by HSCT focal persons 
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Table 5.51: Number and percentage of HSCT households that participate 
in membership associations or community local groups 
 
District 
All 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Internal savings and lending Groups 10,2% 13,8% 12,1% 
Religious or spiritual group 71,4% 70,7% 71,0% 
Burial society 18,4% 3,4% 10,3% 
Women's group 0,0% 3,4% 1,9% 
Traditional healer’s association 0,0% 1,7% 0,9% 
CBO or Civic groups (including family clubs) 0,0% 6,9% 3,7% 
Total 49 58 107 
Members access assistance with funeral and burial expenses following the 
death of a registered household member. The HSCT beneficiaries indicated 
said they were able to sustain payment of their monthly subscriptions to the 
funeral schemes using part of their HSCT money as well as income from own 
productive activities such as poultry sales, goat rearing, and tuckshops. Some 
said they received assistance from relatives working outside Zimbabwe in 
countries like South Africa and United Kingdom. 
Qualitative data indicate that a majority of the HSCT beneficiaries who said 
they were not members of any club or association cited the following factors 
as inhibiting their participation: (1) old age, (2) ill-health, and (3) length of 
residency in the village or area. For the third reason, they said it takes time to 
build social networks, and to decide to join associations when you are new in 
a community. Building trust with people takes time and is often a result of 
numerous repeated interactions. In all these cases the HSCT was not a direct 
factor in their decisions to join membership groups or community networks 
although indirectly the HSCT can lead to repeated interactions of 
beneficiaries, for example, at payment points, and therefore to the building of 
trust which is a decision factor. It appears they lacked the energy to attend 
group meetings and to meet the demands required of group members. Yet for 
others, reasons cited were to do with the small size of the cash transfer which 
limited their entry into subscription-based networks and associations. In this 
sense, the data suggest that a factor linked to the HSCT is a barrier to the 
participation of some of the HSCT beneficiaries in community life or 
subscription-based membership associations. 
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HSCT beneficiaries were asked the question: “Compared to 4 years ago 
(before you were selected as a beneficiary to receive HSCT), do members of 
your household participate in fewer or more groups or organisations?” Results 
in table 5.52 show that 31.9% of respondents in Epworth and 41.1% in 
Goromonzi said they now participate in more community groups or 
organisations. Qualitative data indicate that the HSCT had an influence on 
households’ decisions to join new groups or membership associations. Box 
5.19 gives examples of HSCT’s influence on participation in more 
membership associations and community groups. 
Table 5.52: Do household members participate in more, fewer or same 
number of membership groups or organisations? 
 
District 
Total 
Epworth Goromonzi 
More  31,9% 41,1% 38 
Fewer 4,3% 5,4% 5 
Same number 63,8% 53,6% 60 
Total 47 56 103 
While a majority of beneficiaries in Epworth (63.8%) and in Goromonzi 
(53.6%) indicated that members of their households participate in the same 
number of groups or organisations, they said that the HSCT had for example 
improved their attendance at church as they could now contribute towards 
church offerings; they bought new clothing items which made them appear 
presentable in church; and they were able to renew membership dues in 
subscription-based organisations. Yet for many others who reported that 
household members participate in the same number of community groups, 
being part of the HSCT had not changed anything for them. 
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The HSCT beneficiaries who reported that they participated in membership 
associations or community groups said there were several important benefits 
from joining the groups. In both districts, the church was a key source of 
spiritual, social status and self-esteem support but not so in terms of material 
support due to difficult economic times. According to a focus group discussion 
with non-beneficiaries, many years before the introduction of HSCT in 
Goromonzi ward 15, the Catholic Church was a major source of relief support 
for the poor and vulnerable in the villages. Now the church’s capacity and 
once rich tradition of providing material support and relief to the poor and 
vulnerable in the community are limited due to resource constraints. In the 
words of one non-beneficiary:  
“Through the HSCT, I was able to join the family club. Family clubs are a 
direct creation of the HSCT. They did not exist prior before 2012. We are 
taught parenting skills and how to protect our children back in the 
communities. Prior to the HSCT, the only group I was part of was my 
church” – female beneficiary from ward 15, Goromonzi district. 
 
“My participation in the HSCT has helped me to free up some small 
amount of cash from my income from the tuckshop. I used this extra cash 
to join at internal savings and lending club at my church” – male 
beneficiary from ward 1, Epworth district. 
 
“I joined Wadzanayi Burial Society. I contribute $3 per month from my 
HSCT money” – female beneficiary from ward 4, Goromonzi district. 
 
“I was bed-ridden for a long time prior to joining the HSCT. Since I started 
receiving the HSCT, I have been pay for regular health checks at the local 
clinic. I am much better physically and I have been able to join a new 
church in my area” – female beneficiary from ward 5, Epworth district. 
 
“Five of us HSCT beneficiaries started our own internal savings and 
lending club in 2013. We met at St. Peter’s payment point several times 
and discussed the idea of setting up an ISL. CPC HSCT focal persons 
helped us with ideas about how the ISL might work. We contribute $10 
every month. If one borrows $20, they return with an interest of $2” – 
female beneficiary from ward 15 in Goromonzi district. 
Box 5.19: Beneficiary accounts of how the HSCT led household 
members to participate in more community groups or associations 
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The church used to feed many hungry families and provided free 
health care services to the community. That is all in the past now. The 
church is struggling like many other social and religious institutions in 
Zimbabwe. Mission hospitals now demand cash for health services 
regardless of one’s social status. The church through its bishops and 
priests, some of whom have since returned to their home countries, 
had better access to welfare resources from its good Samaritans 
based overseas. It is the church that is now asking for help from the 
community. While the desire to give is there in the hearts of people, 
these days people go to church and contribute little or nothing in terms 
of offerings because they don’t have. Church priests often plead with 
congregants to contribute to the church. 
HSCT beneficiaries in the two districts viewed ISLs, traders’ associations and 
women’s groups as important for improving their households’ current 
livelihood or access to services. They said burial societies were important in 
times of emergencies such as deaths in the future. Family clubs and other 
civic organisations such as Rotary clubs were perceived to have widespread 
benefits for the communities. 
The study explored the internal diversity of membership of the community 
groups or organisations cited by beneficiaries in the household survey. The 
study found that memberships in church groups were very diverse with people 
coming from different villages, wards, genders, age groups, ethnic and tribal 
groups, and have different income levels, social status, educational levels and 
occupations. One beneficiary in Goromonzi ward 4 said some members in his 
church came all the way from Harare, which is about 30km from his village to 
worship with them. The internal diversity is high in churches and this had the 
benefits of widening HSCT beneficiaries’ social networks, better access to 
resources from bridging social capital, and congregants almost always have 
different information so that more is gained from exchanging information. 
The study further explored whether the groups or associations that HSCT 
beneficiaries said they belonged to worked or interacted with other groups 
with similar goals inside or outside their wards, villages or neighbourhoods. 
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Results for the entire study sample shown in table 5.53 below indicate that 
most of the groups and associations in which HSCT beneficiaries are 
members or participate in that have no horizontal (or bridging) links with other 
groups with similar goals within their villages/wards. Only the traditional 
healers’ associations were cited as occasionally interacting with other groups 
with similar goals in the areas. Similar results were obtained on local groups’ 
interactions with other groups outside the areas in which local groups operate. 
These results suggest that beneficiaries’ access to other social capital 
resources and information beyond their communities is limited. Groups with 
linkages with other groups or associations with similar goals within and 
outside areas in which they operate often have better access to resources 
especially from outside the village, such as from government or NGOs. Such 
linkages provide access to bridging or linking social capital resources in 
contrast to the bonding social capital that exist within the group. 
Table 5.53: Does group or membership association work or interact with 
other groups in your village/area/neighbourhood 
Group ISL 
Group 
Religious/
Spiritual 
Group 
Burial 
Society 
Women’s 
Group 
Traditional 
Healers 
Association 
CBO/Civic 
Group 
No 76,9% 50,0% 72,7% 100,0% 0,0% 75,0% 
Yes, 
occasionall
y 15,4% 34,2% 18,2% 0,0% 100,0% 25,0% 
Yes, 
frequently 7,7% 15,8% 9,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Total 13 76 11 2 1 4 
Family Clubs were prevalent in Goromonzi and their memberships were 
predominantly female, with group members mostly HSCT-beneficiaries. 
Similarly, Internal Savings and Lending clubs comprised mostly of HSCT 
beneficiaries with members coming from the same villages or areas. 
The study found an interesting connection between one family club and one 
ISL in Goromonzi district. HSCT beneficiaries met and interacted regularly as 
a family club leading to development of interpersonal trust among members. 
This trust built in the context of a non-financial social setting contributed to the 
formation of an ISL within the family club – network within a network. 
Members started accessing financial benefits in the form of access to credit. 
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Another example was cited by a female beneficiary from ward 15 in 
Goromonzi district who joined a sewing club in Harare, indicating a form of 
bridging social capital as the sewing club consists of members from diverse 
backgrounds and places of origin. She said they formed a grocery club within 
the sewing club where members contributed groceries worth a group total of 
$25 each month and gave to one member. They rotated this every month until 
each member got her turn to receive the groceries. The findings in both cases 
suggest that economic benefits such as access to credit and goods can result 
non-financial social settings with trust as a key mediator for this to happen. 
Payment of membership subscriptions is generally viewed as a sign of greater 
interest in participating in an association’s activities. The findings show that 
11.3% of survey respondents in Epworth and 3.3% in Goromonzi said they 
used part of their bimonthly cash transfers from the HSCT to pay membership 
subscriptions to organisations and community groups they belonged to. 
5.5.3 Shocks and coping strategies 
The survey asked HSCT beneficiaries whether their households had 
experienced shocks or crises in the last 4 years, which negatively affected the 
household and making it difficult to meet the households’ basic needs. 
Results in table 5.54 show that HSCT households in the two study districts 
experienced both covariate and idiosyncratic shocks. Most of the HSCT 
households in the two districts experienced covariate shocks in the form of 
high agricultural input prices flowed by droughts and floods. The high 
agricultural input prices were felt more in Goromonzi than in Epworth. This is 
not surprising because Goromonzi is predominantly a rural district where 
agriculture is a primary source of livelihood. The most common idiosyncratic 
shock reported by beneficiaries in the two districts was death of a 
breadwinner in their households. In Epworth 23% of respondents reported 
that a household member was jailed in the last four years. This is not 
surprising as criminal activities are a common occurrence and a major 
problem in Epworth district. 
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Table 5.54: Type of shocks experienced by HSCT beneficiaries in the 
last 4 years 
 Shocks reported by district District 
  Epworth Goromonzi 
Drought/Flood 27,9% 34,10% 
Loss of access to land, water or other natural resources 
for production 3,3% 3,4% 
Loss of productive assets (tools, machinery etc. 9,8% 2,3% 
Livestock deaths 0,0% 17,0% 
Inability to pay debts 3,3% 1,1% 
Death of bread winner in household 24,6% 21,6% 
Bread winner left household 8,2% 5,7% 
High agricultural input prices 32,8% 42,0% 
End of regular assistance, aid or remittances from 
outside household 
0,0% 2,3% 
Jailed 23,0% 8,0% 
Dwelling damaged, destroyed, burglary 1,6% 0,0% 
Birth in household 4,9% 1,1% 
Business failure 8,2% 8,0% 
Crop failure 6,6% 0,0% 
Crop damage when stored 0,0% 1,1% 
Large expenditure on social obligations 1,6% 1,1% 
Total 61 88 
On risk coping strategies, results show that HSCT households in the two 
study districts adopted a variety of strategies to manage risks they face. In the 
two study districts, droughts and floods were handled by receiving external 
and unconditional relief assistance from NGOs/religious institutions; changes 
in eating and dietary patterns; and reliance on own savings. Some 
beneficiaries in Goromonzi reported selling livestock. Yet, for others in 
Goromonzi they reported they did not do anything because they had nothing 
to fall back on. 
Household survey data show that receiving unconditional help from relatives 
and friends was the main source of support for dealing with death shocks that 
affected HSCT households in the two districts. HSCT households also relied 
on savings from their HSCT money, and received unconditional help from 
NGOs and religious institutions. In Epworth district, one respondent said 
household members migrated following the death of the breadwinner. 
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In Goromonzi district, weather shocks – droughts and floods resulted in some 
of the HSCT households incurring new credits while others received 
unconditional help in the form of agricultural inputs from government. 
The use of negative coping strategies was limited and isolated with only one 
respondent in Goromonzi district reporting distress sale of livestock. 
Results from this section suggest that the HSCT has positive social effects on 
households as relying on savings indicates that the HSCT is strengthening 
some households’ resilience to cope with both covariate and idiosyncratic 
shocks. It also appears that household coping strategies depended much on 
the nature and quality of the social networks and relationships within the 
HSCT households are embedded. For example, some households relied on 
receiving unconditional help from relatives, friends, NGOs and religious 
institutions. As highlighted earlier, the HSCT facilitated entry of some 
beneficiary households into social networks and community groups with 
positive social effects such as access to support resources in times of need. 
When HSCT beneficiaries turn to others outside their household or receive 
support from the same – it is a positive indication of their connectedness with 
the community and social networks. 
5.5.4 Effects of the HSCT on cognitive dimensions of social capital 
This section discusses the effects of HSCT on the intangible forms of social 
capital, that is, trust, norms of reciprocity and psychosocial benefits, and 
participation of HSCT in mutually beneficial community activities. 
5.5.4.1 Trust dimension 
The survey contained direct questions on trust, some of which were also 
asked in separate FGDs with non-beneficiaries, CPC members, and in-depth 
interviews with community leaders. A number of the questions on trust were 
modelled on standard questions often used in social capital surveys 
particularly in the World Values Survey, while a few others were directly linked 
to the HSCT. The survey asked HSCT beneficiaries the question: How much 
do you trust different types of people (interpersonal trust): HSCT beneficiaries; 
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non-beneficiaries; shop-keepers; local government officials (for example 
district officials, and ward councillors); police; teachers; nurses and doctors; 
strangers; and people from your ethnic/tribal/linguistic/race. The response 
options are on a 5-point scale, 1-5, with 1 representing - to a very small 
extent, 2 = to a small extent, 3 = neither small nor great extent, 4 = to a great 
extent, and 5 = to a very great extent. 
The findings show that most HSCT beneficiaries exhibit high levels of trust in 
other HSCT beneficiaries – people close to them and with whom they 
interacted frequently. Results were similar in the two districts: Epworth – 
45.2% of respondents said they trusted other HSCT beneficiaries to a great 
extent, and 41.9% said to a very great extent; and in Goromonzi – 48.9% of 
respondents said they trusted other HSCT beneficiaries to a great extent, and 
42.4% said to a very great extent.  In the two districts survey data shows that 
most HSCT beneficiaries’ levels of trust in non-beneficiaries are: to a small 
extent (Epworth 25.8% and Goromonzi 30.4%); and to a very small extent 
(Epworth 24.2% and Goromonzi 12%). The least trusted people in both 
districts were strangers. HSCT beneficiaries said this is so because they do 
not have information and knowledge about strangers and so would rather be 
cautious in their dealings with them. HSCT beneficiaries highlighted the 
following reasons for trusting in other HSCT beneficiaries to a very great 
extent are: 
• Repeated interactions resulting in them acquiring general and specific 
knowledge about each other. 
• As beneficiaries they faced similar incentives or disincentives. 
• They vouched for each other at payment points, for example, 
conveying messages from other beneficiaries who miss payments. 
• They frequently travelled together to the payment points. 
• They have developed strong bonds through their regular interactions in 
family, and internal savings clubs. 
The most common reasons cited by HSCT beneficiaries for the low levels of 
trust in non-beneficiaries were: limited interaction between the two groups; 
jealous; making them feel inferior; concern for safety; and fears of witchcraft. 
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This is consistent with an earlier point stated by beneficiaries who said that it 
is a problem if other community members (non-beneficiaries) knew they were 
receiving HSCT payments. The low levels of trust between beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries may partly explain the examples of strained social relations 
between the two groups as highlighted earlier. In addition findings show that 
beneficiaries rarely share programme information with non-beneficiaries as 
one of the consequences of low levels of trust between the two groups. 
HSCT beneficiaries in Epworth and Goromonzi districts said their level of trust 
in people in formal institutions like teachers, nurses and doctors is increasing 
partly because of the HSCT which was enabling them to interact frequently 
with the people who provided services in these institutions. Through the 
HSCT they were now able to send children to school and meet their children’s 
teachers regularly for consultations on children’s school performance, and 
sometimes to request authority for part-payment of school fees in cases 
where they are not able to pay fees in full. They also cited other reasons for 
trusting in teachers as: “they impart knowledge and skills to our children,” 
“they teach our children discipline,” and “they are respected by our children”. 
Furthermore, survey respondents said their trust in MOPSLSW officials and 
staff from NGOs is being strengthened through regular interactions at HSCT 
payment points.  
Survey respondents were asked the question: Do you think that over the last 
four years (since the introduction of the HSCT programme), the level of 
generalised trust in this ward/village/neighbourhood has got better, worse or 
stayed about the same?  The responses took values 1 = got better; 2 = got 
worse, and 3 = stayed about the same. Results in table 5.55 show that 
majority of beneficiaries in the two districts think that generalised trust levels 
stayed about the same. However, considerable numbers of beneficiaries in 
the two districts think the introduction of the HSCT has improved generalised 
trust in their villages, wards or neighbourhoods. Yet, other respondents think 
the HSCT had a negative effect on trust levels in their communities. 
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Table 5.55: Levels of generalised trust after the introduction of the HSCT 
Do you think that over the last 4 years (since the introduction of the HSCT 
programme), the level of trust in this ward/village/neighbourhood has got better, 
worse or stayed bout the same? 
 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Got better 33,9% 33,7% 
Got worse 14,5% 12,0% 
Stayed about the same 51,6% 54,3% 
Total 62 92 
Beneficiaries who suggested that trust levels had improved in the last four 
years said this was on account of reduced levels of begging and crime rates, 
and generally a reduction in destructive coping mechanisms as many poor 
and vulnerable people in their communities now have a safety net in the form 
of the HSCT. 
Generalised trust is often measured with the survey question: Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be 
too careful in your dealings with other people? Results in table 5.56 below 
indicate that HSCT beneficiaries in the two districts do not trust people on 
whom they have no direct information, for example, strangers. These results 
support earlier findings which point to low levels of trust towards strangers. 
Table 5.56: Respondents' views on generalised trust 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t 
be too careful in your dealings with other people 
 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Most people can be trusted 23,0% 38,6% 
You can’t be too careful 77,0% 61,4% 
Total 61 88 
The measures of trust discussed in this section other than high levels of trust 
in other HSCT beneficiaries and officials from public institutions yield low 
estimates of social capital in the two districts. This suggests that the HSCT is 
being implemented in settings with weak social capital. 
The study found that there are some operational aspects of the HSCT which 
appear to have negative effects on particularised trust. 
 405 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.4.2 Norms of reciprocity 
In the two study districts beneficiaries reported that the HSCT is strengthening 
their reciprocal relationships with other community members. Survey findings 
in table 5.57 below show that most of the beneficiaries in Epworth (73.7%) 
and in Goromonzi (70.7%) either agreed or strongly agreed that they were 
involved in exchanging reciprocal favours with their friends.  
Table 5.57: Respondents' levels of participation in reciprocal exchanges 
 
District 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Among my group of friends we 
do favours for each other. 
Strongly disagree 4,9% 6,5% 
Disagree 6,6% 9,8% 
Neither agree nor disagree 14,8% 13,0% 
Agree 55,7% 51,1% 
Strongly agree 18,0% 19,6% 
N 62 92 
A beneficiary in Epworth ward 1 said she exchanged two small chickens in 
return for a bucket of maize with her neighbour, something she could not have 
One female beneficiary, Susan (not her real name) from ward 15 in 
Goromonzi district said the six-month delay in disbursement of the HSCT 
money between March and September 2016 had particularly negative 
effects on her social capital. The payment delay eroded the trust that 
Susan built over time with a community shop operator. The community 
shop operator who is also a neighbour to Susan confronted her and 
demanded that she clears her debt at a time when she did not have any 
money as she was waiting for the HSCT disbursement to come. Susan 
had to be helped by a non-beneficiary neighbour who loaned her $10 so 
she could make a part payment towards clearing the debt.  
 
Susan said her social relations with the shop owner have been affected 
negatively as she might never have access to credit purchases in future. 
Susan is also concerned about the potential snowballing effect this 
incident might have on her social standing in the community. In case that 
she decides to ask to buy goods on credit from other shop owners in the 
community, she fears that the incident might have reached other shop 
operators in the community considering that shop owners in her village 
know each well and exchange information on customers’ 
creditworthiness. Susan also said this incident has made her risk averse 
for taking goods on credit in the short to medium term. 
Box 5.20: Case study - negative effects of payment delays on 
particularised trust 
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done if she was not an HSCT beneficiary. In ward 4 of Goromonzi an HSCT 
beneficiary said he was involved in a reciprocal agriculture labour-sharing 
arrangement with his a fellow HSCT beneficiary. They both have labour 
capacity and would work on each other’s fields during the crop planting and 
harvesting seasons. He reported that their friendship which developed 
through several interactions at St. Peter’s payment point had enabled them to 
enter into a reciprocal exchange of agricultural labour.  In Epworth’s ward 1, a 
female beneficiary said she counted on her fellow HSCT beneficiary who lives 
nearby to take care of her children when she travels. She said she returns the 
favour if her friend travels. In most cases her friend’s children temporarily 
move to her house while their mother is away. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.4.3 Psychosocial effects of the HSCT on beneficiaries 
Survey respondents reported positive and negative individual psycho-social 
effects stemming from their participation in the HSCT. Responses to a wide 
range of closed subjective opinion questions in table 5.58 below give useful 
insights into HSCT beneficiaries’ psychosocial well-being. The findings reveal 
the following: There was most positive agreement that receiving the HSCT 
made beneficiaries no more inferior than others; the HSCT is something 
beneficiaries were happy to be part of; and that the HSCT had a lot of 
influence in making their communities better places to live (figure 5.12) 
suggesting that the HSCT has contributed to the strengthening of community 
social capital. For respondents who said the HSCT was improving community 
life, their justification was that the extent of begging had declined in their 
Belinda (not her real name) is a female HSCT recipient from ward 15 in 
Goromonzi district. She has a close friend and neighbour, Maria (not her real 
name), whom she regularly exchanges gifts and favours with. Maria is a 
beneficiary under a relief programme supported by Plan International in the area. 
From the food items she buys using her cash transfer, Belinda shares cooking oil 
and sugar with her close friend. Maria returns the favour by giving Belinda a share 
of beans she receives from Plan International. Belinda said that the HSCT has 
strengthened her ability for mutually beneficial reciprocity over the past four years. 
In this regard, Belinda said she feels a strong sense of being part of the 
community. 
Box 5.21: An example of a reciprocal exchange between an HSCT beneficiary 
and her neighbour 
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communities, sights of miserable people and the number of extremely poor 
people had declined. They suggested there was a general sense of happiness 
and solidarity in their communities. 
Most HSCT beneficiaries in the two study districts reported an external sense 
of being valued and appreciated by others (others let me know that they enjoy 
working with me; I know that others appreciate me as a person). 
Table 5.58: Beneficiary responses to a wide range of subjective opinion 
questions 
 
District 
Epworth Goromonzi 
I spent time with others who 
have the same interests that I 
do 
Strongly disagree 16,1% 14,3% 
Disagree 6,5% 23,1% 
Neither agree nor disagree 4,8% 9,9% 
Agree 54,8% 38,5% 
Strongly agree 17,7% 14,3% 
Others let me know that they 
enjoy working with me (e.g. in 
the field etc.). 
Strongly disagree 4,8% 2,2% 
Disagree 4,8% 7,6% 
Neither agree nor disagree 11,3% 19,6% 
Agree 59,7% 46,7% 
Strongly agree 19,4% 23,9% 
I have relatives or friends that 
will help me out even if I can't 
pay them back. 
Strongly disagree 12,9% 12,0% 
Disagree 12,9% 10,9% 
Neither agree nor disagree 3,2% 2,2% 
Agree 40,3% 37,0% 
Strongly agree 30,6% 38,0% 
I know that others appreciate 
me as a person. 
Strongly disagree 3,2% 2,2% 
Disagree 4,8% 5,4% 
Neither agree nor disagree 8,1% 3,3% 
Agree 66,1% 59,8% 
Strongly agree 17,7% 29,3% 
I have people to share social 
events and fun activities with. 
Strongly disagree 1,6% 1,1% 
Disagree 4,8% 10,9% 
Neither agree nor disagree 8,1% 6,5% 
Agree 64,5% 57,6% 
Strongly agree 21,0% 23,9% 
I have a sense of being needed 
by another person 
Strongly disagree 8,1% 1,1% 
Disagree 3,2% 6,5% 
Neither agree nor disagree 4,8% 2,2% 
Agree 66,1% 65,2% 
Strongly agree 17,7% 25,0% 
The HSCT makes me no more 
inferior than others. 
Strongly disagree 3,2% 0,0% 
Disagree 0,0% 2,2% 
Neither agree nor disagree 11,3% 2,2% 
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District 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Agree 41,9% 34,8% 
Strongly agree 43,5% 60,9% 
The HSCT is something that I 
am happy to be part of. 
Strongly disagree 4,8% 1,1% 
Disagree 0,0% 1,1% 
Neither agree nor disagree 1,6% 0,0% 
Agree 17,7% 17,4% 
Strongly agree 75,8% 80,4% 
The HSCT has strengthened 
relationships with my family 
Strongly disagree 3,2% 0,0% 
Disagree 3,2% 1,1% 
Neither agree nor disagree 1,6% 4,4% 
Agree 40,3% 36,3% 
Strongly agree 51,6% 58,2% 
N   62 92 
 
Figure 5.12: Influence of the HSCT in making the 
village/community/neighbourhood/ward a better place to live 
 
In Epworth and Goromonzi districts, some beneficiaries were able to build 
houses or made some improvements to their houses. Other respondents said 
they purchased kitchen utensils, blankets, and small livestock. HSCT 
beneficiaries reported that these achievements no matter how small they may 
seem to be, had led to improvements in their sense of self-worth, self-esteem 
and had enhanced beneficiaries’ “I can do” attitude. Box 5.22 shows some of 
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the beneficiaries and their material benefits which have contributed to 
improvements in their psychosocial well-being.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An elderly female beneficiary from ward 1 in Epworth used the HSCT to help 
a neighbour who requested money for grinding mill services. She gave the 
neighbour US$2 and felt happy that she had helped someone: “Giving my 
neighbour US$2 (sharing a portion of my HSCT) without an expectation to be 
paid back made me feel that I was worth something to other people, and that 
someone needed my help”.  
  
Left to right: Picture 1: Miriam (note her real name) is a female HSCT 
beneficiary from ward 4 in Goromonzi. She is a single parent and has six 
children. Miriam receives $50 from the HSCT every two months. Miriam is 
extending her house using part of her savings from the HSCT. She intends to put 
tenants into the extra rooms once completed. In this she will be able to raise 
enough school fees to cover all her school-going age children. Miriam feels the 
HSCT has strengthened her sense of self-worth, and feels appreciated by her 
children for being able to provide for them.  
 
Picture 2: Jane (not her real name) is an HSCT beneficiary from ward 15 in 
Goromonzi district. She is a widowed mother of three children, and two other 
dependents being her mother and a niece. Jane received $50 from the HSCT. 
She saved some money from her first three transfers and bought a second-hand 
sewing machine (in the picture) for $40. Jane completed a dress-making course 
some years ago. After buying the sewing machine, Jane joined a sewing club in 
Harare’s central business district where she to and from commutes daily. Jane’s 
products include ladies clothes, garments, and school uniforms for children in her 
area. Jane said, through the support from the HSCT, she has is able to spend her 
productive time with others who have the same interests as hers, that is, dress-
making. In this way she has been able to enter social networks of the non-poor 
(non-beneficiaries in her sewing club who are from other areas). Jane feels happy 
that she has expanded her social network, and can be counted amongst others. 
Box 5.22: Case studies - material benefits from the HSCT that drive 
positive psychosocial effects on HSCT beneficiaries 
 410 
 
Fumakazi (not her real name) is an HSCT recipient from ward 5 in Epworth. 
She said she uses a portion of her HSCT transfers to contribute to a local 
funeral and burial insurance scheme. Fumakazi said she has a peace of mind 
as she or any of her family members are assured of a decent funeral and 
burial when they die. She said she witnessed other poor people in her 
community receiving pauper’s burials and she does not want to go through 
that hence her decision to join a funeral and burial insurance scheme. The 
scheme also benefits remaining family members in the event that the 
breadwinner dies first. In this regard, she is calm and hopeful about the future 
of her children. 
Margaret (not her real name) is a grandmother born in 1921 in Mareke village 
in Goromonzi ward 15. She walks slowly with the aid of a stick, and with six 
orphans to care for. She explained how before the HSCT programme she had 
literally nothing and used to beg from neighbours and the village head but with 
the HSCT money she received she managed to buy plates and cups, and the 
rest of her payment she uses for part-payment of school fees and for food. 
Margaret now feels less poor, has a sense of renewed self-worth and 
confidence. Her grand-children look happier and are hopeful for a brighter 
future with continued HSCT support. 
Survey respondents were asked how they feel about being designated “HSCT 
beneficiary,” a direct consequence of HSCT’s targeting and selection process. 
Qualitative evidence indicates that the designation had both positive and 
negative psychosocial effects on cash recipients. Some respondents reported 
feelings of stigma, and inferiority while others said they did not care since the 
HSCT was helping them to improve their wellbeing. Those who felt 
stigmatised or made to feel inferior said non-beneficiaries were the source of 
the stigma. Box 5.23 below gives beneficiaries’ views on how they feel about 
being labelled “HSCT beneficiaries”. 
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“There is too much negative talk from non-beneficiaries who make it a 
point to highlight my state of poverty and vulnerability and that I am 
dependent on the HSCT for survival. I try to ignore the talk but 
sometimes it really affects me and makes me feel inferior.” – female 
beneficiary from ward 4 in Goromonzi. 
 
“The label ‘HSCT beneficiary’ created a problem for me. I am 
sarcastically described as ‘the privilege one’. There is unhappiness 
amongst those who are not receiving the HSCT.” – female beneficiary 
from ward 15 in Goromonzi. 
 
“Before I enrolled on to the HSCT, I used to cry every day, thinking of 
my life and my children’s future. It was a struggle to find food, seeds 
and fertiliser for our small field over there. Being an HSCT beneficiary 
has transformed my family’s life and I feel happy to be part of this 
programme. I thank God for it.” – female beneficiary from ward 4 in 
Goromonzi. 
 
“I feel sad about the term “HSCT beneficiary” because here in my 
village non-beneficiaries say we are associated with abject poverty, 
and that we are people who will never be able to stand on our own 
without help from others.” – male beneficiary from ward 15 in 
Goromonzi. 
 
“I feel happy about the designation ‘HSCT beneficiary’ because it 
comes with benefits which I did not have before. My family is in a 
better well-being situation than before.” – male beneficiary from ward 1 
in Epworth. 
 
“I am grateful to Zimbabwe government for remembering poor people 
like myself and others on the HSCT. People in my area do not 
stigmatise or look down upon us because they appreciate that we are 
being assisted and this has reduced the community’s burden of care 
for us.” – male beneficiary from ward 5 in Epworth. 
 
“My neighbours look down upon me. They laugh at me for being a 
recipient of the HSCT. They say I am a lazy person who does not want 
to seek paid employment but just wants to rely on free handouts. They 
do not understand how I became a beneficiary under the HSCT.” – 
female beneficiary from ward 5 in Epworth. 
 
“Since I started receiving the HSCT, I feel appreciated in my village, 
and being of help to others.” – female beneficiary from ward 1 in 
Epworth.  
Box 5.23: Beneficiaries' perceptions about being designated as 
"HSCT beneficiaries" 
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5.5.5 Beneficiaries’ participation in collective action 
In many community contexts, collective action is possible only if a significant 
amount of social capital is available in a household, village or area. The 
household survey assessed three items of information: (1) extent of collective 
action; (2) type of activities undertaken collectively; and (3) extent of 
beneficiaries’ willingness to participate in collective action. Additional data 
were obtained from in-depth interviews with community leaders and FGDs 
with non-beneficiaries on their own, and CPC members. 
HSCT recipients were asked whether in the past 12 months, they worked with 
others in their village or area to do something for the benefit of the community. 
The findings in table 5.59 below indicate that a majority of beneficiaries in 
Epworth were not involved in collective action in the past 12 months. While 
results for Goromonzi indicate that a majority had not participated in collective 
action, a considerable proportion had been involved. 
Table 5.59: Beneficiary participation in collective action 
  
Epworth Goromonzi 
In the past 12 months, have you 
worked with others in your village/ 
neighbourhood/ ward to do 
something for the benefit of the 
community 
Yes 13,1% 40,2% 
No 86,9% 59,8% 
Total 61 92 
 
Data for the entire sample were cross-tabulated by age of respondent. Most of 
the respondents (75.2%) in the 60-99 years age group reported they had not 
been involved in collective community action in the past 12 months. Some of 
those who said they had not participated indicated that they had been 
exempted by the village heads from participating in collective community 
action on account of old age and frail health. This may indicate that the 
communities are caring and show compassion and understanding towards the 
elderly, sick and disabled. Beneficiaries were asked whether their participation 
in collective community action was voluntary or they were required by some 
community authority to participate. A majority of respondents in Goromonzi 
(57.1%) said they were required to participate by community leaders while all 
respondents from Epworth said they volunteered. 
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The type of collective community activities most frequently mentioned by 
beneficiaries (in Goromonzi) were road rehabilitation; removal of litter and 
weeding at the community cemetery (community organised activities for 
maintaining infrastructure). In both cases communities were required to work 
together by village heads. Thus, collective action was mostly not based on 
voluntary participation. In Goromonzi district, FGDs with non-beneficiaries and 
CPC members indicate that there is a strong tradition of mutual help where 
community members are expected to support one another. For example, most 
beneficiaries said if there was a water supply problem in their community, it 
was very likely that people in their community would collectively act to resolve 
the problem. 
Qualitative evidence indicate that participation in collective community 
activities enabled some of the HSCT beneficiaries to access bridging forms of 
social capital resources as they were able to interact with other people across 
social status, and identity. One female HSCT beneficiary from ward 15 in 
Goromonzi said: “I have extended my social network through participation in 
community-organised activities and through these connections; I have been 
able to access useful information resources about cropping practices. I find 
community-organised activities both useful and enjoyable.”  
Some of the HSCT beneficiaries in wards 4 and 15 in Goromonzi district said 
that collective community activities called by community leaders were helping 
to ease “subtle tensions” between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries created 
by the HSCT. Community members reportedly worked well, talked to each 
other and shared jokes during those activities. The beneficiaries commended 
the village heads for bringing them together through these community-
organised activities. 
The effects of the HSCT on collective action are unclear. The findings raise 
questions about whether the HSCT is a factor that contributes to beneficiaries’ 
willingness to participate in collective community action in cases where 
beneficiaries volunteered or were required to participate. The evidence is 
inconclusive even though there are benefits that are realised by beneficiaries 
from their participation in the activities. 
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The survey results in table 5.60 below show that most HSCT beneficiaries in 
Epworth district and in Goromonzi would be willing to contribute either time or 
both time and money towards activities that would improve the quality of life in 
their communities. This is an indication of cooperative efforts and positive 
social and mutually beneficial relationships between the HSCT beneficiaries 
and other community members. Qualitative evidence suggested that in cases 
where HSCT beneficiaries provided monetary contributions toward community 
activities, the amounts involved would be small ranging between $1 and 
$2,50. The contributions would be taken from beneficiaries’ savings from the 
HSCT. This type of evidence suggests that the HSCT contributes to the 
strengthening of beneficiaries’ social connectedness with the wider 
community. It should be highlighted that HSCT beneficiaries were among the 
poorest and most vulnerable people in their communities, majority of whom 
begged for meals, yet they show a willingness to contribute labour or cash 
toward community activities which do not directly benefit them. 
Table 5.60: Beneficiaries willingness to contribute time or money 
towards a community project 
 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Will contribute time 59,7% 67,4% 
Will not contribute time 1,6% 0,0% 
Will contribute money 8,1% 5,4% 
Will not contribute money 1,6% 1,1% 
Will contribute both time and money 22,6% 18,5% 
Will contribute neither time nor money (no contribution at all) 6,5% 7,6% 
Total 62 92 
Household survey data show that old-aged heads of household (60+) were 
less willing to contribute time. They said they no longer had the physical 
energy to do so just as much as they no longer do time and labour demanding 
chores in their households. Labour, disability and ill-health were cited as 
constraints for participation in community-organised activities. 
5.5.6 Effects of the HSCT on beneficiaries’ civic engagement 
HSCT beneficiaries indicated that the cash transfer was helping them to 
strengthen their ability to participate in many social events within their 
communities, including at district level. Results in table 5.61 below show more 
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civic participation of HSCT beneficiaries in Goromonzi than in Epworth in 
agriculture-related events and traditional functions. This is not surprising 
because Goromonzi is a rural district where farming and traditional functions 
are typical events. In addition, communities there are largely homogeneous 
groups of people. Most HSCT beneficiaries in the two study districts said they 
supported one another by making in-kind, and occasionally cash contributions 
to funerals, memorial service functions and other contribution-based events 
within their communities. 
Table 5.61: Beneficiaries' civic participation 
 
District 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Farmer field days 4,9% 46,2% 
Agricultural shows 3,3% 27,5% 
Traditional functions (for example, rain making 
ceremonies) 4,9% 18,7% 
Funerals 93,4% 92,3% 
Independence Day Commemorations 23,0% 39,6% 
Sports 6,6% 12,1% 
Memorial services (nyaradzo) 75,4% 62,6% 
Other (specify) 1,6% 1,1% 
Total 61 91 
The data for the entire sample were analysed by age groups (19-59) and (60-
99). Results in figure 5.13 below suggest that old-aged (60+) beneficiaries 
attended mostly funerals, memorial service functions, traditional ceremonies, 
Independence Day commemorations and agricultural shows. The 19-59 age 
group was mostly involved in attending funerals, farmer field days and sports 
activities. The results are unsurprising because traditionally, in many parts of 
Zimbabwe, the old generations are associated with traditional ceremonies and 
also solidarity-based events in communities, for example, funerals, burials 
and memorial service. For their part, Independence Day commemorations 
may be important for old generations because independence evokes the 
history and memories of the liberation struggle and most of the old generation 
people were already born and knew what was happening at the time. This 
may not be so much the case for young generation particularly those born in 
post-independence Zimbabwe. The young generations are likely to be 
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associated with physically-demanding activities such as sports and 
knowledge-driven events such as farmer field days where there is learning 
about cropping practices and agricultural technologies.  
Figure 5.13: Percentage of respondents who reported participating in 
community events by age of respondent 
 
Beneficiaries in the two study districts said the community events they 
attended were important to them for several reasons: (1) to obtain rain-making 
and agriculture information; (2) grieving together; (3) sharing ideas and 
information; (4) to receive political information updates at Independence Day 
commemorations; (5) promoting cultural values; (6) sports for fun and physical 
fitness.  
5.5.7 Unintended effects of the HSCT 
Household survey and qualitative data suggest that the HSCT led to some 
positive and negative effects that are outside its original design intentions. 
While it could be argued that many of the social effects of the HSCT 
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highlighted above could be classified as unintended effects stemming from 
the programme, this study makes the case for the following as unintended 
consequences of the HSCT: 
5.5.7.1 Exclusion 
The household survey contained questions intended to find out whether there 
were any services from which heads of HSCT beneficiary households or 
members of their households were occasionally denied access or have limited 
opportunities to use in their communities. In addition, the survey sought to 
identify the perceived grounds for such exclusion. Results indicate that most 
of the respondents in the two study districts were occasionally denied or had 
limited access to education/schools; and health services and clinics. Results 
for Epworth were particularly striking as all respondents said they had 
difficulties accessing housing assistance, credit finance, job 
training/employment; water distribution and sanitation services. 
In terms of the reasons or criteria why some people are excluded from 
accessing these services findings in table 5.62 below show that several 
characteristics were grounds for the exclusion.  
Table 5.62: Grounds for exclusion from accessing services - frequency 
 
District 
 
Epworth Goromonzi 
Age 20 15 
Gender 4 3 
Participation in the HSCT programme 12 44 
Religious beliefs  1 4 
Lack of education 7 14 
Income level 45 69 
Social status 12 22 
Race/tribe/ethnicity  1 1 
Being disabled/handicapped  5 7 
Participation in the HSCT is one of the grounds for exclusion from other 
services and material support in both districts. Survey and qualitative data 
show that the pattern of exclusion from other social protection and relief 
support destined to the poor and vulnerable groups in the two districts, 
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notably government’s grain distribution scheme, and Plan International’s food 
assistance scheme in Goromonzi varied within and across wards in the same 
district particularly in Goromonzi. Some HSCT beneficiaries in Goromonzi’s 
ward 15 reported they were receiving 50 kilogram bags of maize every month 
under the MOPSLSW’s grain distribution programme while other HSCT 
beneficiaries in the same ward were not getting the maize. A similar pattern 
obtained in Goromonzi’s ward 4. Respondents from ward 4 said they were 
told the grain distribution scheme was targeting households with old people 
(60+ age). In ward 15, HSCT beneficiaries who reported receiving grain were 
of mixed age groups suggesting that age was not a criterion for selection of 
grain beneficiaries. All survey respondents from ward 15 in Goromonzi 
reported having been excluded from Plan International’s food assistance 
scheme. 
An in-depth interview with a village head in Goromonzi’s ward 15 suggested 
that the exclusion of HSCT beneficiaries from other relief support was 
sanctioned by the community’s traditional leadership. The village head said 
that in times of limited resources and where poverty levels were similar across 
households in a community, it was important to avoid double benefits for 
HSCT beneficiaries while other segments of the poor and vulnerable 
populations in communities faced hunger problems. Thus, giving others while 
limiting access to HSCT beneficiaries was a way of “universalising” resources 
and ensuring that “no one was left behind”. In addition, the village head 
suggested that dividing out benefits in this way reduces social tensions, 
feelings of jealousy, and cases of witchcraft. 
All HSCT respondents from Epworth said they had been included in the 
government’s grain distribution programme. The HSCT focal persons in the 
two study wards also confirmed receiving maize support under the grain 
scheme in recognition of their voluntary contributions towards supporting 
community development projects including the HSCT in their wards. 
HSCT beneficiaries in the two study districts also reported that children from 
their households are often excluded from education assistance under 
government’s Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM). The BEAM is one 
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of government of Zimbabwe’s social protection safety nets that helps children 
from poor and vulnerable households to access education across the country. 
The government’s policy position is that children from HSCT households are 
automatically eligible to receive BEAM assistance. The HSCT and BEAM are 
complementary interventions. Survey respondents said BEAM uses a different 
targeting and selection approach from the HSCT. The selection process is 
community-based, with community leaders having some influence in the 
selection process. The BEAM selection committees apply a similar rationale 
that since HSCT households are already receiving some form of assistance, it 
is important for the community to spread other benefits that come into the 
community across all poor and vulnerable populations. 
Qualitative evidence from in-depth interviews with MOPSLSW officials 
suggested that the exclusion of HSCT beneficiaries from other social 
protection or relief programmes is not formally sanctioned. The officials said 
the MOPSLSW face operational capacity and resource constraints to enforce 
the policy on the ground. However, it is ironical that the grain distribution 
scheme in which some HSCT beneficiaries were excluded from, was 
implemented under the MOPSLSW in coordination with local government 
authorities such as District Administrators. 
5.5.7.2 Currency of HSCT transfers and potential negative effects 
The study identified potential negative effects associated with payment of 
HSCT in United States dollars. Zimbabwe is currently going through a severe 
cash crisis. In November 2016 the government of Zimbabwe through the 
Central Bank introduced a form of local currency called bond notes and coins 
whose exchange rate is fixed by law (RBZ Amendment Act of 2016) and at 
par with the United States Dollar. The market has different rates which are 
higher than the decreed rate. The general premiums offered on the United 
States dollar in the unofficial market are between 30% and 40%. Despite the 
severe cash shortages in Zimbabwe, HSCT beneficiaries have continued to 
receive their transfers in United States Dollars because the main sources of 
HSCT funds are international development partners.  
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Field observations indicate that when beneficiaries purchase goods from 
community shops near payment points and on the day of cash distributions, 
they are given change in bond notes and coins. Shop operators said bond 
notes are the currency that is commonly used in their communities as United 
States dollars are in short supply. Bond notes and real United States dollars 
differ in their purchasing power and store of value properties. With 
beneficiaries giving up their US dollars at the point of first transaction, this 
suggests that beneficiaries’ cash transfers lose value each time they transact. 
Thus, the intended effects of the HSCT are likely to be reduced over time. 
Consequently, HSCT beneficiaries may no longer be able to save and invest 
part of their HSCT. It seems that secondary beneficiaries such as community 
shop operators and other non-beneficiaries who trade commodities with 
HSCT beneficiaries may turn out to be the main beneficiaries from the HSCT 
from an economic perspective.  
There are two other potential negative effects associated with HSCT 
beneficiaries continuing to receive their cash transfers United States dollars, 
and in communities dominated by the weaker bond notes. The first is that 
HSCT beneficiaries appear to be “small United States dollar islands in seas 
bond notes,” a situation which puts them at risk of being victims of theft and 
robberies. Survey data shows that 26.7% of HSCT beneficiaries in Epworth 
and 18% in Goromonzi were victims of crimes such as theft and mugging in 
the past 12 months. The second potential negative effect of HSCT 
disbursements in United States dollars is that in an economic context of 
scarce foreign currency and where demand for the strong currency is high, 
the HSCT may become an unintended channel of United States dollars into 
the unofficial market. This could occur in situations where HSCT beneficiaries 
may be offered high premiums in exchange for their US dollar cash transfers. 
5.5.7.3 New household members: the magnet effect of the HSCT  
Survey findings suggest that the HSCT appears to have acted as a “magnet” 
by attracting new people to HSCT households between 2012 and 2016. The 
HSCT started in 2012. Figure 5.14 below demonstrates reasons which 
support the magnet effect of the HSCT across the study sample. A significant 
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proportion moved in to live with relatives in HSCT households, others came 
back home from living elsewhere; to recover from illness; and moved in 
following death of caregiver(s)/orphaned. 
Figure 5.14: Reasons for joining HSCT households 
 
Across the study sample, most of the new household members were reported 
to have joined HSCT households more than one year ago and between 6 to 
12 months back from the time the survey was carried out. Qualitative 
evidence indicates that in some of the cases, for example, where relatives 
originally came to recover from illness, in the end the visits were transformed 
into long term stays. It seems the HSCT acted as a social safety net 
distributing programme benefits to more people with kinship and social ties 
with HSCT beneficiary households. 
The study found no evidence to suggest that the HSCT may have increased 
fertility levels in beneficiary households which could account for the new- born 
babies. There was also no evidence to suggest that receiving the HSCT may 
have influenced marriage decisions in beneficiary households. This was 
beyond the scope of the present study and these are subjects which may 
require separate academic investigation. 
 
Moved for work Moved for schooling
Moved to live with relatives Death of caregiver(s)/orphaned
Death of person living in this household Marriage
Came home from living elsewhere To follow other family members
Recover from illness Break-up of former household
New born
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5.5.7.4 Effects on social, cultural and gender norms 
With 60% of all HSCT beneficiary households surveyed headed by women, in 
most cases making them the HSCT recipients who travel to the payment point 
to receive their cash transfer every two months, it seems that the HSCT has 
helped to bring women out of their homes and created opportunities for 
socialisation and networking with members of the wider community. Before, 
women generally did not have many frequent opportunities to leave their 
homesteads. 
5.5.7.5 Possession of identification cards 
The HSCT requires beneficiaries to have national identification cards or 
HSCT-specific identification cards in order for beneficiaries or their registered 
proxies to access cash at payment points. At the start of the HSCT in 2012, 
some beneficiaries in Epworth and Goromonzi said they did not possess 
national identification documents but had to obtain IDs from the civil registrar 
so they could be registered in the HSCT management information system. 
Those who could not secure IDs were given programme identification cards 
such as the one in Box 5.24 below.  
Beneficiaries in Epworth and Goromonzi reported that obtaining a national 
identity document or programme through the HSCT had positive psychosocial 
effects on them as they may remained in the “underworld” without some form 
of identification and national recognition of their existence. In this regard, they 
were grateful to the catalytic effects of the programme in helping them to 
secure identity cards. 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Box 5.24: An Example of an HSCT programme identification card 
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5.6 Summary and conclusion 
The chapter presented and interpreted findings from the household survey 
and qualitative data collected from interviews with key informants, FGDs, case 
studies, field observations, and documentary evidence. The entire study 
sample had 217 respondents most of whom were survey respondents from 
beneficiary households. The results are presented according to themes that 
are linked to the study’s objectives and research questions. The demographic 
characteristics of beneficiary households depict a profile typical of extremely 
poor households in Zimbabwe an indication that the HSCT is reaching out to 
the poorest and vulnerable people.  
Beneficiaries’ views on key design and implementation features of the HSCT 
were generally positive with most beneficiaries expressing satisfaction with 
the targeting method and eligibility criteria. An overwhelming majority of cash 
recipients reported that the size of the HSCT is insufficient to meet all their 
wellbeing needs. Data indicates that most beneficiaries use cash positively.  
Most beneficiaries walked to the payment collection points and reported 
travelling with someone for safety and friendship reasons. An overwhelming 
majority of respondents said they were happy with the physical cash delivery 
method. There is no standard approach to the location of payment points 
other than centrality considerations. Some payment collection points are 
within school premises while others are in open spaces making the collection 
a public affair. While most beneficiaries in Epworth and Goromonzi 
understood that receiving the HSCT is an entitlement, this was not supported 
by greater use of grievance and complaints mechanism. There are gaps in 
beneficiaries’ understanding of how and to whom to report grievances and 
complaints in the HSCT.  
Most of the beneficiaries reported satisfaction with provision of extra services 
at payment point. A majority of the beneficiaries reported that they expect to 
receive the HSCT for the rest of their lives and indication that they are not 
expecting to exit the programme even if they may no longer be eligible to 
continue receiving the HSCT. 
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Data indicates that in most cases the HSCT strengthened social, gender and 
generational relations between members in HSCT households. There were 
isolated cases of domestic violence and neglect following receipt of the HSCT 
in some households. The findings show that the HSCT weakened social 
relations and trust between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries yet it 
strengthened social relations between beneficiaries and programme official, 
and HSCT focal persons. The study shows that the HSCT had positive effects 
on bonding social capital of beneficiaries, and linking social capital. 
Furthermore, the study highlighted widespread positive psychosocial effects 
on individual beneficiaries and household members. 
The findings further indicate positive effects on norms of reciprocity, and 
increased the visibility of women in the community as well as improving their 
role in decision-making and management of household income. 
The study reveals that the HSCT has unintended effects on beneficiaries 
particularly indications that the cash transfers act as magnets which attract 
new household members, and act as a catalyst which facilitates some 
beneficiaries’ access to identity documents. 
The next chapter is a detailed discussion of findings in terms of theory, 
practice and existing relevant literature. This is followed by a summary of 
findings, conclusions, implications of findings for policy and practice, 
recommendations for future research and contributions of the study to 
research.    
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CHAPTER 6: 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this exploratory and descriptive study was to examine the 
effects of an unconditional cash transfer scheme on weakening or 
strengthening individual, household and community social capital in a rural 
and a peri-urban project setting in Zimbabwe. The HSCT targets the 
extremely poor and vulnerable segments of Zimbabwe’s population. 
Specifically, this study addressed the following key issues: demographic 
characteristics of beneficiary households; the main design and 
implementation features of the HSCT; the knowledge, experiences and 
perceptions of HSCT beneficiaries, programme officials, community leaders, 
non-beneficiaries, and community volunteers (CPC HSCT focal persons) 
about the HSCT programme; the positive and negative effects of the HSCT on 
a diverse set of social relations, gender dynamics, and generational relations; 
effects on beneficiaries’ participation in membership associations, social 
networks and community groups; effects on cognitive and psychosocial 
dimensions of social capital; types of social capital (bonding, bridging and 
linking) affected by the introduction of the HSCT; and the unintended positive 
and negative effects stemming from the HSCT. 
For this purpose, a comprehensive household survey was conducted with 
heads of HSCT beneficiary households. Qualitative data for this study came 
from: case studies of selected HSCT beneficiaries; in-depth interviews with 
programme officials and community leaders; separate focus group 
discussions with non-beneficiaries and HSCT focal persons; and field 
observations at HSCT payment points. Secondary data came from an 
extensive review of HSCT documents including but not limited to the HSCT 
manual of operations, design documents, beneficiary lists from the HSCT 
MIS, and progress and evaluation reports. 
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The data were coded, analysed and organised by themes and sub-themes 
that are linked to research objectives and questions. The research questions 
and objectives were largely satisfied by the detailed findings presented in 
chapter five. The body of evidence drawn from the primary and secondary 
data suggests that the HSCT has both positive and negative effects on 
structural and psychological dimensions of social capital, as well as on the 
three types of social capital in the two study communities. The programme 
also has unintended positive and negative effects on beneficiaries. The need 
for embedding social capital considerations in the design, and operational 
processes of cash transfers cannot be overemphasised.     
This chapter critically analyses and synthesises the study’s main findings in 
terms of relevant literature, theories, and practice in an attempt to ascertain 
the ways in which the study contributes to the growing body of empirical 
evidence on social effects of cash transfers. The findings are compared with 
those of previous similar studies, and differences or similarities are 
highlighted. The chapter also points out the new insights, unanticipated 
outcomes of the study, and ways in which the findings go beyond existing 
literature. The analysis and synthesis are organised according to the study’s 
objectives and research questions. The first section discusses the key design 
and implementation features of the HSCT. This is followed by a discussion on 
effects of the HSCT on dimensions and types of social capital. The second 
section is a presentation of the main conclusions drawn from the findings; 
followed by a discussion of the key implications for policy and practice; and an 
outline of what further investigations may be beneficial. The chapter closes by 
providing the study’s important contributions to research. 
6.2 HSCT design and implementation features 
The first objective of the study sought to identify and analyse the key design 
and implementation features of the HSCT. The study identified nine design 
and operational features of the HSCT. This section analyses and synthesises 
the main design and operational features in relation existing literature, theory 
and practice. The discussion focuses on the following features: objectives of 
the HSCT; unconditionality; targeting and eligibility; payment method; 
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grievance and complaints handling mechanism; duration of benefits; and 
complementary services. 
6.2.1 Objectives of the HSCT 
The HSCT is a social cash transfer designed with the main goal of alleviating 
short-term poverty and encouraging human capital development (MOLSS 
2014:7). Its specific objectives are to: (1) raise the purchasing power of 
extremely poor and labour-constrained households; (2) empower beneficiary 
households to increase their consumption to levels beyond the food poverty 
line; and (3) improve nutrition status, and health and education outcomes as 
well reduction of mortality for children living in HSCT households. 
The stated objectives of the HSCT are consistent with broad aims and specific 
objectives of cash transfers identified in the CT literature namely: (1) social 
protection and security of vulnerable populations (Hanlon et al. 2010; 
Chambers cited in Nayaran et al. 2000; and Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux 
2010); (2) safety net that reduces suffering of the poor and extremely poor 
(World Bank cited in Africa Progress Panel 2014; and Hanlon et al. 2010); and 
(3) protecting and promoting human capital development (Hanlon et al. 2010).  
From the foregoing, it appears that the HSCT’s stated objectives are defined 
in what Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2010:69) refer to as “a narrow safety 
net sense” where the primary focus of the cash transfer is logically on 
smoothing consumption in response to income and food poverty. Yet, 
according to Blackwood and Lynch (1994:569) “[p]overty does not end 
abruptly once an additional dollar of income raises a family’s (or individual’s) 
income beyond a discretely defined poverty line. It is more accurate to 
conceive of poverty as a continuous function of varying gradation.”  
Findings from this study on use of cash transfers by beneficiary households, 
and the local spill over effects to the wider community indicate that the HSCT 
is having positive effects that go beyond the stated objectives in the 
programme.  
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Beyond alleviating short term poverty, increasing consumption and protecting 
and promoting human capital development, research findings suggests that 
the HSCT has some transformative effects. I borrow from Thandika 
Mkandawire (2007) the notion of “transformation” to demonstrate the 
“productive and investment-oriented effects of the HSCT on beneficiary 
households and the wider recipient communities.  
The stated objectives of the HSCT seem to envisage beneficiary households 
as playing catch-up yet evidence from this study goes beyond this notion. 
Results from this study show that some of the HSCT beneficiaries in Epworth 
and Goromonzi have built or improved their houses; accumulated productive 
assets that help them to build long term resilience and sustainable livelihoods; 
and unlocking investment opportunities through insurance schemes - informal 
savings and loan groups, or more formal life insurance schemes. These 
findings indicate that some of the HSCT beneficiaries are not only playing 
catch-up through the redistributive nature of the HSCT but have instead “leap-
frogged” not only other HSCT beneficiaries but even some of the households 
excluded from the HSCT who were just a little better off initially, as the 
evidence the from the FGDs with non-beneficiaries indicates. Some of the 
non-beneficiaries in Epworth said they were inspired by the achievements of 
some of the HSCT beneficiaries. Construction or renovations of houses, 
accumulation of livestock and purchase of household furniture items were 
cited as examples of beneficiaries’ success stories. 
Furthermore, qualitative evidence from community business operators and 
beneficiaries indicates that increased consumption expenditure is stimulating 
increased demand for goods in the recipient communities. This finding 
supports the results from a Local Economy-Wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) 
study done by FAO (2014c) and which demonstrated through simulation that 
spending by beneficiaries in the HSCT creates multiplier effects as high as 
$1.73 per $1 transferred to a beneficiary household, creates high demand for 
goods, and stimulates the production of crops by $0.31 per $1 transferred and 
livestock by $0.14 per $1 transferred. 
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While not explicitly stated as objectives in the HSCT, findings from the present 
study suggest that the HSCT has moral and ethical dimensions to its effects. 
Hanlon et al. (2010:34) make the point that cash transfers can serve to 
promote moral and ethical goals which include but are not limited to the 
empowerment of girls. Evidence from the present study points to the HSCT 
having positive effects on empowerment of women and girls in beneficiary 
households. With 60% of all HSCT beneficiary households surveyed headed 
by women, and in most cases making them the HSCT recipients, the study 
found that most of them were the decision-makers on how the cash transfer 
was used in the household. In addition, recipient households said risky coping 
mechanisms such as withdrawal of the girl child from school, a practice which 
was prevalent prior to the introduction of the HSCT in both districts had 
declined. Beneficiaries reported paying fees for their children to attend school, 
and making payment plans based on receipt of the HSCT for children to be in 
school. 
Drawing on the works of Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2010:70-71) the 
foregoing discussion and analyses of HSCT objectives based on findings from 
the study, relevant CT literature, and evidence from other studies, point to the 
HSCT as a programme whose effects indicate: relief from poverty and 
deprivation; preventive measures which enhance beneficiaries’ participation in 
informal mechanisms such as savings clubs and funeral societies, and 
strategies of risk diversification; and promotive measures which enhance 
beneficiaries incomes, capabilities, resilient and sustainable livelihoods. 
Furthermore, the HSCT is a programme that has an implicit moral and ethical 
objective on empowerment of women and girls. 
6.2.2 Unconditional nature of the HSCT 
An overwhelming majority of HSCT recipients who took part in the survey in 
Epworth and Goromonzi districts understood that the HSCT is an 
unconditional cash transfer, that is, continued receipt of the HSCT was not 
subject to beneficiaries complying with particular conditions. Household 
survey data further show that HSCT beneficiaries in Goromonzi and Epworth 
were using HSCT payments positively. Consumption expenditures on food 
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and nutrition needs; school fees and uniforms; health care; clothing; shelter; 
investment in productive activities such as small businesses; and membership 
fees in subscription-based networks were identified as the main uses of the 
HSCT by beneficiaries. In addition the findings show that the in most HSCT 
households, all household members benefit from the cash payments. There is 
intense debate in the cash transfer literature on whether cash transfers should 
be conditional or unconditional. Findings from the present study on the 
positive use of cash lend support to the alternative development theoretical 
notions underpinning unconditional cash transfers that the poor and 
vulnerable people are rational actors who use the extra income from cash 
transfers wisely and creatively without the need for conditions (Barrientos and 
Hulme 2010:3). In this regard, the findings challenge the neoliberal ideology 
which is premised on the notion that “poor people must be guided or 
compelled to act in the best interests of their children” (ibid.).  
The study’s results on positive use of cash in an unconditional cash transfer 
scheme are consistent with findings from similar studies in the CT literature. 
For example, Schubert (2010:217) found that beneficiaries of the Kalomo pilot 
cash transfer scheme used most their cash payments wisely on child care and 
to meet basic household welfare needs. In their study investigating the social 
impacts of Indonesia’s Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) unconditional cash 
transfer, Hossain et al. (2012) found widespread positive uses of cash by 
beneficiaries, for example, paying school fees and purchasing uniforms; 
house repairs; repayment of debts; and investments in livelihood activities. 
Other studies with similar results are Banerjee and Duflo (as cited in Cluines-
Ross and Huq 2014:78), and Natali (2017). 
The present study’s findings on unconditionality and the associated positive 
use of cash by HSCT beneficiaries suggest that the assumptions that 
underpinned the government of Zimbabwe’s decision to design the HSCT as 
an unconditional cash transfer have so far proved to be realistic and are 
holding. The research evidence appears to further suggest that poor and 
vulnerable families may need only a boost in their incomes to improve their 
wellbeing.  
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Yet other scholars (Govender 2011; and Baird, De Hoop, and Olzler as cited 
in World Bank 2015) make the point that the distinction between unconditional 
and conditional cash transfers is not sharp. The authors suggest that most 
cash transfers to the poor are conditional even though the conditions may not 
be expressly stated. It could be argued that the HSCT has soft conditions 
premised on the regular messaging at payment points on responsible use of 
cash. Soft conditions do not result in penalties in cases of non-compliance. As 
established in the study, HSCT beneficiaries receive regular 
recommendations on responsible use of cash at payment points each time 
they go to collect their transfers. The study found that a small percentage of 
beneficiaries in the two districts perceived the HSCT as a conditional cash 
transfer. They cited the two perceived conditions: (1) sending children to 
school, and (2) buying food for the household. According to these 
beneficiaries, it appears these perceptions arose from the repeated message 
coming from programme officials on responsible use of the HSCT. Invoking 
Govender’s (2011) theoretical notion of a conditional cash transfer suggests 
that the HSCT may be regarded as a conditional cash transfer on account of 
the fact that recipients have to be food-poor and labour-constrained to qualify 
to receive benefits. Govender (2011) argues that eligibility criteria are a form 
of conditionality in cash transfers just as illness, unemployment or disability 
are, for one to qualify for social insurance benefits in South Africa. Similarly, 
operational rules in the HSCT such as: (1) removal of beneficiaries who miss 
three consecutive payments from the HSCT MIS register, and (2) the 
requirement that only pre-registered representatives are considered for 
payment, may be considered forms of conditionality in the HSCT. However, 
Lund et al. (as cited in in Govender 2011) argue that administrative 
requirements such as the two examples cited above are not conditions. 
6.2.3 Targeting method and eligibility criteria 
The findings on targeting and eligibility criteria have particularly important 
consequences for theoretical debates between the two extreme positions 
identified in the targeting literature. There are proponents who argue in favour 
of universalism, and those who argue in support of targeting as an efficient 
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way of redistributing limited resources. The views expressed separately by 
HSCT programme officials, community leaders, beneficiaries, and non-
beneficiaries on HSCT targeting broadly reflect the dichotomy between 
proponents of universal benefit systems on one end, and targeting 
approaches to social protection on the other end.  
For non-beneficiaries and community leaders in the two study districts, 
universal cash transfers are preferable. This is supported by the findings that 
non-beneficiaries in FGDs in the two study districts perceived their welfare 
challenges to be no different from those that made HSCT beneficiaries eligible 
to receive the HSCT. They did not agree with the finer gradation details that 
resulted from the proxy means tests used in the HSCT suggesting that the 
social divide between themselves and HSCT beneficiaries was artificial. Non-
beneficiaries suggested that the HSCT be scaled up to include them. These 
findings echo results from similar studies: Adato (2000) and Hossaini et al. 
(2012). In both studies, there were strong preferences for universal benefits 
by non-beneficiaries on account of targeting concerns from non-beneficiaries. 
Rothstein; and Rothstein and Uslaner (as cited in Uslaner (2008:114) make a 
point that lends support to the universalistic preference of the non-
beneficiaries in HSCT-recipient communities. The authors aver that countries 
with high levels of trust “are more likely to have universalistic rather than 
means-tested welfare programmes.” 
Community leaders – village heads and ward councillors, HSCT focal persons 
in the two districts alluded to the incidence of exclusion errors in the HSCT, 
sentiments which were corroborated by a majority of the HSCT beneficiaries 
in the two districts. Borrowing from statistical theory, Mkandawire (2007:317) 
refers to exclusion errors as “type I errors” or “false positive”. From their point 
of view, community leaders and HSCT focal persons suggested that a 
universal cash transfer would limit overt and subtle social tensions associated 
with the current proxy means-tested HSCT on account of every deserving 
beneficiary receiving the HSCT.  
The incidence of inclusion errors, which Mkandawire calls “type II errors” or 
“leakage” (ibid), in the HSCT based on observations made by HSCT focal 
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persons particularly in Goromonzi where formally employed persons such as 
teachers and headmasters were identified as ineligible indicates that the 
proxy means test method used in the HSCT has some flaws. The targeting 
flaws identified by the present study namely, perceptions of unfairness, 
inclusion and exclusion errors are similar to the targeting concerns identified 
in previous studies such as Adato (2000); Hanlon et al. (2011); Hossain et al. 
(2012). This suggests a persistence of the known challenges associated with 
proxy means test.  
Concurring with findings of a previous study in Nicaragua (Hanlon et al. 2011) 
the present study indicates that the proxy means test method is not widely 
understood by communities particularly non-beneficiaries and community 
leaders, an indication of information asymmetries. The latter indicated that 
they were not involved in the targeting and selection process of HSCT 
beneficiaries yet they have more information and a deep understanding of 
which individuals or households are vulnerable and in need of assistance. In 
addition they said they have often had to deal with targeting and selection 
complaints from non-beneficiaries. Some non-beneficiaries in FGDs queried 
how they were left out from the HSCT when they perceive their poverty and 
vulnerability characteristics as similar to those of HSCT beneficiaries. These 
findings point to differing definitions of poverty and vulnerability between the 
formal measurements of proxy means tests and community perceptions of 
poverty. Alatas et al. (2010) and Conning and Kevane (2002) make similar 
points in their targeting studies.  
Not surprisingly, most of the HSCT beneficiaries in Goromonzi and Epworth 
perceive the proxy means test method as fair on account of the fact that the 
targeting was carried out by external agents unknown to recipient 
communities and that targeting survey respondents did not know the purpose 
of the exercise. Thus, the targeting data were free from manipulation and elite 
capture by influential people in the community. None of the previous studies in 
the targeting literature that was reviewed cite similar advantages for the proxy 
means test method which suggest that the present study’s findings contribute 
to the existing targeting literature. The commonly cited advantages of proxy 
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means tests relate to the fact that the method can be used to target many 
programmes in a country (Fiszbein and Schady 2009), and that they achieve 
acceptable levels of accuracy (Johannsen, Tejerina and Glassman 2010). In 
analysing the HSCT beneficiaries’ and programme officials’ perceptions of 
HSCT targeting, I draw heavily on Makandawire’s work on “targeting and 
universalism in poverty reduction”. The perceptions of beneficiaries on 
HSCT’s targeting and selection methods seem to advance the case for 
discrimination between the poor and non-poor (Mkandawire 2007:317). It 
seems the HSCT beneficiaries perceive themselves as the “truly deserving 
poor” who have passed the proxy means test, and therefore entitled to receive 
the HSCT benefits ahead of other community members (ibid.), views 
contradicted by non-beneficiaries. 
The MOPSLSW and UNICEF officials argued that given the limited resources 
available for the HSCT, it was important to target the HSCT to the food-poor 
and labour-constrained households. The government was seen as having less 
capacity to provide universal cash transfers under the HSCT. The donors who 
contribute financial resources to the HSCT lean heavily towards targeted 
benefits. According to Mkandawire (2007:309) one reason for the preference 
of targeted benefits by international development partners is that “aid is 
nowadays understood not so much in terms of helping developing countries, 
but in terms of helping the poor.” There is a strong push by international 
donors that developing countries should demonstrate that aid is directly 
reaching the poor (ibid.). The limitation of financial resources as the driving 
force behind targeted benefits has been characterised by Mkandawire 
(2007:307) as “the fiscal constraint and quest for efficiency” argument. In this 
regard, the MOPSLSW, UNICEF and international donors consider proxy 
means test targeting in the HSCT as “the most efficient and commonsensical 
thing to do under the circumstances [budgetary constraints]”. 
A further argument deployed by the MOPSLSW officials for proxy means test 
targeting is political in its formulation. The MOPSLSW officials said the choice 
of proxy means test targeting in HSCT was partly to do with selecting 
beneficiaries in a “non-political” but “technocratic way” (ibid). It was argued by 
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the MOPSLSW that in Zimbabwe’s politically polarised context, it was 
important to use a targeting approach that was free from political interference 
or manipulation. 
Some of the HSCT beneficiaries in the two study districts reported that the 
creation of the category “HSCT beneficiaries” induced feelings of stigma, and 
inferiority in them – a cost consequence of targeting. This finding contradicts 
results from an empirical study conducted by Adato (2000) on the impact of 
Mexico’s PROGRESA on community social relations. Adato (2000) reports 
that “rather than there being stigma from inclusion … there appear[ed] to be 
stigma associated with exclusion [from PROGRESA]” suggesting that 
targeting had negative psychological effects on non-beneficiaries. The finding 
on feelings of stigma and inferiority by HSCT beneficiaries lends support to 
Sen’s argument that “any system of subsidy that requires people to be 
identified as poor and that is seen as a special benefaction for those who 
cannot fend for themselves would tend to have some effects on their self-
respect as well as on the respect accorded to them by others” (Sen as cited in 
Mkandawire 2007:325). Furthermore, the finding is also consistent with the 
assertion that “[m]eans-tested programmes stigmatise the poor – and lead to 
less generalised trust,” Uslaner (2008:114). Mkandawire advances the notion 
that the risk of stigmatisation inherent in targeting is an important policy issue 
which needs addressing. 
Findings show that there are some non-beneficiaries who were missed by the 
targeting survey teams as they were not at home at the time of the visits, and 
that the enumerators did not subsequently return. They perceive this to be the 
reason of their exclusion from the HSCT even though it was unclear if they 
would have met the HSCT eligibility criteria had data on their demographic 
and socio-economic circumstances been collected. Adato (2000) reported 
similar findings from a study carried out in Mexico. In the study some non-
beneficiaries reported that they were excluded from PROGRESA’s beneficiary 
list because they were not at home when the enumerator arrived, and were 
never visited again. These findings suggest that targeting surveys and proxy 
means tests may not be appropriate to specific groups such as mobile 
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populations in peri-urban and largely informal settlements such as Epworth. 
Programme officials and CPC members in Epworth reported that they often 
faced difficulties locating some beneficiaries who would have migrated to live 
in other areas even though these locations may still be within Epworth district. 
This creates difficulties of access to benefits by mobile populations as 
eligibility is not portable. The World Bank (as cited in Gentilini 2015:32) 
similarly notes that “in Indonesia about 20 percent of households being initially 
surveyed in urban areas cannot be found in the same residence within a 
period of 6 months ….”  
The present study found that not all beneficiary households in the two districts 
said they were selected because they have no able-bodied member (18-59 
years) fit for work yet this dimension of labour constraint is an important 
criterion for selecting households into the HSCT. For a household to be 
selected into the HSCT, it should meet both the food-poverty and labour-
constraint criteria. The results seem to suggest that beneficiaries know and 
understand the poverty criterion better than the labour-constraint dimension.  
The notion of the demographic criterion labour-constraint is nebulous as there 
is no internationally accepted definition and this brings subjectivity and context 
factors in operationalising the criterion. In many parts of Africa including 
Zimbabwe, older people beyond the age of 59 years could still regard 
themselves as fit for work even if they still have to care for at least three 
dependents yet. In rural communities in Zimbabwe, sights of older 
generations working in the fields are common. Thus, the labour-constraint 
criterion defined as “where there are no household members between the 
ages 18-59 years who are able to generate an income, or where the only 
able-bodied household member must care for more than three dependents in 
the household” may be at variance with how this is understood in some 
African contexts. In some cases persons in the age group 18-59 years and 
living with disabilities could still regard themselves as fit for some types of 
productive work yet the strict definition of labour-constraint includes people 
living with disabilities or persons taking care of a disabled family member. In 
this regard, beneficiary households that did not cite the labour constraint 
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factor as one of the reasons for being selected into the HSCT could have 
done so on the basis of a different interpretation of what the criterion means to 
them. They could still consider an older person above 59 years and taking 
care of many dependents as fit for productive work. Thus, local perceptions of 
labour-constraint criterion may differ in some way from those which are 
represented by the HSCT guidelines. 
6.2.4 Grievance and complaints mechanisms 
In discussing the findings on HSCT’s grievance and complaints mechanisms, 
I use some of the dimensions that are part of a framework first proposed by 
Barca et al. (2012). The dimensions are: awareness of entitlements; 
awareness of how and to whom to raise grievances and complaints; 
willingness to complain by beneficiaries (and non-beneficiaries) and 
complaints are addressed to complainants’ satisfaction and feedback timely 
provided. The present study’s findings show gaps in the HSCT’s grievance 
system.  
There are some variations in findings between the present study and other 
studies in the CT literature across the above-mentioned dimensions. For 
example, the present study found that while most HSCT beneficiaries in the 
two study districts viewed receiving the HSCT as an entitlement, there was 
still a general lack of willingness to complain, and concerns about protection 
from potential negative repercussions, and lack of privacy at the help desk. 
Yet, in their study of four social protection programmes in Indonesia, Barca et 
al. (2012:64) found that “[beneficiaries] often did not complain about 
programmes due to the fact that they were not fully aware of their 
entitlements, and therefore were not aware of what they should be 
complaining about”. This apparent contradiction between the results from the 
two studies suggests that lack of awareness of entitlements as a stumbling 
block to the effectiveness of grievance mechanisms may be context-specific 
and it is not the only important variable at play in limiting effectiveness of 
grievance mechanisms. 
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As found in a previous study by FAO (2015:48) this study confirms that 
community leaders (village heads and councillors) were handling grievances 
from both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries despite the fact that they were 
outside the formal implementation structures of the HSCT. This finding 
suggests several possibilities which include but are not limited to: (1) 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries may be comfortable and confident raising 
complaints through their “trusted” community-based structures than 
“strangers” in the formal grievance system; (2) that grievances were not being 
addressed at the higher levels leading to a lack of confidence in the system 
with beneficiaries preferring to raise their queries with community leaders; (3) 
a lack of awareness by both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries that 
community leaders are not formally part of the HSCT’s implementation 
structures; and (4) limited access to the grievance system. 
Neutral responses from beneficiaries on key dimensions of the grievance 
mechanism are likely to be valuable as they seem to indicate that the HSCT 
as a programme has not done enough communication to lead beneficiaries to 
have opinions on the topic of grievance and complaints mechanisms, and by 
extension social accountability. 
6.2.5 Complementary services 
Findings from this study illustrate that beneficiaries have access to other 
important benefits at the payment collection point other than receiving their 
cash transfers. The HSCT programme has partnered with NGOs and other 
government departments and provides useful information on access to basic 
services such as birth registration, how to report cases of child abuse, and 
how beneficiaries might access HIV and AIDS counselling services. The 
provision of these extra services suggests that the payment collection point is 
a form of one-stop shop for HSCT beneficiaries. This design and 
implementation model of the HSCT is consistent with cash transfer designs in 
other Sub Saharan Africa. For example, Tanzania’s Productive Social Safety 
Nets (PSSN) programme runs nutrition sessions at payment collection points, 
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme phase 4 (PSNP4) links cash 
transfers to nutrition and health services, and Ghana’s LEAP provides free 
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health insurance Palermo (2016). Evidence from evaluations conducted by 
UNICEF (2015:14) demonstrate the positive effects of combining cash 
transfers with complementary services in limiting risky behaviours compared 
to provision of cash transfers only. Similarly, the findings from this study 
indicate that the link between HSCT and child protection and welfare services 
positively contributes to building demand for those services. 
If the HSCT payment collection points have been “transformed into social 
service points” as stated by UNICEF, then careful consideration which takes 
in to account the security of HSCT beneficiaries, should be given to opening 
service provision to non-beneficiaries too, noting that the location of some of 
the payment points are in public spaces which are frequented by non-
beneficiaries as well. The suggestion by some HSCT beneficiaries to delink 
cash from complementary services is worth considering if complementary 
services are to be provided to whole communities. This may create 
opportunities to raise awareness of the HSCT programme to non-beneficiaries 
too, thereby breaking down information asymmetries. UNICEF and the 
MOPSLSW said that non-beneficiaries have access to information on child 
protection services through CPC members and schools back in their 
communities. However, the mobility of CPC members to reach out to other 
community members especially in remote areas is constrained by broken-
down bicycles. This still leaves the HSCT beneficiaries with the advantage of 
ease of access to vital welfare information over non-beneficiaries. 
6.2.6 Payment method 
In analysing the physical cash payment method (cash-in-envelope) used in 
the HSCT scheme, I draw on – with modifications, an analytical framework 
developed recently by Barca, Hurrel, MacAuslan, Visram and Willis (2016). 
The authors used the framework to analyse three cash transfer programmes 
in Kenya: the Hunger and Safety Net Programme (HSNP) pilot, the Cash 
Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC), and the 
Post-Election Violence Recovery (PEVR) programme. The framework 
analyses payment methods in terms of implications for programming and for 
cash transfer beneficiaries. I modify the framework to include a third 
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dimension: implications for social capital, a critical concept under investigation 
in the present study. Furthermore, I incorporate two additional criteria for 
analysing cash delivery options namely, human resources and flexibility, 
suggested by Harvey (as cited in Catubig, Villano and Dollery 2015). The 
authors analysed payment schemes used in Philippine’s Pantawid Pamilyang 
Pilipino Programme (4Ps). Findings from the present study are compared with 
results from an assessment of a similar CT payment mechanism used in 
Kenya’s CT-OVC programme. Table 6.1 below is an assessment of the 
HSCT’s cash payment method using the above-mentioned criteria. 
Table 6.1: Assessment of the HSCT payment method 
Criteria Assessment 
Programme-level considerations 
Payment method’s 
suitability for HSCT 
programme objectives 
HSCT aims to increase beneficiary households’ purchasing 
power for consumption of basic goods and services. HSCT 
requires a reliable and predictable payment method which 
ensures regular cash flows to recipient households so that 
they can meet their consumption needs.  
 
Cash-in-envelope is suitable as it makes cash directly 
available to recipients who then choose how they use it.  
Current payment method distributes correct amount of cash 
to the right people, at the right time and at a minimum cost. 
Delivery options and 
existing infrastructure 
Uses a private sector security company (Securico) who 
have considerable experience with similar work. Most areas 
covered in the HSCT are accessible by road. At inception of 
the HSCT in 2011 operational costs for electronic payments 
and mobile money transfers were considered high when 
compared with physical cash delivery. In addition mobile 
network coverage was limited which would have still 
required physical cash delivery in remote areas served by 
the HSCT. Mobile network coverage has since improved in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Direct cash delivery has the advantages of flexibility if 
recipients move location. There is no technology involved 
with this method and so no risk of technological failure. 
However, unlike in mobile money and electronic transfers 
opportunities for financial inclusion of the unbanked in 
HSCT districts are not available. 
Recipient-level considerations 
Distance to payment 
point 
Round trip travel time minimal for recipients in Epworth but 
is longer for recipients in Goromonzi, a rural district. 
Recipients here said they took between 1 and 3 hours to 
travel to and from payment points. In Kenya’s CT-OVC 
programme, walking distance was minimal except for 
beneficiaries who lived in the remote district of Garissa 
where walking could take a whole day (Barca et al. 2016). 
Congestion at Average waiting time was between 1 and 3 hours for 
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Criteria Assessment 
payment points recipients in Epworth and Goromonzi. Similar findings in the 
Kenya’s CT-OVC programme where waiting times was 
considered minimal except for Garissa (ibid.). 
Security Payment points in both Goromonzi and Epworth are 
somewhat a public affair and this exposes beneficiaries to 
security threats. Most recipients in Epworth and Goromonzi 
said they felt safe collecting their money from the HSCT 
payment point and taking it back home. However there were 
few reported incidents of muggings in Goromonzi district. In 
Kenya’s CT-OVC, walking, waiting and public 
announcement of transfers was said to generate security 
risks (ibid.). 
Communication about 
payments 
Most beneficiaries are informed of payment date and 
locations by HSCT focal persons, and in private. This limits 
exposure to security risks associated with public 
announcement of payments as in the Kenya’s CT-OVC 
programme (ibid.). 
Need for national ID 
card 
Yes. Beneficiaries are required to produce either national 
identification cards or programme IDs. Those who did not 
have IDs prior to the introduction of the HSCT reported 
feeling happy about owning an ID. Similarly, many cash 
transfer schemes in sub Saharan Africa require 
beneficiaries or their registered representatives to produce 
IDs, for example, Kenya’s CT-OVC, LEAP in Ghana and 
Kalomo CT in Zambia.  
Predictability and 
flexibility of transfers 
Payment method was largely predictable before the onset of 
cash shortages in Zimbabwe. There was one long delay 
since the programme started (March to September 2016). 
Current cash shortages have compromised predictability of 
HSCT payments and may negatively affect beneficiaries, for 
example, they may incur debts while waiting to receive 
cash, and could resort to risky coping mechanisms. 
Electronic or mobile money transfers may be the solution as 
beneficiaries could still transact using paperless money. 
 
Limited flexibility as cash is only collected during the 
payment cycle. If a beneficiary misses payment, they will 
need to wait until the next round where they can collect 
double payment. Kenya’s CT-OVC uses post offices as 
payment collection points. Post offices are reported to 
provide predictability as they are permanent features in 
communities. Similarly, Kenya’s CT-OVC offers little 
flexibility as cash can only be collected during a two-week 
payment window. Missed payments are accumulated (ibid.). 
Cost to beneficiary Yes. Some recipients in Goromonzi reported incurring 
transport and accommodation costs in the process of 
travelling to and from payment points. A few other recipients 
in Epworth and Goromonzi reported paying their registered 
representatives some money as they go and collect 
payments on their behalf. In Garissa district beneficiaries 
under Kenya’s CT-OVC programme reportedly incurred high 
transport and accommodation costs.  
Human resources The HSCT payment method requires more personnel from 
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Criteria Assessment 
Government and the payment agent at payment points – 
help desk and payment desk. In addition, the programme 
relies on community volunteers (HSCT focal persons) to 
contact beneficiaries and to assist at payment points. 
Electronic transfers would require less in terms of personnel 
numbers. 
Social capital level considerations 
Strengthening and 
expanding bonding 
ties 
HSCT beneficiaries in the two study districts highlighted the 
value of attending pay points in person from a social capital 
perspective as a way of connecting with fellow beneficiaries, 
strengthening social ties, and exchanging information. In the 
case of electronic payments being introduced it will remove 
this important social capital dimension of the HSCT 
payment points. 
Linking social capital 
between programme 
staff and beneficiaries 
Physical cash delivery strengthens the vertical ties between 
people in positions of formal authority (government 
departments and NGO staff) and beneficiaries. With 
electronic payments, the physical contact between cash 
recipients and officials is little. 
Social inclusion Payment points are also accessible to non-beneficiaries in 
the two study districts. However, this access was limited to 
logging of grievances and complaints. 
Access to 
complementary 
services 
HSCT beneficiaries have access to other vital welfare 
services and information offered at payment points by 
government departments and NGOs. 
The foregoing assessment demonstrates variation and similarity of issues 
across the HSCT and Kenya’s CT-OVC programme. The latter uses post 
offices as cash transfer collection points. Similarly, the HSCT identifies 
facilities within recipient communities that act as cash payment points, for 
example, schools and business centres. This indicates that both programmes 
use existing infrastructure, although depending on need it seems easier and 
flexible to change payment locations in the HSCT than it is in Kenya because 
the latter uses one type of facility – post office. 
The assessment of the HSCT payment method further shows that direct cash 
delivery method has its advantages and disadvantages. There is a trade-off of 
factors involved in deciding which method to use. For the HSCT, operational 
cost and limited mobile network coverage were key factors considered by the 
MOPSLSW and UNICEF in their decision to use the direct cash delivery 
method. However, with the current cash shortages in Zimbabwe, it’s important 
to reconsider electronic and mobile money transfer options. A dual payment 
delivery mechanism incorporating both the direct cash delivery and electronic 
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or mobile money transfer payments should be considered. The former method 
may remain appropriate for beneficiaries who live in remote parts where there 
is limited to no mobile phone coverage or banks and retail outlets. 
6.2.7 Demographic characteristics of beneficiary households and the 
HSCT model 
The HSCT scheme is being implemented under the Zimbabwe government’s 
overarching national social protection policy framework, and the National 
Action Plan for Orphans and other Vulnerable Children (NAP for OVC).  
The findings from this study show that most of the beneficiary households 
(80%) in Goromonzi and Epworth have children in them, and this is typical of 
the national profile of all HSCT households in the 19 districts where the 
programme is implemented. However there are households in the two study 
districts that do not have children in them but have notably the elderly-poor.  
For example, 27.4% of surveyed HSCT households in Epworth do not have 
children (0-17 years) in them. In Goromonzi district, 15.2% of the HSCT 
households that were in the study sample do not have children in them. Most 
of these households have elderly (60+) household members. A majority of the 
HSCT households are headed by old people in the 60+ age category. 
Furthermore, HSCT beneficiary households in the two study districts have 
some members both adults and children who are disabled including a few with 
mental health challenges.  
Yet the design of the HSCT model and its benefit structure do not reflect the 
composition of the beneficiary households. Zimbabwe can learn from the 
South African social assistance programme – the cash transfer system, in 
terms of the structure of the model. For a developing country, South Africa 
has a well-established and structured categorical social grants model. 
According to Gumede (2016:193) the social grants available in South Africa 
include: 
• Old Age Grant 
• War Veterans Grant 
• Disability Grant 
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• Foster Child Grant 
• Child Dependency Grant 
• Child Support Grant 
Most of the grant recipients fall under the child support grant category. This 
grant benefits children in need up to the age of eighteen. The requirement age 
for the old age grant is 60 years or older (ibid). According to Hanlon et al. 
(2010:39) South Africa’s grants are unconditional and applicants need to meet 
the requirements of a means test. The HSCT could be reshaped in the model 
of South Africa’s categorical grants – grants to OVC, social pension to the 
elderly, and grants to disabled people in beneficiary households. Hanlon et al. 
(2010:39) argue that categorical grants “…satisfy a broadly felt social 
responsibility to support the young, the old, and those too weak to support 
themselves”. The authors further point out that categorical grants address 
equity concerns, are transparent and easier to administer. This could serve 
the HSCT better in terms of dealing with targeting and eligibility concerns 
raised by non-beneficiaries in FGDs in the two study districts. Gumede 
(2016:180) highlights an important challenge and possible unintended effect 
of South Africa’s social assistance programme, which seems to apply to the 
HSCT too. The challenge relates to the financial sustainability of the grants 
with 2010/11 data showing that 15 million people received social grants, 
which represents over 3% of South Africa’s GDP (ibid). The concerns on the 
financial sustainability of the HSCT are discussed in the section below. The 
unintended consequence relates to the potential negative effect that social 
grants may undermine labour force participation thus resulting in more people 
on social assistance than gainful employment (ibid). 
6.2.8 Financial sustainability of the HSCT 
A review of the design and implementation documents of the HSCT, and in-
depth interviews with UNICEF and MOPSLSW officials reveal that the 
government of Zimbabwe’s contribution to the actual cash transfers paid to 
beneficiary households is minimal and erratic. Government of Zimbabwe’s 
financial contribution to the HSCT is mainly focused on supporting the 
institutional setting of the HSCT. Programme officials who work on the HSCT 
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at national and sub-national levels are on government’s pay roll. Thus, the 
financing of the HSCT is mainly through support from international 
development partners. 
The above finding raises two key questions: (1) whether Zimbabwe can afford 
a social cash transfer intervention and (2) the sustainability of a donor-driven 
cash transfer intervention in the long term. The social protection literature is 
generally critical of donor-driven interventions. Barrientos (2009:265) makes 
the point that “low-income countries have large numbers in poverty and a very 
limited capacity for raising domestic revenue”. Zimbabwe faces a similar 
challenge with rising poverty levels associated with declining economic 
indicators, as discussed in chapter one. The government of Zimbabwe has an 
unsatisfactory record of national budget allocations and actual disbursements 
to the HSCT in particular and social protection in general due to fiscal 
constraints and declining economic performance characterised by a rampant 
and unregulated informal sector which restricts government’s tax base. The 
MOPSLSW argues that it always makes a strong case for domestic financing 
of the HSCT but expectations have not been met because of national 
budgetary constraints. In the National Budget Statement presented to 
Parliament of Zimbabwe by the Minister of Finance and Economic 
Development in December 2016, the government allocated US$7 million for 
the HSCT for use in 2017 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
2017:92). As at June 2017 only US$1.8 million of the total allocation to the 
HSCT had been disbursed by government (UNICEF 2017). On the basis of 
the trend of actual disbursements to the HSCT over the past few years, it is 
unlikely that the Government of Zimbabwe will achieve financial sustainability 
over the remaining years of the HSCT.  
Garcia and Moore (2012:51) point out important limitations associated with 
donor-driven cash transfer schemes in low income countries: (1) They are 
usually aligned to donors’ institutional mandates and sector priorities. In the 
case of Zimbabwe’s HSCT, the present study found that the HSCT is aligned 
to the National Social Protection Policy and the National Action Plan for OVC. 
Instead it is a requirement by the government of Zimbabwe that support from 
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the international development partners aligns with its national policies and 
sector priorities. (2) Another fundamental characteristic of donor-funded social 
protection programmes is that they are often projects of limited duration or 
they provide benefits for a limited time before beneficiaries can exit or 
graduate from the programmes. This is consistent with donors’ support to the 
HSCT. According to UNICEF, donors funding the HSCT have indicated that 
their current financial commitments to the HSCT will end in 2019 and it’s 
unclear whether the HSCT will continue in its current form given the limited 
domestic financing from the government of Zimbabwe. However, the current 
support from donors includes strengthening government’s system for social 
cash transfers for example, technical assistance to keep the HSCT’s MIS 
functional. This appears to be an important investment upon which a future 
and 100% domestic-funded HSCT might be based.  
Garcia and Moore (2012:51) state that donor-driven cash transfers are often 
located outside national government institutions and systems. This view is not 
supported in the case of the HSCT as it uses government institutions, 
systems and personnel. The in-depth interview with MOPSLSW officials 
indicated that government views the use of its systems, institutions and 
personnel in the implementation and monitoring of the HSCT as evidence of 
its political will and commitment to support and sustain the programme. This is 
consistent with the notion of affordability advanced by Samson (2009:47). The 
author asserts that “affordability is multi-dimensional”. At one level it’s seen as 
a matter of political will, and on the other, it is an economic issue where many 
countries face real fiscal constraints in financing social protection (ibid.). It 
seems therefore that Zimbabwe is at present only satisfying the non-fiscal 
dimension of affordability. 
The fiscal constraints on the HSCT suggest that there may be no space to 
consider an upward review of transfer sizes in the HSCT in order to respond 
to negative changes in inflation and maintain the purchasing power of the 
transfers – a design intention of the programme. Most of the HSCT 
beneficiaries in the two study districts indicated that the current transfer sizes 
capped at US$25 per month for a household with at least four members are 
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not adequate to meet their welfare needs. Furthermore, the limited levels of 
domestic financing of the HSCT indicate that the programme cannot be 
scaled up in terms of coverage in the medium term. 
6.3 Role of the HSCT in strengthening or weakening social capital 
This section discusses the study’s findings on effects of the HSCT on different 
dimensions and types of social capital in Goromonzi and Epworth districts. 
The discussion is structured around social capital and social network theories 
and concept which form the core of the present study’s theoretical framework. 
The relevant findings as presented in the preceding chapter demonstrate a 
diversity of HSCT effects on structural and cognitive dimensions, and types of 
social capital. As will be demonstrated in this section, in most cases bonding 
and linking social capital were strengthened in the two study districts. There is 
limited evidence to suggest that bridging forms of social capital were 
strengthened. Some evidence points to negative effects of the HSCT on 
social capital. 
6.3.1 Effects on bonding social capital 
Bonding social capital refers to the social relations connecting people who are 
socially alike or who share similar demographic characteristics, for example 
family members, close friends or other social groups living in close proximity 
with a strong degree of emotional involvement (Putnam 2000; World Bank 
2001; and Woolcock 1998). The present study examined proxies which give 
useful insights into the bonding social capital of beneficiary household 
members. The findings indicate that in most cases the HSCT strengthened 
intra-household social, gender and generational relations in beneficiary 
households. 
6.3.1.1 Social bonds within beneficiary households  
The study found that the HSCT appears to strengthen the social bonds within 
beneficiary households by improving wellbeing of household members. The 
additional income injected into the household makes it easier for heads of 
households to look after their families. Most of the beneficiary households in 
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the two study districts reported that the HSCT is something that they are 
happy and proud to be part of as families, and that it had led them to feel 
closer to each other as family members than was the case before the HSCT 
was introduced. Daidone et al. (2015:14) reported similar but not identical 
findings, suggesting strong and positive effects of Ghana’s LEAP cash 
transfers on happiness for smaller households and female-headed 
households – an indication of improved social relations within these recipient 
households.  
Findings suggest that the following features of the HSCT seem to provide the 
channels through which the HSCT improves bonding social capital in HSCT 
households in the two study districts: (1) Use of the HSCT cash within the 
household. The cash payments have positive effects on beneficiaries’ ability 
to meet mainly food, nutrition, health care and educational needs. All 
household members benefitted from the HSCT payments received by the 
household. Pavanello, Watson, Onyango-Ouma and Nukuluki (2016:1153) 
report similar findings in Kenya where the cash transfers enabled households 
to meet education, food and clothing needs of household members with 
positive effects on bonding social capital. (2) Transparency and inclusivity 
through consultative decision making on how to use the cash within 
beneficiary households. Results show that in a majority of the HSCT 
households, the main decision-maker consulted other adult family members 
before deciding on the use of cash. The HSCT promoted the voices of other 
household members in decision-making. (3) Pre-cash distribution speech at 
the payment point is the main source of the HSCT information which shared 
by the cash recipient or head of household with other household members. 
Survey data indicate that heads of beneficiary households or registered cash 
recipients shared information about the HSCT with other household members. 
For example, heads of HSCT households reported sharing information 
pertaining to the purpose of the HSCT, advice on use of cash, payment 
collection procedures, help desk, and transfer size. The source of the 
information is primarily the pre-cash distribution speech delivered at the 
payment point. (4) Some of the cash recipients in the two districts reported 
that they travelled to and from the cash payment collection point in the 
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company of other household members. This interaction was reported as 
strengthening social relations between household members by increasing 
exposure of other household members to the HSCT, thus contributing 
positively to bonding social capital within the household. In this regard, the 
direct cash delivery payment method used in the HSCT is an important 
channel for strengthening bonding social capital. 
The study by Kardan, MacAuslan and Marimo (2010:50) suggests that the 
main driver that improves intra-household relations in cash transfer recipient 
households enough food. Findings from the present study indicate that 
beyond enough food there are other material and non-material benefits from 
cash transfers that strengthen social bonds between members in beneficiary 
households. As highlighted above, consultations among household members 
about how best to use cash has transparency and inclusivity benefits for 
members of the household.  
Furthermore the sharing of programme information within the HSCT 
households suggests that the HSCT contributes to the strengthening of 
bonding social capital within the HSCT households as other household 
members improve their knowledge of the HSCT over time. As earlier reported 
in the section discussing the findings on design and implementation features 
of the HSCT, a majority of survey respondents who said they did not have a 
registered representative who can collect cash on their behalf if they were not 
able to do so but would be willing to designate someone, stated they would 
nominate another household member. Qualitative data indicate that some of 
these beneficiaries would take into account two factors in deciding who to 
designate as a proxy representative within the family: (1) familiarity with, and 
knowledge of the HSCT programme, and (2) trust. The first point suggests the 
utility and benefit of sharing HSCT information with other household 
members. Beyond strengthening social bonds within the household, an 
important implied objective behind the sharing of information of HSCT 
information within beneficiary households is to educate other household 
members about the HSCT with the intention of using this as a basis to decide 
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on who becomes the household’s proxy representative in the future if the 
need arises. 
A valuable contribution from the present study is the attention given to the 
sharing of cash transfer benefits and information within beneficiary 
households. Previous studies either did not pay particular attention to this 
variable or completely missed investigating it. For example, Adato (2000) 
examined the sharing of benefits and information between beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries. AIR (2014a) reported beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in 
Zimbabwe sharing agricultural assets. In this regard, the present study 
complements findings from similar studies in the CT literature. 
Findings on the effects of the HSCT on gender relations in the two districts 
were both positive and negative suggesting strengthening and weakening of 
bonding social capital respectively. Concurring with findings from previous 
studies, for example, Hidrobo et al. (2012) findings from the present studies 
indicate that cash appeared to decrease men’s controlling behaviours over 
women. Some men from HSCT households where the wives were the 
registered recipients under the HSCT said they delegated control and 
decision-making authority over expenditure and saving decisions to their 
wives. They had confidence their wives would manage the HSCT well. This 
was reported as fostering social bonds between the spouses in these 
beneficiary households. In addition, this finding confirms that the HSCT might 
have contributed to the positive transformation of gender relations in some of 
the HSCT households. Yet a similar study by FAO (2015) found that Kenya’s 
CT-OVC “had not transformed gender relations in household decision-
making…” because of deep and structural patriarchal norms in societies that 
were studied. Other beneficiaries reported improved social relations between 
male and female members in HSCT households. In other HSCT households 
findings indicate that cash seemed to have contributed to the weakening of 
bonding social capital between male and female household members. The 
HSCT is said to have led to quarrels between spouses over the use of cash, 
and also allocation decisions in polygamous marriages. 
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A majority of HSCT beneficiary households in the study sample are headed 
by elderly people, a finding which is consistent with national profile of all 
HSCT households enrolled in the programme. Most of the HSCT beneficiary 
households surveyed have children in the 0-17 age group. The households 
also include young adults. These demographic profiles indicate that the HSCT 
households have a missing middle generation. In this regard, the study 
explored the social relations between the old and young generation members 
of the HSCT households. With respect to the effects of the HSCT on social 
bonds between older and younger household members including children in 
HSCT households, findings indicate positive effects. The social relations 
between the two generations were described as mutually beneficial. It 
appears that the vulnerability factors that made a considerable number of 
HSCT households in the two study districts eligible to receive the HSCT (old 
age, and household taking care of orphans, thus meeting the labour constraint 
dimension of the HSCT’s eligibility criteria) and the use of the HSCT which 
brings material and non-material benefits to the households, are important 
factors which drive positive social bonding effects between the older and 
young members of these HSCT households. Their “fates” were mutually tied 
as old age and orphanhood combined to make such households eligible to 
receive the HSCT. Old beneficiaries said the younger members of their 
families needed them for cash collections as they were the registered 
recipients of the HSCT in a majority of the cases, while the old generation 
members relied on children and other younger household members to help 
them with household chores. 
6.3.1.2 Social bonds between HSCT beneficiaries 
Research findings indicate that the HSCT created opportunities for 
beneficiaries to develop or to strengthen social ties between themselves – 
although the ties are appear exclusive in nature. Results suggest that bonding 
forms of social capital between beneficiaries have been developed and/or 
strengthened. In both cases of Epworth and Goromonzi qualitative and 
quantitative evidence indicates that social bonds have been formed and 
strengthened in the following ways: (1) beneficiaries travelling together to and 
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from payment points, (2) interactions at HSCT payment points during pay day, 
and (3) social networking through subsequent meetings in-between payment 
cycles. The HSCT payment method is seen here as the driving force behind 
the strengthening of bonding social capital between HSCT beneficiaries. 
These findings are consistent with results from similar studies in the CT 
literature as demonstrated below. 
The work of Pavanello et al. (2016:1152) in which the authors examined 
evidence of the effects of national CT programmes from five countries, 
reported similar positive findings on effects of CTs on bonding social capital 
between cash recipients. The authors report that in West Bank and Gaza, 
female heads of beneficiary households interacted with other female 
beneficiaries “mostly when travelling to collect the transfer or at cash 
disbursement points – using these occasions to discuss personal problems 
and life experiences, or exchange information on the transfer and other 
available assistance.” Similar findings were reported in Uganda (ibid.). 
Attanasio et al. (2011:147) point out that Familias en Accion, a conditional 
cash transfer in Colombia has a social component which provides an 
opportunity for beneficiary mothers to participate together in a variety of 
activities. In the process they get to know each other better and strengthen 
their social bonds. Adato (2000:30) found that activities linked to the 
PROGRESA CT in Mexico, for example monthly meetings, health and 
community activities, and collection of cash transfers at payment points 
created social interaction opportunities for women beneficiaries to gather 
together and exchange information and ideas. These activities were reported 
to be strengthening the bonding social capital between women beneficiaries 
under the PROGRESA CT. 
Findings from the present study indicate that the HSCT payment method 
which requires beneficiaries to travel to a designated cash collection point in 
their communities has contributed to the narrowing of age, gender, 
geographic and other social barriers which would otherwise prevent regular 
interactions between HSCT beneficiaries. As one beneficiary said: “The HSCT 
payment points are demographic hubs of information exchange, generation of 
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ideas and some kind of cash transfer beneficiary activism.” The point here is 
that the young and old engage and speak with each other more easily, 
sharing concerns, lessons and happenings back in the village. 
In discussing the effects of the HSCT on bonding social capital between 
HSCT beneficiaries further, I now turn to the implications of results for social 
network theory. The discussion is structured around the social selection 
network theory integrating the concept of homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 
1954a; McPherson et al. 2001; Mercken et al. 2009; Robins et al. 2001) cited 
in Prell (2012:28). The theory together with the concept of homophily holds 
that individuals prefer to have social relations with other actors similar to them 
(Prell 2012:129). The social selection network theory and the concept of 
homophily embed a folk proposition: “birds of a feather flock together” 
(Kadushin 2012:18). The findings from the present study indicate that HSCT 
beneficiaries make up one big family in communities where it is implemented. 
It can be argued that the HSCT beneficiaries are people who share many 
similar attributes: they are both extremely poor and labour-constrained; they 
are in the same structural position; have similar socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics, and generally face similar idiosyncratic and 
covariate risks. Thus, they have come to be associated together on account of 
these similar circumstances. Coleman et al. Feld, 1981, 1982 cited in Prell 
(2012:129) posit that social settings determine that ties will form among 
similar actors. The findings from the present study lend support to this theory 
in that the HSCT payment point creates a social setting which draws in 
beneficiaries who share many similar attributes. Thus, this one big group of 
HSCT beneficiaries produces homophily. Unsurprisingly, social bonds 
between beneficiaries have developed and strengthened in the two study 
districts. The result is that social networks in the form of family clubs, internal 
savings and lending clubs and friendships have developed between 
beneficiaries. Family clubs were frequently mentioned in Goromonzi district 
while internals savings clubs were common in both districts. 
A common issue of concern in the social network literature is that it is difficult 
to measure and account for the causal direction of homophily. The key 
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question is: “Is it that people come together and become more similar over 
time or, Is it that they are attracted to similar others and form a social tie 
accordingly?” As the present study is not an experimental design, there is no 
conclusive evidence to resolve the question. However, it can be argued that 
the HSCT brought together households that were typically unrelated and 
unacquainted with each other within the context of a cash transfer 
programme. The beneficiaries might have learnt about their similarities over 
time and subsequently developed interpersonal trust and formed social ties. 
This is a question that could form the basis of further research. 
Homophily is not necessarily a good thing. Kadushin (2012:20) makes the 
point that social networks based on homophily may be unfair as they can 
bring about segregation or social exclusion. The findings from the present 
study on family clubs and savings clubs support this theoretical notion. The 
study found that membership in family clubs in Goromonzi was “female-only,” 
with group members made up of HSCT-beneficiaries only. The same was said 
of group membership in Internal Savings and Lending Clubs. Thus, the social 
networks created can be characterised as closed networks as they were 
composed of HSCT beneficiaries to the exclusion of non-beneficiaries. 
A further issue of concern with social networks of people with similar social, 
cultural and economic characteristics such as family clubs and internal 
savings clubs is that they seem to only serve to strengthen bonding social 
capital at the expense of building bridges. Members may also have similar 
information so that less is gained from exchanging information.  
6.3.1.3 Social bonds between CPC HSCT focal persons 
The study found that CPC HSCT focal persons in each ward where the HSCT 
is being implemented in the two districts constitute important social networks 
that are linked to the HSCT. The social networks of HSCT focal persons are 
direct creations of the HSCT as they did not exist in their current form prior to 
the introduction of the HSCT in selected districts and wards. These networks 
are sources of bonding social capital for the HSCT focal persons.  
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In this section I use parts of the social selection network and social capital 
theories, and concepts that are fundamental to social networks and social 
capital to examine the characteristics HSCT focal persons’ social networks 
that derive from HSCT-based similarity factors. For example, I analyse the 
purpose of the networks, actor attributes; type of relations within the networks; 
whether the networks are restricted to a finite set of members; type of 
networks – egocentric or socio-centric networks; and whether the networks 
exhibit tie multiplexity. 
The HSCT focal persons constitute a social network between persons who 
are socially alike. Focus group discussions showed that members of this 
network see themselves as similar in many respects. There are many defining 
features of the bonding social capital between them. The social network of 
HSCT focal persons in a ward has a social structure with a leader whom the 
programme designated as the HSCT lead focal person. His or her authority is 
respected by group members. 
While not the poorest and most vulnerable in their communities, the HSCT 
focal persons are poor men and women living in close proximity to 
programme beneficiaries and have a significant degree of emotional 
involvement with the HSCT programme. They know the life stories of 
programme beneficiaries, and see how the programme is improving the well-
being of beneficiary households. Members are all unemployed and participate 
in the HSCT programme on a voluntary basis. 
The HSCT focal persons have received similar training, facilitated and 
supported by the HSCT programme. The training sessions covered issues 
such as understanding the HSCT programme’s design and implementation 
features; leadership skills; child protection; parenting skills; and community 
mobilisation. 
The members have fundamentally the same information about the HSCT 
programme since the information is drawn from the same official sources. 
Much of this similar information for example, purpose of the HSCT; pay dates; 
payment locations; referrals; identities and number of beneficiaries in their 
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communities; socio-economic and demographic characteristics of HSCT 
households; and ideas about the HSCT; circulate within their network. From 
the FGDs it was apparent that many of the HSCT focal persons have ties 
between them suggesting that there are no “empty spaces in the social 
structure” described by Burt (as cited in Prell 2012:122) as “structural holes”. 
According to Prell (2012) Burt asserts that networks which have structural 
holes hold a greater diversity of information than those without. The present 
study found that there is not a great diversity of information circulating within 
the social network of HSCT focal persons as much of the information and 
ideas circulating within the network are fundamentally about the HSCT. Much 
of the information becomes redundant in networks that do not have structural 
holes (ibid.). 
The types of relations between the HSCT focal persons within their network 
are communication and instrumental relations. They are communication 
relations in the sense that linkages between them are vital channels through 
which HSCT messages are transmitted. The relations are instrumental 
because members contact one another in an effort to secure valuable 
programme information, services, and advice on how to address difficult 
challenges they encounter as they carry out their HSCT-related tasks. 
The HSCT focal persons received similar material support to facilitate them to 
carry out their tasks on the programme. Common materials and tools that they 
received from the HSCT are bicycles, stationery, mobile phone handsets and 
airtime credit, t-shirts, hats and jackets for ease of their identification in the 
communities, stationery and bags. 
Each social network is characterised by strong in-group loyalty, and members 
share similar group values and norms whose source is the HSCT programme. 
The HSCT lays down operational procedures and rules of how the HSCT 
focal persons should conduct themselves. The FGDs with the focal persons in 
the two districts, and field observations reveal that the focal persons have 
strong interpersonal ties. They spent more time together at payment points, 
and during home visits to HSCT beneficiaries. In this way they have got to 
know each other better. Through their frequent interaction induced by the 
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HSCT, the focal persons have probably developed strong and long-lasting 
friendships. The strength of their ties is an antithesis to Granovetter’s 
theoretical notion of “strength of weak ties” (Kadushin 2012:31). I refer to this 
antithesis as the “weakness of strong ties”. According to Granovetter as cited 
in Kadushin (2012:31) new ideas spread slowly in networks characterised by 
strong ties as information among such strongly connected members tends to 
become redundant. There are no distant parts or structural holes in these 
social networks as all HSCT focal persons know each other well and interact 
frequently within the networks. 
The focal persons share similar grievances and complaints for example, on 
conditions of their work:  inadequacy of incentives, broken down bicycles, and 
need for more uniform allocations so that they are better presented and 
identified. 
Focus group discussions with HSCT focal persons revealed that members 
generally share more than one kind of relational tie between them. In this 
regard, they exhibit what Prell (2012:140) and Kadushin (2012:36) call “tie 
multiplexity”.  In Goromonzi ward 15, four of the HSCT focal persons said they 
related to one another in four contexts which were: going to the same church 
in the same village (Roman Catholic); they were personal friends; they all 
attend the same Family Club in their areas; and share the same totem. Thus, 
their bonding social capital as HSCT focal persons represents many other 
interests between them. 
The individual-level and group-level conception of social capital advanced by 
Putnam (1993 & 1995), Bourdieu (1985), and Coleman (1988), and Bourdieu 
and Wacquant (as cited in Kadushin 2012:175) provide useful analytical 
lenses for examining the social capital resources that accrue to HSCT focal 
persons. The authors argue that social capital resources can be accumulated 
at the individual level or group levels. The accumulated social capital can 
generate both positive and negative effects. Consistent with their theoretical 
notions, the present study finds that social capital resources accrued to the 
HSCT focal persons members at the two levels: (1) as individual members; 
and (2) as groups. The individual level conception of social capital is linked to 
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their improved personal and social status within their communities. The role 
played by the focal persons on the HSCT is critical and qualitative evidence 
from FGDs with the focal persons shows that their role gives them some form 
of symbolic leadership and power. This seems to enhance their self-esteem 
and social standing in the community, and has in many ways changed their 
relationships with other community members for better, and for worst in some 
cases. In addition the skills and knowledge they acquired from training and 
exposure to the HSCT programme as individuals contribute to the 
strengthening of their individual social capital.  
The group level conception of social capital is viewed as the HSCT focal 
person’s collective ability to serve their communities through their voluntary 
role in the implementation of the HSCT programme, something which Putnam 
(1995) refers to as a “civic virtue” or “civic community participation”. The 
privileged information about the HSCT that the focal persons regularly get 
from programme officials, for example, payment dates, and transfer sizes for 
beneficiaries is also an important element of group-level social capital.  
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social capital is useful in analysing potential 
adverse effects of the social networks of HSCT focal persons. The present 
study’s findings suggest that the social capital resources of HSCT focal 
persons are “exclusionary and unfair…” and potentially an instrument social 
inequality in HSCT communities even though the CPC focal persons do not 
see it in this way. The social network of HSCT focal persons is a closed and 
exclusive network centralised around the HSCT programme. The network and 
its internal resources are beyond the reach of other community members 
including programme beneficiaries. Membership of the network is decided by 
external stakeholders, that is, the MOPSLSW programme officials at district 
level. Membership of the network is restricted to a finite set of actors usually 
decided on the basis of the number of HSCT beneficiaries in a given area. 
The HSCT may be inadvertently promoting a kind of class formation and 
creation of “poor elites” in programme communities. FGDs with non-
beneficiaries in Goromonzi district appeared to reinforce this view. One non-
beneficiary said: 
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The HSCT has created a powerful and influential class of relatively 
poor people who have a say in which people are selected to receive 
the HSCT. They are no longer easily accessible to us non-
beneficiaries because they think we may pressure them to let us join 
the HSCT. All we want from them is information about the programme, 
and whether there is scope for us to join the programme in the future. 
6.3.2 Effects on linking social capital 
The study identified a range of positive and negative effects of the HSCT on 
linking social capital in recipient communities. Findings point to strong linking 
capital between beneficiaries, and MOPSLSW officials, payment delivery 
agent officials, NGOs, other Government departments, and community 
business operators; positive effects of the HSCT on linking social capital 
between HSCT focal persons and community leaders; adverse effects on the 
social relations between HSCT focal persons and programme officials; and 
weak linking social capital between beneficiaries and community leaders. This 
diversity of effects of the HSCT on linking social capital is not surprising given 
differences in perceptions, and objective and subjective experiences of 
participants and non-participants in the HSCT. 
The findings highlight the importance of specific design and operational 
features of the HSCT for creating opportunities of formal and informal 
interactions between cash recipients and MOPSLSW officials, payment 
delivery agent officials, NGOs and other Government departments. The 
principal drivers of this strong linking social capital are: the payment method, 
beneficiaries’ happiness with the way they were treated at by MOPSLSW and 
payment delivery agent staff; punctuality, commitment and professional 
conduct by programme officials; help desk; pre-cash distribution speech; 
provision of complementary services at the payment point; and improved 
creditworthiness of beneficiaries induced by the HSCT. 
Woolcock (as cited in Raiser 2008:495) avers that “linking social capital 
supports the hierarchical relationships between citizens and people in 
authority, most usually in government”. The implementation features of the 
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HSCT highlighted above established vertical ties connecting beneficiaries to 
programme officials. These ties were non-existent prior to the introduction of 
the HSCT in recipient communities. The physical cash delivery, help desk 
grievance point and provision of complementary services at the payment 
collection point mean that programme officials are more visible to poor people 
than before. These operational features of the HSCT created opportunities for 
regular and formal interactions between beneficiaries and those in positions of 
authority.  
According to Sabatini (2009:430) and Woolcock (2002:27) linking social 
capital is a gateway to access resources from formal institutions. The 
research findings are consistent with Sabatini and Woolcock’s notion of the 
utility of linking social capital. The HSCT beneficiaries have been able to 
leverage tangible and intangible resources, ideas and information from 
government officials and other HSCT stakeholders namely UNICEF and 
NGOs. As shown in the findings chapter, these benefits are shared with other 
household members and to a small extent with non-programme participants. 
Research evidence in the CT literature shows that linking cash transfers to 
complementary interventions can strengthen the intended effects of CT 
programmes (Palermo 2016). The provision of complementary services at the 
HSCT payment point seems to be strengthening linking social capital between 
beneficiaries and programme officials, NGOs and other Government 
departments, for example civil registry. According to the generalised trust 
theory, trust in public institutions is built and strengthened through the regular 
interactions between public institutions’ officials and communities. According 
to Marschall and Stolle (as cited in Uslaner 2008:115) diversity leads to more 
generalised trust. The diversity of programme officials at the HSCT payment 
points suggest that beneficiaries come into contact with people unlike 
themselves and this creates more opportunities for building and strengthening 
generalised trust – an important ingredient for strengthening linking social 
capital between beneficiaries and programme officials. 
The present study found that the HSCT enhanced some beneficiaries’ 
participation in community events. This in turn created opportunities for 
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beneficiaries’ access to linking social capital resources. For example, at 
Independence Day Commemorations, beneficiaries have opportunities to 
meet national and local government leaders – people with whom they have 
less frequent contact, One beneficiary in Epworth ward 1 explained how a 
local government leader whom he met at Independence Day 
commemorations helped him with information about how he could join a 
contribution-based housing cooperative and apply for a piece of land for 
residential purposes in Epworth. The beneficiary followed up on the 
information, joined the cooperative, made contributions for three years and 
got a piece of land which he is yet to develop. 
The results from the present study suggest that in some cases the HSCT 
enhanced beneficiaries’ creditworthiness enabling them to purchase goods 
from local community shops on credit. Some beneficiaries have been able to 
borrow money or goods from community shop operators in times of 
emergencies. These findings indicate the development of linking social capital 
or vertical relationships between beneficiaries (borrowers) and community 
business operators (lenders). Similar results have been reported in 
microfinance lending schemes where the relationships between borrowers 
and lenders are underpinned by strong linking social capital (Foschi 
2008:475). 
The findings show that the HSCT strengthened the linking social capital 
between the HSCT focal persons and community leaders (village heads and 
ward councillors) in the two study districts. This appears to be primarily driven 
by non-material aspects of the HSCT. In particular, the regular sharing of 
HSCT programme information and updates by HSCT focal persons with 
community leaders. Community leaders said they appreciated this sharing of 
information by HSCT focal persons as it kept them informed about progress of 
the programme. In this regard, it appears that this sharing of information 
reinforced rather than undermine the authority of community leaders. Their 
leadership roles means that they should be in regular contact with their 
community subjects on development, social, and cultural issues. Consistent 
with the theoretical notion advanced by Sabatini (2009:430) and Woolcock 
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(2002:27) that linking social capital facilitates access to resources, the study 
found that the HSCT focal persons earned recognition and rewards facilitated 
by community leaders. For example they reported receiving 50 kilogram bags 
of grain each on a monthly basis from the government’s drought relief 
scheme. They do not meet the eligibility criteria but were recommended to 
receive the grain on account of their role in the HSCT, and keeping 
community leaders informed of progress in the implementation of the HSCT. 
The study’s findings highlighted two important cases of the HSCT weakening 
linking social capital. The evidence indicate that the introduction of the HSCT 
in both districts led to the formation and initial strengthening of linking social 
capital between HSCT focal persons and MOPSLSW officers, marking a 
hierarchical relationship between representatives of HSCT beneficiaries and 
those in positions of authority mainly at district levels. It is a formal 
relationship that did not exist prior to the introduction of the HSCT. The 
manual of operations for the HSCT recognises and gives effect to the role of 
the focal persons on the HSCT. Findings suggest that the HSCT has been a 
powerful force in the social transformation of focal persons from being 
ordinary community members to people with a recognised status and visibility 
in their communities. However, the non-fulfilment of material aspects of the 
work of HSCT focal persons by the MOPSLSW is driving the negative social 
relations between the two groups. HSCT focal persons suggested that the 
unresolved queries pertaining to broken down bicycles, worn-out uniforms, 
lack of airtime credit to facilitate communication with both programme officials 
and beneficiaries, and their request for a small allowance, are issues that are 
increasing the social distance between them and MOPSLSW officials. This 
could lead to reduced trust in public officials, and in turn may exacerbate the 
weakening of the linking social capital between the two groups. 
Evidence collected in Goromonzi and Epworth indicates that the HSCT seems 
to have negatively affected linking social capital between some of the HSCT 
beneficiaries and community leaders. There appears to be limited to no 
contact between beneficiaries, and village heads and ward councillors in 
some cases, something community leaders suggested did not happen prior to 
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the introduction of the HSCT in their communities. They said they lost contact 
with some beneficiaries who previously would reach out to them looking for 
relief assistance but once they enrolled on the HSCT, they never heard from 
them again. The community leaders said they are sources of support for the 
poor in their communities and are interested in getting regular updates on the 
well-being of their subjects. These findings suggest that the HSCT could have 
affected the power dynamic within the community on a small scale. It seems 
community leaders feel they have lost influence on some beneficiaries as they 
have other support now. The concerned beneficiaries do not need to ask for 
community leaders’ help anymore. 
6.3.3 Effects on bridging social capital 
Putnam cited in Warren (2008:133) makes the point that membership in civic 
groups, religious organisations, networks or voluntary associations are 
manifestations of bridging social capital. In his view, bridging social capital is 
“outward looking and encompasses people across diverse social cleavages”. 
Across the two study districts, the findings indicate a low degree of HSCT 
beneficiaries’ social connectedness with community-based groups both 
formally and informally-organised groups and membership associations, 
beyond church groups. Most social interaction of HSCT beneficiaries takes 
place outside associations and groups but within the social forums 
established by the HSCT.  
Religious groups are the dominant membership organisations that HSCT 
beneficiaries participate in. The analysis of internal diversity of membership in 
organisations done in several countries suggests that internally diverse 
associations yield higher levels of benefits than others, although organisations 
with homogeneous memberships are thought to make it easier for members 
to trust each other, share information, reach decisions and bring about 
collective action (Grootaert, Narayan, Jones & Woolcock 2004:11; Grootaert 
& van Bastelaer 2002:48). For church groups, the present study found that 
memberships were very diverse with people coming from different villages, 
wards, genders, age groups, ethnic and tribal groups, social status, 
occupations and ethnic background. One beneficiary in Goromonzi ward 4 
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said some members in his church came all the way from Harare, which is 
about 30km from his village to worship with them. Findings suggest that this 
internal diversity in religious organisations is high in churches has useful 
benefits for HSCT beneficiaries in terms of widening their networks, better 
access to other resources, and HSCT beneficiaries reported that congregants 
almost always have different information so that more is gained from 
exchanging information. 
In few cases in the two districts, the HSCT facilitated entry of beneficiaries 
into networks of the non-poor. A number of HSCT beneficiaries in Epworth 
reported that they were members of reputable funeral insurance schemes, 
such as Nyaradzo Funeral Services. Members access assistance with funeral 
expenses upon the death of a registered family member. The HSCT 
beneficiaries reported that they were able to sustain their monthly 
subscriptions to Nyaradzo using part of their HSCT, and income from 
productive investments they made through HSCT support for example, 
chicken projects and tuckshops. In another case of the HSCT facilitating 
bridging social capital for beneficiaries, a beneficiary from ward 15 in 
Goromonzi joined a network of the non-poor – a sewing club in Harare, whose 
membership consists of people from diverse backgrounds and places of 
origin. These findings contradict the theoretical perspective on social capital 
advanced by Bourdieu (1985) which posits that social capital is an attribute of 
the non-poor, and that the non-poor use their networks to reproduce social 
inequality. Bourdieu (1985) avers that social networks of the non-poor are 
closed and exclusive. Yet, the findings indicate that the poor were able to join 
these networks of non-poor. These findings support the view that social cash 
transfers can serve a transformative purpose by addressing concerns of 
social justice and exclusion (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2008:70). In this 
regard, the evidence suggests that the HSCT Is contributing to greater social 
inclusion of the poor in to networks of non-poor. 
According to Putnam (as cited in Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002:60), 
participation in membership organisations and networks, that is, bridging 
social capital, is an important resource for individual or household support in 
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times of need, and can lead directly or indirectly to higher levels of well-being. 
The present study’s findings confirm this point with strong quantitative and 
qualitative evidence. Beneficiaries highlighted the following benefits: spiritual 
support, improving household’s well-being, and enhancing access to material 
support during difficult times for example, droughts, illness or death of a 
household member. 
Family clubs and internal savings and lending schemes were frequently 
mentioned in the study communities particularly in Goromonzi. However, 
analysis of the membership of the two membership groups contradicts the 
theoretical notion advanced by Putnam (2000:23) that broadly membership in 
some form of community group or organisation is a manifestation of bridging 
forms of social capital. Not all membership groups or associations in 
communities are indicators of bridging social capital. The study found no 
internal diversity of membership in family clubs and internal savings and 
lending schemes. There is no evidence supporting the formation or 
strengthening of bridging social capital amongst HSCT beneficiaries in these 
two clubs. Membership is wholly made up of HSCT beneficiaries who share 
similar socio-economic and demographic identities making them a 
homogeneous group. Theirs is bonding social capital characterised by strong 
ties among them. The HSCT beneficiaries who participate in the family clubs 
and internal savings schemes have limited to no access to new resources 
beyond these networks. This is consistent with the theoretical notion 
advanced by Grootaert, Narayan, Jones & Woolcock (2004:11); and Grootaert 
& van Bastelaer (2002:48). 
6.3.4 Effects on trust 
Trust is an important component of the cognitive dimension of social capital. 
Similar to other studies in the relevant literature for example, Hidrobo et al. 
(2012); Hossain et al. (2012); and Alesina and Ferrara (2002); the present 
study investigated effects of the HSCT on trust of individuals and trust in 
public institutions. Further distinctions were made between effects on 
particularised trust and generalised trust. The breadth of the present study’s 
examination of the effects of a social cash transfer scheme on trust 
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dimensions is instructive not least because the present study examined the 
effects of the HSCT on a range of social relations in the recipient 
communities. As will be shown in this section, the findings on trust offer useful 
insights, echo and complement findings from other studies. In some cases the 
results are consistent with findings from similar studies, yet in others they 
contradict results from previous studies. Furthermore, the results are 
consistent with theoretical notions underpinning generalised and 
particularised trust. 
Findings indicate that most HSCT beneficiaries exhibit high levels of trust in 
other HSCT beneficiaries, programme officials and HSCT focal persons, while 
their levels of trust in non-beneficiaries, police and strangers are low. These 
findings are similar with results from other studies, yet in other cases they 
contradict results from other studies. A study of the effects of Peru’s 
conditional cash transfer on social engagement and trust in institutions found 
that the programme had a positive and significant effect among beneficiary 
households on trust in institutions with which beneficiaries were required to 
engage due to programme conditions. It should be pointed out that while this 
finding relates to a conditional cash transfer, the present study found similar 
effects yet the HSCT is an unconditional cash transfer. This suggests that 
conditions may not be a key factor in a cash transfer programme’s effects on 
trust.  
In their impact evaluation on cash, food vouchers, and food transfers among 
Colombian refugees and poor Ecuadorians in Carchi and Sucumbios, Hidrobo 
et al. (2012:50-53) point out that the cash transfer arm led to a significant 
decrease in trust of individuals, especially trust in neighbours (non-
beneficiaries). Yet results from the same study show that the cash transfer 
arm significantly increased trust and confidence in institutions, for example the 
police. Concurring with Hidrobo et al. (2012) evidence from the present study 
suggests that the HSCT has negative effects on beneficiaries’ trust in non-
beneficiaries. Yet, results from the present study indicate that HSCT 
beneficiaries have low levels of trust in police. Reasons cited by HSCT 
beneficiaries for the low levels of trust in police were: (1) the long social 
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distance between police and beneficiaries, negative externalities such as 
asking bribes and corruption, and taking longer to respond to crime reports. 
Some HSCT beneficiaries reported that they had been victims of theft, 
muggings and burglaries. In Goromonzi, some of the beneficiaries reported 
losing goats and chickens to thieves, and that they had reported these cases 
to the police but no arrests were made, and the affected beneficiaries had not 
recovered their stolen livestock.  
The HSCT beneficiaries’ trust in people in formal education and health 
institutions like teachers, nurses and doctors was reported as improving on 
account of regular contacts with these institutions during the course of visits 
by HSCT beneficiaries to access services. In their work on social impacts of 
cash transfer programmes in Indonesia, Hossain et al. (2012:53) reported that 
the BLT cash transfer programme reduced non-beneficiaries trust in local 
institutions and officials resulting in less cooperation in 20 of the 33 
communities where this impact was reported. In the present study, community 
leaders in Goromonzi pointed out that the HSCT had not affected community 
collective action. HSCT beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries still participated in 
community work, for example, road rehabilitation and clearing grass at the 
local cemeteries, although participation was largely by requirement. 
It seems the HSCT has negative effects on trust between HSCT focal persons 
and non-beneficiaries. Qualitative evidence suggest that this could be a result 
of programme information asymmetries, and non-beneficiaries’ perceptions of 
the role of the HSCT focal persons on the programme. Further, research 
evidence points to declining trust in MOPSLSW programme officials by HSCT 
focal persons. 
The implications of the above-mentioned results for theory are diverse. The 
findings on trust in individuals and trust in institutions highlighted above are 
consistent with the theoretical notions of Platteau (as cited in Fafchamps 
(2006:1183) who theorised that trust arises from varied sources but more 
importantly from repeated interpersonal transactions, and Uslaner (2008:101) 
who asserts that “trust depends on information and experience”. Most of the 
HSCT beneficiaries who said they walked to the payment point said they 
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travelled with other HSCT beneficiaries to and from the payment point. 
Furthermore, the HSCT payment point served an important social function of 
promoting social interaction, as beneficiaries spent time together. While 
waiting to collect their cash transfers, they gain information on, and 
experience with each other leading to the development and strengthening of 
particularised or interpersonal trust.  
Research evidence shows that there is a utility value in the high levels of 
interpersonal trust between HSCT beneficiaries. For example, FGDs with 
HSCT focal persons show that they make use of the interpersonal trust 
created between HSCT beneficiaries by using other beneficiaries as 
information channels for conveying HSCT payment information – payment 
point locations, dates and times, through snowballing. This practice is highly 
prevalent in both districts. 
Drawing on the theoretical distinctions between generalised and particularised 
trusters advanced by Warren (2008:136), and Uslaner (2008:104) the low 
levels of trust in strangers by most of the HSCT beneficiaries in the two study 
districts suggest that the beneficiaries may be “personalised trusters”. 
Personalised trusted are suspicious of strangers because they lack 
information about them, and limit trust to those who are like themselves and 
whom they know and interact with frequently. Warren (2012:136) points out 
that particularised trusters like HSCT beneficiaries as findings suggest, are 
good builders of bonding social capital. As the results from the present study 
confirm, bonding social capital between HSCT beneficiaries is strong. On the 
other hand, generalised trusters are good builders of bridging social capital. 
Research evidence indicate that the HSCT has not contributed much to the 
development and strengthening of bridging forms of social capital beyond 
membership of beneficiaries in local community groups, and church 
organisations. As the findings indicate, levels of generalised trust stayed 
about the same following the introduction of the HSCT in the two districts. 
The finding on higher levels of trust between HSCT beneficiaries offers useful 
insights into the links between structural and cognitive dimensions of social 
capital. According to Rose (2000:151), Inglehart’s view is that networks are a 
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consequence of people trusting each other rather than trust emerging as a by-
product of association. HSCT beneficiaries participating in family clubs and 
ISLs in the two districts said their repeated interactions led them to trust each 
other over time and this influenced to discuss the idea of forming ISLs some 
of which are offshoots of family clubs.  
According to Uphoff (2000:219) social networks are sustained by trust, and 
when trust declines, the networks collapse. The findings from survey data and 
FGDs with HSCT focal persons in Epworth suggest that ISLs collapsed 
because of trust issues. It was pointed out that one of the HSCT beneficiaries 
misappropriated monthly contributions from the beneficiary contributors, and 
the latter lost confidence and trust, and decided to withdraw from the ISL. 
6.3.5 Effects on norms of reciprocity 
The study found that the HSCT is enabling cash recipients to participate in 
reciprocal relationships. The findings suggest that the HSCT enables 
beneficiaries to participate in informal reciprocity-based support systems in 
the communities. The effects may be at two levels: specific and generalised 
reciprocity. These levels derive from the work of Putnam (2000) as cited in 
Warren (2008:139). In the case of specific reciprocity, HSCT beneficiaries 
enter into reciprocal obligations with specific other people for example a 
beneficiary from Goromonzi ward 15 reported exchanging complementary 
basic goods with a close friend and neighbour, who is a beneficiary under a 
separate food aid programme in the same community. A beneficiary in 
Epworth ward 1 said she exchanged two small chickens in return for a bucket 
of maize with her neighbour, something she could not have done if she was 
not an HSCT beneficiary.   
In the case of generalised reciprocity, a person’s contribution or favour to 
someone in a time of need will be repaid eventually by other people. Thus, the 
obligations to repay are not the liability of a specific person. The research 
evidence suggests that the norm of generalised reciprocity was at play in the 
research communities. The main form of generalised reciprocity highlighted 
by beneficiaries was supporting other community members during funerals 
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and memorial services through funeral contributions, and in-kind contributions 
for example mobilising food from the community and provision of labour for 
chores such as fetching water and firewood for use at community ceremonies. 
The HSCT beneficiaries thought it was important to help others in times of 
need not least because they may need reciprocal help in the future. 
Consequently, their attitude toward reciprocity is positive, with the HSCT 
reinforcing the norm. 
6.3.6 Psychosocial effects 
The study’s findings reveal that in addition to the material benefits of the 
HSCT as reported by beneficiaries, there are indications of positive and 
negative psycho-social effects on beneficiaries and household members. The 
individual-level conception of social capital advanced by Bourdieu (1985), and 
Coleman (1988), and Bourdieu and Wacquant (as cited in Kadushin 
2012:175) provide useful analytical lenses for discussing the psychosocial 
effects of the HSCT on beneficiaries in the two study districts. The HSCT 
appears to improve individual beneficiaries’ and their fellow household 
members’ feelings of happiness, dignity, self-esteem, and a sense of being 
needed by other people, and that the HSCT had reduced feelings of inferiority 
in them. FAO (2015:44-45) reported similar positive psychological effects 
linked to cash transfers in Ghana, Ethiopia and Malawi. In agreement with 
findings from a study done by MacAuslan and Riemenschneider (2011), the 
present study indicates that the material benefits arising from the positive use 
of the HSCT appear to be the principal drivers of the positive psychosocial 
effects on beneficiaries. In some cases, beneficiaries in the two districts 
reported constructing decent shelter, refurbishing their houses to make them 
more habitable, buying clothes which improved their outlook, and purchasing 
livestock. In addition, increasing the number and quality of meals meant that 
some beneficiaries stopped begging from their neighbours and community 
leaders. Non-beneficiaries and community leaders in the two districts 
confirmed that the HSCT had contributed to a declined in cases of begging 
among the extremely poor in the community. 
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In comparison to the widespread positive psychosocial effects discussed 
above, the findings indicate less pronounced negative psychosocial effects of 
the HSCT on beneficiaries. The adverse effects seemed to have been limited 
to feelings of stigma induced by the social division created by targeting and 
selection of beneficiaries whereby two categories emerged: “HSCT 
beneficiaries” and “non-beneficiaries” in the study communities. This issue 
was discussed in detail under the targeting sub-theme in this chapter. 
6.3.7 Effects on socio-cultural and gender norms 
With 60 percent of all HSCT beneficiary households surveyed headed by 
women, in most cases making them the registered HSCT recipients who 
travel to the payment point every two months, this suggests that the HSCT 
has the positive effect of bringing women out of their homes, and creates 
opportunities for socialisation and networking with members of the wider 
community. Before, women generally did not leave their houses – today, they 
can. Deeply- entrenched patriarchal socio-cultural and gender norms in most 
rural communities in Sub Saharan Africa mean that women are mostly 
confined to the home where they are mainly responsible for reproductive 
work, for example, socially and culturally assigned tasks such as looking after 
children, cooking, washing, fetching water, collecting fuel wood, and care and 
maintenance of the household. A number of these activities that women do 
are time consuming and tiresome activities especially fetching water and 
collecting firewood. Not only are women the first to get up and prepare the 
household for the day, but also the last to go to sleep. Primary income-
earning productive work for example, producing goods or services for income 
or subsistence, access to markets, is predominantly done by men with women 
often doing secondary income-earning productive work, for example, as 
casual labourers in agricultural work. Men often do small to medium-scale 
agriculture and other productive activities and go to the markets and business 
centres while women do subsistence agriculture and stay at home most of the 
time. For women, the house is their sphere of dominance.  
The position of women’s social and economic standing relative to men is one 
of subordination. The findings from this study seem to indicate a shift in social 
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and gender norms in the two recipient communities. The HSCT has created 
opportunities for women to come out of homes and establish social ties with 
the people from other villages and locations thereby increasing their visibility, 
and social interactions with others such as at payment points, public 
institutions, and markets. For example, some of the women heads of 
household reported meeting teachers, nurses and doctors frequently as they 
visit health centres, and schools to pay school fees for their children and 
grand-children, and during consultations with teachers on the performance of 
their children. The present study’s findings show that women’s access to 
information and knowledge on a range of issues such as child protection, 
parenting, markets, and birth registration has improved through their 
interaction with the HSCT programme, mainly at payment collection points. 
The experiences and knowledge which women beneficiaries have 
accumulated about, and through the HSCT is valuable. In the words of one 
beneficiary: “I have acquired useful information about how best to use the 
cash transfer, I now know I have three choices: consumption, investment and 
savings.”  
Through the HSCT, some women in Epworth and Goromonzi now have more 
public, high-status and leadership roles within their communities. The HSCT’s 
lead focal persons in the study’s four wards are women. The facilitators of the 
family clubs formed through the HSCT are also women. Both roles entail 
community leadership, decision-making, and influencing of key decisions at 
household and community levels. They organise at the community level. The 
participation of women in the HSCT suggests that women’s distinct 
perspectives and interests in social, economic processes are being 
represented and promoted in the HSCT’s recipient communities. Focus group 
discussions with HSCT focal persons indicate that the HSCT has improved 
the position of women particularly in beneficiary households in the last four 
years. The FGDs also repeatedly indicated positive changes in gender 
relations at community level and more respectful community attitudes towards 
women HSCT focal persons. In this regard, it can be argued that the HSCT is 
not perpetuating women’s subordination but is opening up opportunities for 
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women to be involved in community managing and community leadership 
roles. 
However, it should be pointed that while the HSCT seems to be promoting the 
community leadership and management roles of women in recipient 
communities, and in the process contributing to the social empowerment of 
women, the work the women involved in the HSCT do at community level is 
unpaid voluntary work. Moser (1991:34) argues that the activities undertaken 
by women at the community level are “an extension of their reproductive role”. 
Moser argues further stating that “[r]ecognition that women have a community 
managing role is still far from widespread, such that it is still most frequently 
identified as part of the reproductive work”. Consequently, the community 
managing role of women is seen as naturally women’s work. The present 
study’s findings indicate that in the HSCT households that have some labour 
capacity, it seems that it is the adult males that tend to be involved in work 
that earns payment in cash or kind. 
6.4 Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
Based on the findings of this study, this section draws out relevant 
conclusions and identifies the implications of the study for social protection 
policy and cash transfer programmes. This is followed by recommendations 
for further research and the study’s main contributions to research. 
6.4.1 Key design and implementation features of the HSCT 
The study identified and analysed eight key design and operational features of 
the HSCT: objectives; unconditionality; targeting and eligibility criteria; 
grievance and complaints mechanisms; payment method; complementary 
services; demographic characteristics of beneficiary households; and financial 
sustainability.  
From the review of the social cash transfers literature and findings of the 
present study, it can be concluded that while the stated objectives of the 
HSCT are broadly similar to other cash transfers whose focus is on 
addressing income poverty and human capital development, the effects of the 
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HSCT on beneficiaries are wide-ranging and go beyond the HSCT’s core 
programme objectives. The injection of cash into the HSCT households is 
contributing to material, psychosocial and relational well-being and resilience 
of beneficiary households. Findings suggest important social and economic 
spill over effects to the wider recipient communities. In addition, there are 
implicit moral and ethical dimensions to the effects of the HSCT on recipient 
households. Yet, all these important dimensions to the HSCT are not explicit 
in the design and stated objectives of the HSCT. A negative consequence of 
this flaw is that evaluations of the HSCT will continue to prioritise consumption 
and expenditure effects ahead of social effects. 
On unconditionality of the HSCT, the present study’s findings indicate that 
most beneficiaries correctly understood the HSCT as an unconditional social 
cash transfer. Beneficiaries reported positive use of the HSCT for the well-
being of household members, and suggested that the pre-cash distribution 
speech made by government officials at the payment collection point had 
important messages on responsible use of cash. In this regard, the study 
concludes that there seems to be clear and consistent programme 
communication and messaging that emphasise the unconditionality of the 
HSCT and responsible and wise use of cash transfers from the HSCT. 
Furthermore, the evidence on unconditionality and the positive use of cash by 
HSCT beneficiaries constitute an antithesis to the neoliberal notion that 
conditionality is necessary to guide poor people to act in their best interests. It 
can be concluded that HSCT beneficiaries in the two study districts need only 
a boost in their household incomes in order to improve their well-being. 
The evidence generated through this study indicates that targeting and the 
eligibility criteria used in the HSCT have particularly striking consequences for 
recipient communities. The findings reflect the debates about universal and 
targeted approaches to social protection. Non-beneficiaries in the two study 
districts prefer universal benefits and suggest that universalism promotes 
equality. They consider their socio-economic status as similar to beneficiaries’ 
situation of poverty and vulnerability. They reported feeling socially-excluded 
with a targeted approach to the HSCT. On the other hand, HSCT beneficiaries 
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reported satisfaction with the HSCT targeting method and eligibility criteria 
indicating that the selection process was transparent, independent and fair. 
They argue that they “deserve” the HSCT on account of their poverty and 
vulnerability status. In this regard, beneficiaries view the HSCT as socially-
inclusive and promoting equity. 
The study identified cases of inclusion and exclusion errors in the HSCT 
targeting which fed into non-beneficiaries’, HSCT focal persons’ and 
community leaders’ perceptions of unfairness of the proxy means test method 
and eligibility criteria applied in the HSCT. 
Some of the HSCT beneficiaries reported that the creation of the label “HSCT 
beneficiaries” induced feelings of stigma and inferiority in them in terms of 
how they were perceived by other community members particularly non-
beneficiaries. 
The evidence from the present study indicates that the labour-constraint 
dimension of the HSCT’s dual eligibility criteria may not be clearly and easily 
understood by some beneficiaries in the study communities. It seems that 
some beneficiaries do not regard old people above the age of 59 years as 
unfit for productive work. 
There are several conclusions which can be drawn out from the study’s 
findings on targeting and eligibility criteria. The HSCT’s targeting approach 
leads to social divisions between the categories “HSCT beneficiaries” and 
“non-beneficiaries”. This social differentiation appears to negatively affect 
social relations and trust between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.  
There is a further drawback associated with the HSCT’s targeting and the 
positive material effects of the HSCT on beneficiary households. Some of the 
households receiving the HSCT are now in a much better situation than those 
households excluded from the HCST. For example, some HSCT households 
have constructed houses and accumulated assets that help them to build 
resilient and sustainable livelihoods. While this is inevitable to some extent 
and the benefits of leaving recipient households on the HCST for 4+ years 
enables beneficiaries to register these successes, attention needs to be given 
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to the possible effects to community social cohesion and social relations of a 
programme that supports some households and not others. From these 
findings it seems that targeting involves social costs which need to be 
carefully considered at programme design stage. On the labour-constraint 
dimension, evidence from this study suggests that local perceptions of this 
eligibility dimension in the HSCT may be different from those expressed in the 
HSCT’s design document.  
While the fiscal constraints and efficiency arguments deployed by government 
officials in support of targeting in the HSCT appear to be plausible, the 
incidence of inclusion and exclusion errors, and the failure to implement the 
stated retargeting every two years undermine the efficiency argument. The 
exit criteria for the HSCT are defined in relation to bi-annual re-targeting 
exercise. According to the HSCT’s (MOPSLSW 2014) re-targeting in the 
HSCT is aimed at: 
• Re-approving all current beneficiary households that are still labour 
constrained. 
• Phasing out those beneficiary households that are no longer labour 
constrained. 
• Updating the volume of the transfers to the present number of 
household members. 
• Approving additional households that have become extremely poor and 
labour constrained since the last targeting has been undertaken. 
The present study’s findings show that re-targeting in HSCT has not been put 
into practice although there are data collected in 2014 for phase 1 districts. If 
the re-targeting was fully implemented, this could reduce the incidence of 
perceptions of unfairness, inclusion and exclusion errors in the HSCT. This 
could then lead to improvements in levels of social capital in recipient 
communities. 
There are two important conclusions that can be drawn from this study’s 
findings on provision of complementary services in the HSCT. Firstly, it seems 
that the link between cash transfers and child protection is being strengthened 
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through the implementation of a cash transfer model that integrates extra 
services to beneficiaries. UNICEF and the MOPSLSW officials reported that 
demand for other services such as birth registration and reporting of child 
abuse cases is increasing through information provided to beneficiaries at 
payment points. It appears the absence of information about the supply 
environment for such services was a hindrance to access. The provision of 
complementary services in the HSCT could contribute to social justice by 
reducing social risks associated with for example children not having birth 
certificates. Furthermore, this could lead to improvements in other well-being 
aspects of beneficiary households for example, access to antiretroviral 
treatment and prevention of child abuse. 
Secondly, while the present study’s findings indicate that HSCT beneficiaries 
attending payment collection points access a range of other welfare services 
which contribute to the well-being of their households, the study concludes 
that the provision of complementary services at the payment collection point 
appears exclusionary as the focus is on HSCT beneficiaries as opposed to 
whole communities. There are invariably other community members, non-
beneficiaries included, who may need the complementary services too but do 
not have the convenience provided by the programme exclusively to HSCT 
beneficiaries. It is essential that in communities where HCST is active, 
provision of information on access to basic services is not limited to 
beneficiary households only but reaches out to other vulnerable households 
too. 
This study identifies a set of important conclusions about the HSCT’s payment 
method. There are important advantages and disadvantages associated with 
the cash-in-envelopes method. While the physical cash delivery method 
appears suitable to support the achievement of the HSCT’s objectives by 
making beneficiaries’ access to cash easy, the continued economic relevance 
and sustainability of this payment method in a country context where there are 
severe cash shortages is questionable. There are potential risks to the 
predictability and reliability of future payments to beneficiaries. In addition, 
opportunities for the financial inclusion of the unbanked beneficiaries is absent 
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in the current payment method. It seems the HSCT has been slow to 
appreciate the utility and relevance of electronic payments in the current 
environment. Late payments can potentially reduce the intended effects of the 
HSCT, and contribute to risky coping strategies by beneficiaries for example 
incurring of debts, disruptions to households’ financial planning and distress 
sales of assets. There are also important security concerns associated with 
physical cash payments in United States dollars in context where there is a 
high demand of foreign currency. The evidence point to a need to review the 
current payment method while seeking to preserve the social capital benefits 
associated with the method. Findings from the present study suggest that 
physical cash delivery drives positive social benefits for beneficiaries including 
access to other welfare services. 
On the issue of grievance and complaints mechanism used in the HSCT the 
study reaches three key conclusions. Firstly, the grievance system has 
important gaps and relies primarily on the help desks at HSCT payment 
collection points. The identified gaps are: general lack of willingness to 
complain by most beneficiaries; lack of privacy at the help desks; concerns 
about potential negative effects after complaining especially where the 
complaints are against the conduct of programme officials; and lack of a clear 
grievance and complaints escalation pathway. Secondly, from the findings on 
grievance and complaints mechanisms in the HSCT, I conclude that the study 
does not appear to support the assertion by Barca et al. (2012) that a lack of 
awareness of cash transfers as entitlements by beneficiaries is a key 
constraint in beneficiaries’ unwillingness to raise queries about programmes. 
The present study finds that most of the HSCT beneficiaries in the two study 
communities viewed receiving the HSCT as their entitlement yet there was 
still a general unwillingness to raise complaints. These findings suggest that 
there may be other context-specific factors involved. A third conclusion is that 
there is a conflation of grievances and administrative issues with the two 
being addressed through the help desk. The latter requires the programme 
officials to process changes in the HSCT MIS for example in cases where 
either beneficiaries’ household structure changes or beneficiaries register a 
representative to collect cash on their behalf. Thus, the system needs to 
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distinguish between genuine grievances or accountability issues and 
administrative queries. 
The present study’s findings on demographic characteristics of beneficiary 
households in recipient communities highlight the diversity in people’s profiles. 
There are ultra-poor people with no labour capacity; ultra-poor but with some 
labour capacity; households with old people (60+) and with no children; 
eligible households with children; households with disabled members; and 
households with mental health challenges. On the basis of these findings and 
taking into account the objectives of the HSCT, this study concludes that the 
current design and implementation features of the HSCT do not appear to 
adequately support the needs of the diverse groups of people in beneficiary 
households. For example, households with disabled people and metal health 
patients have specific requirements to address their needs but beyond the 
provision of cash, there are no custom-made support services for these 
groups. A key observation at the payment collection point was that there is no 
preferential treatment accorded to disabled and old beneficiaries. Households 
with labour capacity could be linked to productive and paid jobs. It seems 
therefore that a one-size-fits-all approach is used in the implementation of the 
HSCT. 
The study found that domestic financing of the HSCT is constrained by a 
poor-performing national economy and a lack of prioritisation of the limited 
revenues mobilised by the government of Zimbabwe. Most of the revenue 
mobilised by the government from taxes is directed towards the public sector 
wage bill. The study makes two important conclusions with respect to the 
financing of the HSCT. Firstly, the findings do not support a point made by 
Bastagli (2015:27) that external funding often acts as a catalyst for national 
governments to mobilise domestic revenues to finance social protection. 
Since international development partners began funding the HSCT in 2012 to 
date, the HSCT has not seen significant domestic financial contribution to the 
actual cash transfers paid to beneficiaries beyond employment costs for 
programme officials. Secondly, while the government of Zimbabwe 
demonstrates political will towards the HSCT, this is only one dimension of 
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affordability, and it is insufficient to guarantee the sustainability of the HSCT 
beyond donors’ assistance. There is potential for the poverty alleviation gains 
made under the HSCT to be eroded in future if government funding into the 
programme is not improved. Zimbabwe could learn important lessons from 
South Africa and Zambia where governments of the two countries prioritise 
social protection and make significant contributions towards social grants for 
the poor and vulnerable populations. 
6.4.2 Structural dimensions of social capital 
The study examined the effects of the HSCT on the following structural 
dimensions of social capital in recipient communities: social relations, social 
networks, membership associations and groups. The study makes several 
important conclusions on these dimensions of social capital. 
The findings from the two study communities highlight how the introduction of 
the HSCT positively and negatively affected a diverse set of social relations in 
recipient communities. It is apparent that social relations in the cash-recipient 
communities have undergone some form of transformation, and that these 
changes are shaped by specific design and implementation features of the 
HSCT. The HSCT has widespread positive effects on intra-household social, 
gender and generational relations. From the perspectives of most HSCT 
beneficiaries, the HSCT appears to rebuilding and strengthening a sense of 
family belonging between household members. The payment method, use of 
cash, consultative decision-making, eating together, sharing of benefits and 
information between household members, intertwined vulnerability factors 
seem to be the primary driving factors for positive social, gender and 
generational relations within beneficiary households. Similarly, evidence from 
the study shows isolated negative effects of the HSCT on intra-household 
social and gender relations. Domestic violence and family neglect after 
collecting cash were examples of negative effects of the HSCT on intra-
household social and gender relations. In cases where this occurred it seems 
gender of the recipient contributed to the negative social effects. 
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While the HSCT facilitated formation and strengthening of mutually beneficial 
social ties and friendships between beneficiaries, findings suggest that the 
introduction of the programme did not negatively affect pre-existing close 
friendships. Most beneficiaries in the two study districts reported that their 
close friends were non-HSCT beneficiaries whom they had established social 
relations with prior to the introduction of the HSCT. In some cases the HSCT 
served to strengthen pre-existing close friendships between beneficiaries and 
other community members, for example it enhanced reciprocal sharing 
arrangements. 
While the evidence on the effects of the HSCT on social relations between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is mixed, in most cases the HSCT 
weakened social ties between the two groups. Where this occurred it appears 
that the weak social relations were driven by the HSCT’s targeting method; 
non-beneficiaries’ perceptions of the programme’s eligibility criteria; inclusion 
and exclusion errors; actual cash benefits; and the non-sharing of programme 
information. The weak social ties between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
could have negative consequences on social cohesion in recipient 
communities and possibly affect other dimensions of social capital such as 
community collective action. 
The study’s primary conclusion on the effects of the HSCT on social relations 
in cash-recipient communities is that it seems that most of the positive effects 
were confined to people who were involved directly or indirectly with the 
HSCT. Evidence shows positive social ties between beneficiaries; between 
HSCT focal persons; between beneficiaries and HSCT focal persons; 
between beneficiaries and programme officials. Social relations between 
people involved with the programme and those outside the programme were 
for most part negative for example, between HSCT focal persons and non-
beneficiaries; between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries; and between non-
beneficiaries and programmes. These findings raise questions about the 
sustainability of the established social relations between those involved with 
the HSCT beyond the end of the programme. Most of the positive social 
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relations are driven by specific design and operational features of the HSCT 
without which opportunities for social interaction could be limited in the future. 
On social networks the study found that the HSCT led to the formation of two 
types of social networks linked to the HSCT: (1) networks of direct 
beneficiaries and (2) networks of HSCT focal persons. This indicates that the 
effects of the HSCT on social networks go beyond immediate beneficiaries of 
the HSCT but not outside the programme. The rationale for the social 
networks created by the HSCT in recipient communities is social as well as 
economic. Although the HSCT created opportunities for social inclusion of 
HSCT recipients into beneficial social networks such as family clubs, and 
internal savings and lending clubs, the new social networks created by the 
HSCT have been exclusionary benefitting mainly HSCT beneficiaries. The 
study found no evidence of non-beneficiaries’ participation in social networks 
linked to the HSCT. In addition, participants in the social networks were 
mostly women. The findings also raise the question of whether or not the 
social networks created by the HSCT in recipient communities will be 
sustainable beyond the life of the HSCT. 
The present study examined the participation of HSCT beneficiaries in the 
wider community-membership organisations. The study’s findings on 
membership associations show that in the two study districts, beyond 
attending church, HSCT beneficiaries’ participation in community-based 
membership associations is very low. Most social interaction of HSCT 
beneficiaries takes place outside subscription-based associations and groups 
but within the social forums established by the HSCT, for example the family 
clubs and rotational savings and lending clubs highlighted above. The factors 
cited as inhibiting greater participation in community membership associations 
were: (1) old age; (2) ill-health; (3) length of residence in the village or area; 
and (4) size of the cash transfer received by the household. On the basis of 
these findings it can be concluded that beneficiaries’ decision on whether or 
not to participate depended on HSCT and non-HSCT factors. Findings show 
that an important design feature of the HSCT – size of the cash transfer, 
appears to be a barrier to the participation of some of the HSCT beneficiaries 
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in subscription-based membership associations. In this regard, it can be 
argued that the benefits of the HSCT on social inclusion were limited. 
6.4.3 Cognitive dimensions of social capital 
The evidence from this study reveals that the HSCT has positive effects on 
trust, norms of reciprocity and important individual psychosocial elements 
such as happiness, self-esteem and dignity. There were widespread positive 
effects on trust levels between beneficiaries, and trust in HSCT focal persons, 
and in people in formal institutions such as health centres and schools. There 
were also reported cases of the HSCT weakening cognitive and psychosocial 
dimensions of social capital.  
There are several important conclusions that can be drawn from this study’s 
findings on effects of the HSCT on cognitive and psychosocial dimensions of 
social capital. The HSCT appears to have widespread positive effects on 
interpersonal trust, and trust in people in formal institutions with whom 
beneficiaries had frequent interactions. The interpersonal trust appears to be 
driven by frequent interaction opportunities created by the HSCT which in turn 
seem to lead to people getting to know each other better. The HSCT’s 
payment method is important here as it affords beneficiaries opportunities to 
interact frequently and to build trust over time. There appears to be no effects 
on generalised trust following the introduction of the HSCT in the two study 
districts. Generalised trust is good for a community’s social capital as 
evidence from previous studies show that it can generate beneficial outcomes 
such as collective action and reduced levels of crimes. The HSCT’s benefits 
on trust appear to be accrued at the individual level. The ideal is to accrue 
trust and both the individual and the community levels.   
The unconditional nature of the HSCT appears to offer flexibility and respect 
for beneficiaries’ choices. It can be said that there seems to be a positive and 
intrinsic psychological element embedded in unconditional grants. This 
reinforces the argument in favour of unconditional cash transfers over 
conditional grants.  
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On psychosocial effects the study shows that benefits that accrue from the 
use of the HSCT, for example purchase of livestock, house construction, 
increased consumption of nutritious foods, and purchase of clothes appear to 
drive positive psychosocial effects such as increased self-esteem, dignity and 
happiness. In this regard, the study indicates an important enabling 
association between material benefits and psychosocial effects.  
6.4.4 Types of social capital 
The results show that the HSCT contributes to the development and 
strengthening of bonding social capital between HSCT beneficiaries in 
recipient communities. In addition, the findings reveal that the programme 
formed and strengthened bonding social capital between HSCT focal persons. 
Research evidence shows that there are important social and economic 
benefits associated with the bonding social capital between beneficiaries. For 
example the social bonds were a source of support and comfort in times of 
need, and exchange of ideas and information about income-generation 
activities. The benefits contributed to improvements in the well-being of 
beneficiary households. The main limitation of the bonding social capital 
between HSCT beneficiaries is that the social ties between them appear 
exclusive in nature. It’s mainly people who have similar characteristics, for 
example, all being HSCT recipients. People who have social bonds generally 
lack access to new information and resources beyond their networks. The 
driving factor behind the creation and strengthening of bonding social capital 
between beneficiaries is the HSCT’s payment methods which facilitates 
opportunities for beneficiaries to travel together to the payment points, interact 
at payment points while waiting to collect their cash. 
The HSCT has widespread positive effects on linking social capital between 
beneficiaries and programme officials, NGOs and community business 
operators; and between HSCT focal persons and community leaders. 
However, there are negative effects on the vertical relationships between 
HSCT focal persons and programme officials, and weak and infrequent ties 
between beneficiaries and community leaders. It appears that the main driving 
factors for the positive linking social capital in recipient communities are all 
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centred on the payment method used in the HSCT, for example provision of 
complementary services at the payment point, pre-cash distribution speech 
and the conduct of programme officials at the payment point. The linking 
social capital created has important benefits for the well-being of 
beneficiaries. It can be concluded that besides the targeting and selection 
method used in the HSCT, the payment method has particularly striking 
consequences for the effects of the HSCT on social capital. The findings 
suggest that the adverse effects of the HSCT on linking social capital in the 
few but important cases highlighted above appear to be driven by material 
aspects of the HSCT, for example the HSCT focal persons complained about 
unresolved queries related to broken down bicycles and withdrawn airtime 
credits. 
The study’s findings indicate that the HSCT like other cash transfers in the 
literature has limited effects of bridging forms of social capital. This appears to 
be a consequence of concentration of effects on bonding and linking types of 
social capital at the expense of formation and strengthening of bridging or 
horizontal ties. Bridging ties cut across social, cultural, economic and 
demographic cleavages. There are very few cases where the HSCT facilitated 
entry of beneficiaries into the networks of the non-poor within and beyond the 
study communities. The absence of widespread horizontal ties limits 
beneficiaries’ access to new information and resources, an indication that 
their bonding social capital predominantly serves a survival function. Bridging 
ties have the potential to strengthen resilience and productive functions.  
6.4.5 Socio-cultural and gender norms 
The design and implementation features of the HSCT do not explicitly 
consider social, cultural and gender norms, yet results from this study suggest 
a shift in social and gender norms in the cash-recipient communities. Most of 
the registered cash recipients in the two study communities are women, and 
this was also confirmed by field observations at the HSCT payment 
collections points. The HSCT has increased the scope and opportunities for 
women from beneficiary household to socialise, network and access vital 
information for the well-being of their families. This occurs in the course of 
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cash collections at payment points, increased interactions with officials from 
public institutions as at payment points, at health centres and schools. Thus, 
their visibility in public spaces has increased. Findings show that before the 
introduction of the HSCT, women were generally confined to their 
homesteads and focused more on socially and culturally-ascribed tasks such 
as child care and maintenance of the household. Men had greater visibility in 
public spaces such as markets and business centres. The HSCT has also led 
to greater participation of women in community leadership and management 
roles as in their roles in the predominantly female-led HSCT focal persons’ 
networks. It can be concluded that the HSCT has unintended positive effects 
on women’s empowerment, social, gender and cultural norms. 
6.4.6 Implications of findings for policy and practice 
One of the main objectives of this study is to draw out and demonstrate the 
implications of the present study’s findings for social protection policy, and the 
design and implementation of social cash transfer interventions. The findings 
highlight a number of important points for consideration by social protection 
policy stakeholders mainly government; and social cash transfer actors mainly 
UNICEF; NGOs; international development partners and researchers. These 
implications should be considered more explicitly in the design, 
implementation and evaluation of social protection policies and social cash 
transfer schemes. 
The implications are divided into two categories with the first one highlighting 
key issues that are linked to the design and implementation features of CT 
programmes. The second category covers issues drawn from social capital 
dimensions. 
• Social protection policies and cash transfer interventions are usually 
designed with objectives that narrowly focus on redistribution and 
reducing income poverty. The preoccupation is on material benefits, 
human capital and economic priorities of the beneficiaries. The design 
of the HSCT mirrors these outcome concerns. The evidence from this 
study supports the idea that objectives of social protection policies in 
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general, and cash transfers in particular should be explicit about social 
capital, women’s empowerment, local community development and 
other transformative benefits of CT schemes. Where current CT 
objectives do not reflect these dimensions, it is recommended that 
recalibration of objectives based on emerging empirical evidence 
should be done.  
• This study has shown that an unconditional cash transfer can have 
important positive and negative social effects which could in turn affect 
the intended material effects of CTs on beneficiaries. For example, the 
study finds that participation in the HSCT led to the exclusion of some 
beneficiaries from accessing other important basic services such as 
education assistance for children in HSCT households under the 
government’s social safety net programme – BEAM. 
• Social cash transfers are not the silver bullet for addressing all forms 
of vulnerabilities and risks. This study reveals that beneficiaries were 
exposed to both covariate and idiosyncratic shocks and had to rely on 
savings from the HSCT and/or support from other sources within and 
outside their immediate communities while others had no means to 
cope with the shocks. The design of social cash transfers and social 
protection policies should incorporate shock-response mechanisms 
which could minimise negative risk coping behaviours, and reduce the 
need for separate humanitarian programmes. Such mechanisms entail 
provision of reserve funds whose use could be triggered in the event 
of beneficiaries experiencing covariate shocks such as droughts, 
floods, sharp rise in costs of basic commodities. 
• The design of social protection instruments should take in to 
consideration the diversity of beneficiary profiles. Programmes such as 
the HSCT which depict a profile with mainly three categories of 
beneficiaries: the old; children; disabled and chronically ill, should 
consider moving towards a tri-modal design with separate old age 
grants; child support grants and disability grants as is the example of 
South Africa’s social grants system. The needs of these groups of 
vulnerable people are different, and as results from this study show, 
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the size of the cash transfer may not be adequate to address their 
special requirements as in school fees for children, increased health 
needs for the old and regular medical requirements for household 
members with mental health challenges. 
• A majority of beneficiary households have young people who failed to 
complete primary or secondary school. Most of the young people in 
these beneficiary households are labour-endowed and have been 
involved in some kind of work that earned payment in either cash or 
kind. The design of cash transfer schemes could consider integrating 
vocational skills and business training for young people, and linkages 
to income-generation opportunities. These young people could in turn 
and in future help break the inter-generational poverty cycle in their 
families using the skills they would have gained through social cash 
transfers. 
• While no grievance and complaints mechanism is perfect, the design 
and implementation of cash transfer programmes should ensure that 
beneficiaries are clearly aware of how and to whom to complain, feel 
confident about registering complaints, know the grievance escalation 
pathway, and clearly express their opinions and views about how the 
grievance system is serving them. It seems that the following factors 
are vital for promoting increased use of the grievance systems: (1) that 
regular communication about the grievance system, (2) formal 
assurances that there will be no negative repercussions to 
beneficiaries who register sensitive complaints, and (3) frequent 
monitoring of the effectiveness of the grievance and complaints 
mechanism. In addition it is important to CT programme designs to 
integrate multiple options through which beneficiaries could raise 
grievances and complaints anonymously, for example the use of toll 
free phone numbers and suggestion boxes at payment points and 
other accessible locations. This could help protect beneficiaries from 
potential negative repercussions through confidential handling of 
sensitive complaints. An effective grievance mechanism should be 
able to clearly distinguish between complaints and administrative 
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queries. All these factors should be considered in the design and 
operational features of social protection instruments. 
• This study raises an important question about whether CTs’ grievance 
and complaints systems should narrowly focus on beneficiaries only. 
There are community volunteers who are directly involved in the 
delivery of CT programmes and there are also non-beneficiaries who 
as this study shows may have queries about CT programmes. The 
findings suggest that CT grievance and complaints systems should 
create opportunities and entry points for other stakeholders to register 
their complaints. It seems such an approach could help strengthen 
social accountability in social protection programmes. 
• To reduce the social divisions and tensions that could result from 
proxy means tests, programmes should incorporate transparent 
community verification processes which include the participation of a 
wide spectrum of community members comprising representatives of 
non-beneficiaries, community leaders and beneficiaries. Such an 
approach adds the use of local knowledge in targeting and selection of 
beneficiaries and may contribute to reducing inclusion and exclusion 
errors and perceptions of unfairness. The design and implementation 
of social cash transfers should integrate robust programme 
communication strategies which should serve the information needs of 
beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and the general community 
membership. In this way cash transfers can address information 
asymmetries about the objectives of CT programmes and targeting 
and selection methods.  
• The evidence from this study indicates that there is a gap between the 
theoretical arguments supporting equity and efficiency of proxy means 
test targeting and actual practice. There are social problems 
associated with household targeting and proxy means tests for 
example perceptions of unfairness, inclusion and exclusion errors. It 
might be better when resources are available for social cash transfers 
to switch to universal benefit systems. In the absence of a universal 
benefit system, programmes should consider ways of making existing 
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household targeting more flexible for example retargeting of 
beneficiaries at context-appropriate points in the life cycle of a 
programme; exiting households that no longer meet the eligibility 
criteria; and integrating newly vulnerable households. This may 
generate a greater sense of equal treatment in recipient communities 
and could contribute to the preservation and strengthening of 
community social capital with positive effects on community collective 
action. 
• The evidence from this study suggests the need for inflation-indexed 
cash transfer amounts in the design of cash transfer schemes 
particularly in cases where the primary objective of the CT is to raise 
the incomes and purchasing power of extremely poor households. The 
transfer amounts in the HSCT have not been adjusted for about five 
years and with the economic decline in Zimbabwe, it appears that the 
purchasing power of the transfers is being eroded. Furthermore, it’s 
important for CT programmes to adjust transfer sizes for existing 
recipient households in cases where the demographic structure or 
membership of the household changes. This ensures consistency 
between household size and cash transfer entitlements. 
• In terms of locations of cash transfers’ collection points, the results of 
this research support the idea of a standard approach to the choice of 
locations as is the case in Kenya’s OVC-CT programme which uses 
local post offices. If a programme selects cash collection centres that 
are in the vicinity of public institutions such as schools or health 
centres, it is recommended that the actual collection points be located 
inside the school premises or health centres for the safety and privacy 
of beneficiaries. In addition, measures should be put in place to ensure 
that the payment processes do not interfere with the core business of 
the public institutions. 
• The findings of this study suggest that cash transfer schemes that 
embed the provision of complementary or extra services to 
beneficiaries should take a more inclusive approach which considers 
extending access to information and extra services to non-
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beneficiaries too. Where this inclusive approach is considered, it may 
be necessary to separate provision of extra services from cash 
collection in order to ensure the collection of cash transfers remains a 
private affair for the safety and security of beneficiaries. Furthermore, 
the choice of complementary services should be tailored to meet the 
needs of demographic and vulnerability characteristics of beneficiary 
and non-beneficiary households’ members for example, the disabled 
and chronically ill, the old and people with mental health challenges. 
• The findings of this investigation support the idea that social protection 
requires an effective and sustainable finance mix (Barrientos 
2010:300). Reliance on external sources of financing raise questions 
on affordability and long-term sustainability of social protection 
instruments. Governments should expand fiscal space to finance 
social protection from domestic revenues for example by reducing 
expenditure on low priority areas, and leveraging on revenues from 
natural resources. 
The points highlighted below draw on the findings on social capital 
dimensions and unintended social effects of the HSCT.  
• The introduction of a cash transfer scheme into a community seems to 
alter the social organisation in a community in positive and negative 
ways. The evidence from this study reinforces the idea that the design 
of cash transfer programmes should be informed by prior analysis and 
understanding of the social organisation or social order and the pre-
existing forms and levels of social capital in targeted communities.. 
This calls for a greater and more explicit role for sociologists and 
anthropologists in the design and analysis of social protection 
instruments in general, and cash transfer schemes in particular. These 
experts need to work closely with economists. 
• Taken together, this study’s findings indicate that the introduction of an 
unconditional cash transfer has widespread positive and negative 
effects on bonding and linking forms of social capital in recipient 
communities. The effects on bridging or horizontal forms of social 
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capital appear to be limited and this suggests that beneficiaries have 
limited access to information and resources beyond their immediate 
social networks. Thus, the design and implementation of cash 
transfers should consciously embed strategies that promote the 
formation and strengthening of horizontal social ties. For example, CT 
designs could actively support the participation of beneficiaries in 
membership organisations that cut across social, cultural and 
economic boundaries. 
• While research evidence broadly indicates that cash transfers promote 
social inclusion of beneficiaries in the development processes, this 
study has raised important questions about the exclusionary nature of 
social networks and ties created through cash transfer schemes. 
Social cash transfers should take a more inclusive approach towards 
non-beneficiaries for example by promoting their participation in 
community verification of targeting and selection processes, social 
accountability aspects of the programmes, and giving them access to 
complementary services and general programme information. In 
addition, social networks and membership groups that are linked to 
cash transfers should explore ways of encouraging the participation of 
non-beneficiaries – making membership more diverse than exclusive 
to beneficiaries. This might narrow social divisions and tensions 
between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. 
• The study highlights a number design and implementation features of 
social cash transfers that promote formation and strengthening of 
bonding and linking forms of social capital. For example, the payment 
system, pre-cash distribution speech, provision of complementary 
services, and parts of the grievance system such as help desks. 
Programmes should invest more human and financial resources into 
these features in order to maximise on their positive effects on 
dimensions of social capital. 
• The evidence from this study indicates that beneficiaries value 
attending payment collection points in person from a social 
perspective as a way of connecting with fellow beneficiaries, 
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strengthening social ties and exchanging information. In the case of 
electronic payments being introduced to replace physical cash delivery 
it will be critical for the design and implementation of CT schemes to 
consider how to replace this social capital function of the payment 
collection points. 
• The results of this study indicate that the design and implementation of 
social cash transfer programmes need to consider the importance of 
giving recognition and visibility to the community support and 
leadership roles of women, who are the faces of community 
volunteerism upon which the delivery of the programmes in 
communities is based. The mobilisation and organisation activities for 
the HSCT at community level are time consuming and often take 
women away from their households for long periods particularly when 
cash distribution dates are drawing close. The HSCT should consider 
paying women (and men) for the work they do at community level and 
which benefits the programme. The gender division at the community 
level between paid men’s work and unpaid women’s voluntary work 
should be addressed and the HSCT can contribute towards achieving 
that by converting unpaid voluntary work to paid community support 
work. In this way the HSCT could contribute to meeting important 
productive and strategic gender needs of women in recipient 
communities. 
• The findings from this study highlight old age, disability and chronic 
illness as constraints limiting participation of some beneficiaries in 
community events and social networks. It is important that the design 
and implementation of social cash transfers takes into account these 
factors and explore ways of promoting the social inclusion and 
participation of these vulnerable groups in social activities linked to 
cash transfer programmes. 
• The evidence from this study shows that some of the cash transfer 
beneficiaries in the study communities have been victims of theft and 
house burglaries. Others reported that they do not feel safe from crime 
when they are at home alone. It was beyond the scope of the present 
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study to establish the causal link between being a cash transfer 
recipient and vulnerability to crime. The evidence base could benefit 
from studies that might examine the causal relationship between 
receiving cash transfers and vulnerability to crime activities. 
 
6.4.7 Recommendations for further research work 
The study identifies a number of areas where further research could broaden 
and deepen our understanding of the confluence of social cash transfers and 
social capital that is, where the two meet and how cash transfers impact on 
the latter. Five broad areas are summarised below. 
i. Future similar studies might focus on better understanding of whether 
social cash transfers contribute to beneficiaries’ willingness to 
participate in community collective action in cases where beneficiaries 
either volunteer to participate or may be required to participate by 
community leaders. The present study found inconclusive evidence on 
the effects of the HSCT on beneficiaries’ participation in community 
collective action. 
ii. An investigation to establish whether the pre-cash distribution dialogue 
between programme officials and beneficiaries at payment points has a 
direct causal effect on positive use of cash transfers by beneficiaries. 
The pre-cash distribution speech includes information on the desired 
cash transfer spend behaviours. This might constitute some form of 
soft condition in the cash transfer programme. 
iii. The present study examined a targeted cash transfer scheme. The 
evidence base could benefit from additional similar studies which might 
investigate the effects of a universal cash transfer scheme on social 
capital. 
iv. The evidence from the present study highlights the importance of the 
physical cash payment method for social capital outcomes. Further 
research is necessary to explore the effects of cash transfer schemes 
that use electronic payments on social capital. 
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v. The findings from the present study offer useful but limited insights in to 
the social dynamics of a cash transfer on polygamous households. 
One avenue for further study would be specific research into the effects 
of a cash transfer on the social capital of polygamous households.  
6.4.8 Contribution of the study to research 
The present study makes six important contributions to the literature that 
examines the effects of social cash transfers on social capital. 
Firstly, one of the key strengths of the present study was to combine into one 
study an in-depth analysis of the design and implementation features of a 
cash transfer programme from the perspectives of a diverse set of actors, and 
an examination of the effects of the design and implementation features on 
social capital. This gave the study thematic rigour and enabled the research to 
make several noteworthy contributions to the fields of cash transfers and 
social capital separately and jointly as demonstrated in the points made under 
implications of the findings for policy and practice. Previous similar studies 
identified in the CT literature have focused broadly on the effects of CTs of 
some dimensions of social capital but without a robust identification and 
analysis of the design and operational features of CT programmes.   
Secondly, to my knowledge, most studies that have explored the effects of 
cash transfers on social relations have narrowly focused their analyses on 
relations between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, and between 
beneficiaries and public officials. The present study identified and explored in 
insightful detail inter alia the effects of an unconditional cash transfer on a 
diverse and complex set of social, gender and generational relations between 
the following groups of people: 
i. HSCT household members (intra-household);  
ii. Beneficiaries (inter-household);  
iii. Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries;  
iv. Beneficiaries and HSCT focal persons 
v. Cash recipients and HSCT programme officials 
vi. HSCT focal persons and programme officials  
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vii. Cash recipients and community leaders;  
viii. HSCT focal persons and community leaders 
ix. HSCT focal persons 
This broad and deep analysis of the effects of a cash transfer on a structural 
dimension of social capital extends our knowledge of how the implementation 
of a cash transfer operates through and affects different sets of social 
relations even between people who are not directly involved in the 
implementation of cash transfer programmes. The effects on social relations 
are widespread, complex and indicate strengthening and weakening of social 
capital. 
Thirdly, this research makes an important contribution to the CT literature that 
addresses evaluation of payment methods for cash transfer programmes. 
There is a gap in the current frameworks used in analysing CT payment 
systems. Barca et al. (2010) suggested a framework that considers 
programme level issues and beneficiary considerations. This study expanded 
the scope of the evaluation framework by incorporating social capital 
dimensions. The modified framework can serve as a useful basis for future 
studies that analyse the implications of payment systems for social capital.  
Fourthly, the present study provides additional evidence which extends our 
knowledge with respect to the unintended effects of cash transfer 
programmes. The findings suggest that cash transfers: (1) seem to act as a 
magnet which attracts new members into beneficiary households; (2) 
promotes increased possession of identity documents by beneficiaries; and 
(3) the use of United States dollars as the transfer currency in contexts with 
severe shortages of cash could lead to a reduction in the value of transfers, 
cause price distortions in local community economies, and expose 
beneficiaries to crime. 
The fifth contribution of this study to research is that it enhances our 
understanding of the social dynamics, poverty and social protection 
programmes in a peri-urban setting as one of the two study communities, 
Epworth Is peri-urban. Most studies in the CT literature almost always focus 
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on rural communities. In most low-income countries, social protection tends to 
be mainly more rural than urban especially on the basis of higher prevalence 
of poverty in those rural settings. 
Last but not least the present study brought to the fore useful insights on the 
social structure of informal networks formed following the introduction of a 
cash transfer programme. Using social network and social capital theories, 
the study identified the phenomenon of networks within networks. Within the 
family clubs set by through the HSCT in study communities, members formed 
sub networks in the form of internal savings and lending groups. The networks 
served dual objectives – social and economic. 
6.4.9 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter presented a detailed discussion of the research findings in terms 
of existing literature, theory and practice. This was followed by a summary of 
the findings and conclusions organised in line with the study’s objectives. 
Overall, the findings of the study on perceptions and experiences of 
beneficiaries with design and operational features of the HSCT were positive. 
The views of community members on the HSCT were mixed with non-
beneficiaries expressing a preference for a universal benefit system from the 
perspective of equal treatment. Programme officials deployed the efficiency 
and equity argument for a targeted cash transfer programme.  
Findings indicate that targeting and the payment method had particularly 
striking consequences for social capital. The HSCT has both positive and 
negative effects on dimensions and types of social capital. Data points to 
widespread positive effects on bonding and linking forms of social capital but 
limited effects on bridging social capital. Furthermore, the study suggests 
more positive psychosocial effects on individual beneficiaries and household 
members, and limited negative effects such as feelings of stigma and 
inferiority. The study confirms and in some cases contradicts findings of 
previous studies. There are also areas where the study provides additional 
evidence and extends our knowledge of some aspects of CTs and social 
capital.  
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The implications of the present study for social protection policy and cash 
transfers, and recommendations for future research drawing on gaps and 
areas identified in the present study were outlined. There is scope to 
contribute further to the growing body of empirical evidence on the nexus 
between social capital and cash transfers. 
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Appendix 3: Beneficiary Household Questionnaire and Informed Consent Forms 
Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) Beneficiary Household Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire number I____I of I____I 
 
Interview details 
 Name 
Province:  
District:  
Ward number:  
Location name (Urban):  
Village name (Rural):  
Household:  
HSCT HH 1 = Yes  2 = No  
 
Outcome of first visit  
  
  Outcome of second visit  
Completed 01  Completed 01 
No household member at home or no competent respondent at home at time of visit 02  No household member at home or 
no competent respondent at 
home at time of visit 
02 
Entire household absent for extended period of time 03  Refusal 04 
Postponed 04  Other (specify) 95 
Refusal 05   
Dwelling vacant or address not a dwelling 06  
Dwelling destroyed 07  
Dwelling not found 08  
Other (specify) 
 
95  
 
Date: Start time End time Main interviewee/respondent: Informed 
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ddmmyyyy hhmm hhmm consent given 
Yes = 1  No = 2 
   Name ID  
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Language details 1 
 Shona: 1  Ndebele: 2 English: 3 Other: 4 (specify) 
Main language used 
by interviewer 
    
 
 
 Shona: 1  Ndebele: 2 English: 3 Other: 4 (specify) 
Main language used 
by respondent 
    
 
 
 Yes: 1  No: 2 
Did you use a 
translator for this 
interview 
  
 
 
Interviewer details 1 
 Name ID code Date (ddmmyyyy) Signature 
Interviewer:            
Checked by:            
Data entered by:            
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Introducing yourself and the purpose of the interview including the 
informed consent statement 
Good morning/afternoon (as may be appropriate). My name is [Research Assistant Name]. I 
am representing Nyasha Mayanga, who is the Principal Investigator in this study. The study is 
being done as part of Nyasha Mayanga’s Doctoral studies with the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) under the supervision of Professor Vusi Gumede. We are investigating the social 
effects of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) programme in your household and 
wider community. You are being asked to participate in the study because you have been 
identified as a beneficiary of the HSCT programme in this district, ward and area/village. We 
are interested in gathering your views about your experience with the programme and how it 
has shaped or influenced social relations in your community. We hope this study contributes 
to improving the way this programme is implemented not only in this area but throughout 
Zimbabwe. Many people are expected to participate in this study across two districts. 
The answers and information you give will be completely confidential. Your personal 
contributions and views will not be shared with anyone else in a way that can identify you. It is 
important for you to understand that the answers and the information you give will in no way 
affect your status with respect to the HSCT programme. Please note that your participation in 
this study is voluntary and you don’t have to participate if you don’t want to. It will take about 
two hours to complete this survey. If you decide to participate, in order for me not to miss any 
aspects of our interview, I would appreciate it if you can allow me to write down the entire 
interview, only if that is fine with you. Please answer all questions truthfully.  
It is possible that some of the questions may make you feel uncomfortable or cause you to be 
upset. You do not have to answer any question that makes you feel uncomfortable or may 
cause you to think about upsetting issues. You should feel free to interrupt me if you ever 
want to stop the interview at any time. You will not be penalised in any way for this decision. 
In a situation of potential adverse effects, I may suggest an appropriate referral to counselling 
service providers. 
You will not be paid or compensated for participating in the survey. There are no costs 
associated with your participation in the survey other than your time. However, I expect that 
you may enjoy the experience of sharing your views about the HSCT programme. Do you 
have anything you want to ask me? 
You may speak to Professor Vusi Gumede at TMALI if you have questions, or problems with 
the study. He is contactable on telephone number: 0027 123376155 and e-mail 
gumedevt@unisa.ac.za. 
Interviewer: Ask respondents directly if they are willing to participate in the study. Will you 
please give me some time to speak with you? Only after they say YES, can you then 
proceed to obtain signature for informed consent. 
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Informed consent: I have been read or read to myself this entire statement in my own 
language. All my questions have been satisfactorily answered. I agree to participate in the 
study. 
Signature of interviewee: ______________________________  Age: ________________ 
Signature of guardian if respondent is under 18:________________________________ 
Signature of Researcher: _____________________________________ 
Date: ______________________________ 
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Photography 
I seek your permission to take a few photographs of you, your home and its surroundings. We 
will use these photographs to assist us in construction of case studies, and recollection of 
events, places and respondents encountered during the course of the study. You and your 
family will not be named in these photographs. We will also not reveal the specific location. 
The answers and information you give will not be connected to your photograph. Would you 
be willing to have the photographs taken? 
Statement of consent to be photographed 
I understand that photographs will be taken during the study, and: 
I agree to have photographs taken of me. (Mark either “Yes” or “No”) 
Yes  No  Initial of researcher  
I agree to have photographs taken of my family. (Mark either “Yes” or “No”). 
Yes  No  Initial of researcher  
I agree to have photographs taken of my home and home surroundings. (Mark either “Yes” 
or “No”). 
Yes  No  Initial of researcher  
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Section A: Household characteristics and roster 
 
NOTE 
 
List all people who usually live in this household (given/first names only). 
 
Definition of a Household: A group of people who live together and eat together. “Live 
together” means they live under the same roof. However, if one household member lives in a 
separate room or annexe that is close to the main house, and shares meals with the other 
members, he or she can be considered a member of the same household. 
 
“Eat together” means they share food that is bought from a common household budget. It 
does not necessarily mean that they take their meals at the same time. 
 
For the purposes of this household survey, a usual household member is one who has been 
continuously living in a household for at least 6 months. He or she may or may not be 
related to the other household members by blood or marriage, and may be a house helper or 
labourer. A usual household member normally lives together with other household members 
in one house or closely related premises and takes his or her meals from the same kitchen.  
 
If a household member is continuously living ELSEWHERE for the majority of the year (more 
than 6 months e.g. someone abroad for studies), DO NOT include them in the roster.  
 
Children of any age away from home on a temporary job or children 18 at boarding school are 
included as members of the household. 
 
Newly-born babies are usual members of a household and should be included as usual 
members of that household. 
 
Newly married couples are to be regarded as usual members of the households even if one 
or both of them has been in the household for less than 6 months. 
 
Add up from household roster and record the total number of household members who are 
over 18 years of age, and also for those who are 18 years of age and younger who are 
members of this household. The total figure will give the size of each household. 
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House characteristics 
 
Q1. In what type of main house do the members live? (observation only) 
1. = Separate house 
2. = Semi-detached house 
3. = Rooms/compound house 
4. = Room within a house 
5. = Several huts/buildings same compound 
6. = Several huts/buildings different compounds 
7. = Tent 
8. = Other (specify) 
Q4. What is the construction material of most of the floor of this 
house? 
1. = Concrete/cement 
2. = Wood 
3. = Stone 
4. = Ceramic/marble tiles 
5. = Vinyl tiles 
6. = Earth/sand 
7. = Cane 
8. = Bamboo 
9. = Other (specify) 
Q2. What is the construction material used for the majority of the exterior 
walls of the house? 
1. = Mud/mud bricks 
2. = Mud bricks with cement plastering 
3. = Brick and cement 
4. = Burnt bricks 
5. = Perimeter wall blocks/concrete blocks 
6. = Stone 
7. = Wood/bamboo 
8. = Metal sheet/asbestos 
9. = Cardboard 
10. = Thatch 
11. = Other (specify)  
Q5. What is the primary source of water supply for this household? 
1. = Piped water system 
2. = Water vendor 
3. = Water truck/tanker service 
4. = Communal borehole 
5. = Protected well 
6. = Unprotected well                                      
7. = River or stream 
8. = Rain water/spring 
9. = Pipe in neighbouring household 
 
 
Q3. What is the construction material of most of the roof of this house? 
1. = Corrugated iron sheet 
2. = Asbestos 
3. = Roofing tiles 
4. = Straw or thatch 
5. = Bamboo 
6. = Wood 
7. = Cement/concrete 
Q6. How long does it take to go for drinking water and come back? 
Number of minutes.  
 
Code: 888 for water on premises 
Code 999 for ‘Don’t Know’ 
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8. = Other (specify) 
 
Q7. What type of toilet is used by your household? 
1. = Pit latrine 
2. = Flush toilet 
3. = Public toilet 
4. = Toilet in another house 
5. = No toilet facility (bush) 
6. = Other (specify) 
Q12. To whom do you pay rent? 
1. = Local authority (e.g. Local Board) 
2. = Parents – land lords 
3. = Friend – land lord 
4. = Other (specify) 
 
 
Q8. What type of lighting does this household use? 
1. Electricity 
2. Gas lamp 
3. Candles/Torches(flash lights) 
4. Solar energy 
5. Generator 
6. No light 
7. Open fire 
8. Other (specify) 
Q13. Do you pay rates for this dwelling? 
1. = Yes (>>>14a and 14b) 
2. = No (>>>15) 
 
 
Q9. The house  
1. Is owned and completely paid for (>>>13) 
2. Is owned with a mortgage (>>>13) 
3. Is rented (>>>10, 11a, 11b, 12, 14a, 14b) 
4. Is a squatter dwelling (>>>15) 
5. Given in exchange for services (>>>13) 
6. Belongs to the church (>>>13) 
7. Other (specify) (>>>13) 
Q14a. To whom do you pay rates?                     
1. = Local authority (e.g. Local Board)                       
2. = Land lord 
3. = Other (specify) 
 
Q14b. How much do you pay towards rates? 
 
Amount in USD  
 
Time unit 
1. = Weekly 
2. = Monthly 
3. = Quarterly 
4. = Half yearly 
5. = Yearly 
Q10. How much does the household pay in cash towards rent? 
 
Amount in USD  
 
Time unit 
1. = Weekly 
2. = Monthly 
3. = Quarterly 
4. = Half yearly 
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5. = Yearly 
 
 
Q11a. Is part of the rent paid by someone who is not a member of the 
household? 
1. = Yes   
2. = No >>>12 
 
 
Q11b. How much does this person pay? 
 
Amount in USD  
 
Q15. Are there any other costs associated with this house that you 
pay? 
1. = Yes                     
2. = No (>>>17) 
 
Q16. List the cost categories from Q15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q17. Does the house have access to the following? 
 
1 = Yes                        2 = No 
Fixed line telephone  
Mobile phone  
Personal computer  
Internet  
Digital Satellite Television (DSTV)   
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House roster: See separate sheet for response codes 
 
 Household members: ID code # 
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 
Questions             
1. Names of 
individuals in 
household [Use 
first names 
only]. 
 
 
2. What sex is 
[Name]? 
            
3. Relationship to 
the head of 
household 
            
4. Marital status             
5. How old 
[Name]? 
            
6. What is 
[Name]’s date 
of birth? 
            
7. Interviewer: 
How did you 
determine date 
of birth in Q6 
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Household Roster: 
 
For adult household members (18 years and older): See laminated sheet for response codes 
 
 Household members: ID code # 
 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 
Questions   
 
 
For adults 
18 years 
and older 
            
9. Does [NAME] 
have a 
National ID 
card? 
10. If not, why 
not? 
            
11. Education 
level 
            
12. What is 
[NAME]’s 
religion? 
For all 
household 
members 
            
13. What kind of 
EMPLOYME
NT (work that 
earns 
payment 
either in cash 
or kind) does 
[NAME] 
usually have? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For adults 
18 years 
and older 
            
14. What was 
[NAME]’s 
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main 
ACTIVITY in 
the last 2 
months? (i.e. 
the activity 
that [NAME] 
spent the 
most time 
doing) 
15. Does [NAME] 
have 
permanent 
physical 
disability? 
 
 
 
 
For all 
household 
members 
            
16. Does [NAME] 
suffer from a 
chronic 
illness (an 
illness that 
takes more 
than 3 
months to 
recover) 
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House roster: New household members 
List all NEW household members (including any previously listed and ‘not listed’ household members) who joined the 
household between 2012 and 2016. 
 
Q1: Did any new person join the household between 2012 and 2016?      
1 = Yes >>>>2, 3, 4, and 5 
2 = No >>>Section B 
 
 
 
 Household members: ID code # 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Questions             
2. What is the 
person’s first 
name? 
 
3. Why did 
[NAME] join 
this household? 
            
4. When did 
[NAME] join the 
household? 
            
5. Where did 
[NAME] move 
from? 
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Section B: HSCT Programme design, implementation and operational performance 
 
Introduction 
 
This section is about the HSCT programme and seeks beneficiaries’ views, experiences and perceptions of the HSCT’s design, implementation 
and operational features. 
 
For this section, I would like to speak to the person most knowledgeable about the Harmonised Cash Transfer (HSCT) programme (for example, 
the head of household identified in section A, or the registered cash recipient if it is not the head of the household). 
 
  New ID Code of most knowledgeable 
household member about the HSCT 
programme, if it is not the intended 
respondent. 
 
N    
 Beneficiary targeting/selection  
1. Are you or any member of the household 
currently a beneficiary of the HSCT 
programme? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
Interviewer: If ‘NO’ explain what the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer is to double-
check the respondent’s awareness.  
 
2. Sex of the registered HSCT beneficiary or 
recipient. 
1 = Male     2 = Female  
2a. Ask to see the HSCT Programme ID of 
designated beneficiary or recipient. 
[Card seen?] 
1 = Yes 
2 = No >> 2c 
 
2b. Write down the Programme Card’s ID 
number: 
PID # 
If the Programme Card is not available enter “98” 
 
 
Probe why card is not available. 1 = Never issued     2 = Lost  
2c. Who usually collects the payment from the 
HSCT payment point? 
Note Programme ID of Person. If not 
PID      
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member of the household, Enter “98” 
3 Is your household still receiving payments 
from the HSCT programme? 
1 = Yes >>>5     
2 = No 
 
4. Why are you NOT still receiving payments 
from the HSCT programme? 
1 = Missed collection of payments on 3 consecutive occasions 
2 = Voluntarily left the programme: didn’t need it 
3 = Voluntarily left the programme: programme didn’t work properly 
4 = Cash payments discontinued after programme officials found that I had been 
erroneously included as I do not meet selection criteria 
5 = Enrolled in another social protection programme 
6 = Other, specify____________________________________ 
__________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________ 
 
98 = Don’t know 
 
5. Who do you think are eligible to receive the 
cash transfers? 
 
Response codes: 1 = Yes               2 = No Yes No 
a) Very poor households – unable to meet their most urgent basic needs   
b) House hold has no able-bodied member (18-59yrs) who is fit to productively 
work 
  
c) Household has disabled or chronically ill member(s) who require regular and 
intensive care 
  
d) House hold has old members    
e) Household has individuals taking care of many orphans/children    
f) Other (specify)__________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
    98)   Don’t Know 
 
 
6. Why do you think you were selected to 
receive the transfer? 
 
Response codes: 1 = Yes               2 = No Yes No 
a) I am very poor – unable to meet the most urgent basic neds of my household   
b) My household has no able-bodied member (18-59yrs) fit for work   
c) I am disabled, or I have disabled/chronically ill member(s) in my household 
whom I look after 
  
d) I am old   
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e) Take care of many orphans/children   
f) Other (specify)  
    98)    I do not know  
7.  Do you think targeting/selection process 
for the HSCT is fair? 
Response codes:                                  1 = Yes               2 = No 
 
 
 
Probe reasons behind a NO response. 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8. Do you think the eligibility criteria for the 
HSCT programme are clear? 
 
 
Response codes:                                  1 = Yes               2 = No 
 
 
 
Probe reasons behind a NO response: 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
9. Do you think there are people who are very 
poor and need the HSCT programme but 
were wrongly excluded from the programme? 
Response codes:                                  1 = Yes               2 = No 
 
 
10. Do you think there are people currently 
benefitting from the HSCT programme but do 
not need the cash transfers? 
Response codes:                                  1 = Yes               2 = No 
 
 
11. a) In your opinion how do you feel about being designated as an “HSCT beneficiary”? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Do you think the creation of categories “HSCT beneficiaries” and “non-beneficiaries” leads to social tensions, social divisions and/or conflicts in 
your community? 
 
1 = Yes        2 = No     
  
 
Interviewer: Probe reasons behind the tensions, divisions or conflicts?) Or: If there are no social problems, ask why this could be the 
case? Interviewer: Be clear about your probes. 
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Please tell me whether in general you agree or disagree with the following statements that relate to the HSCT. Interviewer – emphasise gravity of 
response codes to respondent. 
12. HSCT beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in 
my community get along with each other fine 
as before.  
1 = Strong Agree     2 = Agree      
3 = Disagree     4 = Strongly Disagree 
 
 
13. Beneficiaries receiving HSCT payments have 
the right to receive the money. It is not a gift 
or loan, but an entitlement 
1 = Strong Agree     2 = Agree      
3 = Disagree     4 = Strongly Disagree 
 
 
14. Beneficiaries who are receiving HSCT 
payments will continue to receive the 
payments until they are no longer eligible to 
receive the transfers (i.e. they are no longer 
labour-constrained and food poor). 
 
1 = Strong Agree     2 = Agree      
3 = Disagree     4 = Strongly Disagree 
 
 
. HSCT payment systems and operations 
15. When was the last time your household 
received an HSCT payment? 
 
List MONTH and YEAR numerically: MM—
YYYY 
Enter “9999” in the YYYY boxes if 
respondent doesn’t know. 
 
    
     
     
  
 
 
                                              
 
16. How much did you receive? 
 
Enter “9999” if respondent does not know. 
 
 
 
Amount in United States Dollars 
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17. When do you expect to receive the next 
HSCT payment? 
1 = In the next 2 months 
2 = In the next 6 months 
3 = In the next 12 months 
4 = Greater than 12 months 
5 = Never 
 
18. How long in the future do you expect to 
continue receiving HSCT payments? 
1 = 6 months          2 = 1 Year          3 = 2 years          4 = 5 years 
5 = longer/for the rest of life 
 
 
19. What method(s) of transport do you (or your 
representative) use to travel to and from the 
Payment Point to collect your HSCT 
payment? 
 
[INTERVIEWER CIRCLE ALL THAT 
APPLY] 
A = Walk A. 
B = Ox/donkey-drawn scotch cart B. 
C = Bus/Minibus/Kombi C. 
D = Bicycle D. 
E = Motor bike E. 
F = Car F. 
G = Boat/Canoe G. 
H = Wheel chair (manual/motorised) H. 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 98. 
J = Other (specify) J. 
20. For your last HSCT payment, how much did 
you (or your representative) spend on 
transportation to travel from your house to 
the HSCT Payment point and back? 
 
Two-way total for going from household 
to payment point and back. 
 
Enter “0” if None. 
 
Amount in United States Dollars 
 
          
 
 
 
21. In general how long does it take you (or your 
representative) to travel from your household 
to the Payment point and back again? 
 
Interviewer: Note that this does not 
include time/days spent waiting at 
Payment point. 
 
  DAYS                                 HOURS                                     MINUTES 
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22. How do you or your representative feel about 
the journey/trip to and from the HSCT 
payment point? 
1 = easy 
2 = very easy 
3 = difficult 
4 = very difficult 
    
 
23a. 
 
 
 
 
 
23b 
When you or your representative travel to the 
HSCT Payment point, do you travel alone or 
you travel in the company of other household 
members, relatives, or friends from the same 
community? 
1 = I travel alone 
2 = I travel with other household members >>23b 
3 = I travel with other HSCT beneficiaries from my village/neighbourhood 
4 = I travel with non-beneficiary neighbours/friends from my village >>23b 
98 = Can’t say 
 
 
Interviewer: Probe why they prefer to travel to the Payment point with someone. Take down notes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. In general, how long do you have to wait at 
the Payment point to get your HSCT money? 
 
 
 
 
   DAYS                                HOURS                                      MINUTES 
            
 
 
 
25a. 
 
25b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, have you made new friends at the 
HSCT Payment point? 
1 = Yes >>25b and 25c 
2 = No >>26 
 
Where are these friends from? (Interviewer: NB: village if it is Gorormonzi, and area if it is Epworth) 
 
1 = my village/area  
2 = other villages/areas in my ward 
3 = other wards in the districts 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
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25c 
 
Interviewer: Probe how they have benefitted from these new friendships and social connections? Take down notes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26. For your last payment, how were you 
informed about the date and place of 
collection? 
Informed in public (in front of other community members) by: 
 
1 = Ward councillor 
2 = Chief/Headman/Village Heads 
3 = Child Protection Committee (CPC) members/CPC HSCT focal persons 
4 = Another beneficiary 
6 = A neighbour who is not a beneficiary 
7 = Family member 
8 = School teachers/Local clinic staff/Arex Officers 
 
Informed in private by 
 
9 = Ward councillor 
10 = Chief/Headman 
11 = Child Protection Committee (CPC) members/CPC HSCT focal persons 
12 = Another beneficiary 
1. A neighbour who is not a beneficiary 
14 = Family member 
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15 = School teachers/Local clinic staff/Arex Officers 
 
16 = I saw others going to collect HSCT payments 
 
17 = Others (specify):________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27a. Did you think the way you were told when 
and where to collect your last payment was 
appropriate? 
1 = Yes>>28 
2 = No 
 
27b Interviewer: Probe reasons for a NO answer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Do you have a registered representative 
(proxy) that can collect your HSCT payment 
on your behalf if you are sick, injured or not 
able to collect the payment yourself? 
1 = Yes >>30, 31 and 32 
2 = No  
 
29a. 
 
 
 
29b 
Will you be willing to identify and designate a 
representative to collect the payment for you 
on your behalf? 
1 = Yes  
2 = No >>>33 
 
 
Identify whom you want to designate. 
 
1 = Family member/relative that lives in your household 
2 = Family member/relative that lives outside of your household 
3 = Friend/Neighbour who is not a beneficiary 
4 = Another beneficiary 
5 = Community elder/leader 
6 = Chief/Government representative 
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7 = CPC member 
Other (specify): __________________________________________________ 
 
30. What is your relationship to the 
representative (proxy) you have identified for 
the HSCT programme? 
1 = Family member/relative that lives in your household 
2 = Family member/relative that lives outside of your household 
3 = Friend/Neighbour who is not a beneficiary 
4 = Another beneficiary 
5 = Community elder/leader 
6 = Chief/Government representative 
7 = CPC member 
1. Other (specify): __________________________________________________ 
 
 
31. Have you ever sent your representative to 
collect your HSCT payment from the 
Payment point? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
32. The last time you sent your representative 
did you pay him/her to collect your payment 
from the HSCT Payment point? 
1 = Yes, transport/accommodation costs only 
2 = Yes, transport/accommodation costs and payment in cash or in-kind 
3 = Yes, payment in cash or in-kind only 
4 = No 
98 = Don’t know 
 
33. Have you ever had to pay any money (cash 
or in-kind) to the Payment point staff when 
you went to collect your payment? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
98 = Can’t say 
 
34a. 
 
 
34b. 
Has anyone at the HSCT Payment point ever 
asked you for money (gift) before or after 
payment of the HSCT transfer? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No>>>36 
 
For the LAST time you had to pay any such 
monies (gifts) to the Payment point staff, how 
much did you have to pay? 
 
 
Amount in US dollars 
 
          
 
 
 
35. In general, do you feel safe collecting your 
money from the HSCT Payment point and 
taking it back home? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
36. In general, are you happy with the way you 1 = Yes  
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are treated by the Securico (HSCT payment 
delivery agent) staff when you go to collect 
your HSCT payment at the Payment point? 
2 = No 
98  = Don’t know/Can’t say 
37. In general, are you happy with the way you 
are treated by staff from the Department of 
Social Services (DSS) when you go to collect 
your HSCT payment at the Payment point? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
98  = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
38a. 
 
 
 
 
 
38b. 
In general, are you happy with the way you 
are treated by CPC members/HSCT focal 
persons at community level before and when 
you go to collect your HSCT payment at the 
Payment point? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
98  = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
 
In the HSCT programme, what is your relationship like with the CPC members/HSCT focal persons that you interact with before, during and after 
each HSCT payment cycle? Interviewer: Probe respondent’s understanding and perceptions of the role of the CPC members in the HSCT 
programme. Ask what kind of assistance has respondent received from CPC members? How well do CPC members/HSCT focal persons discharge 
their duties? 
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39. In general, do you think Securico (HSCT 
payment delivery agent) staff exhibit care, 
compassion and understanding (preferential 
treatment) towards the elderly, disabled, sick 
or children who come to collect their HSCT 
payments? 
Response codes:                                  1 = Yes               2 = No 
 
 
40. In general, do you think staff from the 
Department of Social Services exhibit care, 
compassion and understanding (preferential 
treatment) towards the elderly, disabled, sick 
or children who come to collect their HSCT 
payments? 
Response codes:                                  1 = Yes               2 = No 
 
 
41a. In general, over the last payment did the 
HSCT Payment point officers (both DSS and 
Securico staff) arrive at the HSCT Payment 
point on time? 
1 = Yes >>>42a 
2 = No 
3 = Don’t know/Can’t say >>>42a 
 
41b Interviewer: Probe to find out how late they were and reasons for the delays (i.e. if beneficiaries were informed of the reasons for the late arrival? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42a. Are you happy with the current HSCT 
payment method (physical cash delivery by 
Securico)? 
1 = Yes >>>43a 
2 = No 
 
42b. Interviewer: Probe to find out why he/she is not happy about the payment method? Also ask what payment method the respondent would prefer 
instead of the physical cash delivery? 
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43a. 
 
 
43b. 
 
 
43c. 
Have you ever missed an HSCT payment? 1 = Yes  
2 = No >>>44a 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say >>>44a 
 
After you missed a payment, did anyone 
follow up on you to understand why you have 
missed your payment? 
1 = Yes  
2 = No >>>44 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say >>>44a 
 
Who followed up on you? 1 = CPC member/HSCT ward focal person 
2 = District Social Services (DSS) 
3 = Another beneficiary 
4 = Community leader 
 
44a. 
 
 
44b. 
Do other people in community know that you 
are receiving payments from the HSCT 
programme? 
1 = Yes >>>45a 
2 = No 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say >>>45a 
 
Is it, or would it be a problem for you if others 
in the community know that you are receiving 
payments from the HSCT programme? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No >>45 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say>>45 
 
44cde
. 
If yes, why would it be a problem if others 
know you are receiving payments from the 
HSCT programme? 
 
Interviewer: DO NOT READ PROMPT. LET 
THE RESPONDENT STATE THEIR 
CONCERN(S). IF MORE THAN ONE 
CONCERN IS SHARED, ASK THE 
RESPONDENT TO INDICATE NO MORE 
THAN THREE (3) AND TO RANK THEM IN 
ORDER OF IMPORTANCE. 
 
IF FEWER THAN THREE RESPONSES 
ARE PROVIDED, ENTER “98” TO ANY 
1 = May be asked for money by others 
2 = May be asked to care for other family members 
3 = I will be embarrassed 
4 = Concerned for my safety 
5 = Jealousy 
6 = Witchcraft 
7 = Concerned I will be removed from other social support programmes 
8 = May not get additional help in times of need 
9 = I don’t actually qualify to be a beneficiary in the HSCT programme 
 
10 = Other (specify):___________________________________________ 
 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
44c. Most 
important 
44d. 
Second 
most 
important  
44e. Third 
most 
important 
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NON-RESPONSE CELLS. 
45a. 
 
 
 
45b. 
For the LAST HSCT payment, did the HSCT 
programme staff (DSS Officers) do a pre-
distribution speech at the payment points 
before payment commenced? 
1 = Yes  
2 = No >>>46 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
What topics or items were covered in the 
pre-distribution speech? 
 
Interviewer: List all that are applicable. 
1 = Purpose of the HSCT programme 
2 = Targeting/selection criteria 
3 = Volume of transfers 
4 = Grievance handling procedures 
5 = Advice to beneficiaries on use of cash transfer payments 
6 = Child protection issues 
 
6 = Other (specify): __________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46a. 
 
 
46b. 
 
 
46c. 
In general, are you given an opportunity to 
ask questions or clarifications during or after 
the pre-distribution speech? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
In general, are you happy with the range of 
topics covered in the pre-distribution 
speech? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
What improvements to the pre-distribution speech would you suggest? 
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47a. 
 
 
47b. 
In general, do beneficiaries of different 
genders (male and female) get along well 
with each other at HSCT Payment points? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No  
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
Interviewer: If yes/no, probe why this may be case? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48a. 
 
 
48b. 
In general, do beneficiaries of different 
generations (young and old) get along well 
with each other at HSCT payment points? 
1 = Yes  
2 = No  
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
Interviewer: If yes/no, probe why this may be case? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49. List any other complementary services that 
you think should be provided at the HSCT 
Pay point but are currently not being 
provided? 
 
 
 
 
Interviewer: List services here. 
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50a. 
 
 
50b. 
Since you started receiving HSCT payments, 
have you been asked to care for other family 
members outside your original household? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No >>51a 
 
If yes, how many additional people do you 
care for? 
 
Insert number: >>> 
 
    
 
 
51a. 
 
 
51b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51c. 
Do families participating in the HSCT 
programme have to follow any conditions in 
order to continue receiving payments? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No >>>> proceed to next section on grievance system 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say >>>> proceed to next section on grievance system 
 
If yes, can you please list the conditions that 
you think HSCT households have to follow or 
comply with in order to continue receiving 
HSCT payments? 
1 = Send children to school 
2 = Attendance o health facility for immunisation 
3 = Attendance to health facility for growth monitoring 
4 = Attendance to health facility for Vitamin A supplement 
5 = Buy food 
6 = Provide adequate care for children 
7 = Birth certificate for children 
8 = Other (specify):_________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
98 = Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
 
How did you learn about the conditions of the 
HSCT that you have outlined above? 
1 = HSCT programme officials (DSSO) 
2 = CPC members 
3 = At the HSCT Payment point 
4 = Another beneficiary 
5 = Community leaders (headman, village head or ward councillor) 
6 = Other (specify):_________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
98 = Don’t know 
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Grievance and complains systems: Interviewer – introduce this new subsection as follows: Now I am going to ask you questions about the HSCT’s 
grievance and complaints mechanisms. 
1. Are you aware of how to raise a grievance or 
complaint about problems with HSCT 
payments or other parts of the HSCT 
programme? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
2. Are you aware of to whom you may raise a 
grievance or complaint with in the HSCT 
programme? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
3. Have you ever contacted anyone? 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
4. For grievance and complaints about the 
HSCT programme, I have contacted: 
1 = HSCT programme staff at Payment point Help Desk 
2 = CPC focal persons 
3 = DSS staff when they do their monitoring visits 
4 = Deloitte staff who come to do payment verification surveys 
5 = Community leaders (e.g. councillors, headman, village head) 
6 = Other (specify)_____________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1st  
2nd  
3rd  
5. For what problem did you contact them to 
resolve? 
1 = change management issues (e.g. when a representative cannot collect a payment 
because they are not a registered proxy in the MIS, name of recipient skipped on pay 
schedule, lost ID Card and changes to household structure). 
2 = Missed previous payment(s) and asking to be paid outstanding payments 
3 = Travel time 
4 = Problems with getting informed of payments 
5 = Fraud/Bribes 
6 = Unhappy with treatment from Securico Payment point staff 
7 = Unhappy with treatment from DSS staff 
8 = Transfer size 
9 = Other (specify):____________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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6. Was your complaint or query officially 
registered on a form and were you given a 
serial reference number to ensure follow up 
and case resolution? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
7. Are you confident that if you raised a 
grievance through the HSCT Help Desk at 
Payment point, it would be addressed 
properly and to your satisfaction? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
Now I am going to read you two statements (#8 and #9) related to the HSCT grievance and complaints system. Please tell me whether you agree or 
disagree with the following statements. Interviewer: emphasise gravity of each response code. 
8. Complaints are addressed and feedback 
provided by DSS staff. 
1 = Strong Agree     2 = Agree     3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Disagree     5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
9. There are sufficient DSS staff members at 
the Payment Point Help Desk dedicated to 
complaints handling. 
1 = Strong Agree     2 = Agree     3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Disagree     5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
10. Is grievance escalation pathway is clear to 
HSCT beneficiaries. 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
11 Do you think there is privacy at the Help 
Desk (i.e. beneficiaries feel comfortable 
raising their queries with no other people 
present). 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
12. Beneficiaries are protected from potential 
negative repercussions through confidential 
handling of sensitive complaints. 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
13. Beneficiaries are willing to complain (not 
afraid, do not see as futile). 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
Transfer size, frequency and use of cash 
1. The cash transfer amount that I receive is 
adequate to meet the needs of my 
household. 
1 = Yes >>>4a 
2 = No  
 
2. Interviewer: Probe. If no, explain why? 
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3. What would you suggest would be an 
appropriate level of the cash transfer per 
cycle? 
 
 
Amount in US dollars 
 
            
 
 
 
4a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4b. 
In this household, who generally decides 
how the payment from the HSCT programme 
is used? 
 
INTERVIEWER: WRITE DOWN THE NAME 
OF THE MAIN DECISION MAKER. STATE 
THEIR ID CODE FROM THE HOUSEHOLD 
ROSTER.  
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Name of main decision maker 
 
 
 HHMID     
 
 
Interviewer: Refer to the name of the main 
decision maker provided in Q4 above. 
 
In general, who does [NAME] consult with 
when deciding how to use the payment from 
the HSCT programme? 
 
1 = Alone 
2 = In consultation with other adult family members 
3 = In consultation with children 
4 = In consultation with ALL family members 
5 = In consultation with someone else in the community 
98 = Don’t know 
 
5. In general, can you tell me who in your 
household benefits from the payments of the 
HSCT programme? 
1 = All household members 
2 = Adults(s) only 
3 = Children only (OVC and non-OVC) 
4 = OVCs only 
5 = Other (specify):____________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
6. In general, list the main things that the 1 = Food and nutrition  
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payment from the HSCT programme is used 
for. List up to 3. 
 
Interviewer: Circle all that apply. Do not 
prompt or give them examples for them to 
mention. 
2 = Formal government education (fees, text books and uniforms etc) 
3 = Other education (nursery, other religious school 
4 = Health care 
5 = Shelter/accommodation/rent 
6 = Clothing/shoes (does not include school uniforms 
7 = Savings 
8 = Investment 
9 = Formal social functions/events such as weddings/funerals 
10 = Membership fees for social networks/Associations 
11 = Small businesses 
12 = Other spending (Specify): ___________________________________________ 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
7a. Has the cash transfer changed the 
relationship between men and women within 
your household? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No >>>>8 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say >>>>8 
 
7b. Interviewer: If yes, how and why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. During the past 12 months, has any member 
of your household provided money or goods, 
including clothing, food, livestock or 
medicines to persons who are not members 
of your household? For example to relatives, 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
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friends or neighbours? 
9. The HSCT transfers have helped me to live 
better 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
10. The HSCT transfers make it easier for me to 
look after my family. 
1 = Yes  
2 = No 
98 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
11a. 
 
 
11b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11c. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11d. 
Are you happy with the frequency of HSCT 
payments (i.e. after every 2 months)?  
1 = Yes >>> 11d 
2 = No 
3 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
Interviewer: Probe why if answer is No: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What would be your preferred frequency of HSCT payments and why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Did the Ministry (DSS Officers) explain to you 
the reasons behind a bimonthly pay cycle? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
3 = Don’t know/Can’t say 
 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WHOLE HSCT PROGRAMME 
    
1. What would you like the Department of Social Services (DSS) to change to make HSCT a better programme? What improvements if any do 
you suggest should be made to the current design and implementation features of the programme?  
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2. Interviewer: check which themes the respondent’s comments relate to: 
  
1 = Targeting 
2 = Payment method 
3 = Transfer size 
4 = Payment point 
5 = Frequency and predictability of payments 
6 = Programme communications 
6 = Programme governance 
7 = Community involvement in the HSCT programme 
8 = Grievance and complaints mechanisms 
9 = Exit and graduation from the HSCT programme 
10 = Change management 
11 = Other (specify): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CREDIT: I am now going to ask you any type of loan (credit) owed by your household. [Interviewer: Note that any credit is considered as a loan in 
this section]. 
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1a. Does your household still owe money for any 
loan/credit you contracted before you started 
receiving HSCT payments? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No >>2 
3 = N/A >>2 
 
1b. How much does your household still owe? 
 
 
 
 
Amount in United States Dollars 
 
            
 
 
2. In the last year did you or anyone in your 
household borrow money from any person or 
institution?  
[Excluding purchase on credit] 
 
[Report only the largest loan in cases 
where a household borrowed more than 
once] 
1 = Yes >>6a 
2 = No 
 
 
3. In the last year did you or anyone in your 
household apply for a loan? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No >>5a 
 
4. Why did you not obtain the loan? 
 
[Interviewer: Ask for most important 
reason] 
1 = Project not profitable 
2 = Inadequate collateral 
3 = Bad credit history 
4 = Owe too much 
5 = Other (specify): ___________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
>>[INTERVIEWER: GO TO QUESTION 7] 
 
5a. Would someone lend to you or anyone in 
your household if you applied? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
5b. Interviewer: Find out why for either a Yes or No answer. Take down notes. 
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>>[GO TO QUESTION 7] 
6a. 
 
 
 
 
6b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6c. 
Who in the household received the loan? 
 
[Interviewer: please report the Household 
roster ID] 
 
Household member ID 
 
      
 
 
Who provided the loan? 1 = Relative 
2 = Neighbour 
3 = Grocery/local merchant 
4 = Money lender 
5 = Employer 
6 = Church 
7 = Bank 
8 = Micro-finance institution 
9 = Community leader 
10 = CPC member 
Other (specify): _____________________________________________________ 
 
 
What was the loan used for? 1 = Farm activity 
2 = Off-farm business activity 
3 = Education 
4 = Consumption 
5 = Buy or improve land/building/equipment 
6 = Health 
7 = Other (specify): ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Purchases on credit 
 
7. In the last 12 months, has anyone in your 
household purchased food or other goods on 
credit? 
1 = Yes >>11 
2 = No 
 
8a. In the last 12 months, has anyone in your 1 = Yes   
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8b. 
household asked to purchase on credit and 
been denied?  
2 = No >>10a 
Why were you denied? 
 
[Interviewer: Ask for most important 
reason] 
1 = Inadequate collateral 
2 = Bad credit history 
3 = Owe too much 
4 = Other (specify): __________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
[>>>>Interviewer: Go to next section on REMITTANCES & TRANSFERS] 
 
10a. 
 
10b. 
Could you purchase on credit if you asked? 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
Interviewer: Find out why for either a Yes or No answer. Take down notes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. For the last time a credit purchase was 
obtained, how much did your household 
purchase on credit? 
 
 
 
 
 
Amount in US Dollars 
 
            
 
 
Remittances and transfers 
 
12 During the past 12 months, has any member 
of your household received money or gifts, 
goods, including food, clothing, livestock or 
1 = Yes  
2 = No >>13 
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medicines from persons who are not 
members of your household? For example 
from relatives, friends or neighbours or 
NGOs?  
 
[Interviewer: NB: THIS SHOULD NOT 
INCLUDE HSCT CASH TRANSFERS] 
 
 12a. What are the names of the persons 
or organisations from which household 
members have received assistance 
during the past 12 months? 
12b. Relationship to household 
1 = Friend 
2 = Neighbour 
3 = Relative 
4 = NGO 
5 = Government aid 
6 = Church 
7 = Other (specify): 
 
12c. How much money have 
members of the household 
received from […] in the past 
12 months? 
 
 
US Dollars 
12d. What is the 
approximate value in 
cash of food or other 
goods received in the 
past 12 months? 
 
US Dollars 
i.      
ii.      
iii.      
iv.      
v.      
13. During the past 12 months, has any member 
of your household provided money or gifts, 
goods, including clothing, food, livestock, or 
medicines, to persons who are not members 
of your household? For examples to 
relatives, friends or neighbours?  
1 = Yes  
2 = No >> go to next section on social capital 
 
 13a. Names of recipients of assistance in 
the past 12 months. 
13b. Relationship to household 
head  
 
[Use same codes as in HH 
roster]  
13c. How much money was 
given to […] in the past 12 
months? 
 
US Dollars 
13d. What is the 
approximate value in 
cash of goods given to 
[…]? 
 
US Dollars 
1.     
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2.  
 
 
   
3.  
 
 
   
4.  
 
 
   
5.  
 
 
   
6.  
 
 
   
7.  
 
 
   
8.  
 
 
   
9.  
 
 
   
10.  
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Section C: Social Capital 
 
Structural social capital 
 
1. Now I would like to ask you some questions about groups or organisations, social networks or membership associations to which you or 
any member of your household belong. These could be formally organised groups or informal groups of people who get together regularly 
to do an activity or talk about different things. As I read the following list of groups, social networks or membership associations, please 
tell me if anyone in this household belongs to such a group. Are there any other groups or informal associations that you or someone in 
your household belongs to? If the household is not a member in any group or association go to Question 22. 
 
    
1=YES 
 
2 =NO 
 Name of organisation: Type of organisation: 
1 = Internal Savings and Lending Group (ISL – 
Mukando can include money or in-kind e.g. 
groceries)  
2 = Religious or spiritual group (e.g. church, 
mosque, temple, religious study group). 
3 = Youth group 
4 = Sports group 
5 = Burial society 
6 = Cultural group or association (e.g. arts, music, 
theatre, film) 
7 = Education group (e.g. school development 
committee, parent-teacher association). 
8 = Health group (e.g. First Aid club) 
9 = Child Protection Committee (WCPC) 
10 = Neighbourhood/Village Committee 
11 = Traders or Business Association 
12 = Farmer/Fishermen’s group or Cooperative 
13 = Women’s Group 
14 = Water/Waste management 
16 = Community Development Committee 
17 = Traditional Healers Association 
18 = CBO or civic group (e.g. Rotary club, Red 
Cross) 
19 = Professional Association (doctors, teachers, 
nurses) 
Degree of participation 
(Do you consider 
yourself/household 
member to be active in the 
group, such as by 
attending meetings or 
volunteering your time in 
other ways, or you are 
relatively inactive? Are 
you/household member a 
leader in the group? 
 
1 = leader 
2 = Very active 
3 = Somewhat active 
4 = Not active 
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20 = Trade Union or Labour Union 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
2a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2b 
Compared to 4 years ago 
(before you were selected as a 
beneficiary to receive HSCT 
cash transfers), do members of 
your household participate in 
more or fewer groups or 
organisations? 
1 = More 
2 = Fewer  
3 = Same number >>>3 
 
Interviewer: Probe: How has your participation in the HSCT programme led to you or household member to participate in more [or fewer] (choose 
one that is applicable based on answer to Q2 above)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Of all the groups to which 
members of your household 
belong; which 2 are the most 
important to your household? 
Group 1: name of group >> Code type of Org: [        ] 
Group 2: name of group >> Code type of Org: [        ] 
4. When did you or household 
member actually join these 
Group 1: name of group >> YYYY: 
Group 2: name of group >> YYYY: 
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groups/networks/associations? 
5. What is the main benefit from 
joining this group? 
1 = Improves my household’s current 
livelihood or access to services 
2 = Important in times of emergency/in 
future 
3 = Benefits the community 
4 = Enjoyment/recreation 
5 = Spiritual, social status, self esteem 
6 = Other (specify): ________________ 
________________________________ 
 
Group 1: (Enter benefit code in the 
next cell) 
 
Group 2: (Enter benefit code in the 
next cell) 
 
6. How does one become a 
member of this 
group/association? 
1 = Invited 
2 = Voluntary choice 
3 = Born into the group 
4 = Required to join 
5 = Other (specify): _________________________________________________ 
 
Group 1:  
Group 2:  
7. How many times in the past 12 
months did anyone in this 
household participate in this 
group/association’s activities 
e.g. by attending meetings or 
doing group work? 
Group 1: (Enter number of times in the next cell).  
Group 2: (Enter number of times in the next cell).  
8. How much money or goods did 
your household contribute to this 
group in the past 12 months? 
Group 1: (Amount in US Dollars): >>>>>>> USD: 
Group 2: (Amount in US Dollars): >>>>>>> USD: 
9. How many days of work/labour 
did your household contribute to 
this group in the past 12 
months? 
Group 1: (Number of days): >>>>>>>  
Group 2: (Number of days): >>>>>>>  
10. Does the group/association help 
your household get access to 
any of the following services? 
1 = Yes 
 
2 = No 
 Group 1 Group 2 
A. Credit or Savings   
B. Health services   
C. Water supply and sanitation   
D. Agriculture input, services or   
 581 
 
technology 
E. Irrigation   
F. Education   
G. Business Development and 
Training 
  
H. Vocational skills training   
I. HIV/AIDS and Counselling Services   
J. Land/Housing    
K. Other (specify): ______________ 
_______________________________ 
 
  
11a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11b. 
 
 
 
11c. 
 
 
11d. 
Thinking about the members of 
this group, are group members 
mostly of the same… 
 
1 = Yes 
 
2 = No 
 Group 1 Group 2 
A. Neighbourhood/Village/Ward   
B. Family or Kin group   
C. Religion   
D. Gender   
E. Age Group   
F. Ethnic or linguistic group/tribe   
   
Do members mostly have the 
same... 
 
1 = Yes 
 
2 = No 
 Group 1 Group 2 
Occupation   
Education background or level   
Are some members richer or 
poorer than others, or do they all 
have mostly the same income 
level? 
1 = Mostly same income level 
 
2 = Mixed rich/poor 
Group 1 Group 2 
  
Are group members mostly 
HSCT beneficiaries? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
Group 1 Group 2 
  
12. Following the introduction of the 
HSCT programme in your 
community/ward in 2012, has 
membership in the group 
declined, remained the same, or 
increased? 
1 = Declined 
 
2 = Remained the same 
 
3 = Increased 
Group 1 Group 2 
  
13. Overall, are the same people 1 = Little overlap  
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members of these two different 
groups or is there little overlap in 
membership? 
2 = Some overlap 
3 = Much overlap 
 
14. How does the group usually 
make decisions? 
 Group 1 Group 2 
1. The leader decides and informs other group 
members 
  
2. The leader asks group members what they 
think and then decides 
  
3. The group members hold a discussion and 
decide together 
  
4. Decision is imposed from outside   
5. Other (specify):   
15. How are leaders in this group 
selected? 
 Group 1 Group 2 
1. By an outside person or entity   
2. Each leader chooses his/her successor   
3. By rotation (all members have a chance to 
lead group) 
  
4. By a small group of members   
5. By decision/vote of all members   
6. Other (specify):   
16. Does this group work or interact 
with other groups with similar 
goals in the 
village/neighbourhood/ward? 
 Group 1 Group 2 
1 = No   
2 = Yes, occasionally   
3 = Yes, frequently   
17. Does this group work or interact 
with other groups with similar 
goals outside the ward? 
 Group 1 Group 2 
1 = No   
2 = Yes, occasionally   
3 = Yes, frequently   
18. What is the most source of 
funding of this group? 
 Group 1 Group 2 
1. From member’s 
subscriptions/dues 
  
2. Other sources within the 
community 
  
3. Sources outside the community   
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19a. 
 
 
 
 
19b. 
Are there any new membership 
groups or associations that were 
formed directly as a result of the 
introduction of the HSCT 
programme in your community? 
1 = Yes  
 
2 = No >>>next section 
 
If yes, can you name the 
groups/associations and what 
their goals are? 
 
Name of group/association:__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Goals/objectives of group/association:__________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Social networks, sources of support and shocks 
20a. 
 
 
 
 
20b. 
How many close friends do you 
have these days? These are 
people you feel at ease with, 
can talk to about private 
matters, or call on for help? 
 
 
  
  
 
Are these close friends mostly… 
 
1 = Other HSCT beneficiaries 
2 = Non-HSCT beneficiaries 
 
In our everyday lives there are personal and family situations or problems that we must deal with. I am going to read you some situations in which 
one might need support and assistance. Please consider each statement in light of your own situation, thinking back over the past 12 months. I 
would like you to think of all the sources of support you might have in that situation. You may select more than one source of support 
(person/individual) if there is more than one source of help you can count on. 
 
Interviewer: Mark 1 = Yes for all that apply. If the respondent does not mention the source, put “98” [Don’t know/can’t say].  
  Q21. Q22. Q23. Q24. Q25. 
 Source of support 
[Interviewer: DO NOT READ]: 
If you were to 
experience 
urgent needs, 
who would you 
turn to? 
If you needed 
help for an 
extended period 
of time caring for 
sick or disabled 
If you were 
having financial 
problems, who 
would you turn to 
for help? 
If you felt lonely, 
who would you 
turn to? 
If you were sick and not 
able to carry out your 
usual activities for a 
week or so, who would 
you turn to for help? 
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family member, 
who would you 
turn to? 
A. Spouse/Partner      
B. Other family members 
(inside household) 
     
C. Other family members 
(outside household) 
     
D. Friend/neighbour      
E. Spiritual leader 
(priest/traditional healer) 
     
F. Health care worker      
G. Ward Child Protection 
Committee Members or 
Community Child Care 
Workers (WCPC or 
CCCWs) 
     
H. Teacher or other 
Education Professional 
     
I. Community leader (e.g. 
chief, headman, or 
village head) 
     
J. Local government 
member (e.g. ward 
councillor).  
     
K. District Social Welfare 
and Social Services 
Departments 
     
L. Member of CBO/NGO      
M. No one is available      
N. No one (I prefer to 
handle it alone) 
     
O. Other (Specify):      
 
26a. In the last 4 years has there 1 = Yes A. Drought/Flood  
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been any 
unexpected/emergencies 
[shocks] that affected your 
household and made it difficult 
to meet the household’s basic 
needs? 
 
[Interviewer: Prompt the 
respondent to tell you the 
“story” of events. While he or 
she is telling you the story, 
record any events mentioned 
in the next column]. 
 
[If a given shock/emergency 
occurred more than once, ask 
about most recent.] 
2 = No B. Loss of access to land, water or other natural resources for 
production 
 
C. Severe water shortages (well/borehole dried)  
D. Loss of productive assets (tools, machinery etc)  
E. Displacement  
F. Livestock deaths  
G. Livestock theft  
H. Inability to pay debts  
I. Break-up of household  
J. Death of bread winner in household  
K. Incapacitation (disability or handicap visiting the household) 
of breadwinner 
 
L. Bread winner left household  
M. High food costs  
N. High agricultural input prices  
O. Large expenditure due to ill-health, chronic/severe illness, 
accident or death – including funeral, hospitalisation, medical 
treatment (sickness that has taken more than 3 months to 
recover) 
 
P. End of regular assistance, aid or remittances from outside 
household 
 
Q. Jailed  
R. Dwelling damaged, destroyed, burglary  
S. Birth in household  
T. Business failure  
U. Crop failure  
V. Crop theft  
W. Crop damage when stored  
X. Large expenditure on social obligations  
Y. Accident  
26b. What did your household do in 
response to this 
shock/emergency to try to 
Shock Coping strategies codes Code # 
A.  1. Relied on own savings  
B.  2. Received unconditional help from relatives/friends  
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regain your former welfare 
level? 
 
[Interviewer: Use coping 
strategies codes e.g. 1 = 
relied on savings; 17 = sold 
livestock]. 
C.  3. Received unconditional help from government  
D.  4. Received unconditional help from NGO/Religious institution  
E.  5. Changed eating/dietary patterns  
F.  6. Employed members of the household took on more 
employment 
 
G.  7. Adult HH member(s) who were not working had to find a job  
H.  8. Household members migrated  
I.  9. Reduced expenditure on health/education  
J.  10. Obtained credit  
K.  11. Sold durable assets  
L.  12. Sold crop stocks  
M.  13. Sold agricultural assets  
N.  14. Sold land/building  
O.  15. Intensified fishing  
P.  16. Engaged in spiritual efforts  
Q.  17. Sold livestock  
R.  18. Sent children to live elsewhere  
S.  19. Intensified gardening   
T.  20. Did not do anything  
U.  21. Other (specify)  
Exclusion: 
27a. Differences often exist between 
people living in the same 
ward/village/neighbourhood. To 
what extent do differences such 
as the following tend to divide 
people in your 
ward/village/neighbourhood? 
 
Interviewer: use codes: 1, 2 or 
3 as appropriate]. 
1 = Very much 
 
2 = Somewhat 
 
3 = Not at all 
a. Differences in education  
b. Differences between men and 
women 
 
c. Differences between younger 
and older generation 
 
d. Differences between HSCT and 
non-HSCT beneficiaries 
 
e. Differences in religious beliefs  
f. Differences between long-time 
inhabitants and new settlers 
 
g. Differences in ethnic 
backgrounds 
 
h. Differences in social status  
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i. Differences in wealth/material 
possessions 
 
27b. Do these differences cause 
problems? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No>>>28a 
 
27c. How are these problems usually 
handled? 
 
1 = Yes 
 
2 = No 
 
a. People work it between themselves  
b. Family/household members intervene  
c. Neighbours intervene  
d. WCPC/CCCW members mediate  
e. Community leaders mediate  
f. Religious leaders mediate  
g. Other (specify): 
 
 
 
 
27d. Do such problems ever lead to 
violence? 
1 = Yes 
 
2 = No 
 
28a. Are there any services where 
you or members of your 
household are occasionally 
denied services or have only 
limited opportunities to use? 
1 = Yes 
 
2 = No 
a. Education/schools  
b. Health services and clinics  
c. Housing assistance  
d. Job training/employment  
e. Credit/finance  
f. Transportation  
g. Water distribution  
h. Sanitation services  
i. Agricultural extension services  
j. Other (specify):  
28b. Do you think that there are other 
households in this community 
that have such access 
problems? 
1 = Yes 
 
2 = No 
 
28c. What are the reasons or criteria 
why some people are excluded 
from these services? 
1 = Yes 
 
2 = No 
a. Age  
b. Gender  
c. Religious beliefs  
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d. Participation in the HSCT programme  
e. Religious beliefs  
f. Lack of education  
g. Income level  
h. Social status (class etc)  
i. Race/tribe/ethnicity  
j. Language  
k. Being disabled/handicapped  
l. Other (specify): 
 
 
 
Collective action and cooperation 
29a. 
 
 
 
 
 
29b. 
In the past 12 months, have you 
worked with others in your 
village/neighbourhood/ward to 
do something for the benefit of 
the community? 
1 = Yes 
 
2 = No>>>30 
 
What were the 3 main activities 
in the past 12 months? Was 
participation in these activities 
voluntary or required? 
 Voluntary Required 
Activity 1:   
Activity 2:   
Activity 3:   
30. In general, do most HSCT 
beneficiaries participate in 
community activities? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
98 = Don’t know/can’t say 
 
31. In general, do most non-HSCT 
beneficiaries participate in 
community activities? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
98 = Don’t know/can’t say 
 
32. Suppose something unfortunate 
happened to someone in the 
village/neighbourhood/communit
y, such as a serious illness, or 
the death of a parent. How likely 
is it that some people in the 
community would get together to 
help them? 
1 = Very likely 
2 = Somewhat likely 
3 = Neither likely nor unlikely 
4 = Somewhat unlikely 
5 = Very unlikely  
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33.  If there was a water supply 
problem in this community, how 
likely is it that people in your 
community/village/neighbourhoo
d would cooperate to solve the 
problem? 
1 = Very likely 
2 = Somewhat likely 
3 = Neither likely nor unlikely 
4 = Somewhat unlikely 
5 = Very unlikely 
 
34. How likely is it that people who 
do not participate in community 
activities will be criticised or 
sanctioned? 
1 = Very likely 
2 = Somewhat likely 
3 = Neither likely nor unlikely 
4 = Somewhat unlikely 
5 = Very unlikely  
 
35. How much influence do you 
think the HSCT programme can 
have in making this 
village/community/neighbourhoo
d/ward a better place to live? 
1 = A lot 
2 = Some 
3 = Not very much 
4 = None 
 
    
HSCT beneficiaries’ civic participation 
36a. Which of the following 
community events do you 
usually participate in, in your 
district/ward/village? 
1 = Farmer field days 
2 = Agricultural shows 
3 = Traditional functions (e.g. Rain making ceremonies, bira) 
4 = Funerals 
5 = Independence Day Commemorations 
6 = Sports 
7 = Memorial services (nyaradzo) 
8 = Other (specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36b. Why are these important events 
important to you? 
1 = Rain making and agricultural information 
2 = Political information update 
3 = Social interaction and cooperation 
4 = Grieving together 
5 = Sharing of ideas and information 
6 = Upholding culture 
7 = Physical fitness 
8 = Other (specify): 
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COGNITIVE SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
Trust and solidarity: 
In every community, some people get along with others, and trust each other, while other people do not. Now I would like to talk to you about trust 
and solidarity in your community. 
1. Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can’t be too 
careful in your dealings with 
other people? 
1 = Most people can be trusted 
 
2 = You can’t be too careful 
 
2. In general, do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statements? 
1 = Strongly agree 
2 = Somewhat agree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Somewhat disagree 
5 = Strongly disagree 
 
Interviewer: Emphasise 
gravity of each response 
code.  
A. Most people who live in this 
ward/village/neighbourhood can be 
trusted 
 
B. In this ward/village/neighbourhood, one 
has to be alert or someone is likely to take 
advantage of you 
 
C. Most people in this 
ward/village/neighbourhood are willing to 
help if you need it 
 
D. In this ward/village/neighbourhood, 
people generally do not trust each other in 
matter of lending and borrowing. 
 
3a. Now I want to ask you how 
much you trust different types of 
people. On a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 1 means a very small 
extent and 5 means a very 
great extent, how much do 
you trust the people in that 
category? 
1 = To a very small extent 
2 = To a small extent 
3 = Neither small nor great 
extent 
4 = To a great extent 
5 = To a very great extent 
A. HSCT beneficiaries  
B. Non-HSCT beneficiaries  
C. Shop-keepers  
D. Local government officials (e.g. District 
Officials, ward councillors) 
 
E. Police  
F. Teachers  
G. Nurses and doctors  
H. Strangers  
I. People from your 
ethnic/tribal/linguistic/race 
 
J. People from other  
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ethnic/tribal/linguistic/race 
3b. Interviewer: Probe reasons 
why they trust or do not trust 
people in different categories. 
Category Reason for not trusting Reason for trusting 
  1. HSCT beneficiaries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2. Non-HSCT beneficiaries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  3. Shop-keepers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  4. Local government officials 
(e.g. District Officials, ward 
councillors) 
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  5. Police  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  6. Teachers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  7. Nurses and doctors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  8. Strangers  
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  9. People from your 
ethnic/tribal/linguistic/race 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Do you think that over the last 4 
years (since the introduction of 
the HSCT programme), the level 
of trust in this 
ward/village/neighbourhood has 
got better, worse or stayed bout 
the same? 
1 = Got better 
 
2 = Got worse 
 
3 = Stayed about the same 
 
5. If you suddenly had to go away 
for a day or two, could you count 
on our neighbours to take care 
of your children or 
grandchildren? 
1 = Definitely 
2 = Probably 
3 = Probably not 
4 = Definitely not 
 
6. How well do people in your 
ward/village/neighbourhood help 
each other out these days? Use 
a five point scale, where 1 
means always helping and 5 
means never helping. 
1 = Always helping 
2 = Helping most of the time 
3 = Helping sometimes 
4 = Rarely helping 
5 = Never helping 
 
7. If a community project does not 
directly benefit you, but has 
benefits for many others in the 
ward/village/neighbourhood, 
A1 = Will contribute time 
A2 = Will not contribute time 
B1 = Will contribute money 
B2 = Will not contribute money 
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would you contribute time or 
money to the project? 
C1 = Will contribute both time and money 
C2 = Will contribute neither time nor money (no contribution at all). 
    
Now I am going to read you some statements with which some people agree and others disagree. Tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 if you agree or not 
with the statement. 
8. I spent time with others who 
have the same interests that I 
do. 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
9. Others let me know that they 
enjoy working with me (e.g. in 
the field etc). 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
10. Among my group of friends we 
do favours for each other. 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
11. I have relatives or friends that 
will help me out even if I can’t 
pay them back. 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
12. I know that others appreciate 
me as a person. 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
13. I have people to share social 
events and fun activities with. 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
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14. I have a sense of being needed 
by another person. 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
15. The HSCT programme makes 
me no more inferior than others. 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
16. The HSCT is something that I 
am happy to be part of. 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
17. The HSCT has strengthened 
relationships with my family. 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
18. Most people in this 
village/neighbourhood/ward are 
willing to help if you need it. 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
    
SHARING BENEFITS AND INFORMATION 
1a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1b. 
In the last 2 years, did you share 
any portion of your HSCT cash 
transfer with non-beneficiaries in 
your 
village/neighbourhood/communit
y/ward without an expectation to 
be paid back? 
1 = Yes  
2 = No>>>2a 
 
If yes, how much did you give?  
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Amount in US Dollars     
  
        
 
2a. 
 
 
 
 
2b 
In the last 2 years, did you share 
any information from the HSCT 
programme with non-
beneficiaries? 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
Interviewer: Probe the type of information that was shared with non-beneficiaries: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3a. 
 
 
 
3b 
In the last 2 years, have you 
shared any HSCT information 
with your household/family 
members? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
Interviewer: Probe the type of information that was shared with other household members: 
 
 
 
 
CRIME 
1. In general, how safe from crime 
do you feel when you are at 
home alone? 
1 = Very safe 
2 = Moderately safe 
3 = Neither safe nor unsafe 
4 = Moderately unsafe 
5 = Very unsafe 
 
2a. In the past 12 months, have you 
or anyone in your household 
1 = Yes 
2 = No >>3a 
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been the victim of a crime such 
as theft or mugging? 
2b. If yes, how many times?  
 
 
3a 
 
 
 
3b. 
In the past 12 months, has your 
house been burglarised or 
vandalised? 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
If yes, how many times?  
 
 
Happiness 
1. In general, are you happy with 
the HSCT programme? 
1 = Very happy 
2 = Moderately happy 
3 = Neither happy nor unhappy 
4 = Moderately unhappy 
5 = Very unhappy 
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Appendix 4: In-depth interview guide: Senior Social Welfare Officer 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE – Senior Social Welfare Officer 
responsible for the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) in the 
Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (MOPSLSW) 
 
Date: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Name of key informant: …………………………………………………………. 
 
Designation of key informant: …………………………………………………. 
 
Gender of respondent: Male:       Female:   
 
Interviewer: ………………………………………………………………………... 
 
Location of interview: ………………………………………………………….... 
 
 
Good morning/afternoon (as appropriate). 
 
Thank you for finding time in your busy schedule to meet with me. My name is 
Nyasha Mayanga. I am currently doing post-graduate research towards a 
Doctor of Philosophy degree with the University of South Africa (UNISA). I am 
studying under the supervision of the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership 
Institute (TMALI), one of UNISA’s institutes. Professor Vusi Gumede is the 
Head of TMALI. 
 
I am investigating the social effects of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer 
(HSCT) in selected wards in Epworth and Goromonzi districts. In addition, I 
am doing a social analysis of the HSCT’s design and implementation features 
using the concept of social capital. You have been chosen as a respondent 
because of the official role you have on the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer 
programme. I understand your position oversees the coordination and 
implementation of the HSCT at national and district levels. In addition, you 
provide a programme and operational link between the Ministry of Public 
Service, Labour and Social Welfare, and UNICEF and the private sector 
company contracted to deliver cash to beneficiary households. You also have 
occasional direct contact with HSCT beneficiaries. As such you are a valuable 
source of research information.  I am keen to benefit from your knowledge, 
views, experiences and perceptions of the HSCT.  
 
Please note that your involvement in this study is voluntary and you are under 
no obligation to consent to participation. Your personal contributions and 
views are confidential and will not be shared with anyone else in a way that 
can identify you. 
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By means of this study, I hope to find answers to specific research questions, 
including contributing to improving the way these programmes work. 
 
The answers and information you will give will be completely confidential. I will 
describe and explain what you think in my research report, but I will not 
mention any names. Your personal contributions will not be shared with 
anyone else in ways that can identify you. Your honest and detailed answers 
and information will be helpful in informing my research. 
 
Also, you don’t have to participate if you don’t want to. I would like to 
emphasise that your participation is voluntary. You are free to withdraw at any 
stage of the discussion and you can let me know of any questions that you 
don’t want to answer or discuss so that I can skip them. However, I look 
forward to your cooperation since your views are important. The discussion 
will take about an hour and a half. 
 
In order for me not to miss any aspects of our interview, I would appreciate it if 
you can allow me to audio-record the full interview, if that is fine with you. 
Turn on the recorder only when permission is granted otherwise, make 
extensive notes. 
 
Do you have anything you want to ask me, or can we start? 
 
By signing below, you signify that you agree to participate in the study 
and that your participation is entirely voluntary. 
 
 
SIGNATURE__________________________________ 
 
DATE________________________________________ 
 
 
Interviewer’s signature___________________________ 
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1. First, describe and explain your full role in the coordination and 
implementation structure of the HSCT? 
 
a. Which aspects of the HSCT implementation do you have direct 
control or oversight on? 
b. How important is your role to the success or failure of the HSCT? 
c. How long have you worked on the HSCT for? 
d. Were you involved in the design of the HSCT? If yes, what was role 
in the design of the HSCT? 
 
2. According to the HSCT manual of operations, the Department of Social 
Services (DSS) at national level should have the following staff members 
in order to be able to carry out its management and oversight functions for 
the HSCT: National Coordinator (1), Programme Manager (1), 
Management Information System architect (1), Data base Administrator 
(1), Network Administrator (1), Programme Officers (2) and Accountant 
(1).  
 
a. Are you currently structured and resourced as such? If not, what is 
the current staff structure like and why is it like that? 
b. Is the staff capacity both in terms of number of staff as well as 
training and knowledge for existing staff to run the programme at 
national level adequate? If not, what are the gaps in terms of both 
considerations?  
c. Are your transport, IT equipment and communication needs 
adequate to support your work at national level? If not, what are the 
gaps? 
d. What other capacity challenges are limiting you as a national office 
in discharging your HSCT roles and responsibilities? 
 
 
3. HSCT design and implementation features 
 
a. Social analysis:  
 
i. In designing the HSCT, what social analysis was done at the 
beginning of the programme in order to inform its design?  
ii. Probes: What specific social factors were taken into account 
at design stage? If no social analysis was built into the 
design of the HSCT, has this affected the implementation or 
outcomes of the HSCT in any way? 
iii. Through your programme monitoring work over the time you 
have been involved with the HSCT, what have you learnt or 
observed as the important social implications of the HSCT in 
recipient communities? 
 
b. Programme flexibility and context-appropriateness:  
 
There is one manual of operations for the HSCT and it guides 
implementation of the programme in both rural and urban settings.  
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i. Given this situation, how have you ensured that the HSCT 
includes flexibility and context-appropriate components and 
mechanisms to support implementation in different social 
and administrative contexts?  
ii. Please provide practical examples of how flexibility and 
context-appropriate mechanisms have been applied in 
different programme contexts? 
 
c. Community involvement: 
  
i. How is the involvement of the community promoted in the 
HSCT? Is the participation of communities in the HSCT 
decided after consultations with communities or it’s a top-
down approach? 
ii. Are there more opportunities to promote increased 
participation of communities in the HSCT? What more could 
be done, and why is not currently happening?  
 
d. Targeting and selection/eligibility: 
 
i. What are your views on the HSCT’s beneficiary targeting 
process and selection/eligibility criteria?  
ii. Why was this method (proxy means test) of targeting chosen 
as appropriate for the HSCT? 
iii. Does the HSCT target the poorest households in general? If 
yes, what is the evidence to support that view? 
iv. Have there been particular concerns from any stakeholders 
in the HSCT about the proxy means test method, and the 
eligibility criteria (food poverty and labour-constrained)? 
v. How well do you think the targeting process and eligibility 
criteria are (proxy means test – food poor and labour-
constrained i.e no fit adult to work or higher dependency ratio 
per fit adult) understood by HSCT’s stakeholders including 
communities, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries? 
vi. How does the overall targeting performance of the HSCT 
compare with similar programmes elsewhere in the region or 
internationally? 
vii. What targeting/selection challenges have been experienced 
in the HSCT and how have these been resolved? 
 
The exit criteria for the HSCT are defined in relation to re-targeting 
of beneficiaries every two years as follows: 
 
1. Re-approving all current beneficiary households that are 
still labour-constrained 
2. Phasing out those beneficiary households that are no 
longer labour-constrained 
 602 
 
3. Approving additional households that have become 
extremely poor and labour-constrained since the last re-
targeting has been undertaken. 
 
viii. Was the re-targeting of HSCT beneficiaries carried out as 
stated above? If yes, what did the findings say, and how has 
this information been used in the HSCT? 
ix. If no re-targeting has been done in the HSCT, why so and 
has this affected the programme in any way? 
 
e. Social accountability: 
  
i. What are the existing social accountability mechanisms in 
the HSCT that are aimed at promoting and guaranteeing (1) 
beneficiaries’ (and non-beneficiaries) feedback, (2) 
accountability to beneficiaries and communities, and (3) 
independent oversight of HSCT operations?  
ii. How appropriate, accessible and effective are these 
mechanisms? Have they strengthened programme 
effectiveness and accountability for beneficiaries (and non-
beneficiaries), and in turn state-citizen relations? 
  
f. HSCT payment system:  
 
i. When designing the HSCT’s current cash-in transit payment 
system, what programme-level and beneficiary-level 
considerations were taken into account? 
ii. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the current 
cash delivery system? 
 
 
 
g. HSCT transfer size:  
 
Setting the size and structure of a transfer is one of the most 
important decisions that are made when designing a cash transfer 
scheme. 
  
i. How were the transfer size and structure set for the HSCT?  
ii. What considerations were taken in to account?  
iii. Who made the decision? 
iv. Do you think that the transfer amount is adequate? 
v. Was the size of the transfer ever adjusted since the HSCT 
started? If yes. How and why was it adjusted? If not, why? 
vi. What have been the effects of adjusting or not adjusting the 
transfer size and structure? 
 
h. HSCT communication strategy: 
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Public communication strategies are critical components of the 
design and implementation of cash transfer (CT) schemes. 
Communication can hinder or help the achievement of cash transfer 
goals. Communication tools used in CT schemes vary according to 
programme contexts.  
 
i. Briefly outline the HSCT’s communication strategy for me, or 
at the least, refer me to the HSCT communications strategy 
document? 
ii. What purpose does communication serve in the HSCT? 
iii. What are the communication tools used in the HSCT? 
 
i. General:  
 
i. What aspects of the HSCT’s implementation are working 
well? (Probes: Unconditionality; Grievance and complaints 
mechanisms; payment point processes; change 
management; HSCT communications; and HSCT 
monitoring). 
ii. What aspects of the HSCT’s implementation are not working 
as well as they should be? Why so? (Probes: 
Unconditionality; Grievance and complaints mechanisms; 
payment point processes; change management; HSCT 
communications; and HSCT monitoring). 
 
4. HSCT and gender 
 
i. What scope has been there for attention to gender 
inequalities and relations in the design and implementation of 
the HSCT?  
ii. Do you think the HSCT has in some ways contributed to 
tackling social norms and harmful practices that produce and 
reproduce gender inequalities and power imbalances 
between men and women in recipient communities? If yes, 
how, and what is the evidence to support this? 
 
5. Role of local governments/authorities in the HSCT: 
 
Administrative arrangements vary considerable across the HSCT’s 
geographical areas of implementation. For example, in Epworth, the 
settlement is managed by the Epworth Local Board, and in 
Goromonzi, the District Administrator is in charge of the district’s 
administrative affairs. 
  
i. To what extent does the HSCT work through local 
governments/authorities i.e. what is the role of local 
authorities in the HSCT?  
ii. It appears that in Epworth settlement, the implementation of 
the HSCT bypasses the local authority. Does this not 
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undermine the authority of the ELB in the eyes of HSCT 
beneficiaries, with whom the ELB has regular contact? 
 
6. Supply side support:  
 
The HSCT is largely a demand-side cash incentive to households. 
By raising the purchasing power of beneficiaries, it increases 
demand for goods and services in the local community/district 
economy.   
 
i. Has there been a need for supply-side support to strengthen 
for example: economic goods, health, education and nutrition 
services in recipient communities/districts? 
ii. How have local economies in recipient communities 
generally responded to meet increased demand for goods 
and services? Is this something that is tracked or monitored 
in the programme? 
iii. Have you come across cases of inflationary pressure in 
some recipient communities where local supply may fail to 
meet increased demand induced by the HSCT? 
 
7. HSCT linkages with other programmes:  
 
i. How well is the HSCT linking with other social protection and 
community development programmes at national and district 
levels? (Probes: Basic Education Assistance Module; 
Assisted Medical Treatment Orders; Food Distribution; 
Agricultural Inputs Support Programmes). 
ii. Have there been cases where the HSCT makes one 
ineligible to receive other social protection and livelihoods 
assistance? If yes, why so? 
 
8. Sustainability of the HSCT and its achievement: 
 
The HSCT is financed through a combination of general tax 
revenue from Government, and donor funds with the latter 
contributing nearly 90 percent of the funding. 
 
i. How does the HSCT’s design and implementation address 
the issue of sustainability of the programme and its effects? 
ii. What is your view about the long-term viability of the HSCT 
and its welfare effects on beneficiaries? 
iii. What messages have been communicated (programme 
communications) to beneficiaries about the future of the 
HSCT? 
 
9. Recommendations: 
 
i. Based on your experience, knowledge, observations and views 
around the HSCT over the years, what social considerations would 
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you suggest should be carefully taken in to account when designing 
and implementing future cash transfer schemes? 
ii. What would you like to see changed in the design and 
implementation of the HSCT to make it a greater cash transfer 
scheme? 
 
10. We are now at the end of our interview. Are there any other relevant 
issues you would like to raise? 
 
11. Do you have any questions for me? 
 
We have now come to the end of our discussion. Thank you very much 
for sharing your knowledge, views, and experiences with me. 
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Appendix 5: In-depth interview guide: Village Head 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE: Village Head 
 
Date: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Name of key informant: …………………………………………………………. 
 
Designation of key informant: …………………………………………………. 
 
Ward number: …………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Village name: ……………………………………………………………………… 
 
District: …………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Gender of respondent: Male:       Female:   
 
Interviewer: ………………………………………………………………………... 
 
Location of interview: ………………………………………………………….... 
 
 
Good morning/afternoon (as appropriate). 
 
Thank you for finding time in your busy schedule to meet with me. My name is 
Nyasha Mayanga. I am currently doing post-graduate research towards a 
Doctor of Philosophy degree with the University of South Africa (UNISA). I am 
studying under the supervision of the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership 
Institute (TMALI), one of UNISA’s institutes. Professor Vusi Gumede is the 
Head of TMALI. 
 
I am investigating the social effects of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer 
(HSCT) in selected wards in Epworth and Goromonzi districts. In addition, I 
am doing a social analysis of the HSCT’s design and implementation features 
using the concept of social capital. You have been chosen as a respondent 
because of your important traditional leadership position. I understand that 
amongst your duties, you lead your village in all traditional, customary and 
cultural matters and promote sound morals and good social conduct among 
members of your village. In addition, you preside over the village development 
committee and co-ordinate its work. You are also familiar with the well-being 
of inhabitants in your community some of whom are HSCT beneficiaries. Your 
role as a village head means that you are in regular contact with your 
community on development, social, welfare, cultural and traditional issues. As 
such you are a valuable source of research information.  I am keen to benefit 
from your knowledge, views, experiences and perceptions of the HSCT.  
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Please note that your involvement in this study is voluntary and you are under 
no obligation to consent to participation. Your personal contributions and 
views are confidential and will not be shared with anyone else in a way that 
can identify you. 
 
By means of this study, I hope to find answers to specific research questions, 
including contributing to improving the way these programmes are designed 
and work. 
 
The answers and information you will give will be completely confidential. I will 
describe and explain what you think in my research report, but I will not 
mention any names. Your personal contributions will not be shared with 
anyone else in ways that can identify you. Your honest and detailed answers 
and information will be helpful in informing my research. 
 
Also, you don’t have to participate if you don’t want to. I would like to 
emphasise that your participation is voluntary. You are free to withdraw at any 
stage of the discussion and you can let me know of any questions that you 
don’t want to answer or discuss so that I can skip them. However, I look 
forward to your cooperation since your views are important. The discussion 
will take about an hour and a half. 
 
In order for me not to miss any aspects of our interview, I would appreciate it if 
you can allow me to audio-record the full interview, if that is fine with you. 
Turn on the recorder only when permission is granted otherwise, make 
extensive notes. 
 
Do you have anything you want to ask me, or can we start? 
 
By signing below, you signify that you agree to participate in the study 
and that your participation is entirely voluntary. 
 
 
SIGNATURE__________________________________ 
 
DATE________________________________________ 
 
 
Interviewer’s signature___________________________ 
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12. First, describe and explain to me your full role as a Village Head? 
 
13. Are you aware of the HSCT cash transfer programme that is operating in 
your village? [If no, interviewer – explain what the HSCT is to double-
check respondent’s awareness]. 
a. If yes, how did you come to know about the HSCT, and when? 
b. Please describe and explain your understanding of the HSCT 
scheme? 
c. Has the HSCT been discussed in the Village Assembly meetings? If 
yes, what about the HSCT has been discussed, and why? 
d. What do you like about the HSCT scheme, and why? 
e. What do you not like about the HSCT, and why? 
f. Are you interested in seeing the HSCT continue or discontinued in 
your community? If yes/no, why? 
 
14. As a Village Head, do you have a role (formal or informal) that you play in 
the implementation of the HSCT in your community? 
a. If yes, what role do you have in the implementation of the HSCT? 
b. If no, why don’t you have a role in the HSCT? Do you think you 
should have a role in the implementation of the programme? If yes, 
what should that role be? Have you raised this with the HSCT’ 
programme officials? If yes, what response did you get? 
 
15. Are traditional authority structures involved in the implementation of the 
HSCT? If yes, how? If not, do you think they should be involved, and how? 
 
16. Social cash transfers may affect power dynamics within a household or 
community. What if any, are the changes in terms of household or 
community power dynamics following the introduction of the HSCT in your 
area? 
a. For example, did the introduction of the HSCT affect traditional 
authority in any way? 
b. Have some people lost their influence because people have other 
support now (e.g. beneficiary households don’t need to ask for their 
help anymore). For example, while beneficiaries may continue to 
look to religious leaders for spiritual guidance they will no longer 
turn to them if they have financial problems. 
 
17. As a traditional leader, how do you feel about the HSCT’s targeting 
process and its selection/eligibility criteria? 
a. Do you think the targeting process and selection of beneficiaries is 
fair in concept and application? If yes/no, why? 
b. Do you think most of the households selected to receive cash 
transfers in your village are the most needy? If yes/no, why? 
c. Are there people in your village who are very poor and need the 
HSCT but were wrongly excluded from the programme? If yes, how 
do you know about these people? Did they approach you directly? 
Why were they excluded from the programme? What have you 
done with their queries? 
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d. Do you think there are people in your village currently benefitting 
from the HSCT but do not need programme? 
  
18. What have you observed as some of the HSCT’s effects on recipient 
households, and your village in general? 
a. What changes in people’s (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) 
behaviours have you seen following the introduction of the HSCT in 
your village? 
 
19. Cultural identity is built through the sharing of common history or common 
culture, common pride in the past, and in some the sharing of a common 
passion. These community bonds can help to stabilise communities and 
ease the stresses of poverty. Cultural identity is maintained through rituals, 
celebrations, traditional ceremonies, and the poor frequently mention 
participation in these events. 
  
a. Has the HSCT had any effects on cultural and social norms in your 
community (village)? 
b. What effect has the HSCT had on the participation of beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries in traditional ceremonies, rituals and other 
socio-cultural events in your community? 
c. Have you observed an increase of decrease in socio-cultural events 
in your community following the introduction of the HSCT e.g. more 
ceremonies, rituals etc.? 
d. What effect if any has the HSCT had on social solidarity in your 
community? 
e. What are the social sanctions for violating expected norms of social 
solidarity in your community? 
  
20. Has the HSCT changed social relations in your community between 
people who receive the transfers, and those who do not? 
a. Has the social differentiation between “beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries” introduced through the HSCT affected relationships 
between people in the two groups in your community? If yes, in 
what ways? 
b. If yes, how does this manifest, and what features of the programme 
could have resulted in the changes in people’s social relations? 
 
21. Have you come across cases of direct conflicts and social tensions 
between HSCT beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in your village? If yes, 
what forms have these conflicts and social tensions taken? 
 
22. Do HSCT beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries cooperate and participate 
together in community activities in your village? If yes, please provide 
examples of community activities where both groups participate or have 
participated together for community good. If not, why do they not work 
together for the common community good? 
 
23. Social cash transfers may affect power dynamics within a household or 
community. Traditionally women have less access to money and decision 
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making in a household or community. Evidence elsewhere shows that 
cash transfers ensure women have access to resources to alleviate their 
multiple deprivations. In some cases CTs have reduced the need to resort 
to risky copying strategies such as child labour, early marriage or 
commercial sex work. Sudden change of power dynamics may cause 
negative reactions from those who used to have power.  
 
a. Do you think the HSCT has transformed gender relations and 
power dynamics within beneficiary households in your village, and 
gender relations and power dynamics within your wider community? 
If yes, how and in what ways? [Probes: risky coping behaviours, 
child labour, early marriages, social/gender norms, women and 
girls’ empowerment, and power dynamics between rich and poor 
women]. 
b. What are the common types of gender-based violence in your 
community?  
c. Do you think the HSCT has had any effect on gender-based 
violence in your village? If so, in what ways? Can you give 
examples? 
 
24. Have you at some point had to handle HSCT-related grievances and 
complaints brought to you by HSCT beneficiaries and/or non-
beneficiaries?  
a. If yes, what was the nature of the grievances and complaints? 
b. Why do you think you were approached? 
c. How did you deal with the grievances and complaints? 
d. Did you inform/ HSCT programme officials about the grievances 
and complaints, and how your resolved them? 
 
25. Have you at some point mediated conflicts or social tensions between 
HSCT beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries? 
a. If yes, what were the conflicts all about? 
b. How did you help resolve the conflicts? 
c. Did you inform HSCT programme officials about the conflicts, and 
how you helped resolve them? 
 
26. What are your views with regards to the level of community participation in 
the HSCT by members of your community? For example, there are CPC 
members involved in the implementation of the HSCT at local levels. 
a. Do you think there is scope to promote increased community 
participation in the HSCT? 
b. What form might this participation take, and in which HSCT 
implementation processes? 
 
27. How well do you think the HSCT is linking with other community 
development programmes in your community? (Probes: Basic Education 
Assistance Module and Food Distribution programmes). 
 
 611 
 
28. Have there been cases where the HSCT makes one ineligible to receive 
other forms of welfare assistance or support in your community? If yes, 
why so? 
 
29. Recommendations: 
 
iii. What would you like to see changed in the design and 
implementation of the HSCT to make it a greater cash transfer 
scheme? 
iv. What social considerations/factors would you suggest to be 
carefully taken in to account when designing and implementing 
future cash transfer schemes? 
 
30. We are now at the end of our interview. Are there any other relevant 
issues you would like to raise? 
 
31. Do you have any questions for me? 
 
We have now come to the end of our discussion. Thank you very much 
for sharing your knowledge, views, and experiences with me. 
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Appendix 6: Focus group discussion guide: HSCT focal persons 
Ward Child Protection Committee Members (WCPC – HSCT focal 
persons) 
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Guide 
 
Thank you for coming. My name is Nyasha Mayanga. I am currently doing 
post-graduate research towards a Doctor of Philosophy degree with the 
University of South Africa (UNISA). I am studying under the supervision of the 
Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI), one of UNISA’s institutes. 
Professor Vusi Gumede is the Head of TMALI. 
 
I am investigating the social effects of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer 
(HSCT) in selected wards in Epworth and Goromonzi districts. You are being 
asked to participate in this study because you have been identified as 
community people who have an important role in the implementation of the 
HSCT in your ward. As such you are a valuable source of research 
information. I am eager to collect your views, experiences and perceptions of 
the HSCT; its perceived effects on social relations, social networks, norms, 
trust, solidarity and collective action within your community.  
 
By means of this study, I hope to find answers to specific research questions, 
including contributing to improving the way these programmes work. 
 
The answers and information you will give will be completely confidential. I will 
describe and explain what you think in my research report, but I will not 
mention any names. Your personal contributions will not be shared with 
anyone else in ways that can identify you. Your honest and detailed answers 
and information will be helpful in informing my research. 
 
Also, you don’t have to participate if you don’t want to. I would like to 
emphasise that your participation is voluntary. You are free to withdraw at any 
stage of the discussion and you can let me know of any questions that you 
don’t want to answer or discuss so that I can skip them. However, I look 
forward to your cooperation since your views are important. The discussion 
will take about an hour and a half. 
 
Do you have anything you want to ask me, or can we start? 
 
Can we start by introducing ourselves to each other? Give your names, where 
you are from, and your role on the HSCT. 
 
Date: DD: MM: YYYY: 
   
Ward represented:  
Number of females in FGD:  
Number of males in FGD:  
Describe the nature of the group:  
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Main things to keep in mind 
1. Explain that you will need to record the discussion using a tape or 
digital recorder so that you can capture everything that is said. Obtain 
verbal consent. Once consent is granted, turn on the recorder at this 
point. Otherwise make extensive notes. 
2. Answers and response should be evidenced with examples whenever 
possible. When probing for cases, examples are critical for collecting 
data and actual stories as findings. 
3. Give the participants enough time and opportunity to talk about their 
opinions and experiences. 
4. Try to keep the discussion focused on the subject, but allow 
participants to lead the discussion in new directions if they arise and 
they are relevant to the subject. This may highlight new and important 
information. 
5. There is always a significant challenge in bringing out the views of the 
quitter members of the group. Address this challenge in the following 
ways: 
a. Write down everyone’s name and using their names to ask them 
directly. 
b. Ensure there are no tasks that make people feel embarrassed 
because they cannot do them – such as writing or reading. 
c. Ask quitter members for their opinions. 
d. Explain in advance to the group that you would like a 
conversation between them all, and that you want to hear 
everyone’s views. 
e. Explain that there is no correct answer to the questions and that 
you are interested in hearing many different views on them. 
6. When the discussion comes to a natural end, or after about an hour 
and a half, ask whether there is anything else that the participants wish 
to discuss. Check again that the participants know what the information 
will be used for. 
7. Thank participants for their time and effort. 
 
 
 
 614 
 
Key questions Possible probing questions  
Knowledge and understanding of the HSCT 
1. Can you tell me what you know about the 
Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT)? 
a. What are the purpose and objectives of the HSCT?  
b. Tell me about the HSCT’s eligibility criteria, transfer size, payment 
method and frequency of payments? 
c. Does the HSCT have any conditions which beneficiaries should comply 
with in order to continue to receive the cash transfers? If yes, what are 
the conditions? 
d. When did the HSCT start and how long is it intended to last? 
e. Please identify the HSCT’s key stakeholders (state and non-state actors, 
institutions and organisations). 
f. Who provides funding for the HSCT? 
Your role as HSCT focal persons in the community  
2. What is your role as focal persons in the 
HSCT? 
a. How were you selected to be HSCT focal persons? 
b. What do you do on a regular basis as HSCT focal persons? 
c. What proportion of your time do you spend on HSCT activities? 
d. What motivated you to serve your community in the capacity of HSCT 
focal persons? 
e. Does being a CPC member (HSCT focal person) affect your relationship 
with the community? 
f. What are the community’s perceptions of your role as HSCT focal 
persons? Ask how they are perceived by HSCT beneficiaries, and the 
generality of the community including non-beneficiaries. 
g. How have you benefitted from participating in the HSCT as a CPC focal 
person? 
h. What support is provided to you by the HSCT programme to enable you 
to perform your role and tasks in the implementing the HSCT (e.g. 
transport, communication, stationery and incidental expenses)? 
HSCT operational processes 
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Beneficiary targeting and selection   
3. How were the HSCT beneficiaries in your 
ward selected to receive cash payments? 
a. What do you think about the way households were selected for the 
HSCT? 
b. Do you think the eligibility criteria for the HSCT are clear? 
c. Do you think there are households which are very poor and need the 
HSCT but were wrongly excluded (exclusion errors)? If yes, what could 
be the reasons for their exclusion? 
d. Do you think there are households currently benefitting from the HSCT 
but should not be receiving the transfers (inclusion errors)? If yes, why do 
you think the households should not be receiving the HSCT? 
e. For (a) and (b), as CPC focal persons, what have you done about the 
cases of exclusion and inclusion errors? 
f. Did you play any role in the targeting and selection of HSCT household? 
If yes, what was your role? 
g. Do you have any suggestions about how the targeting and selection of 
HSCT beneficiaries could be improved? 
4. How do community members feel as 
designated HSCT beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries? 
a. How is the relationship between HSCT beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries? 
b. Do you think non-beneficiaries understand why they are not receiving 
HSCT? 
c. How do you deal with cases of non-beneficiaries who approach you with 
queries about being left out of the programme? 
d. What is your relationship like with HSCT beneficiaries? 
e. Do most non-beneficiaries know about the HSCT? If yes, how do you 
think they got to know about the existence of the HSCT in the 
community? 
f. What is your relationship like with non-beneficiaries in your community? 
Programme effects 
5. What has changed in your ward/community a. What have you observed as the main well-being effects (improvements 
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following the introduction of the HSCT? or negative effects) of the HSCT on beneficiary households? 
b. Overall, do you think HSCT beneficiaries use funds positively (food 
security, productive capacity of households, education, health and 
nutrition) or spend cash irresponsibly (e.g. alcohol, cigarettes and other 
non-essentials)? 
c. In your opinion, how has the wider community benefitted from the HSCT 
(secondary benefits/multiplier effects)?   
6. Has the HSCT affected the activities of other 
development or relief programmes in your 
community? 
a. If yes, how? [Check if HSCT offers more advantageous services than 
other existing development/relief programmes – BEAM, Food distribution 
etc.?  
7. Has the HSCT led to exclusion of beneficiary 
households from other development or relief 
interventions (BEAM, Food distribution etc.? 
a. If yes, why is this so? 
Gender relations  
8. What is the procedure for handling 
polygamous households in the HSCT? 
a. How does the HSCT work with polygamous households? 
b. What are the patterns of cash transfer use among polygamous 
households? 
c. Have you encountered any challenges in handling polygamous 
households in the programme? If yes, what challenges did you encounter 
and how were they addressed? 
9. Who (men or women) generally collects the 
transfers from pay points? 
a. In either case, why is this so? What are the underlying issues? 
10. In your opinion, has the HSCT changed the 
relationship between men and women within 
beneficiaries’ families? 
a. If so, how and why? 
11. In general, do you think the HSCT has 
reinforced or weakened the institution of 
marriage amongst beneficiary households in 
cases where the family is intact i.e. father, 
a. In either case, how and why? 
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mother and children make up the household? 
12. Are men and women differently affected by 
the distance travelled and time required to 
collect cash transfers? 
a. If yes, explain how and why this may be the case? 
13. HSCT payment days and outreach to 
beneficiary households play a valuable role in 
connecting with the community. How are 
these, or could these interactions be used to 
address particular gender issues? 
 
14. How does the HSCT respond to cases where 
a beneficiary couple separates or divorces? 
a. Have you encountered cases of this nature? 
15. Are women and girls at risk of violence if and 
when they collect cash from payment points? 
 
16. What are the common types of acts of 
gender-based violence in your community? 
 
17. Do you think the HSCT has had any effect on 
gender-based violence in your community? If 
so, in what ways? 
a. Can you give examples of actual cases that you have come across and 
where such cases are/were negative effects of the HSCT? 
HSCT complaints and grievance system 
18. Are you aware of how beneficiaries’ 
complaints and grievances are registered, 
investigated and resolved in HSCT? 
a. Please tell me more about the current complaints and grievance handling 
system in place? 
b. Is the grievance and complaints escalation/appeals pathway clear to you 
and beneficiaries? 
c. What role do you have in the system as HSCT focal persons? 
d. Have you ever received complaints from beneficiaries and how have you 
dealt with them? 
e. In your opinion, do you think most HSCT beneficiaries are aware of how 
the system works (i.e. how and to whom to complain), and are willing to 
use the system (i.e. are not afraid, do not see as futile)? 
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f. What are the common HSCT complaints and grievances reported by 
HSCT beneficiaries? 
g. Do you think the system is appropriate and accessible? 
h. Are sensitive complaints and grievances handled in a confidential and 
sensitive manner? 
i. Are there gender differences in who speaks out, and do grievances and 
complaints show any gender patterns? 
j. How are non-HSCT queries handled? This may include examples like 
child welfare issues, HSCT information request etc. 
k. Do non-beneficiaries have access to the same system? What are the 
common queries reported by non-beneficiaries? 
19. How effective is the complaints and 
grievance handling system? 
a. In your informed opinion, are complaints adequately addressed in a 
timely manner, and feedback to beneficiaries provided? 
b. Is the system supported by adequate numbers of staff who are dedicated 
to handling grievances? 
20. What specific improvements do you suggest 
be made to the current complaints and 
grievance handling system? 
 
HSCT change management 
Responses to changes in the structure of beneficiary households, change of a representative for collection of payments, and 
removal of beneficiary households that should not have been on HSCT (inclusion errors). 
21. What is your role in the HSCT change 
management? 
a. What are the common change management queries you have dealt with? 
b. Have you had to deal with exclusion cases – where households that 
should not have been on the scheme from the beginning are removed 
from the programme? If yes, did the removal of such households affect 
your relationship with those households and other community members 
in any way? 
22. How efficient and effective is the HSCT 
change management system? 
a. Have you encountered problems with change management processes? 
b. Are there any gaps in the current change management system? 
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c. What do you suggest be done to improve HSCT change management? 
Social capital 
Social networks, membership associations, solidarity, collective action, social divisions, tensions, norms of reciprocity, trust 
23. In general, how has the wider community 
benefitted from the HSCT (directly and 
indirectly)?  
a. Identify a few specific examples of how the wider community has 
benefitted. 
b. Let’s discuss the likely pathways or channels through which these 
benefits have accrued to the wider community. 
24. What if any, were the changes in terms of 
community power dynamics? 
c. For example, has your role as CPC focal persons altered power 
dynamics in the community? What are the effects on local elites or local 
power structures? Are you regarded as new leadership in the 
community? 
d. Have some people lost their influence because people have other 
support now (e.g. beneficiary households don’t need to ask for their help 
anymore). For example, while beneficiaries may continue to look to 
religious leaders for spiritual guidance they will no longer turn to them if 
they have financial problems. 
25. Have there been any conflicts and tensions 
within the community as a consequence of 
the HSCT? 
a. If so, why and what form have the conflicts and tensions taken? 
b. Which aspects of the HSCT triggered the conflicts? 
c. What are the patterns of conflict – are they at the community or 
family/household levels? 
d. Who are the actors involved in such conflicts? 
e. Have the conflicts ever escalated to violence in the community? 
f. What kinds of mediation have taken place to help resolve the conflicts? 
Have you had to help resolve some conflicts in your role as CPC 
members/HSCT focal persons? Has this worked? 
26. Is there any jealousy, or resentfulness 
towards HSCT beneficiaries within the 
community? 
a. Who expresses this jealousy and why? 
b. Which design/operational/implementation aspects of the HSCT could be 
fuelling this jealousy and resentment?  
27. Has there been ill-will directed at CPC  
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members or those perceived to have power 
in the decision-making process regarding 
who would be included and who would be 
excluded as HSCT beneficiaries? 
28. In your opinion, in what ways has the HSCT 
improved or worsened beneficiaries’ 
experiences with community engagement?  
 
29. Are you members of any associations, 
groups or networks in your community? 
a. Has being part of the HSCT (as CPC members/focal persons) allowed 
you into existing or new networks? 
30. Has your association with the HSCT led to 
any positive or negative changes in your 
individual and community life? 
a. If so, how? 
31. In times of difficulty or crises (hunger, health 
emergencies, deaths etc.) how do people 
help each other in your community?  
 
32. What formal and informal groups, 
associations, and networks exist in your 
community? 
a. How do individuals or households enter into these networks, groups or 
associations, and how do they maintain network ties? 
b. What is exchanged in these networks and groups (e.g. good, services, 
information, moral support and favours)? 
c. What characteristics are most valued among network members (e.g. 
trustworthiness, reciprocity, cooperation, honesty, community respect 
etc.)? 
d. What were these networks, groups and associations like before the 
introduction and implementation of the HSCT and how did they relate to 
people’s well-being? 
e. How are the existing social and support networks or membership 
associations affected by the introduction of a targeted HSCT? 
f. Are the changes to the networks positive or negative? How does the 
community view these changes to the networks? 
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g. Which social networks, groups and membership associations have been 
most affected and why? (Including churches, kinship networks, 
contribution-based networks such as burial societies etc.). 
h. Has the HSCT led to the creation of new social networks, groups or 
associations? (e.g. Internal Savings and Lending [Mukando] clubs). If so, 
how? Which networks have been created? Are the new networks 
localised or extend beyond your ward/community? 
33. If there was a joint community development 
project, or a response to a problem or crisis, 
to what extent do community members 
cooperate or collaborate with one another to 
solve the problem? 
a. Are there any cultural, social, or community traditions/norms that affect 
patterns of cooperation, and collective action? 
b. Do HSCT beneficiaries participate in community activities? If no, why so? 
c. What about non-beneficiaries? If no, why so? 
34. Describe recent examples of collective action 
that have taken place in your 
community/ward (or a segment of the ward).  
a. Did the activities involve both HSCT beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries? 
b. What was the course and outcome of these activities? 
35. Do social, cultural, age or gender constraints 
limit the participation of specific groups in 
community activities (e.g. women, poor 
people, young people, children, minorities 
etc.). 
a. For example HSCT households are mostly generation gap households 
(households with very old people and young children with no productive 
labour could mean that such households do not participate in collective 
community activities) despite a willingness to do so. 
36. What other kinds of constraints limit people’s 
ability or willingness to work together? 
a. For example, lack of time, lack of trust or confidence in others or 
outcomes, suspicions towards the initiators or mobilisers, high mobility of 
people (people always moving in and out of the community – i.e. they do 
not stay long enough to learn the community culture and norms for 
collective action). 
37. What are the social sanctions for violating 
expected norms of collective action in the 
community? 
 
38. Do you think in your community (ward) a. If yes/no, why so? 
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people generally trust one another in matters 
of lending and borrowing? 
b. Have you come across cases of borrowing and lending between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries? Is this a common occurrence in your 
community? 
39. Do you think that since the introduction of the 
HSCT, thus level of trust has got better, 
worse or stayed about the same? 
Why? 
Recommendations and suggestions 
40. What would you like to see changed or 
introduced in the HSCT to make it better? 
a. Which themes would you say your comment relate to? 
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Appendix 7: Focus Group Discussion Guide: Non-beneficiaries 
Non-beneficiaries: 
(Ineligible to receive HSCT) 
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Guide 
Thank you for coming. My name is Nyasha Mayanga. I am currently doing 
post-graduate research towards a Doctor of Philosophy degree with the 
University of South Africa (UNISA). I am studying under the supervision of the 
Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI), one of UNISA’s institutes. 
Professor Vusi Gumede is the Head of TMALI. 
 
I am investigating the social effects of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer 
(HSCT) in selected wards in Epworth and Goromonzi districts. You are being 
asked to participate in this study because you have been identified as people 
who could provide important insights into community perceptions of the 
HSCT. In addition, your views are important to understand the social effects of 
the HSCT beyond beneficiary households including your social relations with 
beneficiary households. As such you are a valuable source of research 
information. I am keen to collect your views, experiences and perceptions of 
the HSCT; its perceived effects on social relations, social networks, norms, 
trust, solidarity and collective action within your community.  
 
By means of this study, I hope to find answers to specific research questions, 
including contributing to improving the way these programmes work. 
 
The answers and information you will give will be completely confidential. I will 
describe and explain what you think in my research report, but I will not 
mention any names. Your personal contributions will not be shared with 
anyone else in ways that can identify you. Your honest and detailed answers 
and information will be helpful in informing my research. 
 
Also, you don’t have to participate if you don’t want to. I would like to 
emphasise that your participation is voluntary. You are free to withdraw at any 
stage of the discussion and you can let me know of any questions that you 
don’t want to answer or discuss so that I can skip them. However, I look 
forward to your cooperation since your views are important. The discussion 
will take about an hour and a half. 
 
Do you have anything you want to ask me, or can we start? 
 
Can we start by introducing ourselves to each other? Give your names, where 
and you are from. 
 
Date: DD: MM: YYYY: 
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Ward represented:  
Number of females in FGD:  
Number of males in FGD:  
Describe the nature of the group:  
 
 
 
 
 
Main things to keep in mind 
8. Explain that you will need to record the discussion using a tape or 
digital recorder so that you can capture everything that is said. Obtain 
verbal consent. Once consent is granted, turn on the recorder at this 
point. Otherwise make extensive notes. 
9. Answers and response should be evidenced with examples whenever 
possible. When probing for cases, examples are critical for collecting 
data and actual stories as findings. 
10. Give the participants enough time and opportunity to talk about their 
opinions and experiences. 
11. Try to keep the discussion focused on the subject, but allow 
participants to lead the discussion in new directions if they arise and 
they are relevant to the subject. This may highlight new and important 
information. 
12. There is always a significant challenge in bringing out the views of the 
quitter members of the group. Address this challenge in the following 
ways: 
a. Write down everyone’s name and using their names to ask them 
directly. 
b. Ensure there are no tasks that make people feel embarrassed 
because they cannot do them – such as writing or reading. 
c. Ask quitter members for their opinions. 
d. Explain in advance to the group that you would like a 
conversation between them all, and that you want to hear 
everyone’s views. 
e. Explain that there is no correct answer to the questions and that 
you are interested in hearing many different views on them. 
13. When the discussion comes to a natural end, or after about an hour 
and a half, ask whether there is anything else that the participants wish 
to discuss. Check again that the participants know what the information 
will be used for. 
14. Thank participants for their time and effort. 
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Key questions Possible probing questions  
Awareness and knowledge of the HSCT 
41. Do you know about the Harmonised Social 
Cash Transfer (HSCT)? 
g. If yes, can you describe the HSCT? 
h. How did you get to know about the HSCT? 
i. What do you like about the HSCT? 
j. What do you not like about the HSCT? 
42. As non-beneficiaries, do you in anyway interact 
with some aspects of the HSCT? 
k. If yes, what kind of involvement/interaction do you have with some 
components of the HSCT? 
l. If not, do you see a need for your involvement with the programme 
other than being a direct beneficiary? What form could your 
involvement take? 
Non-beneficiaries’ perceptions of HSCT’s targeting and selection method and outcomes  
43. Do you know how the people receiving the 
HSCT in your neighbourhood/ward were 
selected in to the HSCT programme? 
h. What do you think about the way households were selected for the 
HSCT? 
i. Do you think the eligibility criteria for the HSCT are clear? 
j. Do you understand why you not selected to receive HSCT? If no, have 
you approached HSCT officials about it? 
k. In your community how do you know who is extremely poor (and needs 
the HSCT) and who is not (does not need the HSCT)? 
l. Do you think there are households which are very poor and need the 
HSCT but were wrongly excluded (exclusion errors)? If yes, what could 
be the reasons for why they were left off the HSCT list? 
m. Do you think there are households currently benefitting from the HSCT 
but should not be receiving the transfers (inclusion errors)? If yes, why 
do you think the households should not be receiving the HSCT? 
44. How do you feel about the creation of 
categories of “HSCT beneficiaries” and “non-
beneficiaries?” 
a. Has this social division created any problems in the community? If yes, 
what kind of problems has this brought about? 
Programme effects 
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45. What has changed in your ward/community 
following the introduction of the HSCT? 
d. What have you observed as the main effects (improvements or 
negative effects) of the HSCT in your community? 
e. Has anything changed between people in your 
community/ward/neighbourhood after the introduction of the HSCT? 
46. In your opinion, has the wider community 
benefitted somehow (directly and indirectly) 
from the HSCT (secondary benefits/multiplier 
effects)?   
b. What are your perceptions in terms of: 
i. Gender relations and norms 
ii. Cash availability in the community (liquidity) 
iii. Increased opportunities for trade (e.g. higher purchases from 
beneficiary households and opportunities for business 
creation or expansion). 
iv. Increased demand for a variety of goods and services 
offered in the community. 
v. Increased creditworthiness of customers 
vi. Increased competition 
vii. Price changes 
viii. Increased labour market opportunities 
47. Have your relationships with people who 
receive the cash transfer changed? 
c. How? How has this affected you? 
48. Are HSCT beneficiaries treated differently now 
in your community compared to before the 
transfer? 
b. If so, why?  
Sharing cash and information 
49. Have your households (non-beneficiaries) 
indirectly received any of the money from the 
HSCT as help from friends/family? 
l. If so, how was this money used in your households? 
50. Do HSCT beneficiaries share part of their cash 
with some non-beneficiaries? 
m. If sharing the cash is unlikely, what do you think could be the reasons 
for this? 
51. Do beneficiaries share any information that they 
learn from HSCT with non-beneficiaries (e.g. 
a. Can you give me examples of information that is commonly shared? 
b. Is this information voluntarily and proactively shared by the HSCT 
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child protection, markets, targeting/retargeting, 
grievance and complaints handling system etc.) 
beneficiaries or it’s the non-beneficiaries who approach former asking 
for information? 
Queries related to the HSCT 
52. Even though you are not directly benefitting 
from the HSCT, do you have information on 
where to seek information/clarifications related 
to the programme e.g. HSCT information 
request, exclusion errors etc.? 
a. How did you know about this mechanism? 
b. How accessible is this mechanism for you as a non-beneficiary? 
c. Have you actually raised any queries before? If so, what were the 
queries about? 
Social capital dimensions 
53. If you were to experience urgent needs (e.g. 
health emergency) or a crisis such as hunger, 
who would you feel comfortable to approach? 
e. Why? 
f. Would you ever consider approaching an HSCT beneficiary who may 
be your neighbour? 
54. If you were having financial problems, who 
would you turn to for help? 
 
55. If you were sick and not able to carry out your 
usual activities for a week or so, who would you 
turn to for help? 
 
56. What if any, were the changes in terms of 
community power dynamics? 
g. Have some people lost their influence because people have other 
support now (e.g. beneficiary households don’t need to ask for their 
help anymore).  
57. Have there been any conflicts and tensions 
within the community as a consequence of the 
HSCT? 
g. If so, why and what form have the conflicts and tensions taken? 
h. What are the patterns of conflict – are they at the community or 
family/household levels? 
i. Who are the actors involved in such conflicts? 
j. Have the conflicts ever escalated to violence in the community? 
k. What kinds of mediation have taken place to help resolve the conflicts? 
Has this worked? 
58. Is there any jealousy, or resentfulness towards 
HSCT beneficiaries within the community? 
c. Who expresses this jealousy and why? 
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59. Has there been ill-will directed at CPC members 
or those perceived to have power in the 
decision-making process regarding who would 
be included and who would be excluded as 
HSCT beneficiaries? 
 
60. Are you members of any associations, groups 
or networks in your community? 
b. Do these associations, groups or networks include HSCT beneficiaries 
as well or they are exclusive to non-beneficiaries?  
61. What formal and informal groups, associations, 
and networks exist in your community? 
i. How do individuals or households enter into these networks, groups or 
associations, and how do they maintain network ties? 
j. Does being an HSCT beneficiary affect their ability to join associations 
or networks? 
k. What is exchanged in these networks and groups (e.g. good, services, 
information, moral support and favours)? 
l. What characteristics are most valued among network members (e.g. 
trustworthiness, reciprocity, cooperation, honesty, community respect 
etc.)? 
m. What were these networks, groups and associations like before the 
introduction and implementation of the HSCT and how did they relate 
to people’s well-being? 
n. How are the existing social and support networks or membership 
associations affected by the introduction of a targeted HSCT? 
o. Are the changes to the networks positive or negative? How does the 
community view these changes to the networks? 
p. Which social networks, groups and membership associations have 
been most affected and why? (Including churches, kinship networks, 
contribution-based networks such as burial societies etc.). 
q. Has the HSCT led to the creation of new social networks, groups or 
associations? (e.g. Internal Savings and Lending [Mukando] clubs) in 
which non-beneficiaries are also members? 
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62. If there was a joint community development 
project, or a response to a problem or crisis, to 
what extent do community members cooperate 
or collaborate with one another to solve the 
problem? 
d. Are there any cultural, social, or community traditions/norms that affect 
patterns of cooperation, and collective action? 
e. Do non-beneficiaries participate in community activities? If no, why so? 
f. What about HSCT beneficiaries? If no, why so? 
63. Describe recent examples of collective action 
that have taken place in your community/ward 
(or a segment of the ward).  
c. Did the activities involve both HSCT beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries? 
d. What was the course and outcome of these activities? 
64. Do social, cultural, age or gender constraints 
limit the participation of specific groups in 
community activities (e.g. women, poor people, 
young people, children, minorities etc.). 
b. For example HSCT households are mostly generation gap households 
(households with very old people and young children with no 
productive labour could mean that such households do not participate 
in collective community activities) despite a willingness to do so. 
65. What other kinds of constraints limit people’s 
ability or willingness to work together? 
b. For example, lack of time, lack of trust or confidence in others or 
outcomes, suspicions towards the initiators or mobilisers, high mobility 
of people (people always moving in and out of the community – i.e. 
they do not stay long enough to learn the community culture and 
norms for collective action). 
66. What are the social sanctions for violating 
expected norms of collective action in the 
community? 
 
67. Do you think in your community (ward) people 
generally trust one another in matters of lending 
and borrowing? 
c. If yes/no, why so? 
d. Have you come across cases of borrowing and lending between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries? Is this a common occurrence in 
your community? 
68. Do you think that since the introduction of the 
HSCT, the level of trust has got better, worse or 
stayed about the same? 
Why? 
Recommendations and suggestions 
69. As non-beneficiaries, are you interested in b. If yes/no, why? 
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seeing the HSCT expand and continue? 
70. What would you like to see changed or 
introduced in the HSCT to make it better? 
c. Which themes would you say your comment relate to? 
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Appendix 8: Observation Guide – HSCT Payment Point 
OBSERVATION GUIDE: Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) 
Payment Point 
 
Date: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Name of HSCT Payment Point: ………………………………………………… 
 
Ward number: …………………………………………………………………….. 
 
District: …………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Observer: ………………………………………………………………………... 
 
Good morning/afternoon (as appropriate) HSCT programme officials and 
beneficiaries here present. 
 
My name is Nyasha Mayanga. I am currently doing post-graduate research 
towards a Doctor of Philosophy degree with the University of South Africa 
(UNISA). I am studying under the supervision of the Thabo Mbeki African 
Leadership Institute (TMALI), one of UNISA’s institutes. Professor Vusi 
Gumede is the Head of TMALI. 
 
I am investigating the social effects of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer 
(HSCT) in selected wards in Epworth and Goromonzi districts. In addition, I 
am doing a social analysis of the HSCT’s design and implementation features 
using the concept of social capital.  
 
I am here to observe the HSCT payment process including the interactions 
between HSCT programme officials and beneficiaries. I am also interested in 
observing the social interactions between beneficiaries at this payment point. I 
will also randomly speak with beneficiaries and programme officials before, 
during and after the actual payment process. 
 
By means of these observations and other data collection techniques, I hope 
to find answers to specific research questions, including contributing to 
improving the way these programmes are designed and work. 
 
I seek the permission of HSCT programme officials and beneficiaries to take a 
few photographs of the activities and interactions at this HSCT payment point. 
The photographs will assist me in the construction of case studies, and 
recollection of events of what it looks like on an HSCT payment day. 
 
Informed consent for observations and photography to be done. 
 
YES   NO   
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Do you have anything you want to ask me, or I can start my observations and 
photography? 
 
32. Describe the location and setting of the HSCT payment point? 
a. Is the location familiar to cash recipients? 
b. Is the location at a shopping centre, school or health facility? 
 
33. What is the demographic profile of the HSCT beneficiaries present at this 
payment point? 
 
34. How many HSCT beneficiaries are scheduled to be paid at this payment 
point? 
 
35. How many CPC focal persons are at this payment point? 
a. What “tools of trade” do they have (uniforms, files, payment 
schedule, bicycles, mobile phones)? 
 
36. What time did the HSCT payment team (Department of Social Services 
and payment delivery agency Officers) arrive at the payment point? 
a. What time were they scheduled to arrive? 
b. How long did beneficiaries have to wait before the arrival of the 
payment officers? 
c. What time did the programme officials stop making HSCT 
payments? 
d. How long was the entire payment process? 
 
37. How many HSCT payment officers are at this payment point? Are the 
numbers adequate? 
 
38. Describe the set-up of the HSCT payment point? 
a. What other services are being provided at the payment point? 
b. Are there informal traders at the payment point? If yes, how are 
they conducting their business with HSCT beneficiaries? 
c. Is there a grievance and complaints point at the cash payment 
station? If yes, describe how this is set up? 
d. Observe how grievances and complaints are being handled. Ask 5 
beneficiaries if they successfully logged their grievances or 
complaints? Check with beneficiaries if these are repeat complaints. 
Verify the information with programme officials without getting in to 
the specific details of the grievances. 
 
39. Did the HSCT payment team do a pre-disbursement speech before the 
start of the payments? 
a. Who delivered the speech and what topics or issues were covered 
in the pre-disbursement speech? 
b. Did beneficiaries get a chance to ask questions? If yes, what 
queries were raised? Did they get satisfactory answers to their 
queries? 
 
 633 
 
40. Assess whether there are beneficiaries with special needs and if they are 
getting preferential treatment at this payment point? If yes, what kind of 
preferential treatment? 
 
41. Describe the actual payment process? 
 
a. Is the payment process a public or private affair? 
b. What documentation is required by programme officials before 
beneficiaries are paid? 
c. Do all beneficiaries have the required documentation? How many 
don’t have? 
d. How many beneficiaries have sent representatives to collect cash 
on their behalf? Are these representatives registered proxies? If 
they are not, are they being paid or not? 
e. Observe if there are beneficiaries using thumb-print signatures? Are 
they many compared to hand-written signatures?  
 
42. Who is assisting beneficiaries to check if they have received correct 
amounts of money? 
 
43. Is there congestion at the payment point? 
  
44. Is the process of payment quick and efficient? 
 
45. What is the role of the HSCT CPC focal persons in the actual payment 
process? 
 
46. Were the payment reconciliations done at the payment point? 
 
a. If yes, who was involved and what was the outcome of the 
reconciliation? 
 
47. How many people were paid at this payment point? 
 
48. How many people were not paid at this payment point, and why? 
 
49. What is the atmosphere like at the cash payment station? 
 
50. What is the social interaction like between HSCT beneficiaries? 
 
a. Are there any discernible social and traditional norms and practices 
at the payment point? 
b. What is the sitting arrangement like between beneficiaries of 
different gender, and age while they wait for the payment team to 
arrive at the payment point?  
c. Are the old and young generation socialising? What kind of issues 
are they discussing about? 
d. How are beneficiaries of different genders (males and females) 
relating at the payment point? 
 
